Commit Graph

4442 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Borislav Petkov
c45e80358c x86/microcode/AMD: Convert early parser to the new verification routines
Now that they have the required functionality, use them to verify the
equivalence table and each patch, thus making parse_container() more
readable.

Originally-by: "Maciej S. Szmigiero" <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181107170218.7596-12-bp@alien8.de
2018-11-19 10:51:06 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
d430a305b7 x86/microcode/AMD: Change verify_patch()'s return value
Have it return 0 on success, positive value when the current patch
should be skipped and negative on error.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181107170218.7596-11-bp@alien8.de
2018-11-19 10:51:06 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
c79570205b x86/microcode/AMD: Move chipset-specific check into verify_patch()
... where it belongs.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181107170218.7596-10-bp@alien8.de
2018-11-19 10:51:06 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
51776fb805 x86/microcode/AMD: Move patch family check to verify_patch()
... where all the microcode patch verification is being concentrated.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181107170218.7596-9-bp@alien8.de
2018-11-19 10:51:05 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
6cdce951f7 x86/microcode/AMD: Simplify patch family detection
Instead of traversing the equivalence table, compute the family a patch
is for, from the processor revision ID in the microcode header.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181107170218.7596-8-bp@alien8.de
2018-11-19 10:51:05 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
2b8d34b1ec x86/microcode/AMD: Concentrate patch verification
Add a verify_patch() function which tries to sanity-check many aspects
of a microcode patch supplied by an outside container before attempting
a load.

Prepend all sub-functions' names which verify an aspect of a microcode
patch with "__".

Call it in verify_and_add_patch() *before* looking at the microcode
header.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181107170218.7596-7-bp@alien8.de
2018-11-19 10:51:05 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
70887cb23e x86/microcode/AMD: Cleanup verify_patch_size() more
Rename the variable which contains the patch size read out from the
section header to sh_psize for better differentiation of all the "sizes"
in that function.

Also, improve the comment above it.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181107170218.7596-6-bp@alien8.de
2018-11-19 10:51:05 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
cfffbfeb42 x86/microcode/AMD: Clean up per-family patch size checks
Starting with family 0x15, the patch size verification is not needed
anymore. Thus get rid of the need to update this checking function with
each new family.

Keep the check for older families.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181107170218.7596-5-bp@alien8.de
2018-11-19 10:51:00 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
3974b68114 x86/microcode/AMD: Move verify_patch_size() up in the file
... to enable later improvements.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181107170218.7596-4-bp@alien8.de
2018-11-19 10:45:08 +01:00
Maciej S. Szmigiero
f4ff25916c x86/microcode/AMD: Add microcode container verification
Add container and patch verification functions to the AMD microcode
update driver.

These functions check whether a passed buffer contains the relevant
structure, whether it isn't truncated and (for actual microcode patches)
whether the size of a patch is not too large for a particular CPU family.
By adding these checks as separate functions the actual microcode loading
code won't get interspersed with a lot of checks and so will be more
readable.

 [ bp: Make all pr_err() calls into pr_debug() and drop the
   verify_patch() bits. ]

Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3014e96c82cd90761b4601bd2cfe59c4119e46a7.1529424596.git.mail@maciej.szmigiero.name
2018-11-19 10:45:03 +01:00
Maciej S. Szmigiero
479229d160 x86/microcode/AMD: Subtract SECTION_HDR_SIZE from file leftover length
verify_patch_size() verifies whether the remaining size of the microcode
container file is large enough to contain a patch of the indicated size.

However, the section header length is not included in this indicated
size but it is present in the leftover file length so it should be
subtracted from the leftover file length before passing this value to
verify_patch_size().

 [ bp: Split comment. ]

Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/6df43f4f6a28186a13a66e8d7e61143c5e1a2324.1529424596.git.mail@maciej.szmigiero.name
2018-11-19 10:44:59 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
68b5e4326e x86/mce: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings
Add the proper includes and make smca_get_name() static.

Fix an actual bug too which the warning triggered:

  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/therm_throt.c:395:39: error: conflicting \
  types for ‘smp_thermal_interrupt’
   asmlinkage __visible void __irq_entry smp_thermal_interrupt(struct pt_regs *r)
                                         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  In file included from arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/therm_throt.c:29:
  ./arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h:107:17: note: previous declaration of \
	  ‘smp_thermal_interrupt’ was here
   asmlinkage void smp_thermal_interrupt(void);

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Cc: Michael Matz <matz@suse.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1811081633160.1549@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
2018-11-14 13:46:26 +01:00
Steven Rostedt (VMware)
1503538843 x86/cpu/vmware: Do not trace vmware_sched_clock()
When running function tracing on a Linux guest running on VMware
Workstation, the guest would crash. This is due to tracing of the
sched_clock internal call of the VMware vmware_sched_clock(), which
causes an infinite recursion within the tracing code (clock calls must
not be traced).

Make vmware_sched_clock() not traced by ftrace.

Fixes: 80e9a4f21f ("x86/vmware: Add paravirt sched clock")
Reported-by: GwanYeong Kim <gy741.kim@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CC: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com>
CC: GwanYeong Kim <gy741.kim@gmail.com>
CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CC: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
CC: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181109152207.4d3e7d70@gandalf.local.home
2018-11-09 21:39:14 +01:00
Vishal Verma
e8a308e5f4 acpi/nfit, x86/mce: Validate a MCE's address before using it
The NFIT machine check handler uses the physical address from the mce
structure, and compares it against information in the ACPI NFIT table
to determine whether that location lies on an NVDIMM. The mce->addr
field however may not always be valid, and this is indicated by the
MCI_STATUS_ADDRV bit in the status field.

Export mce_usable_address() which already performs validation for the
address, and use it in the NFIT handler.

Fixes: 6839a6d96f ("nfit: do an ARS scrub on hitting a latent media error")
Reported-by: Robert Elliott <elliott@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CC: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
CC: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
CC: elliott@hpe.com
CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
CC: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
CC: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
CC: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
CC: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com>
CC: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
CC: Ross Zwisler <zwisler@kernel.org>
CC: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CC: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
CC: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
CC: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181026003729.8420-2-vishal.l.verma@intel.com
2018-11-06 19:13:26 +01:00
Vishal Verma
5d96c9342c acpi/nfit, x86/mce: Handle only uncorrectable machine checks
The MCE handler for nfit devices is called for memory errors on a
Non-Volatile DIMM and adds the error location to a 'badblocks' list.
This list is used by the various NVDIMM drivers to avoid consuming known
poison locations during IO.

The MCE handler gets called for both corrected and uncorrectable errors.
Until now, both kinds of errors have been added to the badblocks list.
However, corrected memory errors indicate that the problem has already
been fixed by hardware, and the resulting interrupt is merely a
notification to Linux.

As far as future accesses to that location are concerned, it is
perfectly fine to use, and thus doesn't need to be included in the above
badblocks list.

Add a check in the nfit MCE handler to filter out corrected mce events,
and only process uncorrectable errors.

Fixes: 6839a6d96f ("nfit: do an ARS scrub on hitting a latent media error")
Reported-by: Omar Avelar <omar.avelar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CC: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
CC: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
CC: elliott@hpe.com
CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
CC: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
CC: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
CC: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
CC: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com>
CC: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
CC: Ross Zwisler <zwisler@kernel.org>
CC: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CC: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
CC: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
CC: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181026003729.8420-1-vishal.l.verma@intel.com
2018-11-06 19:13:10 +01:00
Sean Christopherson
43500e6f29 x86/cpufeatures: Remove get_scattered_cpuid_leaf()
get_scattered_cpuid_leaf() was added[1] to help KVM rebuild hardware-
defined leafs that are rearranged by Linux to avoid bloating the
x86_capability array. Eventually, the last consumer of the function was
removed[2], but the function itself was kept, perhaps even intentionally
as a form of documentation.

Remove get_scattered_cpuid_leaf() as it is currently not used by KVM.
Furthermore, simply rebuilding the "real" leaf does not resolve all of
KVM's woes when it comes to exposing a scattered CPUID feature, i.e.
keeping the function as documentation may be counter-productive in some
scenarios, e.g. when KVM needs to do more than simply expose the leaf.

[1] 47bdf3378d ("x86/cpuid: Provide get_scattered_cpuid_leaf()")
[2] b7b27aa011 ("KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX")

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CC: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181105185725.18679-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2018-11-05 20:54:20 +01:00
Michael Kelley
1de72c7064 x86/hyper-v: Enable PIT shutdown quirk
Hyper-V emulation of the PIT has a quirk such that the normal PIT shutdown
path doesn't work, because clearing the counter register restarts the
timer.

Disable the counter clearing on PIT shutdown.

Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "devel@linuxdriverproject.org" <devel@linuxdriverproject.org>
Cc: "daniel.lezcano@linaro.org" <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Cc: "virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org" <virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "jgross@suse.com" <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: "akataria@vmware.com" <akataria@vmware.com>
Cc: "olaf@aepfle.de" <olaf@aepfle.de>
Cc: "apw@canonical.com" <apw@canonical.com>
Cc: vkuznets <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: "jasowang@redhat.com" <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "marcelo.cerri@canonical.com" <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Cc: KY Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1541303219-11142-3-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com
2018-11-04 11:04:46 +01:00
Ingo Molnar
23a12ddee1 Merge branch 'core/urgent' into x86/urgent, to pick up objtool fix
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-11-03 23:42:16 +01:00
Mike Rapoport
57c8a661d9 mm: remove include/linux/bootmem.h
Move remaining definitions and declarations from include/linux/bootmem.h
into include/linux/memblock.h and remove the redundant header.

The includes were replaced with the semantic patch below and then
semi-automated removal of duplicated '#include <linux/memblock.h>

@@
@@
- #include <linux/bootmem.h>
+ #include <linux/memblock.h>

[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: dma-direct: fix up for the removal of linux/bootmem.h]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002185342.133d1680@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: powerpc: fix up for removal of linux/bootmem.h]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181005161406.73ef8727@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: x86/kaslr, ACPI/NUMA: fix for linux/bootmem.h removal]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181008190341.5e396491@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536927045-23536-30-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-31 08:54:16 -07:00
Jordan Borgner
0e96f31ea4 x86: Clean up 'sizeof x' => 'sizeof(x)'
"sizeof(x)" is the canonical coding style used in arch/x86 most of the time.
Fix the few places that didn't follow the convention.

(Also do some whitespace cleanups in a few places while at it.)

[ mingo: Rewrote the changelog. ]

Signed-off-by: Jordan Borgner <mail@jordan-borgner.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181028125828.7rgammkgzep2wpam@JordanDesktop
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-10-29 07:13:28 +01:00
Ingo Molnar
4b783dd6a4 Merge branches 'x86/early-printk', 'x86/microcode' and 'core/objtool' into x86/urgent, to pick up simple topic branches
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-10-29 07:13:09 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
d82924c3b8 Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 pti updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes:

   - Make the IBPB barrier more strict and add STIBP support (Jiri
     Kosina)

   - Micro-optimize and clean up the entry code (Andy Lutomirski)

   - ... plus misc other fixes"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs
  x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation
  x86/speculation: Apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak
  x86/speculation: Add RETPOLINE_AMD support to the inline asm CALL_NOSPEC variant
  x86/CPU: Fix unused variable warning when !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
  x86/pti/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 entry trampoline
  x86/entry/64: Use the TSS sp2 slot for SYSCALL/SYSRET scratch space
  x86/entry/64: Document idtentry
2018-10-23 18:43:04 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
f682a7920b Merge branch 'x86-paravirt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 paravirt updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Two main changes:

   - Remove no longer used parts of the paravirt infrastructure and put
     large quantities of paravirt ops under a new config option
     PARAVIRT_XXL=y, which is selected by XEN_PV only. (Joergen Gross)

   - Enable PV spinlocks on Hyperv (Yi Sun)"

* 'x86-paravirt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/hyperv: Enable PV qspinlock for Hyper-V
  x86/hyperv: Add GUEST_IDLE_MSR support
  x86/paravirt: Clean up native_patch()
  x86/paravirt: Prevent redefinition of SAVE_FLAGS macro
  x86/xen: Make xen_reservation_lock static
  x86/paravirt: Remove unneeded mmu related paravirt ops bits
  x86/paravirt: Move the Xen-only pv_mmu_ops under the PARAVIRT_XXL umbrella
  x86/paravirt: Move the pv_irq_ops under the PARAVIRT_XXL umbrella
  x86/paravirt: Move the Xen-only pv_cpu_ops under the PARAVIRT_XXL umbrella
  x86/paravirt: Move items in pv_info under PARAVIRT_XXL umbrella
  x86/paravirt: Introduce new config option PARAVIRT_XXL
  x86/paravirt: Remove unused paravirt bits
  x86/paravirt: Use a single ops structure
  x86/paravirt: Remove clobbers from struct paravirt_patch_site
  x86/paravirt: Remove clobbers parameter from paravirt patch functions
  x86/paravirt: Make paravirt_patch_call() and paravirt_patch_jmp() static
  x86/xen: Add SPDX identifier in arch/x86/xen files
  x86/xen: Link platform-pci-unplug.o only if CONFIG_XEN_PVHVM
  x86/xen: Move pv specific parts of arch/x86/xen/mmu.c to mmu_pv.c
  x86/xen: Move pv irq related functions under CONFIG_XEN_PV umbrella
2018-10-23 17:54:58 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
fec98069fb Merge branch 'x86-cpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cpu updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes in this cycle were:

   - Add support for the "Dhyana" x86 CPUs by Hygon: these are licensed
     based on the AMD Zen architecture, and are built and sold in China,
     for domestic datacenter use. The code is pretty close to AMD
     support, mostly with a few quirks and enumeration differences. (Pu
     Wen)

   - Enable CPUID support on Cyrix 6x86/6x86L processors"

* 'x86-cpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  tools/cpupower: Add Hygon Dhyana support
  cpufreq: Add Hygon Dhyana support
  ACPI: Add Hygon Dhyana support
  x86/xen: Add Hygon Dhyana support to Xen
  x86/kvm: Add Hygon Dhyana support to KVM
  x86/mce: Add Hygon Dhyana support to the MCA infrastructure
  x86/bugs: Add Hygon Dhyana to the respective mitigation machinery
  x86/apic: Add Hygon Dhyana support
  x86/pci, x86/amd_nb: Add Hygon Dhyana support to PCI and northbridge
  x86/amd_nb: Check vendor in AMD-only functions
  x86/alternative: Init ideal_nops for Hygon Dhyana
  x86/events: Add Hygon Dhyana support to PMU infrastructure
  x86/smpboot: Do not use BSP INIT delay and MWAIT to idle on Dhyana
  x86/cpu/mtrr: Support TOP_MEM2 and get MTRR number
  x86/cpu: Get cache info and setup cache cpumap for Hygon Dhyana
  x86/cpu: Create Hygon Dhyana architecture support file
  x86/CPU: Change query logic so CPUID is enabled before testing
  x86/CPU: Use correct macros for Cyrix calls
2018-10-23 16:16:40 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
e1d20beae7 Merge branch 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes in this cycle were the fsgsbase related preparatory
  patches from Chang S. Bae - but there's also an optimized
  memcpy_flushcache() and a cleanup for the __cmpxchg_double() assembly
  glue"

* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/fsgsbase/64: Clean up various details
  x86/segments: Introduce the 'CPUNODE' naming to better document the segment limit CPU/node NR trick
  x86/vdso: Initialize the CPU/node NR segment descriptor earlier
  x86/vdso: Introduce helper functions for CPU and node number
  x86/segments/64: Rename the GDT PER_CPU entry to CPU_NUMBER
  x86/fsgsbase/64: Factor out FS/GS segment loading from __switch_to()
  x86/fsgsbase/64: Convert the ELF core dump code to the new FSGSBASE helpers
  x86/fsgsbase/64: Make ptrace use the new FS/GS base helpers
  x86/fsgsbase/64: Introduce FS/GS base helper functions
  x86/fsgsbase/64: Fix ptrace() to read the FS/GS base accurately
  x86/asm: Use CC_SET()/CC_OUT() in __cmpxchg_double()
  x86/asm: Optimize memcpy_flushcache()
2018-10-23 15:24:22 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
0d1b82cd8a Merge branch 'ras-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull RAS updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Misc smaller fixes and cleanups"

* 'ras-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/mcelog: Remove one mce_helper definition
  x86/mce: Add macros for the corrected error count bit field
  x86/mce: Use BIT_ULL(x) for bit mask definitions
  x86/mce-inject: Reset injection struct after injection
2018-10-23 13:46:36 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
c05f3642f4 Merge branch 'perf-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main updates in this cycle were:

   - Lots of perf tooling changes too voluminous to list (big perf trace
     and perf stat improvements, lots of libtraceevent reorganization,
     etc.), so I'll list the authors and refer to the changelog for
     details:

       Benjamin Peterson, Jérémie Galarneau, Kim Phillips, Peter
       Zijlstra, Ravi Bangoria, Sangwon Hong, Sean V Kelley, Steven
       Rostedt, Thomas Gleixner, Ding Xiang, Eduardo Habkost, Thomas
       Richter, Andi Kleen, Sanskriti Sharma, Adrian Hunter, Tzvetomir
       Stoyanov, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, Jiri Olsa.

