Update the KVM support to work with SME. The VMCB has a number of fields
where physical addresses are used and these addresses must contain the
memory encryption mask in order to properly access the encrypted memory.
Also, use the memory encryption mask when creating and using the nested
page tables.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/89146eccfa50334409801ff20acd52a90fb5efcf.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Since video memory needs to be accessed decrypted, be sure that the
memory encryption mask is not set for the video ranges.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a19436f30424402e01f63a09b32ab103272acced.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add support to check if memory encryption is active in the kernel and that
it has been enabled on the AP. If memory encryption is active in the kernel
but has not been enabled on the AP, then set the memory encryption bit (bit
23) of MSR_K8_SYSCFG to enable memory encryption on that AP and allow the
AP to continue start up.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/37e29b99c395910f56ca9f8ecf7b0439b28827c8.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The IOMMU is programmed with physical addresses for the various tables
and buffers that are used to communicate between the device and the
driver. When the driver allocates this memory it is encrypted. In order
for the IOMMU to access the memory as encrypted the encryption mask needs
to be included in these physical addresses during configuration.
The PTE entries created by the IOMMU should also include the encryption
mask so that when the device behind the IOMMU performs a DMA, the DMA
will be performed to encrypted memory.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: <iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3053631ea25ba8b1601c351cb7c541c496f6d9bc.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Move the setting of the cpuinfo_x86.microcode field from amd_init() to
early_amd_init() so that it is available earlier in the boot process. This
avoids having to read MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL directly during early boot.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7b7525fa12593dac5f4b01fcc25c95f97e93862f.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add warnings to let the user know when bounce buffers are being used for
DMA when SME is active. Since the bounce buffers are not in encrypted
memory, these notifications are to allow the user to determine some
appropriate action - if necessary. Actions can range from utilizing an
IOMMU, replacing the device with another device that can support 64-bit
DMA, ignoring the message if the device isn't used much, etc.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d112564053c3f2e86ca634a8d4fa4abc0eb53a6a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Since DMA addresses will effectively look like 48-bit addresses when the
memory encryption mask is set, SWIOTLB is needed if the DMA mask of the
device performing the DMA does not support 48-bits. SWIOTLB will be
initialized to create decrypted bounce buffers for use by these devices.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aa2d29b78ae7d508db8881e46a3215231b9327a7.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
When Secure Memory Encryption is enabled, the trampoline area must not
be encrypted. A CPU running in real mode will not be able to decrypt
memory that has been encrypted because it will not be able to use addresses
with the memory encryption mask.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c70ffd2614fa77e80df31c9169ca98a9b16ff97c.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute for one or more
memory pages. This will be useful when we have to change the AP trampoline
area to not be encrypted. Or when we need to change the SWIOTLB area to
not be encrypted in support of devices that can't support the encryption
mask range.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/924ae0d1f6d4c90c5a0e366c291b90a2d86aa79e.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Persistent memory is expected to persist across reboots. The encryption
key used by SME will change across reboots which will result in corrupted
persistent memory. Persistent memory is handed out by block devices
through memory remapping functions, so be sure not to map this memory as
encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7d829302d8fdc85f3d9505fc3eb8ec0c3a3e1cbf.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The SMP MP-table is built by UEFI and placed in memory in a decrypted
state. These tables are accessed using a mix of early_memremap(),
early_memunmap(), phys_to_virt() and virt_to_phys(). Change all accesses
to use early_memremap()/early_memunmap(). This allows for proper setting
of the encryption mask so that the data can be successfully accessed when
SME is active.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d9464b0d7c861021ed8f494e4a40d6cd10f1eddd.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Boot data (such as EFI related data) is not encrypted when the system is
booted because UEFI/BIOS does not run with SME active. In order to access
this data properly it needs to be mapped decrypted.
Update early_memremap() to provide an arch specific routine to modify the
pagetable protection attributes before they are applied to the new
mapping. This is used to remove the encryption mask for boot related data.
Update memremap() to provide an arch specific routine to determine if RAM
remapping is allowed. RAM remapping will cause an encrypted mapping to be
generated. By preventing RAM remapping, ioremap_cache() will be used
instead, which will provide a decrypted mapping of the boot related data.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/81fb6b4117a5df6b9f2eda342f81bbef4b23d2e5.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
When SME is active, pagetable entries created for EFI need to have the
encryption mask set as necessary.
When the new pagetable pages are allocated they are mapped encrypted. So,
update the efi_pgt value that will be used in CR3 to include the encryption
mask so that the PGD table can be read successfully. The pagetable mapping
as well as the kernel are also added to the pagetable mapping as encrypted.
All other EFI mappings are mapped decrypted (tables, etc.).
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9a8f4c502db4a84b09e2f0a1555bb75aa8b69785.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The efi_mem_type() function currently returns a 0, which maps to
EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, if the function is unable to find a memmap entry for
the supplied physical address. Returning EFI_RESERVED_TYPE implies that
a memmap entry exists, when it doesn't. Instead of returning 0, change
the function to return a negative error value when no memmap entry is
found.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7fbf40a9dc414d5da849e1ddcd7f7c1285e4e181.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted
state and are copied early in the boot process. The early page fault
support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy
them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied.
For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of
the initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed
properly.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bb0d430b41efefd45ee515aaf0979dcfda8b6a44.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add support to be able to either encrypt or decrypt data in place during
the early stages of booting the kernel. This does not change the memory
encryption attribute - it is used for ensuring that data present in either
an encrypted or decrypted memory area is in the proper state (for example
the initrd will have been loaded by the boot loader and will not be
encrypted, but the memory that it resides in is marked as encrypted).
