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x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs
If spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled, RSB is filled on context switch in order to protect from various classes of spectrev2 attacks. If this mitigation is enabled, say so in sysfs for spectrev2. Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438580.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
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@ -874,10 +874,11 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
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return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
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case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
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ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
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ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
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boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
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boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
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(x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "",
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boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
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spectre_v2_module_string());
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return ret;
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