     ... with the bulk of the changes written by Jiri Olsa, Tzvetomir
     Stoyanov and Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo.

   - Continued intel_rdt work with a focus on playing well with perf
     events. This also imported some non-perf RDT work due to
     dependencies. (Reinette Chatre)

   - Implement counter freezing for Arch Perfmon v4 (Skylake and newer).
     This allows to speed up the PMI handler by avoiding unnecessary MSR
     writes and make it more accurate. (Andi Kleen)

   - kprobes cleanups and simplification (Masami Hiramatsu)

   - Intel Goldmont PMU updates (Kan Liang)

   - ... plus misc other fixes and updates"

* 'perf-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (155 commits)
  kprobes/x86: Use preempt_enable() in optimized_callback()
  x86/intel_rdt: Prevent pseudo-locking from using stale pointers
  kprobes, x86/ptrace.h: Make regs_get_kernel_stack_nth() not fault on bad stack
  perf/x86/intel: Export mem events only if there's PEBS support
  x86/cpu: Drop pointless static qualifier in punit_dev_state_show()
  x86/intel_rdt: Fix initial allocation to consider CDP
  x86/intel_rdt: CBM overlap should also check for overlap with CDP peer
  x86/intel_rdt: Introduce utility to obtain CDP peer
  tools lib traceevent, perf tools: Move struct tep_handler definition in a local header file
  tools lib traceevent: Separate out tep_strerror() for strerror_r() issues
  perf python: More portable way to make CFLAGS work with clang
  perf python: Make clang_has_option() work on Python 3
  perf tools: Free temporary 'sys' string in read_event_files()
  perf tools: Avoid double free in read_event_file()
  perf tools: Free 'printk' string in parse_ftrace_printk()
  perf tools: Cleanup trace-event-info 'tdata' leak
  perf strbuf: Match va_{add,copy} with va_end
  perf test: S390 does not support watchpoints in test 22
  perf auxtrace: Include missing asm/bitsperlong.h to get BITS_PER_LONG
  tools include: Adopt linux/bits.h
  ...
2018-10-23 13:32:18 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
0200fbdd43 Merge branch 'locking-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull locking and misc x86 updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Lots of changes in this cycle - in part because locking/core attracted
  a number of related x86 low level work which was easier to handle in a
  single tree:

   - Linux Kernel Memory Consistency Model updates (Alan Stern, Paul E.
     McKenney, Andrea Parri)

   - lockdep scalability improvements and micro-optimizations (Waiman
     Long)

   - rwsem improvements (Waiman Long)

   - spinlock micro-optimization (Matthew Wilcox)

   - qspinlocks: Provide a liveness guarantee (more fairness) on x86.
     (Peter Zijlstra)

   - Add support for relative references in jump tables on arm64, x86
     and s390 to optimize jump labels (Ard Biesheuvel, Heiko Carstens)

   - Be a lot less permissive on weird (kernel address) uaccess faults
     on x86: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses (Jann
     Horn)

   - macrofy x86 asm statements to un-confuse the GCC inliner. (Nadav
     Amit)

   - ... and a handful of other smaller changes as well"

* 'locking-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (57 commits)
  locking/lockdep: Make global debug_locks* variables read-mostly
  locking/lockdep: Fix debug_locks off performance problem
  locking/pvqspinlock: Extend node size when pvqspinlock is configured
  locking/qspinlock_stat: Count instances of nested lock slowpaths
  locking/qspinlock, x86: Provide liveness guarantee
  x86/asm: 'Simplify' GEN_*_RMWcc() macros
  locking/qspinlock: Rework some comments
  locking/qspinlock: Re-order code
  locking/lockdep: Remove duplicated 'lock_class_ops' percpu array
  x86/defconfig: Enable CONFIG_USB_XHCI_HCD=y
  futex: Replace spin_is_locked() with lockdep
  locking/lockdep: Make class->ops a percpu counter and move it under CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKDEP=y
  x86/jump-labels: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs
  x86/cpufeature: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs
  x86/extable: Macrofy inline assembly code to work around GCC inlining bugs
  x86/paravirt: Work around GCC inlining bugs when compiling paravirt ops
  x86/bug: Macrofy the BUG table section handling, to work around GCC inlining bugs
  x86/alternatives: Macrofy lock prefixes to work around GCC inlining bugs
  x86/refcount: Work around GCC inlining bug
  x86/objtool: Use asm macros to work around GCC inlining bugs
  ...
2018-10-23 13:08:53 +01:00
Ingo Molnar
dda93b4538 Merge branch 'x86/cache' into perf/core, to pick up fixes
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-10-23 12:30:19 +02:00
Jithu Joseph
b61b8bba18 x86/intel_rdt: Prevent pseudo-locking from using stale pointers
When the last CPU in an rdt_domain goes offline, its rdt_domain struct gets
freed. Current pseudo-locking code is unaware of this scenario and tries to
dereference the freed structure in a few places.

Add checks to prevent pseudo-locking code from doing this.

While further work is needed to seamlessly restore resource groups (not
just pseudo-locking) to their configuration when the domain is brought back
online, the immediate issue of invalid pointers is addressed here.

Fixes: f4e80d67a5 ("x86/intel_rdt: Resctrl files reflect pseudo-locked information")
Fixes: 443810fe61 ("x86/intel_rdt: Create debugfs files for pseudo-locking testing")
Fixes: 746e08590b ("x86/intel_rdt: Create character device exposing pseudo-locked region")
Fixes: 33dc3e410a ("x86/intel_rdt: Make CPU information accessible for pseudo-locked regions")
Signed-off-by: Jithu Joseph <jithu.joseph@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/231f742dbb7b00a31cc104416860e27dba6b072d.1539384145.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-10-19 14:54:28 +02:00
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
711f76a328 x86/mcelog: Remove one mce_helper definition
Commit

  5de97c9f6d ("x86/mce: Factor out and deprecate the /dev/mcelog driver")

moved the old interface into one file including mce_helper definition as
static and "extern". Remove one.

Fixes: 5de97c9f6d ("x86/mce: Factor out and deprecate the /dev/mcelog driver")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CC: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
CC: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
CC: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181017170554.18841-3-bigeasy@linutronix.de
2018-10-18 00:05:04 +02:00
Yi Sun
3a025de64b x86/hyperv: Enable PV qspinlock for Hyper-V
Implement the required wait and kick callbacks to support PV spinlocks in
Hyper-V guests.

[ tglx: Document the requirement for disabling interrupts in the wait()
  	callback. Remove goto and unnecessary includes. Add prototype
	for hv_vcpu_is_preempted(). Adapted to pending paravirt changes. ]

Signed-off-by: Yi Sun <yi.y.sun@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
Cc: Michael Kelley (EOSG) <Michael.H.Kelley@microsoft.com>
Cc: chao.p.peng@intel.com
Cc: chao.gao@intel.com
Cc: isaku.yamahata@intel.com
Cc: tianyu.lan@microsoft.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1538987374-51217-3-git-send-email-yi.y.sun@linux.intel.com
2018-10-09 14:21:39 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
2a7adf6ce6 x86/intel_rdt: Fix initial allocation to consider CDP
When a new resource group is created it is initialized with a default
allocation that considers which portions of cache are currently
available for sharing across all resource groups or which portions of
cache are currently unused.

If a CDP allocation forms part of a resource group that is in exclusive
mode then it should be ensured that no new allocation overlaps with any
resource that shares the underlying hardware. The current initial
allocation does not take this sharing of hardware into account and
a new allocation in a resource that shares the same
hardware would affect the exclusive resource group.

Fix this by considering the allocation of a peer RDT domain - a RDT
domain sharing the same hardware - as part of the test to determine
which portion of cache is in use and available for use.

Fixes: 95f0b77efa ("x86/intel_rdt: Initialize new resource group with sane defaults")
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b1f7ec08b1695be067de416a4128466d49684317.1538603665.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-10-09 08:50:47 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
e5f3530c39 x86/intel_rdt: CBM overlap should also check for overlap with CDP peer
The CBM overlap test is used to manage the allocations of RDT resources
where overlap is possible between resource groups. When a resource group
is in exclusive mode then there should be no overlap between resource
groups.

The current overlap test only considers overlap between the same
resources, for example, that usage of a RDT_RESOURCE_L2DATA resource
in one resource group does not overlap with usage of a RDT_RESOURCE_L2DATA
resource in another resource group. The problem with this is that it
allows overlap between a RDT_RESOURCE_L2DATA resource in one resource
group with a RDT_RESOURCE_L2CODE resource in another resource group -
even if both resource groups are in exclusive mode. This is a problem
because even though these appear to be different resources they end up
sharing the same underlying hardware and thus does not fulfill the
user's request for exclusive use of hardware resources.

Fix this by including the CDP peer (if there is one) in every CBM
overlap test. This does not impact the overlap between resources
within the same exclusive resource group that is allowed.

Fixes: 49f7b4efa1 ("x86/intel_rdt: Enable setting of exclusive mode")
Reported-by: Jithu Joseph <jithu.joseph@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jithu Joseph <jithu.joseph@intel.com>
Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e538b7f56f7ca15963dce2e00ac3be8edb8a68e1.1538603665.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-10-09 08:50:43 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
521348b011 x86/intel_rdt: Introduce utility to obtain CDP peer
Introduce a utility that, when provided with a RDT resource and an
instance of this RDT resource (a RDT domain), would return pointers to
the RDT resource and RDT domain that share the same hardware. This is
specific to the CDP resources that share the same hardware.

For example, if a pointer to the RDT_RESOURCE_L2DATA resource (struct
rdt_resource) and a pointer to an instance of this resource (struct
rdt_domain) is provided, then it will return a pointer to the
RDT_RESOURCE_L2CODE resource as well as the specific instance that
shares the same hardware as the provided rdt_domain.

This utility is created in support of the "exclusive" resource group
mode where overlap of resource allocation between resource groups need
to be avoided. The overlap test need to consider not just the matching
resources, but also the resources that share the same hardware.

Temporarily mark it as unused in support of patch testing to avoid
compile warnings until it is used.

Fixes: 49f7b4efa1 ("x86/intel_rdt: Enable setting of exclusive mode")
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jithu Joseph <jithu.joseph@intel.com>
Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9b4bc4d59ba2e903b6a3eb17e16ef41a8e7b7c3e.1538603665.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-10-09 08:50:40 +02:00
Ingo Molnar
fc8eaa8568 Merge branch 'x86/urgent' into x86/cache, to pick up dependent fix
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-10-09 08:50:10 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
49e00eee00 x86/intel_rdt: Fix out-of-bounds memory access in CBM tests
While the DOC at the beginning of lib/bitmap.c explicitly states that
"The number of valid bits in a given bitmap does _not_ need to be an
exact multiple of BITS_PER_LONG.", some of the bitmap operations do
indeed access BITS_PER_LONG portions of the provided bitmap no matter
the size of the provided bitmap. For example, if bitmap_intersects()
is provided with an 8 bit bitmap the operation will access
BITS_PER_LONG bits from the provided bitmap. While the operation
ensures that these extra bits do not affect the result, the memory
is still accessed.

The capacity bitmasks (CBMs) are typically stored in u32 since they
can never exceed 32 bits. A few instances exist where a bitmap_*
operation is performed on a CBM by simply pointing the bitmap operation
to the stored u32 value.

The consequence of this pattern is that some bitmap_* operations will
access out-of-bounds memory when interacting with the provided CBM. This
is confirmed with a KASAN test that reports:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __bitmap_intersects+0xa2/0x100

and

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __bitmap_weight+0x58/0x90

Fix this by moving any CBM provided to a bitmap operation needing
BITS_PER_LONG to an 'unsigned long' variable.

[ tglx: Changed related function arguments to unsigned long and got rid
	of the _cbm extra step ]

Fixes: 72d5050566 ("x86/intel_rdt: Add utilities to test pseudo-locked region possibility")
Fixes: 49f7b4efa1 ("x86/intel_rdt: Enable setting of exclusive mode")
Fixes: d9b48c86eb ("x86/intel_rdt: Display resource groups' allocations' size in bytes")
Fixes: 95f0b77efa ("x86/intel_rdt: Initialize new resource group with sane defaults")
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/69a428613a53f10e80594679ac726246020ff94f.1538686926.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-10-09 08:02:15 +02:00
Ingo Molnar
22245bdf0a x86/segments: Introduce the 'CPUNODE' naming to better document the segment limit CPU/node NR trick
We have a special segment descriptor entry in the GDT, whose sole purpose is to
encode the CPU and node numbers in its limit (size) field. There are user-space
instructions that allow the reading of the limit field, which gives us a really
fast way to read the CPU and node IDs from the vDSO for example.

But the naming of related functionality does not make this clear, at all:

	VDSO_CPU_SIZE
	VDSO_CPU_MASK
	__CPU_NUMBER_SEG
	GDT_ENTRY_CPU_NUMBER
	vdso_encode_cpu_node
	vdso_read_cpu_node

There's a number of problems:

 - The 'VDSO_CPU_SIZE' doesn't really make it clear that these are number
   of bits, nor does it make it clear which 'CPU' this refers to, i.e.
   that this is about a GDT entry whose limit encodes the CPU and node number.

 - Furthermore, the 'CPU_NUMBER' naming is actively misleading as well,
   because the segment limit encodes not just the CPU number but the
   node ID as well ...

So use a better nomenclature all around: name everything related to this trick
as 'CPUNODE', to make it clear that this is something special, and add
_BITS to make it clear that these are number of bits, and propagate this to
every affected name:

	VDSO_CPU_SIZE         =>  VDSO_CPUNODE_BITS
	VDSO_CPU_MASK         =>  VDSO_CPUNODE_MASK
	__CPU_NUMBER_SEG      =>  __CPUNODE_SEG
	GDT_ENTRY_CPU_NUMBER  =>  GDT_ENTRY_CPUNODE
	vdso_encode_cpu_node  =>  vdso_encode_cpunode
	vdso_read_cpu_node    =>  vdso_read_cpunode

This, beyond being less confusing, also makes it easier to grep for all related
functionality:

  $ git grep -i cpunode arch/x86

Also, while at it, fix "return is not a function" style sloppiness in vdso_encode_cpunode().

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Markus T Metzger <markus.t.metzger@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1537312139-5580-2-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-10-08 10:45:02 +02:00
Chang S. Bae
b2e2ba578e x86/vdso: Initialize the CPU/node NR segment descriptor earlier
Currently the CPU/node NR segment descriptor (GDT_ENTRY_CPU_NUMBER) is
initialized relatively late during CPU init, from the vCPU code, which
has a number of disadvantages, such as hotplug CPU notifiers and SMP
cross-calls.

Instead just initialize it much earlier, directly in cpu_init().

This reduces complexity and increases robustness.

[ mingo: Wrote new changelog. ]

Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Markus T Metzger <markus.t.metzger@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1537312139-5580-9-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-10-08 10:41:10 +02:00
Ingo Molnar
c0554d2d3d Merge branch 'linus' into x86/core, to pick up fixes
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-10-04 08:23:03 +02:00
Xiaochen Shen
2cc81c6992 x86/intel_rdt: Show missing resctrl mount options
In resctrl filesystem, mount options exist to enable L3/L2 CDP and MBA
Software Controller features if the platform supports them:

 mount -t resctrl resctrl [-o cdp[,cdpl2][,mba_MBps]] /sys/fs/resctrl

But currently only "cdp" option is displayed in /proc/mounts. "cdpl2" and
"mba_MBps" options are not shown even when they are active.

Before:
 # mount -t resctrl resctrl -o cdp,mba_MBps /sys/fs/resctrl
 # grep resctrl /proc/mounts
 /sys/fs/resctrl /sys/fs/resctrl resctrl rw,relatime,cdp 0 0

After:
 # mount -t resctrl resctrl -o cdp,mba_MBps /sys/fs/resctrl
 # grep resctrl /proc/mounts
 /sys/fs/resctrl /sys/fs/resctrl resctrl rw,relatime,cdp,mba_MBps 0 0

Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536796118-60135-1-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2018-10-03 21:53:49 +02:00
Andy Shevchenko
82159876d3 x86/intel_rdt: Switch to bitmap_zalloc()
Switch to bitmap_zalloc() to show clearly what is allocated. Besides that
it returns a pointer of bitmap type instead of opaque void *.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180830115039.63430-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
2018-10-03 21:53:49 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
53ed74af05 x86/intel_rdt: Re-enable pseudo-lock measurements
Commit 4a7a54a55e ("x86/intel_rdt: Disable PMU access") disabled
measurements of pseudo-locked regions because of incorrect usage
of the performance monitoring hardware.

Cache pseudo-locking measurements are now done correctly with the
in-kernel perf API and its use can be re-enabled at this time.

The adjustment to the in-kernel perf API also separated the L2 and L3
measurements that can be triggered separately from user space. The
re-enabling of the measurements is thus not a simple revert of the
original disable in order to accommodate the additional parameter
possible.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/bfb9fc31692e0c62d9ca39062e55eceb6a0635b5.1537377064.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-10-03 21:53:35 +02:00
Nathan Chancellor
88296bd42b x86/cpu/amd: Remove unnecessary parentheses
Clang warns when multiple pairs of parentheses are used for a single
conditional statement.

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c:925:14: warning: equality comparison with
extraneous parentheses [-Wparentheses-equality]
        if ((c->x86 == 6)) {
             ~~~~~~~^~~~
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c:925:14: note: remove extraneous parentheses
around the comparison to silence this warning
        if ((c->x86 == 6)) {
            ~       ^   ~
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c:925:14: note: use '=' to turn this equality
comparison into an assignment
        if ((c->x86 == 6)) {
                    ^~
                    =
1 warning generated.

Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002224511.14929-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/187
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-10-03 08:27:47 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra
f2c4db1bd8 x86/cpu: Sanitize FAM6_ATOM naming
Going primarily by:

  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Intel_Atom_microprocessors

with additional information gleaned from other related pages; notably:

 - Bonnell shrink was called Saltwell
 - Moorefield is the Merriefield refresh which makes it Airmont

The general naming scheme is: FAM6_ATOM_UARCH_SOCTYPE

  for i in `git grep -l FAM6_ATOM` ; do
	sed -i  -e 's/ATOM_PINEVIEW/ATOM_BONNELL/g'		\
		-e 's/ATOM_LINCROFT/ATOM_BONNELL_MID/'		\
		-e 's/ATOM_PENWELL/ATOM_SALTWELL_MID/g'		\
		-e 's/ATOM_CLOVERVIEW/ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET/g'	\
		-e 's/ATOM_CEDARVIEW/ATOM_SALTWELL/g'		\
		-e 's/ATOM_SILVERMONT1/ATOM_SILVERMONT/g'	\
		-e 's/ATOM_SILVERMONT2/ATOM_SILVERMONT_X/g'	\
		-e 's/ATOM_MERRIFIELD/ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID/g'	\
		-e 's/ATOM_MOOREFIELD/ATOM_AIRMONT_MID/g'	\
		-e 's/ATOM_DENVERTON/ATOM_GOLDMONT_X/g'		\
		-e 's/ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE/ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS/g' ${i}
  done

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: len.brown@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-10-02 10:14:32 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
dd45407c0b x86/intel_rdt: Use perf infrastructure for measurements
The success of a cache pseudo-locked region is measured using
performance monitoring events that are programmed directly at the time
the user requests a measurement.

Modifying the performance event registers directly is not appropriate
since it circumvents the in-kernel perf infrastructure that exists to
manage these resources and provide resource arbitration to the
performance monitoring hardware.

The cache pseudo-locking measurements are modified to use the in-kernel
perf infrastructure. Performance events are created and validated with
the appropriate perf API. The performance counters are still read as
directly as possible to avoid the additional cache hits. This is
done safely by first ensuring with the perf API that the counters have
been programmed correctly and only accessing the counters in an
interrupt disabled section where they are not able to be moved.

As part of the transition to the in-kernel perf infrastructure the L2
and L3 measurements are split into two separate measurements that can
be triggered independently. This separation prevents additional cache
misses incurred during the extra testing code used to decide if a
L2 and/or L3 measurement should be made.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fc24e728b446404f42c78573c506e98cd0599873.1537468643.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-09-28 22:48:27 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
0a701c9dd5 x86/intel_rdt: Create required perf event attributes
A perf event has many attributes that are maintained in a separate
structure that should be provided when a new perf_event is created.

In preparation for the transition to perf_events the required attribute
structures are created for all the events that may be used in the
measurements. Most attributes for all the events are identical. The
actual configuration, what specifies what needs to be measured, is what
will be different between the events used. This configuration needs to
be done with X86_CONFIG that cannot be used as part of the designated
initializers used here, this will be introduced later.

Although they do look identical at this time the attribute structures
needs to be maintained separately since a perf_event will maintain a
pointer to its unique attributes.

In support of patch testing the new structs are given the unused attribute
until their use in later patches.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1822f6164e221a497648d108913d056ab675d5d0.1537377064.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-09-28 22:48:27 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
b5e4274ef7 x86/intel_rdt: Remove local register variables
Local register variables were used in an effort to improve the
accuracy of the measurement of cache residency of a pseudo-locked
region. This was done to ensure that only the cache residency of
the memory is measured and not the cache residency of the variables
used to perform the measurement.

While local register variables do accomplish the goal they do require
significant care since different architectures have different registers
available. Local register variables also cannot be used with valuable
developer tools like KASAN.

Significant testing has shown that similar accuracy in measurement
results can be obtained by replacing local register variables with
regular local variables.

Make use of local variables in the critical code but do so with
READ_ONCE() to prevent the compiler from merging or refetching reads.
Ensure these variables are initialized before the measurement starts,
and ensure it is only the local variables that are accessed during
the measurement.

With the removal of the local register variables and using READ_ONCE()
there is no longer a motivation for using a direct wrmsr call (that
avoids the additional tracing code that may clobber the local register
variables).

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f430f57347414e0691765d92b144758ab93d8407.1537377064.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-09-28 22:48:26 +02:00
Pu Wen
ac78bd7235 x86/mce: Add Hygon Dhyana support to the MCA infrastructure
The machine check architecture for Hygon Dhyana CPU is similar to the
AMD family 17h one. Add vendor checking for Hygon Dhyana to share the
code path of AMD family 17h.

Signed-off-by: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: mingo@redhat.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87d8a4f16bdea0bfe0c0cf2e4a8d2c2a99b1055c.1537533369.git.puwen@hygon.cn
2018-09-27 18:28:59 +02:00
Pu Wen
1a576b23d6 x86/bugs: Add Hygon Dhyana to the respective mitigation machinery
The Hygon Dhyana CPU has the same speculative execution as AMD family
17h, so share AMD spectre mitigation code with Hygon Dhyana.

Also Hygon Dhyana is not affected by meltdown, so add exception for it.

Signed-off-by: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: mingo@redhat.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0861d39c8a103fc0deca15bafbc85d403666d9ef.1537533369.git.puwen@hygon.cn
2018-09-27 18:28:59 +02:00
Pu Wen
6d0ef316b9 x86/events: Add Hygon Dhyana support to PMU infrastructure
The PMU architecture for the Hygon Dhyana CPU is similar to the AMD
Family 17h one. To support it, call amd_pmu_init() to share the AMD PMU
initialization flow, and change the PMU name to "HYGON".

The Hygon Dhyana CPU supports both legacy and extension PMC MSRs (perf
counter registers and event selection registers), so add Hygon Dhyana
support in the similar way as AMD does.

Signed-off-by: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: mingo@redhat.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9d93ed54a975f33ef7247e0967960f4ce5d3d990.1537533369.git.puwen@hygon.cn
2018-09-27 18:28:57 +02:00
Pu Wen
39dc6f154d x86/cpu/mtrr: Support TOP_MEM2 and get MTRR number
The Hygon Dhyana CPU has a special MSR way to force WB for memory >4GB,
and support TOP_MEM2. Therefore, it is necessary to add Hygon Dhyana
support in amd_special_default_mtrr().

The number of variable MTRRs for Hygon is 2 as AMD's.

Signed-off-by: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: mingo@redhat.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8246f81648d014601de3812ade40e85d9c50d9b3.1537533369.git.puwen@hygon.cn
2018-09-27 18:28:57 +02:00
Pu Wen
d4f7423efd x86/cpu: Get cache info and setup cache cpumap for Hygon Dhyana
The Hygon Dhyana CPU has a topology extensions bit in CPUID. With
this bit, the kernel can get the cache information. So add support in
cpuid4_cache_lookup_regs() to get the correct cache size.

The Hygon Dhyana CPU also discovers num_cache_leaves via CPUID leaf
0x8000001d, so add support to it in find_num_cache_leaves().

Also add cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id() and init_hygon_cacheinfo()
functions to initialize Dhyana cache info. Setup cache cpumap in the
same way as AMD does.

Signed-off-by: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: mingo@redhat.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2a686b2ac0e2f5a1f2f5f101124d9dd44f949731.1537533369.git.puwen@hygon.cn
2018-09-27 18:28:57 +02:00
Borislav Petkov
7eae653c80 Merge branch 'tip-x86-hygon' into tip-x86-cpu
... in order to share one commit with the EDAC tree.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
2018-09-27 18:13:01 +02:00
Pu Wen
c9661c1e80 x86/cpu: Create Hygon Dhyana architecture support file
Add x86 architecture support for a new processor: Hygon Dhyana Family
18h. Carve out initialization code needed by Dhyana into a separate
compilation unit.

To identify Hygon Dhyana CPU, add a new vendor type X86_VENDOR_HYGON.

Since Dhyana uses AMD functionality to a large degree, select
CPU_SUP_AMD which provides that functionality.

 [ bp: drop explicit license statement as it has an SPDX tag already. ]

Signed-off-by: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: mingo@redhat.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1a882065223bacbde5726f3beaa70cebd8dcd814.1537533369.git.puwen@hygon.cn
2018-09-27 16:14:05 +02:00
Jiri Kosina
bb4b3b7762 x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs
If spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled, RSB is filled on context switch
in order to protect from various classes of spectrev2 attacks.

If this mitigation is enabled, say so in sysfs for spectrev2.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438580.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
2018-09-26 14:26:52 +02:00
Jiri Kosina
53c613fe63 x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation
STIBP is a feature provided by certain Intel ucodes / CPUs. This feature
(once enabled) prevents cross-hyperthread control of decisions made by
indirect branch predictors.

Enable this feature if

- the CPU is vulnerable to spectre v2
- the CPU supports SMT and has SMT siblings online
- spectre_v2 mitigation autoselection is enabled (default)

After some previous discussion, this leaves STIBP on all the time, as wrmsr
on crossing kernel boundary is a no-no. This could perhaps later be a bit
more optimized (like disabling it in NOHZ, experiment with disabling it in
idle, etc) if needed.

Note that the synchronization of the mask manipulation via newly added
spec_ctrl_mutex is currently not strictly needed, as the only updater is
already being serialized by cpu_add_remove_lock, but let's make this a
little bit more future-proof.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438240.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
2018-09-26 14:26:52 +02:00
Matthew Whitehead
2893cc8ff8 x86/CPU: Change query logic so CPUID is enabled before testing
Presently we check first if CPUID is enabled. If it is not already
enabled, then we next call identify_cpu_without_cpuid() and clear
X86_FEATURE_CPUID.

Unfortunately, identify_cpu_without_cpuid() is the function where CPUID
becomes _enabled_ on Cyrix 6x86/6x86L CPUs.

Reverse the calling sequence so that CPUID is first enabled, and then
check a second time to see if the feature has now been activated.

[ bp: Massage commit message and remove trailing whitespace. ]

Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Whitehead <tedheadster@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180921212041.13096-3-tedheadster@gmail.com
2018-09-22 11:47:39 +02:00
Matthew Whitehead
03b099bdcd x86/CPU: Use correct macros for Cyrix calls
There are comments in processor-cyrix.h advising you to _not_ make calls
using the deprecated macros in this style:

  setCx86_old(CX86_CCR4, getCx86_old(CX86_CCR4) | 0x80);

This is because it expands the macro into a non-functioning calling
sequence. The calling order must be:

  outb(CX86_CCR2, 0x22);
  inb(0x23);

From the comments:

 * When using the old macros a line like
 *   setCx86(CX86_CCR2, getCx86(CX86_CCR2) | 0x88);
 * gets expanded to:
 *  do {
 *    outb((CX86_CCR2), 0x22);
 *    outb((({
 *        outb((CX86_CCR2), 0x22);
 *        inb(0x23);
 *    }) | 0x88), 0x23);
 *  } while (0);

The new macros fix this problem, so use them instead.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Whitehead <tedheadster@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180921212041.13096-2-tedheadster@gmail.com
2018-09-22 11:46:56 +02:00
Borislav Petkov
7401a633c3 x86/mce-inject: Reset injection struct after injection
Clear the MCE struct which is used for collecting the injection details
after injection.

Also, populate it with more details from the machine.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180905081954.10391-1-bp@alien8.de
2018-09-21 14:28:37 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
ffb2315fd2 x86/intel_rdt: Fix incorrect loop end condition
In order to determine a sane default cache allocation for a new CAT/CDP
resource group, all resource groups are checked to determine which cache
portions are available to share. At this time all possible CLOSIDs
that can be supported by the resource is checked. This is problematic
if the resource supports more CLOSIDs than another CAT/CDP resource. In
this case, the number of CLOSIDs that could be allocated are fewer than
the number of CLOSIDs that can be supported by the resource.

Limit the check of closids to that what is supported by the system based
on the minimum across all resources.

Fixes: 95f0b77ef ("x86/intel_rdt: Initialize new resource group with sane defaults")
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Xiaochen Shen" <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Cc: "Chen Yu" <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1537048707-76280-10-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2018-09-18 23:38:07 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
939b90b20b x86/intel_rdt: Fix exclusive mode handling of MBA resource
It is possible for a resource group to consist out of MBA as well as
CAT/CDP resources. The "exclusive" resource mode only applies to the
CAT/CDP resources since MBA allocations cannot be specified to overlap
or not. When a user requests a resource group to become "exclusive" then it
can only be successful if there are CAT/CDP resources in the group
and none of their CBMs associated with the group's CLOSID overlaps with
any other resource group.

Fix the "exclusive" mode setting by failing if there isn't any CAT/CDP
resource in the group and ensuring that the CBM checking is only done on
CAT/CDP resources.

Fixes: 49f7b4efa ("x86/intel_rdt: Enable setting of exclusive mode")
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Xiaochen Shen" <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Cc: "Chen Yu" <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1537048707-76280-9-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2018-09-18 23:38:07 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
f0df4e1acf x86/intel_rdt: Fix incorrect loop end condition
A loop is used to check if a CAT resource's CBM of one CLOSID
overlaps with the CBM of another CLOSID of the same resource. The loop
is run over all CLOSIDs supported by the resource.

The problem with running the loop over all CLOSIDs supported by the
resource is that its number of supported CLOSIDs may be more than the
number of supported CLOSIDs on the system, which is the minimum number of
CLOSIDs supported across all resources.

Fix the loop to only consider the number of system supported CLOSIDs,
not all that are supported by the resource.

Fixes: 49f7b4efa ("x86/intel_rdt: Enable setting of exclusive mode")
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Xiaochen Shen" <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Cc: "Chen Yu" <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1537048707-76280-8-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2018-09-18 23:38:06 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
32d736abed x86/intel_rdt: Do not allow pseudo-locking of MBA resource
A system supporting pseudo-locking may have MBA as well as CAT
resources of which only the CAT resources could support cache
pseudo-locking. When the schemata to be pseudo-locked is provided it
should be checked that that schemata does not attempt to pseudo-lock a
MBA resource.

Fixes: e0bdfe8e3 ("x86/intel_rdt: Support creation/removal of pseudo-locked region")
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Xiaochen Shen" <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Cc: "Chen Yu" <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1537048707-76280-7-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2018-09-18 23:38:06 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
70479c012b x86/intel_rdt: Fix unchecked MSR access
When a new resource group is created, it is initialized with sane
defaults that currently assume the resource being initialized is a CAT
resource. This code path is also followed by a MBA resource that is not
allocated the same as a CAT resource and as a result we encounter the
following unchecked MSR access error:

unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xd51 (tried to write 0x0000
000000000064) at rIP: 0xffffffffae059994 (native_write_msr+0x4/0x20)
Call Trace:
mba_wrmsr+0x41/0x80
update_domains+0x125/0x130
rdtgroup_mkdir+0x270/0x500

Fix the above by ensuring the initial allocation is only attempted on a
CAT resource.

Fixes: 95f0b77ef ("x86/intel_rdt: Initialize new resource group with sane defaults")
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Xiaochen Shen" <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Cc: "Chen Yu" <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1537048707-76280-6-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2018-09-18 23:38:06 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
47d53b184a x86/intel_rdt: Fix invalid mode warning when multiple resources are managed
When multiple resources are managed by RDT, the number of CLOSIDs used
is the minimum of the CLOSIDs supported by each resource. In the function
rdt_bit_usage_show(), the annotated bitmask is created to depict how the
CAT supporting caches are being used. During this annotated bitmask
creation, each resource group is queried for its mode that is used as a
label in the annotated bitmask.

The maximum number of resource groups is currently assumed to be the
number of CLOSIDs supported by the resource for which the information is
being displayed. This is incorrect since the number of active CLOSIDs is
the minimum across all resources.

If information for a cache instance with more CLOSIDs than another is
being generated we thus encounter a warning like:

invalid mode for closid 8
WARNING: CPU: 88 PID: 1791 at [SNIP]/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c
:827 rdt_bit_usage_show+0x221/0x2b0

Fix this by ensuring that only the number of supported CLOSIDs are
considered.

Fixes: e651901187 ("x86/intel_rdt: Introduce "bit_usage" to display cache allocations details")
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Xiaochen Shen" <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Cc: "Chen Yu" <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1537048707-76280-5-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2018-09-18 23:38:05 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
c793da8e4c x86/intel_rdt: Global closid helper to support future fixes
The number of CLOSIDs supported by a system is the minimum number of
CLOSIDs supported by any of its resources. Care should be taken when
iterating over the CLOSIDs of a resource since it may be that the number
of CLOSIDs supported on the system is less than the number of CLOSIDs
supported by the resource.

Introduce a helper function that can be used to query the number of
CLOSIDs that is supported by all resources, irrespective of how many
CLOSIDs are supported by a particular resource.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Xiaochen Shen" <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Cc: "Chen Yu" <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1537048707-76280-4-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2018-09-18 23:38:05 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
f968dc119a x86/intel_rdt: Fix size reporting of MBA resource
Chen Yu reported a divide-by-zero error when accessing the 'size'
resctrl file when a MBA resource is enabled.

divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 93 PID: 1929 Comm: cat Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2-debug-rdt+ #25
RIP: 0010:rdtgroup_cbm_to_size+0x7e/0xa0
Call Trace:
rdtgroup_size_show+0x11a/0x1d0
seq_read+0xd8/0x3b0

Quoting Chen Yu's report: This is because for MB resource, the
r->cache.cbm_len is zero, thus calculating size in rdtgroup_cbm_to_size()
will trigger the exception.

Fix this issue in the 'size' file by getting correct memory bandwidth value
which is in MBps when MBA software controller is enabled or in percentage
when MBA software controller is disabled.

Fixes: d9b48c86eb ("x86/intel_rdt: Display resource groups' allocations in bytes")
Reported-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Xiaochen Shen" <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180904174614.26682-1-yu.c.chen@intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1537048707-76280-3-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2018-09-18 23:38:05 +02:00
Xiaochen Shen
753694a8df x86/intel_rdt: Fix data type in parsing callbacks
Each resource is associated with a parsing callback to parse the data
provided from user space when writing schemata file.

The 'data' parameter in the callbacks is defined as a void pointer which
is error prone due to lack of type check.

parse_bw() processes the 'data' parameter as a string while its caller
actually passes the parameter as a pointer to struct rdt_cbm_parse_data.
Thus, parse_bw() takes wrong data and causes failure of parsing MBA
throttle value.

To fix the issue, the 'data' parameter in all parsing callbacks is defined
and handled as a pointer to struct rdt_parse_data (renamed from struct
rdt_cbm_parse_data).

Fixes: 7604df6e16 ("x86/intel_rdt: Support flexible data to parsing callbacks")
Fixes: 9ab9aa15c3 ("x86/intel_rdt: Ensure requested schemata respects mode")
Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Chen Yu" <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1537048707-76280-2-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2018-09-18 23:38:05 +02:00
zhong jiang
8e6b65a1b6 x86/CPU: Fix unused variable warning when !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
Get rid of local @cpu variable which is unused in the
!CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION case.

Signed-off-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536806985-24197-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
[ Clean up commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
2018-09-15 14:57:05 +02:00
Andy Lutomirski
bf904d2762 x86/pti/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 entry trampoline
The SYSCALL64 trampoline has a couple of nice properties:

 - The usual sequence of SWAPGS followed by two GS-relative accesses to
   set up RSP is somewhat slow because the GS-relative accesses need
   to wait for SWAPGS to finish.  The trampoline approach allows
   RIP-relative accesses to set up RSP, which avoids the stall.

 - The trampoline avoids any percpu access before CR3 is set up,
   which means that no percpu memory needs to be mapped in the user
   page tables.  This prevents using Meltdown to read any percpu memory
   outside the cpu_entry_area and prevents using timing leaks
   to directly locate the percpu areas.

The downsides of using a trampoline may outweigh the upsides, however.
It adds an extra non-contiguous I$ cache line to system calls, and it
forces an indirect jump to transfer control back to the normal kernel
text after CR3 is set up.  The latter is because x86 lacks a 64-bit
direct jump instruction that could jump from the trampoline to the entry
text.  With retpolines enabled, the indirect jump is extremely slow.

Change the code to map the percpu TSS into the user page tables to allow
the non-trampoline SYSCALL64 path to work under PTI.  This does not add a
new direct information leak, since the TSS is readable by Meltdown from the
cpu_entry_area alias regardless.  It does allow a timing attack to locate
the percpu area, but KASLR is more or less a lost cause against local
attack on CPUs vulnerable to Meltdown regardless.  As far as I'm concerned,
on current hardware, KASLR is only useful to mitigate remote attacks that
try to attack the kernel without first gaining RCE against a vulnerable
user process.

On Skylake, with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y and KPTI on, this reduces syscall
overhead from ~237ns to ~228ns.

There is a possible alternative approach: Move the trampoline within 2G of
the entry text and make a separate copy for each CPU.  This would allow a
direct jump to rejoin the normal entry path. There are pro's and con's for
this approach:

 + It avoids a pipeline stall

 - It executes from an extra page and read from another extra page during
   the syscall. The latter is because it needs to use a relative
   addressing mode to find sp1 -- it's the same *cacheline*, but accessed
   using an alias, so it's an extra TLB entry.

 - Slightly more memory. This would be one page per CPU for a simple
   implementation and 64-ish bytes per CPU or one page per node for a more
   complex implementation.

 - More code complexity.

The current approach is chosen for simplicity and because the alternative
does not provide a significant benefit, which makes it worth.

[ tglx: Added the alternative discussion to the changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8c7c6e483612c3e4e10ca89495dc160b1aa66878.1536015544.git.luto@kernel.org
2018-09-12 21:33:53 +02:00
Juergen Gross
9bad5658ea x86/paravirt: Move the Xen-only pv_cpu_ops under the PARAVIRT_XXL umbrella
Most of the paravirt ops defined in pv_cpu_ops are for Xen PV guests
only. Define them only if CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL is set.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: akataria@vmware.com
Cc: rusty@rustcorp.com.au
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828074026.820-13-jgross@suse.com
2018-09-03 16:50:36 +02:00
Juergen Gross
5c83511bdb x86/paravirt: Use a single ops structure
Instead of using six globally visible paravirt ops structures combine
them in a single structure, keeping the original structures as
sub-structures.

This avoids the need to assemble struct paravirt_patch_template at
runtime on the stack each time apply_paravirt() is being called (i.e.
when loading a module).

[ tglx: Made the struct and the initializer tabular for readability sake ]

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: akataria@vmware.com
Cc: rusty@rustcorp.com.au
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828074026.820-9-jgross@suse.com
2018-09-03 16:50:35 +02:00
Jann Horn
81fd9c1844 x86/fault: Plumb error code and fault address through to fault handlers
This is preparation for looking at trap number and fault address in the
handlers for uaccess errors. No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828201421.157735-6-jannh@google.com
2018-09-03 15:12:09 +02:00
Filippo Sironi
8da38ebaad x86/microcode: Update the new microcode revision unconditionally
Handle the case where microcode gets loaded on the BSP's hyperthread
sibling first and the boot_cpu_data's microcode revision doesn't get
updated because of early exit due to the siblings sharing a microcode
engine.

For that, simply write the updated revision on all CPUs unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Filippo Sironi <sironi@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: prarit@redhat.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533050970-14385-1-git-send-email-sironi@amazon.de
2018-09-02 14:10:54 +02:00
Prarit Bhargava
370a132bb2 x86/microcode: Make sure boot_cpu_data.microcode is up-to-date
When preparing an MCE record for logging, boot_cpu_data.microcode is used
to read out the microcode revision on the box.

However, on systems where late microcode update has happened, the microcode
revision output in a MCE log record is wrong because
boot_cpu_data.microcode is not updated when the microcode gets updated.

But, the microcode revision saved in boot_cpu_data's microcode member
should be kept up-to-date, regardless, for consistency.

Make it so.

Fixes: fa94d0c6e0 ("x86/MCE: Save microcode revision in machine check records")
Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: sironi@amazon.de
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731112739.32338-1-prarit@redhat.com
2018-09-02 14:10:54 +02:00
Jacek Tomaka
f4661d293e x86/microcode: Make revision and processor flags world-readable
The microcode revision is already readable for non-root users via
/proc/cpuinfo. Thus, there's no reason to keep the same information
readable by root only in /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpuX/microcode/.

Make .../processor_flags world-readable too, while at it.

Reported-by: Tim Burgess <timb@dug.com>
Signed-off-by: Jacek Tomaka <jacek.tomaka@poczta.fm>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180825035039.14409-1-jacekt@dugeo.com
2018-09-02 14:09:13 +02:00
Andi Kleen
cc51e5428e x86/speculation/l1tf: Increase l1tf memory limit for Nehalem+
On Nehalem and newer core CPUs the CPU cache internally uses 44 bits
physical address space. The L1TF workaround is limited by this internal
cache address width, and needs to have one bit free there for the
mitigation to work.

Older client systems report only 36bit physical address space so the range
check decides that L1TF is not mitigated for a 36bit phys/32GB system with
some memory holes.

But since these actually have the larger internal cache width this warning
is bogus because it would only really be needed if the system had more than
43bits of memory.

Add a new internal x86_cache_bits field. Normally it is the same as the
physical bits field reported by CPUID, but for Nehalem and newerforce it to
be at least 44bits.

Change the L1TF memory size warning to use the new cache_bits field to
avoid bogus warnings and remove the bogus comment about memory size.

Fixes: 17dbca1193 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf")
Reported-by: George Anchev <studio@anchev.net>
Reported-by: Christopher Snowhill <kode54@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Michael Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: vbabka@suse.cz
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180824170351.34874-1-andi@firstfloor.org
2018-08-27 10:29:14 +02:00
Andi Kleen
1ab534e85c x86/spectre: Add missing family 6 check to microcode check
The check for Spectre microcodes does not check for family 6, only the
model numbers.

Add a family 6 check to avoid ambiguity with other families.

Fixes: a5b2966364 ("x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes")
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180824170351.34874-2-andi@firstfloor.org
2018-08-27 10:29:14 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
2a8a2b7c49 Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:

 - Correct the L1TF fallout on 32bit and the off by one in the 'too much
   RAM for protection' calculation.

 - Add a helpful kernel message for the 'too much RAM' case

 - Unbreak the VDSO in case that the compiler desides to use indirect
   jumps/calls and emits retpolines which cannot be resolved because the
   kernel uses its own thunks, which does not work for the VDSO. Make it
   use the builtin thunks.

 - Re-export start_thread() which was unexported when the 32/64bit
   implementation was unified. start_thread() is required by modular
   binfmt handlers.

 - Trivial cleanups

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Suggest what to do on systems with too much RAM
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix off-by-one error when warning that system has too much RAM
  x86/kvm/vmx: Remove duplicate l1d flush definitions
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix overflow in l1tf_pfn_limit() on 32bit
  x86/process: Re-export start_thread()
  x86/mce: Add notifier_block forward declaration
  x86/vdso: Fix vDSO build if a retpoline is emitted
2018-08-26 10:13:21 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
2923b27e54 libnvdimm-for-4.19_dax-memory-failure
* memory_failure() gets confused by dev_pagemap backed mappings. The
   recovery code has specific enabling for several possible page states
   that needs new enabling to handle poison in dax mappings. Teach
   memory_failure() about ZONE_DEVICE pages.
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Merge tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.19_dax-memory-failure' of gitolite.kernel.org:pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm

Pull libnvdimm memory-failure update from Dave Jiang:
 "As it stands, memory_failure() gets thoroughly confused by dev_pagemap
  backed mappings. The recovery code has specific enabling for several
  possible page states and needs new enabling to handle poison in dax
  mappings.

  In order to support reliable reverse mapping of user space addresses:

   1/ Add new locking in the memory_failure() rmap path to prevent races
      that would typically be handled by the page lock.

   2/ Since dev_pagemap pages are hidden from the page allocator and the
      "compound page" accounting machinery, add a mechanism to determine
      the size of the mapping that encompasses a given poisoned pfn.

   3/ Given pmem errors can be repaired, change the speculatively
      accessed poison protection, mce_unmap_kpfn(), to be reversible and
      otherwise allow ongoing access from the kernel.

  A side effect of this enabling is that MADV_HWPOISON becomes usable
  for dax mappings, however the primary motivation is to allow the
  system to survive userspace consumption of hardware-poison via dax.
  Specifically the current behavior is:

     mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200
     {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action
     mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged
     {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected
     Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users
     [..]
     Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed
     mce: Memory error not recovered
     <reboot>

  ...and with these changes:

     Injecting memory failure for pfn 0x20cb00 at process virtual address 0x7f763dd00000
     Memory failure: 0x20cb00: Killing dax-pmd:5421 due to hardware memory corruption
     Memory failure: 0x20cb00: recovery action for dax page: Recovered

  Given all the cross dependencies I propose taking this through
  nvdimm.git with acks from Naoya, x86/core, x86/RAS, and of course dax
  folks"

* tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.19_dax-memory-failure' of gitolite.kernel.org:pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm:
  libnvdimm, pmem: Restore page attributes when clearing errors
  x86/memory_failure: Introduce {set, clear}_mce_nospec()
  x86/mm/pat: Prepare {reserve, free}_memtype() for "decoy" addresses
  mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages
  filesystem-dax: Introduce dax_lock_mapping_entry()
  mm, memory_failure: Collect mapping size in collect_procs()
  mm, madvise_inject_error: Let memory_failure() optionally take a page reference
  mm, dev_pagemap: Do not clear ->mapping on final put
  mm, madvise_inject_error: Disable MADV_SOFT_OFFLINE for ZONE_DEVICE pages
  filesystem-dax: Set page->index
  device-dax: Set page->index
  device-dax: Enable page_mapping()
  device-dax: Convert to vmf_insert_mixed and vm_fault_t
2018-08-25 18:43:59 -07:00
Vlastimil Babka
6a012288d6 x86/speculation/l1tf: Suggest what to do on systems with too much RAM
Two users have reported [1] that they have an "extremely unlikely" system
with more than MAX_PA/2 memory and L1TF mitigation is not effective.

Make the warning more helpful by suggesting the proper mem=X kernel boot
parameter to make it effective and a link to the L1TF document to help
decide if the mitigation is worth the unusable RAM.

[1] https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1105536

Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/966571f0-9d7f-43dc-92c6-a10eec7a1254@suse.cz
2018-08-24 15:55:17 +02:00
Dan Williams
284ce4011b x86/memory_failure: Introduce {set, clear}_mce_nospec()
Currently memory_failure() returns zero if the error was handled. On
that result mce_unmap_kpfn() is called to zap the page out of the kernel
linear mapping to prevent speculative fetches of potentially poisoned
memory. However, in the case of dax mapped devmap pages the page may be
in active permanent use by the device driver, so it cannot be unmapped
from the kernel.

Instead of marking the page not present, marking the page UC should
be sufficient for preventing poison from being pre-fetched into the
cache. Convert mce_unmap_pfn() to set_mce_nospec() remapping the page as
UC, to hide it from speculative accesses.

Given that that persistent memory errors can be cleared by the driver,
include a facility to restore the page to cacheable operation,
clear_mce_nospec().

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-08-20 09:22:45 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
d5acba26bf Char/Misc driver patches for 4.19-rc1
Here is the bit set of char/misc drivers for 4.19-rc1
 
 There is a lot here, much more than normal, seems like everyone is
 writing new driver subsystems these days...  Anyway, major things here
 are:
 	- new FSI driver subsystem, yet-another-powerpc low-level
 	  hardware bus
 	- gnss, finally an in-kernel GPS subsystem to try to tame all of
 	  the crazy out-of-tree drivers that have been floating around
 	  for years, combined with some really hacky userspace
 	  implementations.  This is only for GNSS receivers, but you
 	  have to start somewhere, and this is great to see.
 Other than that, there are new slimbus drivers, new coresight drivers,
 new fpga drivers, and loads of DT bindings for all of these and existing
 drivers.
 
 Full details of everything is in the shortlog.
 
 All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
 issues.
 
 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'char-misc-4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc

Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH:
 "Here is the bit set of char/misc drivers for 4.19-rc1

  There is a lot here, much more than normal, seems like everyone is
  writing new driver subsystems these days... Anyway, major things here
  are:

   - new FSI driver subsystem, yet-another-powerpc low-level hardware
     bus

   - gnss, finally an in-kernel GPS subsystem to try to tame all of the
     crazy out-of-tree drivers that have been floating around for years,
     combined with some really hacky userspace implementations. This is
     only for GNSS receivers, but you have to start somewhere, and this
     is great to see.

  Other than that, there are new slimbus drivers, new coresight drivers,
  new fpga drivers, and loads of DT bindings for all of these and
  existing drivers.

  All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
  issues"

* tag 'char-misc-4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (255 commits)
  android: binder: Rate-limit debug and userspace triggered err msgs
  fsi: sbefifo: Bump max command length
  fsi: scom: Fix NULL dereference
  misc: mic: SCIF Fix scif_get_new_port() error handling
  misc: cxl: changed asterisk position
  genwqe: card_base: Use true and false for boolean values
  misc: eeprom: assignment outside the if statement
  uio: potential double frees if __uio_register_device() fails
  eeprom: idt_89hpesx: clean up an error pointer vs NULL inconsistency
  misc: ti-st: Fix memory leak in the error path of probe()
  android: binder: Show extra_buffers_size in trace
  firmware: vpd: Fix section enabled flag on vpd_section_destroy
  platform: goldfish: Retire pdev_bus
  goldfish: Use dedicated macros instead of manual bit shifting
  goldfish: Add missing includes to goldfish.h
  mux: adgs1408: new driver for Analog Devices ADGS1408/1409 mux
  dt-bindings: mux: add adi,adgs1408
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Cleanup synic memory free path
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove use of slow_virt_to_phys()
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Reset the channel callback in vmbus_onoffer_rescind()
  ...
2018-08-18 11:04:51 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
9a76aba02a Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
 "Highlights:

   - Gustavo A. R. Silva keeps working on the implicit switch fallthru
     changes.

   - Support 802.11ax High-Efficiency wireless in cfg80211 et al, From
     Luca Coelho.

   - Re-enable ASPM in r8169, from Kai-Heng Feng.

   - Add virtual XFRM interfaces, which avoids all of the limitations of
     existing IPSEC tunnels. From Steffen Klassert.

   - Convert GRO over to use a hash table, so that when we have many
     flows active we don't traverse a long list during accumluation.

   - Many new self tests for routing, TC, tunnels, etc. Too many
     contributors to mention them all, but I'm really happy to keep
     seeing this stuff.

   - Hardware timestamping support for dpaa_eth/fsl-fman from Yangbo Lu.

   - Lots of cleanups and fixes in L2TP code from Guillaume Nault.

   - Add IPSEC offload support to netdevsim, from Shannon Nelson.

   - Add support for slotting with non-uniform distribution to netem
     packet scheduler, from Yousuk Seung.

   - Add UDP GSO support to mlx5e, from Boris Pismenny.

   - Support offloading of Team LAG in NFP, from John Hurley.

   - Allow to configure TX queue selection based upon RX queue, from
     Amritha Nambiar.

   - Support ethtool ring size configuration in aquantia, from Anton
     Mikaev.

   - Support DSCP and flowlabel per-transport in SCTP, from Xin Long.

   - Support list based batching and stack traversal of SKBs, this is
     very exciting work. From Edward Cree.

   - Busyloop optimizations in vhost_net, from Toshiaki Makita.

   - Introduce the ETF qdisc, which allows time based transmissions. IGB
     can offload this in hardware. From Vinicius Costa Gomes.

   - Add parameter support to devlink, from Moshe Shemesh.

   - Several multiplication and division optimizations for BPF JIT in
     nfp driver, from Jiong Wang.

   - Lots of prepatory work to make more of the packet scheduler layer
     lockless, when possible, from Vlad Buslov.

   - Add ACK filter and NAT awareness to sch_cake packet scheduler, from
     Toke Høiland-Jørgensen.

   - Support regions and region snapshots in devlink, from Alex Vesker.

   - Allow to attach XDP programs to both HW and SW at the same time on
     a given device, with initial support in nfp. From Jakub Kicinski.

   - Add TLS RX offload and support in mlx5, from Ilya Lesokhin.

   - Use PHYLIB in r8169 driver, from Heiner Kallweit.

   - All sorts of changes to support Spectrum 2 in mlxsw driver, from
     Ido Schimmel.

   - PTP support in mv88e6xxx DSA driver, from Andrew Lunn.

   - Make TCP_USER_TIMEOUT socket option more accurate, from Jon
     Maxwell.

   - Support for templates in packet scheduler classifier, from Jiri
     Pirko.

   - IPV6 support in RDS, from Ka-Cheong Poon.

   - Native tproxy support in nf_tables, from Máté Eckl.

   - Maintain IP fragment queue in an rbtree, but optimize properly for
     in-order frags. From Peter Oskolkov.

   - Improvde handling of ACKs on hole repairs, from Yuchung Cheng"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1996 commits)
  bpf: test: fix spelling mistake "REUSEEPORT" -> "REUSEPORT"
  hv/netvsc: Fix NULL dereference at single queue mode fallback
  net: filter: mark expected switch fall-through
  xen-netfront: fix warn message as irq device name has '/'
  cxgb4: Add new T5 PCI device ids 0x50af and 0x50b0
  net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: missing unlock on error path
  rds: fix building with IPV6=m
  inet/connection_sock: prefer _THIS_IP_ to current_text_addr
  net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: bitwise vs logical bug
  net: sock_diag: Fix spectre v1 gadget in __sock_diag_cmd()
  ieee802154: hwsim: using right kind of iteration
  net: hns3: Add vlan filter setting by ethtool command -K
  net: hns3: Set tx ring' tc info when netdev is up
  net: hns3: Remove tx ring BD len register in hns3_enet
  net: hns3: Fix desc num set to default when setting channel
  net: hns3: Fix for phy link issue when using marvell phy driver
  net: hns3: Fix for information of phydev lost problem when down/up
  net: hns3: Fix for command format parsing error in hclge_is_all_function_id_zero
  net: hns3: Add support for serdes loopback selftest
  bnxt_en: take coredump_record structure off stack
  ...
2018-08-15 15:04:25 -07:00
Guenter Roeck
1eb46908b3 x86/l1tf: Fix build error seen if CONFIG_KVM_INTEL is disabled
allmodconfig+CONFIG_INTEL_KVM=n results in the following build error.

  ERROR: "l1tf_vmx_mitigation" [arch/x86/kvm/kvm.ko] undefined!

Fixes: 5b76a3cff0 ("KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry")
Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Cc: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-08-15 09:44:38 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
31130a16d4 xen: features and fixes for 4.19-rc1
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Merge tag 'for-linus-4.19-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip

Pull xen updates from Juergen Gross:

 - add dma-buf functionality to Xen grant table handling

 - fix for booting the kernel as Xen PVH dom0

 - fix for booting the kernel as a Xen PV guest with
   CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL enabled

 - other minor performance and style fixes

* tag 'for-linus-4.19-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  xen/balloon: fix balloon initialization for PVH Dom0
  xen: don't use privcmd_call() from xen_mc_flush()
  xen/pv: Call get_cpu_address_sizes to set x86_virt/phys_bits
  xen/biomerge: Use true and false for boolean values
  xen/gntdev: don't dereference a null gntdev_dmabuf on allocation failure
  xen/spinlock: Don't use pvqspinlock if only 1 vCPU
  xen/gntdev: Implement dma-buf import functionality
  xen/gntdev: Implement dma-buf export functionality
  xen/gntdev: Add initial support for dma-buf UAPI
  xen/gntdev: Make private routines/structures accessible
  xen/gntdev: Allow mappings for DMA buffers
  xen/grant-table: Allow allocating buffers suitable for DMA
  xen/balloon: Share common memory reservation routines
  xen/grant-table: Make set/clear page private code shared
2018-08-14 16:54:22 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
958f338e96 Merge branch 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Merge L1 Terminal Fault fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "L1TF, aka L1 Terminal Fault, is yet another speculative hardware
  engineering trainwreck. It's a hardware vulnerability which allows
  unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in the
  Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry controlling the virtual
  address, which is used for the access, has the Present bit cleared or
  other reserved bits set.

  If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant
  page table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved
  bits set, then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads
  the referenced data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if
  the page referenced by the address bits in the PTE was still present
  and accessible.

  While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will
  raise a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of
  loading the data and making it available to other speculative
  instructions opens up the opportunity for side channel attacks to
  unprivileged malicious code, similar to the Meltdown attack.

  While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
  allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the
  attack works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX
  and also works from inside virtual machines because the speculation
  bypasses the extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.

  The assoicated CVEs are: CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646

  The mitigations provided by this pull request include:

   - Host side protection by inverting the upper address bits of a non
     present page table entry so the entry points to uncacheable memory.

   - Hypervisor protection by flushing L1 Data Cache on VMENTER.

   - SMT (HyperThreading) control knobs, which allow to 'turn off' SMT
     by offlining the sibling CPU threads. The knobs are available on
     the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs

   - Control knobs for the hypervisor mitigation, related to L1D flush
     and SMT control. The knobs are available on the kernel command line
     and at runtime via sysfs

   - Extensive documentation about L1TF including various degrees of
     mitigations.

  Thanks to all people who have contributed to this in various ways -
  patches, review, testing, backporting - and the fruitful, sometimes
  heated, but at the end constructive discussions.

  There is work in progress to provide other forms of mitigations, which
  might be less horrible performance wise for a particular kind of
  workloads, but this is not yet ready for consumption due to their
  complexity and limitations"

* 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (75 commits)
  x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled
  tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions
  x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF
  x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert
  x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings
  cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation
  KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry
  x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry
  x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability
  Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list
  x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr()
  x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d
  x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h
  x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d
  x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16
  x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush()
  x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond'
  x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush()
  cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS
  ...
2018-08-14 09:46:06 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
13e091b6dd Merge branch 'x86-timers-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Early TSC based time stamping to allow better boot time analysis.

  This comes with a general cleanup of the TSC calibration code which
  grew warts and duct taping over the years and removes 250 lines of
  code. Initiated and mostly implemented by Pavel with help from various
  folks"

* 'x86-timers-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (37 commits)
  x86/kvmclock: Mark kvm_get_preset_lpj() as __init
  x86/tsc: Consolidate init code
  sched/clock: Disable interrupts when calling generic_sched_clock_init()
  timekeeping: Prevent false warning when persistent clock is not available
  sched/clock: Close a hole in sched_clock_init()
  x86/tsc: Make use of tsc_calibrate_cpu_early()
  x86/tsc: Split native_calibrate_cpu() into early and late parts
  sched/clock: Use static key for sched_clock_running
  sched/clock: Enable sched clock early
  sched/clock: Move sched clock initialization and merge with generic clock
  x86/tsc: Use TSC as sched clock early
  x86/tsc: Initialize cyc2ns when tsc frequency is determined
  x86/tsc: Calibrate tsc only once
  ARM/time: Remove read_boot_clock64()
  s390/time: Remove read_boot_clock64()
  timekeeping: Default boot time offset to local_clock()
  timekeeping: Replace read_boot_clock64() with read_persistent_wall_and_boot_offset()
  s390/time: Add read_persistent_wall_and_boot_offset()
  x86/xen/time: Output xen sched_clock time from 0
  x86/xen/time: Initialize pv xen time in init_hypervisor_platform()
  ...
2018-08-13 18:28:19 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
eac3411944 Merge branch 'x86/pti' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 PTI updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "The Speck brigade sadly provides yet another large set of patches
  destroying the perfomance which we carefully built and preserved

   - PTI support for 32bit PAE. The missing counter part to the 64bit
     PTI code implemented by Joerg.

   - A set of fixes for the Global Bit mechanics for non PCID CPUs which
     were setting the Global Bit too widely and therefore possibly
     exposing interesting memory needlessly.

   - Protection against userspace-userspace SpectreRSB

   - Support for the upcoming Enhanced IBRS mode, which is preferred
     over IBRS. Unfortunately we dont know the performance impact of
     this, but it's expected to be less horrible than the IBRS
     hammering.

   - Cleanups and simplifications"

* 'x86/pti' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits)
  x86/mm/pti: Move user W+X check into pti_finalize()
  x86/relocs: Add __end_rodata_aligned to S_REL
  x86/mm/pti: Clone kernel-image on PTE level for 32 bit
  x86/mm/pti: Don't clear permissions in pti_clone_pmd()
  x86/mm/pti: Fix 32 bit PCID check
  x86/mm/init: Remove freed kernel image areas from alias mapping
  x86/mm/init: Add helper for freeing kernel image pages
  x86/mm/init: Pass unconverted symbol addresses to free_init_pages()
  mm: Allow non-direct-map arguments to free_reserved_area()
  x86/mm/pti: Clear Global bit more aggressively
  x86/speculation: Support Enhanced IBRS on future CPUs
  x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
  x86/kexec: Allocate 8k PGDs for PTI
  Revert "perf/core: Make sure the ring-buffer is mapped in all page-tables"
  x86/mm: Remove in_nmi() warning from vmalloc_fault()
  x86/entry/32: Check for VM86 mode in slow-path check
  perf/core: Make sure the ring-buffer is mapped in all page-tables
  x86/pti: Check the return value of pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd()
  x86/pti: Check the return value of pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d()
  x86/entry/32: Add debug code to check entry/exit CR3
  ...
2018-08-13 17:54:17 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
30de24c7dd Merge branch 'x86-cache-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cache QoS (RDT/CAR) updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Add support for pseudo-locked cache regions.

  Cache Allocation Technology (CAT) allows on certain CPUs to isolate a
  region of cache and 'lock' it. Cache pseudo-locking builds on the fact
  that a CPU can still read and write data pre-allocated outside its
  current allocated area on cache hit. With cache pseudo-locking data
  can be preloaded into a reserved portion of cache that no application
  can fill, and from that point on will only serve cache hits. The cache
  pseudo-locked memory is made accessible to user space where an
  application can map it into its virtual address space and thus have a
  region of memory with reduced average read latency.

  The locking is not perfect and gets totally screwed by WBINDV and
  similar mechanisms, but it provides a reasonable enhancement for
  certain types of latency sensitive applications.

  The implementation extends the current CAT mechanism and provides a
  generally useful exclusive CAT mode on which it builds the extra
  pseude-locked regions"

* 'x86-cache-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (45 commits)
  x86/intel_rdt: Disable PMU access
  x86/intel_rdt: Fix possible circular lock dependency
  x86/intel_rdt: Make CPU information accessible for pseudo-locked regions
  x86/intel_rdt: Support restoration of subset of permissions
  x86/intel_rdt: Fix cleanup of plr structure on error
  x86/intel_rdt: Move pseudo_lock_region_clear()
  x86/intel_rdt: Limit C-states dynamically when pseudo-locking active
  x86/intel_rdt: Support L3 cache performance event of Broadwell
  x86/intel_rdt: More precise L2 hit/miss measurements
  x86/intel_rdt: Create character device exposing pseudo-locked region
  x86/intel_rdt: Create debugfs files for pseudo-locking testing
  x86/intel_rdt: Create resctrl debug area
  x86/intel_rdt: Ensure RDT cleanup on exit
  x86/intel_rdt: Resctrl files reflect pseudo-locked information
  x86/intel_rdt: Support creation/removal of pseudo-locked region
  x86/intel_rdt: Pseudo-lock region creation/removal core
  x86/intel_rdt: Discover supported platforms via prefetch disable bits
  x86/intel_rdt: Add utilities to test pseudo-locked region possibility
  x86/intel_rdt: Split resource group removal in two
  x86/intel_rdt: Enable entering of pseudo-locksetup mode
  ...
2018-08-13 16:01:46 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
7796916146 Merge branch 'x86-cpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cpu updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Two small updates for the CPU code:

   - Improve NUMA emulation

   - Add the EPT_AD CPU feature bit"

* 'x86-cpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/cpufeatures: Add EPT_AD feature bit
  x86/numa_emulation: Introduce uniform split capability
  x86/numa_emulation: Fix emulated-to-physical node mapping
2018-08-13 14:41:53 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
37a1604680 Merge branch 'ras-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 RAS updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A small set of changes to the RAS core:

   - Rework of the MCE bank scanning code

   - Y2038 converion"

* 'ras-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/mce: Cleanup __mc_scan_banks()
  x86/mce: Carve out bank scanning code
  x86/mce: Remove !banks check
  x86/mce: Carve out the crashing_cpu check
  x86/mce: Always use 64-bit timestamps
2018-08-13 11:19:25 -07:00
Josh Poimboeuf
07d981ad4c x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled
The kernel unnecessarily prevents late microcode loading when SMT is
disabled.  It should be safe to allow it if all the primary threads are
online.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
2018-08-10 08:32:15 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
bc2d8d262c cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation
Josh reported that the late SMT evaluation in cpu_smt_state_init() sets
cpu_smt_control to CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED in case that 'nosmt' was supplied
on the kernel command line as it cannot differentiate between SMT disabled
by BIOS and SMT soft disable via 'nosmt'. That wreckages the state and
makes the sysfs interface unusable.

Rework this so that during bringup of the non boot CPUs the availability of
SMT is determined in cpu_smt_allowed(). If a newly booted CPU is not a
'primary' thread then set the local cpu_smt_available marker and evaluate
this explicitely right after the initial SMP bringup has finished.

SMT evaulation on x86 is a trainwreck as the firmware has all the
information _before_ booting the kernel, but there is no interface to query
it.

Fixes: 73d5e2b472 ("cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS")
Reported-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-08-07 12:25:30 +02:00
M. Vefa Bicakci
405c018a25 xen/pv: Call get_cpu_address_sizes to set x86_virt/phys_bits
Commit d94a155c59 ("x86/cpu: Prevent cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits
adjustment corruption") has moved the query and calculation of the
x86_virt_bits and x86_phys_bits fields of the cpuinfo_x86 struct
from the get_cpu_cap function to a new function named
get_cpu_address_sizes.

One of the call sites related to Xen PV VMs was unfortunately missed
in the aforementioned commit. This prevents successful boot-up of
kernel versions 4.17 and up in Xen PV VMs if CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL
is enabled, due to the following code path:

  enlighten_pv.c::xen_start_kernel
    mmu_pv.c::xen_reserve_special_pages
      page.h::__pa
        physaddr.c::__phys_addr
          physaddr.h::phys_addr_valid

phys_addr_valid uses boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits to validate physical
addresses. boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits is no longer populated before
the call to xen_reserve_special_pages due to the aforementioned commit
though, so the validation performed by phys_addr_valid fails, which
causes __phys_addr to trigger a BUG, preventing boot-up.

Signed-off-by: M. Vefa Bicakci <m.v.b@runbox.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for v4.17 and up
Fixes: d94a155c59 ("x86/cpu: Prevent cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits adjustment corruption")
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
2018-08-06 16:27:41 -04:00
Thomas Gleixner
315706049c Merge branch 'x86/pti-urgent' into x86/pti
Integrate the PTI Global bit fixes which conflict with the 32bit PTI
support.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-08-06 20:56:34 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini
8e0b2b9166 x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry
Bit 3 of ARCH_CAPABILITIES tells a hypervisor that L1D flush on vmentry is
not needed.  Add a new value to enum vmx_l1d_flush_state, which is used
either if there is no L1TF bug at all, or if bit 3 is set in ARCH_CAPABILITIES.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-08-05 17:10:19 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini
ea156d192f x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability
Three changes to the content of the sysfs file:

 - If EPT is disabled, L1TF cannot be exploited even across threads on the
   same core, and SMT is irrelevant.

 - If mitigation is completely disabled, and SMT is enabled, print "vulnerable"
   instead of "vulnerable, SMT vulnerable"

 - Reorder the two parts so that the main vulnerability state comes first
   and the detail on SMT is second.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-08-05 17:10:19 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner
f2701b77bb Merge 4.18-rc7 into master to pick up the KVM dependcy
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-08-05 16:39:29 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner
4a7a54a55e x86/intel_rdt: Disable PMU access
Peter is objecting to the direct PMU access in RDT. Right now the PMU usage
is broken anyway as it is not coordinated with perf.

Until this discussion settled, disable the PMU mechanics by simply
rejecting the type '2' measurement in the resctrl file.

Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
CC: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
2018-08-03 13:06:35 +02:00
Sai Praneeth
706d51681d x86/speculation: Support Enhanced IBRS on future CPUs
Future Intel processors will support "Enhanced IBRS" which is an "always
on" mode i.e. IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is enabled once and never
disabled.

From the specification [1]:

 "With enhanced IBRS, the predicted targets of indirect branches
  executed cannot be controlled by software that was executed in a less
  privileged predictor mode or on another logical processor. As a
  result, software operating on a processor with enhanced IBRS need not
  use WRMSR to set IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS after every transition to a more
  privileged predictor mode. Software can isolate predictor modes
  effectively simply by setting the bit once. Software need not disable
  enhanced IBRS prior to entering a sleep state such as MWAIT or HLT."

If Enhanced IBRS is supported by the processor then use it as the
preferred spectre v2 mitigation mechanism instead of Retpoline. Intel's
Retpoline white paper [2] states:

 "Retpoline is known to be an effective branch target injection (Spectre
  variant 2) mitigation on Intel processors belonging to family 6
  (enumerated by the CPUID instruction) that do not have support for
  enhanced IBRS. On processors that support enhanced IBRS, it should be
  used for mitigation instead of retpoline."

The reason why Enhanced IBRS is the recommended mitigation on processors
which support it is that these processors also support CET which
provides a defense against ROP attacks. Retpoline is very similar to ROP
techniques and might trigger false positives in the CET defense.

If Enhanced IBRS is selected as the mitigation technique for spectre v2,
the IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is set once at boot time and never
cleared. Kernel also has to make sure that IBRS bit remains set after
VMEXIT because the guest might have cleared the bit. This is already
covered by the existing x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest() and
x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() speculation control functions.

Enhanced IBRS still requires IBPB for full mitigation.

[1] Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf
[2] Retpoline-A-Branch-Target-Injection-Mitigation.pdf
Both documents are available at:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511

Originally-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim C Chen <tim.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533148945-24095-1-git-send-email-sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com
2018-08-03 12:50:34 +02:00
Peter Feiner
301d328a6f x86/cpufeatures: Add EPT_AD feature bit
Some Intel processors have an EPT feature whereby the accessed & dirty bits
in EPT entries can be updated by HW. MSR IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP exposes the
presence of this capability.

There is no point in trying to use that new feature bit in the VMX code as
VMX needs to read the MSR anyway to access other bits, but having the
feature bit for EPT_AD in place helps virtualization management as it
exposes "ept_ad" in /proc/cpuinfo/$proc/flags if the feature is present.

[ tglx: Amended changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180801180657.138051-1-pshier@google.com
2018-08-03 12:36:23 +02:00
Jiri Kosina
fdf82a7856 x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack 
Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks, 
making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to 
BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).

Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.

[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1807261308190.997@cbobk.fhfr.pm
2018-07-31 00:45:15 +02:00
David S. Miller
19725496da Merge ra.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net 2018-07-24 19:21:58 -07:00
Dmitry Torokhov
488dee96bb kernfs: allow creating kernfs objects with arbitrary uid/gid
This change allows creating kernfs files and directories with arbitrary
uid/gid instead of always using GLOBAL_ROOT_UID/GID by extending
kernfs_create_dir_ns() and kernfs_create_file_ns() with uid/gid arguments.
The "simple" kernfs_create_file() and kernfs_create_dir() are left alone
and always create objects belonging to the global root.

When creating symlinks ownership (uid/gid) is taken from the target kernfs
object.

Co-Developed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-07-20 23:44:35 -07:00
Joerg Roedel
45d7b25574 x86/entry/32: Enter the kernel via trampoline stack
Use the entry-stack as a trampoline to enter the kernel. The entry-stack is
already in the cpu_entry_area and will be mapped to userspace when PTI is
enabled.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-8-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20 01:11:37 +02:00
Borislav Petkov
9b3661cd7e x86/CPU: Call detect_nopl() only on the BSP
Make it use the setup_* variants and have it be called only on the BSP and
drop the call in generic_identify() - X86_FEATURE_NOPL will be replicated
to the APs through the forced caps. Helps to keep the mess at a manageable
level.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: steven.sistare@oracle.com
Cc: daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk
Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com
Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com
Cc: john.stultz@linaro.org
Cc: sboyd@codeaurora.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: prarit@redhat.com
Cc: feng.tang@intel.com
Cc: pmladek@suse.com
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180719205545.16512-11-pasha.tatashin@oracle.com
2018-07-20 00:02:39 +02:00
Pavel Tatashin
8990cac6e5 x86/jump_label: Initialize static branching early
Static branching is useful to runtime patch branches that are used in hot
path, but are infrequently changed.

The x86 clock framework is one example that uses static branches to setup
the best clock during boot and never changes it again.

It is desired to enable the TSC based sched clock early to allow fine
grained boot time analysis early on. That requires the static branching
functionality to be functional early as well.

Static branching requires patching nop instructions, thus,
arch_init_ideal_nops() must be called prior to jump_label_init().

Do all the necessary steps to call arch_init_ideal_nops() right after
early_cpu_init(), which also allows to insert a call to jump_label_init()
right after that. jump_label_init() will be called again from the generic
init code, but the code is protected against reinitialization already.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: steven.sistare@oracle.com
Cc: daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk
Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com
Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com
Cc: john.stultz@linaro.org
Cc: sboyd@codeaurora.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: prarit@redhat.com
Cc: feng.tang@intel.com
Cc: pmladek@suse.com
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180719205545.16512-10-pasha.tatashin@oracle.com
2018-07-20 00:02:38 +02:00
Dewet Thibaut
fbdb328c6b x86/MCE: Remove min interval polling limitation
commit b3b7c4795c ("x86/MCE: Serialize sysfs changes") introduced a min
interval limitation when setting the check interval for polled MCEs.
However, the logic is that 0 disables polling for corrected MCEs, see
Documentation/x86/x86_64/machinecheck. The limitation prevents disabling.

Remove this limitation and allow the value 0 to disable polling again.

Fixes: b3b7c4795c ("x86/MCE: Serialize sysfs changes")
Signed-off-by: Dewet Thibaut <thibaut.dewet@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com>
[ Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716084927.24869-1-alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com
2018-07-17 17:56:25 +02:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
83cf9cd6d5 Merge 4.18-rc5 into char-misc-next
We want the char-misc fixes in here as well.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-16 09:04:54 +02:00
Jiri Kosina
d90a7a0ec8 x86/bugs, kvm: Introduce boot-time control of L1TF mitigations
Introduce the 'l1tf=' kernel command line option to allow for boot-time
switching of mitigation that is used on processors affected by L1TF.

The possible values are:

  full
	Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF vulnerability. Disables
	SMT and enables all mitigations in the hypervisors. SMT control via
	/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control is still possible after boot.
	Hypervisors will issue a warning when the first VM is started in
	a potentially insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
	disabled.

  full,force
	Same as 'full', but disables SMT control. Implies the 'nosmt=force'
	command line option. sysfs control of SMT and the hypervisor flush
	control is disabled.

  flush
	Leaves SMT enabled and enables the conditional hypervisor mitigation.
	Hypervisors will issue a warning when the first VM is started in a
	potentially insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
	disabled.

  flush,nosmt
	Disables SMT and enables the conditional hypervisor mitigation. SMT
	control via /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control is still possible
	after boot. If SMT is reenabled or flushing disabled at runtime
	hypervisors will issue a warning.

  flush,nowarn
	Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when
	a VM is started in a potentially insecure configuration.

  off
	Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any warnings.

Default is 'flush'.

Let KVM adhere to these semantics, which means:

  - 'lt1f=full,force'	: Performe L1D flushes. No runtime control
    			  possible.

  - 'l1tf=full'
  - 'l1tf-flush'
  - 'l1tf=flush,nosmt'	: Perform L1D flushes and warn on VM start if
			  SMT has been runtime enabled or L1D flushing
			  has been run-time enabled
			  
  - 'l1tf=flush,nowarn'	: Perform L1D flushes and no warnings are emitted.
  
  - 'l1tf=off'		: L1D flushes are not performed and no warnings
			  are emitted.

KVM can always override the L1D flushing behavior using its 'vmentry_l1d_flush'
module parameter except when lt1f=full,force is set.

This makes KVM's private 'nosmt' option redundant, and as it is a bit
non-systematic anyway (this is something to control globally, not on
hypervisor level), remove that option.

Add the missing Documentation entry for the l1tf vulnerability sysfs file
while at it.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.202758176@linutronix.de
2018-07-13 16:29:56 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner
fee0aede6f cpu/hotplug: Set CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED early
The CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED state is set (if the processor does not support
SMT) when the sysfs SMT control file is initialized.

That was fine so far as this was only required to make the output of the
control file correct and to prevent writes in that case.

With the upcoming l1tf command line parameter, this needs to be set up
before the L1TF mitigation selection and command line parsing happens.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.121795971@linutronix.de
2018-07-13 16:29:56 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner
895ae47f99 x86/kvm: Allow runtime control of L1D flush
All mitigation modes can be switched at run time with a static key now:

 - Use sysfs_streq() instead of strcmp() to handle the trailing new line
   from sysfs writes correctly.
 - Make the static key management handle multiple invocations properly.
 - Set the module parameter file to RW

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142322.954525119@linutronix.de
2018-07-13 16:29:55 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner
a7b9020b06 x86/l1tf: Handle EPT disabled state proper
If Extended Page Tables (EPT) are disabled or not supported, no L1D
flushing is required. The setup function can just avoid setting up the L1D
flush for the EPT=n case.

Invoke it after the hardware setup has be done and enable_ept has the
correct state and expose the EPT disabled state in the mitigation status as
well.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142322.612160168@linutronix.de
2018-07-13 16:29:53 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner
72c6d2db64 x86/litf: Introduce vmx status variable
Store the effective mitigation of VMX in a status variable and use it to
report the VMX state in the l1tf sysfs file.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142322.433098358@linutronix.de
2018-07-13 16:29:53 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
2989360d9c x86/intel_rdt: Fix possible circular lock dependency
Lockdep is reporting a possible circular locking dependency:

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 4.18.0-rc1-test-test+ #4 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 user_example/766 is trying to acquire lock:
 0000000073479a0f (rdtgroup_mutex){+.+.}, at: pseudo_lock_dev_mmap

 but task is already holding lock:
 000000001ef7a35b (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: vm_mmap_pgoff+0x9f/0x

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #2 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}:
        _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x70
        filldir+0x91/0x100
        dcache_readdir+0x54/0x160
        iterate_dir+0x142/0x190
        __x64_sys_getdents+0xb9/0x170
        do_syscall_64+0x86/0x200
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

 -> #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}:
        start_creating+0x60/0x100
        debugfs_create_dir+0xc/0xc0
        rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_create+0x217/0x4d0
        rdtgroup_schemata_write+0x313/0x3d0
        kernfs_fop_write+0xf0/0x1a0
        __vfs_write+0x36/0x190
        vfs_write+0xb7/0x190
        ksys_write+0x52/0xc0
        do_syscall_64+0x86/0x200
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

 -> #0 (rdtgroup_mutex){+.+.}:
        __mutex_lock+0x80/0x9b0
        pseudo_lock_dev_mmap+0x2f/0x170
        mmap_region+0x3d6/0x610
        do_mmap+0x387/0x580
        vm_mmap_pgoff+0xcf/0x110
        ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x170/0x1f0
        do_syscall_64+0x86/0x200
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   rdtgroup_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3 --> &mm->mmap_sem

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
                                lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3);
                                lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
   lock(rdtgroup_mutex);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 1 lock held by user_example/766:
  #0: 000000001ef7a35b (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: vm_mmap_pgoff+0x9f/0x110

rdtgroup_mutex is already being released temporarily during pseudo-lock
region creation to prevent the potential deadlock between rdtgroup_mutex
and mm->mmap_sem that is obtained during device_create(). Move the
debugfs creation into this area to avoid the same circular dependency.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fffb57f9c6b8285904c9a60cc91ce21591af17fe.1531332480.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-07-12 21:33:43 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
23adbe6fb5 Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86/pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Two small fixes correcting the handling of SSB mitigations on AMD
  processors"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/bugs: Fix the AMD SSBD usage of the SPEC_CTRL MSR
  x86/bugs: Update when to check for the LS_CFG SSBD mitigation
2018-07-08 13:56:25 -07:00
Jann Horn
15279df6f2 x86/mtrr: Don't copy out-of-bounds data in mtrr_write
Don't access the provided buffer out of bounds - this can cause a kernel
out-of-bounds read when invoked through sys_splice() or other things that
use kernel_write()/__kernel_write().

Fixes: 7f8ec5a4f0 ("x86/mtrr: Convert to use strncpy_from_user() helper")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180706215003.156702-1-jannh@google.com
2018-07-07 18:58:41 +02:00
Michael Kelley
7dc9b6b808 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Make TLFS #define names architecture neutral
The Hyper-V feature and hint flags in hyperv-tlfs.h are all defined
with the string "X64" in the name.  Some of these flags are indeed
x86/x64 specific, but others are not.  For the ones that are used
in architecture independent Hyper-V driver code, or will be used in
the upcoming support for Hyper-V for ARM64, this patch removes the
"X64" from the name.

This patch changes the flags that are currently known to be
used on multiple architectures. Hyper-V for ARM64 is still a
work-in-progress and the Top Level Functional Spec (TLFS) has not
been separated into x86/x64 and ARM64 areas.  So additional flags
may need to be updated later.

This patch only changes symbol names.  There are no functional
changes.

Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-03 13:09:15 +02:00
Michael Kelley
e9a7fda29a x86/hyperv: Add interrupt handler annotations
Add standard interrupt handler annotations to
hyperv_vector_handler(). This does not fix any observed
bug, but avoids potential removal of the code by link
time optimization and makes it consistent with
hv_stimer0_vector_handler in the same source file.

Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-03 13:02:28 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
612bc3b3d4 x86/bugs: Fix the AMD SSBD usage of the SPEC_CTRL MSR
On AMD, the presence of the MSR_SPEC_CTRL feature does not imply that the
SSBD mitigation support should use the SPEC_CTRL MSR. Other features could
have caused the MSR_SPEC_CTRL feature to be set, while a different SSBD
mitigation option is in place.

Update the SSBD support to check for the actual SSBD features that will
use the SPEC_CTRL MSR.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 6ac2f49edb ("x86/bugs: Add AMD's SPEC_CTRL MSR usage")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180702213602.29202.33151.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-07-03 09:45:48 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
845d382bb1 x86/bugs: Update when to check for the LS_CFG SSBD mitigation
If either the X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD or X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD features are
present, then there is no need to perform the check for the LS_CFG SSBD
mitigation support.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180702213553.29202.21089.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-07-03 09:45:48 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
33dc3e410a x86/intel_rdt: Make CPU information accessible for pseudo-locked regions
When a resource group enters pseudo-locksetup mode it reflects that the
platform supports cache pseudo-locking and the resource group is unused,
ready to be used for a pseudo-locked region. Until it is set up as a
pseudo-locked region the resource group is "locked down" such that no new
tasks or cpus can be assigned to it. This is accomplished in a user visible
way by making the cpus, cpus_list, and tasks resctrl files inaccassible
(user cannot read from or write to these files).

When the resource group changes to pseudo-locked mode it represents a cache
pseudo-locked region. While not appropriate to make any changes to the cpus
assigned to this region it is useful to make it easy for the user to see
which cpus are associated with the pseudo-locked region.

Modify the permissions of the cpus/cpus_list file when the resource group
changes to pseudo-locked mode to support reading (not writing).  The
information presented to the user when reading the file are the cpus
associated with the pseudo-locked region.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/12756b7963b6abc1bffe8fb560b87b75da827bd1.1530421961.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-07-03 08:38:40 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
392487def4 x86/intel_rdt: Support restoration of subset of permissions
As the mode of a resource group changes, the operations it can support may
also change. One way in which the supported operations are managed is to
modify the permissions of the files within the resource group's resctrl
directory.

At the moment only two possible permissions are supported: the default
permissions or no permissions in support for when the operation is "locked
down". It is possible where an operation on a resource group may have more
possibilities. For example, if by default changes can be made to the
resource group by writing to a resctrl file while the current settings can
be obtained by reading from the file, then it may be possible that in
another mode it is only possible to read the current settings, and not
change them.

Make it possible to modify some of the permissions of a resctrl file in
support of a more flexible way to manage the operations on a resource
group. In this preparation work the original behavior is maintained where
all permissions are restored.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8773aadfade7bcb2c48a45fa294a04d2c03bb0a1.1530421961.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-07-03 08:38:40 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
546d3c7427 x86/intel_rdt: Fix cleanup of plr structure on error
When a resource group enters pseudo-locksetup mode a pseudo_lock_region is
associated with it. When the user writes to the resource group's schemata
file the CBM of the requested pseudo-locked region is entered into the
pseudo_lock_region struct. If any part of pseudo-lock region creation fails
the resource group will remain in pseudo-locksetup mode with the
pseudo_lock_region associated with it.

In case of failure during pseudo-lock region creation care needs to be
taken to ensure that the pseudo_lock_region struct associated with the
resource group is cleared from any pseudo-locking data - especially the
CBM. This is because the existence of a pseudo_lock_region struct with a
CBM is significant in other areas of the code, for example, the display of
bit_usage and initialization of a new resource group.

Fix the error path of pseudo-lock region creation to ensure that the
pseudo_lock_region struct is cleared at each error exit.

Fixes: 018961ae55 ("x86/intel_rdt: Pseudo-lock region creation/removal core")
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/49b4782f6d204d122cee3499e642b2772a98d2b4.1530421026.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-07-03 08:38:39 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
ce730f1cc1 x86/intel_rdt: Move pseudo_lock_region_clear()
The pseudo_lock_region_clear() function is moved to earlier in the file in
preparation for its use in functions that currently appear before it. No
functional change.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ef098ec2a45501e23792289bff80ae3152141e2f.1530421026.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-07-03 08:38:39 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
6fc0de37f6 x86/intel_rdt: Limit C-states dynamically when pseudo-locking active
Deeper C-states impact cache content through shrinking of the cache or
flushing entire cache to memory before reducing power to the cache.
Deeper C-states will thus negatively impact the pseudo-locked regions.

To avoid impacting pseudo-locked regions C-states are limited on
pseudo-locked region creation so that cores associated with the
pseudo-locked region are prevented from entering deeper C-states.
This is accomplished by requesting a CPU latency target which will
prevent the core from entering C6 across all supported platforms.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1ef4f99dd6ba12fa6fb44c5a1141e75f952b9cd9.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-24 15:35:48 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
f3be1e7b2c x86/intel_rdt: Support L3 cache performance event of Broadwell
Broadwell microarchitecture supports pseudo-locking. Add support for
the L3 cache related performance events of these systems so that
the success of pseudo-locking can be measured more accurately on these
platforms.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/36c1414e9bd17c3faf440f32b644b9c879bcbae2.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-24 15:35:48 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
8a2fc0e1bc x86/intel_rdt: More precise L2 hit/miss measurements
Intel Goldmont processors supports non-architectural precise events that
can be used to give us more insight into the success of L2 cache
pseudo-locking on these platforms.

Introduce a new measurement trigger that will enable two precise events,
MEM_LOAD_UOPS_RETIRED.L2_HIT and MEM_LOAD_UOPS_RETIRED.L2_MISS, while
accessing pseudo-locked data. A new tracepoint, pseudo_lock_l2, is
created to make these results visible to the user.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/06b1456da65b543479dac8d9493e41f92f175d6c.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-24 15:35:48 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
746e08590b x86/intel_rdt: Create character device exposing pseudo-locked region
After a pseudo-locked region is created it needs to be made
available to user space for usage.

A character device supporting mmap() is created for each pseudo-locked
region. A user space application can now use mmap() system call to map
pseudo-locked region into its virtual address space.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fccbb9b20f07655ab0a4df9fa1c1babc0288aea0.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-24 15:35:48 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
d4e860eaf0 Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A set of fixes for x86:

   - Make Xen PV guest deal with speculative store bypass correctly

   - Address more fallout from the 5-Level pagetable handling. Undo an
     __initdata annotation to avoid section mismatch and malfunction
     when post init code would touch the freed variable.

   - Handle exception fixup in math_error() before calling notify_die().
     The reverse call order incorrectly triggers notify_die() listeners
     for soemthing which is handled correctly at the site which issues
     the floating point instruction.

   - Fix an off by one in the LLC topology calculation on AMD

   - Handle non standard memory block sizes gracefully un UV platforms

   - Plug a memory leak in the microcode loader

   - Sanitize the purgatory build magic

   - Add the x86 specific device tree bindings directory to the x86
     MAINTAINER file patterns"

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/mm: Fix 'no5lvl' handling
  Revert "x86/mm: Mark __pgtable_l5_enabled __initdata"
  x86/CPU/AMD: Fix LLC ID bit-shift calculation
  MAINTAINERS: Add file patterns for x86 device tree bindings
  x86/microcode/intel: Fix memleak in save_microcode_patch()
  x86/platform/UV: Add kernel parameter to set memory block size
  x86/platform/UV: Use new set memory block size function
  x86/platform/UV: Add adjustable set memory block size function
  x86/build: Remove unnecessary preparation for purgatory
  Revert "kexec/purgatory: Add clean-up for purgatory directory"
  x86/xen: Add call of speculative_store_bypass_ht_init() to PV paths
  x86: Call fixup_exception() before notify_die() in math_error()
2018-06-24 19:59:52 +08:00
Linus Torvalds
177d363e72 Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 pti fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Two small updates for the speculative distractions:

   - Make it more clear to the compiler that array_index_mask_nospec()
     is not subject for optimizations. It's not perfect, but ...

   - Don't report XEN PV guests as vulnerable because their mitigation
     state depends on the hypervisor. Report unknown and refer to the
     hypervisor requirement"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/spectre_v1: Disable compiler optimizations over array_index_mask_nospec()
  x86/pti: Don't report XenPV as vulnerable
2018-06-24 19:48:30 +08:00
Linus Torvalds
a43de48993 Merge branch 'ras-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull ras fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A set of fixes for RAS/MCE:

   - Improve the error message when the kernel cannot recover from a MCE
     so the maximum amount of information gets provided.

   - Individually check MCE recovery features on SkyLake CPUs instead of
     assuming none when the CAPID0 register does not advertise the
     general ability for recovery.

   - Prevent MCE to output inconsistent messages which first show an
     error location and then claim that the source is unknown.

   - Prevent overwriting MCi_STATUS in the attempt to gather more
     information when a fatal MCE has alreay been detected. This leads
     to empty status values in the printout and failing to react
     promptly on the fatal event"

* 'ras-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/mce: Fix incorrect "Machine check from unknown source" message
  x86/mce: Do not overwrite MCi_STATUS in mce_no_way_out()
  x86/mce: Check for alternate indication of machine check recovery on Skylake
  x86/mce: Improve error message when kernel cannot recover
2018-06-24 19:22:19 +08:00
Kirill A. Shutemov
2458e53ff7 x86/mm: Fix 'no5lvl' handling
early_identify_cpu() has to use early version of pgtable_l5_enabled()
that doesn't rely on cpu_feature_enabled().

Defining USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 before all includes does the trick.

I lost the define in one of reworks of the original patch.

Fixes: 372fddf709 ("x86/mm: Introduce the 'no5lvl' kernel parameter")
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180622220841.54135-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2018-06-23 14:20:37 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
443810fe61 x86/intel_rdt: Create debugfs files for pseudo-locking testing
There is no simple yes/no test to determine if pseudo-locking was
successful. In order to test pseudo-locking we expose a debugfs file for
each pseudo-locked region that will record the latency of reading the
pseudo-locked memory at a stride of 32 bytes (hardcoded). These numbers
will give us an idea of locking was successful or not since they will
reflect cache hits and cache misses (hardware prefetching is disabled
during the test).

The new debugfs file "pseudo_lock_measure" will, when the
pseudo_lock_mem_latency tracepoint is enabled, record the latency of
accessing each cache line twice.

Kernel tracepoints offer us histograms (when CONFIG_HIST_TRIGGERS is
enabled) that is a simple way to visualize the memory access latency
and immediately see any cache misses. For example, the hist trigger
below before trigger of the measurement will display the memory access
latency and instances at each latency:
echo 'hist:keys=latency' > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/resctrl/\
                           pseudo_lock_mem_latency/trigger
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/resctrl/pseudo_lock_mem_latency/enable
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/resctrl/<newlock>/pseudo_lock_measure
echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/resctrl/pseudo_lock_mem_latency/enable
cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/resctrl/pseudo_lock_mem_latency/hist

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6b2ea76181099d1b79ccfa7d3be24497ab2d1a45.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:51 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
37707ec6cb x86/intel_rdt: Create resctrl debug area
In preparation for support of debugging of RDT sub features the user can
now enable a RDT debugfs region.

The debug area is always enabled when CONFIG_DEBUG_FS is set as advised in
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180523080501.GA6822@kroah.com

Also from same discussion in above linked email, no error checking on the
debugfs creation return value since code should not behave differently when
debugging passes or fails. Even on failure the returned value can be passed
safely to other debugfs calls.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9f553faf30866a6317f1aaaa2fe9f92de66a10d2.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:51 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
0af6a48da4 x86/intel_rdt: Ensure RDT cleanup on exit
The RDT system's initialization does not have the corresponding exit
handling to ensure everything initialized on load is cleaned up also.

Introduce the cleanup routines that complement all initialization. This
includes the removal of a duplicate rdtgroup_init() declaration.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a9e3a2bbd731d13915d2d7bf05d4f675b4fa109b.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:50 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
f4e80d67a5 x86/intel_rdt: Resctrl files reflect pseudo-locked information
Information about resources as well as resource groups are contained in a
variety of resctrl files. Now that pseudo-locked regions can be created the
files can be updated to present appropriate information to the user.

Update the resource group's schemata file to show only the information of
the pseudo-locked region.

Update the resource group's size file to show the size in bytes of only the
pseudo-locked region.

Update the bit_usage file to use the letter 'P' for all pseudo-locked
regions.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5ece82869b651c2178b278e00bca959f7626b6e9.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:50 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
e0bdfe8e36 x86/intel_rdt: Support creation/removal of pseudo-locked region
The user triggers the creation of a pseudo-locked region when writing a
valid schemata to the schemata file of a resource group in the
pseudo-locksetup mode.

A valid schemata is one that: (1) does not overlap with any other resource
group, (2) does not involve a cache that already contains a pseudo-locked
region within its hierarchy.

After a valid schemata is parsed the system is programmed to associate the
to be pseudo-lock bitmask with the closid associated with the resource
group. With the system set up the pseudo-locked region can be created.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8929c3a9e2ba600e79649abe584aa28b8d0ff639.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:50 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
018961ae55 x86/intel_rdt: Pseudo-lock region creation/removal core
The user requests a pseudo-locked region by providing a schemata to a
resource group that is in the pseudo-locksetup mode. This is the
functionality that consumes the parsed user data and creates the
pseudo-locked region.

First, required information is deduced from user provided data.
This includes, how much memory does the requested bitmask represent,
which CPU the requested region is associated with, and what is the
cache line size of that cache (to learn the stride needed for locking).
Second, a contiguous block of memory matching the requested bitmask is
allocated.

Finally, pseudo-locking is performed. The resource group already has the
allocation that reflects the requested bitmask. With this class of service
active and interference minimized, the allocated memory is loaded into the
cache.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/67391160bbf06143bc62d856d3d234eb152008b7.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:49 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
f2a177292b x86/intel_rdt: Discover supported platforms via prefetch disable bits
Knowing the model specific prefetch disable bits is required to support
cache pseudo-locking because the hardware prefetchers need to be disabled
when the kernel memory is pseudo-locked to cache. We add these bits only
for platforms known to support cache pseudo-locking.

When the user requests locksetup mode to be entered it will fail if the
prefetch disabling bits are not known for the platform.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3eef559aa9fd693a104ff99ff909cfee450c1695.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:49 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
72d5050566 x86/intel_rdt: Add utilities to test pseudo-locked region possibility
A pseudo-locked region does not have a class of service associated with
it and thus not tracked in the array of control values maintained as
part of the domain. Even so, when the user provides a new bitmask for
another resource group it needs to be checked for interference with
existing pseudo-locked regions.

Additionally only one pseudo-locked region can be created in any cache
hierarchy.

Introduce two utilities in support of above scenarios: (1) a utility
that can be used to test if a given capacity bitmask overlaps with any
pseudo-locked regions associated with a particular cache instance, (2) a
utility that can be used to test if a pseudo-locked region exists within
a particular cache hierarchy.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b8e31dbdcf22ddf71df46072647b47e7558abb32.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:49 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
17eafd0762 x86/intel_rdt: Split resource group removal in two
Resource groups used for pseudo-locking do not require the same work on
removal as the other resource groups.

The resource group removal is split in two in preparation for support of
pseudo-locking resource groups. A single re-ordering occurs - the
setting of the rdtgrp flag is moved to later. This flag is not used by
any of the code between its original and new location.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c8cbf7a7c72480b39bb946a929dbae96c0f9aca1.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:48 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
dfe9674b04 x86/intel_rdt: Enable entering of pseudo-locksetup mode
The user can request entering pseudo-locksetup mode by writing
"pseudo-locksetup" to the mode file. Act on this request as well as
support switching from a pseudo-locksetup mode (before pseudo-locked
mode was entered). It is not supported to modify the mode once
pseudo-locked mode has been entered.

The schemata reflects the new mode by adding "uninitialized" to all
resources. The size resctrl file reports zero for all cache domains in
support of the uninitialized nature. Since there are no users of this
class of service its allocations can be ignored when searching for
appropriate default allocations for new resource groups. For the same
reason resource groups in pseudo-locksetup mode are not considered when
testing if new resource groups may overlap.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/56f553334708022903c296284e62db3bbc1ff150.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:48 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
63657c1cdf x86/intel_rdt: Support enter/exit of locksetup mode
The locksetup mode is the way in which the user communicates that the
resource group will be used for a pseudo-locked region. Locksetup mode
should thus ensure that all restrictions on a resource group are met before
locksetup mode can be entered. The resource group should also be configured
to ensure that it cannot be modified in unsupported ways when a
pseudo-locked region.

Introduce the support where the request for entering locksetup mode can be
validated. This includes: CDP is not active, no cpus or tasks are assigned
to the resource group, monitoring is not in progress on the resource
group. Once the resource group is determined ready for a pseudo-locked
region it is configured to not allow future changes to these properties.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b120f71ced30116bcc6c6f651e8a7906ae6b903d.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:47 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
e8140a2d13 x86/intel_rdt: Introduce pseudo-locked region
A pseudo-locked region is introduced representing an instance of a
pseudo-locked cache region. Each cache instance (domain) can support one
pseudo-locked region. Similarly a resource group can be used for one
pseudo-locked region.

Include a pointer to a pseudo-locked region from the domain and resource
group structures.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9f69eb159051067703bcbc714de62e69874d5dee.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:47 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
bbcee99b67 x86/intel_rdt: Add check to determine if monitoring in progress
When a resource group is pseudo-locked it is orphaned without a class of
service associated with it. We thus do not want any monitoring in progress
on a resource group that will be used for pseudo-locking.

Introduce a test that can be used to determine if pseudo-locking in
progress on a resource group. Temporarily mark it as unused to avoid
compile warnings until it is used.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/14fd9494f87ca72a213b3a197d1172d4e66ae196.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:47 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
2a5d76a4fc x86/intel_rdt: Utilities to restrict/restore access to specific files
In support of Cache Pseudo-Locking we need to restrict access to specific
resctrl files to protect the state of a resource group used for
pseudo-locking from being changed in unsupported ways.

Introduce two utilities that can be used to either restrict or restore the
access to all files irrelevant to cache pseudo-locking when pseudo-locking
in progress for the resource group.

At this time introduce a new source file, intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.c, that
will contain most of the code related to cache pseudo-locking.

Temporarily mark these new functions as unused to silence compile warnings
until they are used.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ab6319d1244366be3f9b7f9fba1c3da4810a274b.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:46 +02:00
Reinette Chatre
c966dac8a5 x86/intel_rdt: Protect against resource group changes during locking
We intend to modify file permissions to make the "tasks", "cpus", and
"cpus_list" not accessible to the user when cache pseudo-locking in
progress. Even so, it is still possible for the user to force the file
permissions (using chmod) to make them writeable. Similarly, directory
permissions will be modified to prevent future monitor group creation but
the user can override these restrictions also.

Add additional checks to the files we intend to restrict to ensure that no
modifications from user space are attempted while setting up a
pseudo-locking or after a pseudo-locked region is set up.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Cc: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0c5cb006e81ead0b8bfff2df530c5d3017fd31d1.1529706536.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
2018-06-23 13:03:46 +02:00