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f9968e9432cd6c4b57ef245729be04ff18852225.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add early_memremap() support to be able to specify encrypted and
decrypted mappings with and without write-protection. The use of
write-protection is necessary when encrypting data "in place". The
write-protect attribute is considered cacheable for loads, but not
stores. This implies that the hardware will never give the core a
dirty line with this memtype.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/479b5832c30fae3efa7932e48f81794e86397229.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The CR3 register entry can contain the SME encryption mask that indicates
the PGD is encrypted. The encryption mask should not be used when
creating a virtual address from the CR3 register, so remove the SME
encryption mask in the read_cr3_pa() function.
During early boot SME will need to use a native version of read_cr3_pa(),
so create native_read_cr3_pa().
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/767b085c384a46f67f451f8589903a462c7ff68a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to
be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these
macros. Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular
pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and
_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC) to allow for early pagetable creation/initialization
without the encryption mask before SME becomes active. Two new pgprot()
macros are defined to allow setting or clearing the page encryption mask.
The FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE define is introduced for use with MMIO. SME does
not support encryption for MMIO areas so this define removes the encryption
mask from the page attribute.
Two new macros are introduced (__sme_pa() / __sme_pa_nodebug()) to allow
creating a physical address with the encryption mask. These are used when
working with the cr3 register so that the PGD can be encrypted. The current
__va() macro is updated so that the virtual address is generated based off
of the physical address without the encryption mask thus allowing the same
virtual address to be generated regardless of whether encryption is enabled
for that physical location or not.
Also, an early initialization function is added for SME. If SME is active,
this function:
- Updates the early_pmd_flags so that early page faults create mappings
with the encryption mask.
- Updates the __supported_pte_mask to include the encryption mask.
- Updates the protection_map entries to include the encryption mask so
that user-space allocations will automatically have the encryption mask
applied.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b36e952c4c39767ae7f0a41cf5345adf27438480.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Create a pgd_pfn() macro similar to the p[4um]d_pfn() macros and then
use the p[g4um]d_pfn() macros in the p[g4um]d_page() macros instead of
duplicating the code.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e61eb533a6d0aac941db2723d8aa63ef6b882dee.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt
the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory
encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption.
The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are
stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e52ad781f085224bf835b3caff9aa3aee6febccb.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Currently there is a check if the address being mapped is in the ISA
range (is_ISA_range()), and if it is, then phys_to_virt() is used to
perform the mapping. When SME is active, the default is to add pagetable
mappings with the encryption bit set unless specifically overridden. The
resulting pagetable mapping from phys_to_virt() will result in a mapping
that has the encryption bit set. With SME, the use of ioremap() is
intended to generate pagetable mappings that do not have the encryption
bit set through the use of the PAGE_KERNEL_IO protection value.
Rather than special case the SME scenario, remove the ISA range check and
usage of phys_to_virt() and have ISA range mappings continue through the
remaining ioremap() path.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/88ada7b09c6568c61cd696351eb59fb15a82ce1a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support
provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and
defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent
patches to mark pages as encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a6c34d16caaed3bc3e2d6f0987554275bd291554.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the
Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature. SME is identified by CPUID
0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of
MSR_K8_SYSCFG). Only show the SME feature as available if reported by
CPUID, enabled by BIOS and not configured as CONFIG_X86_32=y.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/85c17ff450721abccddc95e611ae8df3f4d9718b.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The ioremap() function is intended for mapping MMIO. For RAM, the
memremap() function should be used. Convert calls from ioremap() to
memremap() when re-mapping RAM.
This will be used later by SME to control how the encryption mask is
applied to memory mappings, with certain memory locations being mapped
decrypted vs encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b13fccb9abbd547a7eef7b1fdfc223431b211c88.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The SME patches we are about to apply add some E820 logic, so merge in
pending E820 code changes first, to have a single code base.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The original function process_e820_entry() only takes care of each
e820 entry passed.
And move the E820_TYPE_RAM checking logic into process_e820_entries().
And remove the redundent local variable 'addr' definition in
find_random_phys_addr().
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com
Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Cc: thgarnie@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1499603862-11516-2-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull sparc fixes from David Miller:
- Fix DMA regression in 4.13 merge window, only certain chips can do
64-bit DMA. From Dave Dushar.
- Correct cpu cross-call algorithm to correctly detect stalled or stuck
remote cpus, from Jane Chu.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/sparc:
sparc64: Measure receiver forward progress to avoid send mondo timeout
SPARC64: Fix sun4v DMA panic
Pull irq fix from Thomas Gleixner:
"Fix the fallout from reworking the locking and resource management in
request/free_irq()"
* 'irq-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
genirq: Keep chip buslock across irq_request/release_resources()
Pull SMP fix from Thomas Gleixner:
"Replace the bogus BUG_ON in the cpu hotplug code"
* 'smp-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
smp/hotplug: Replace BUG_ON and react useful
The regmap support for w1 was added shortly before a reorganization of
the w1 headers. While this was noticed before the merge window and
efforts made to get it resolved in what was sent that managed to fall
through the cracks, this cleans up and updates things so we look for the
header in the new location.
It didn't cause build failures as the driver that's going to be the
first user got held up with other review issues.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQFHBAABCAAxFiEEreZoqmdXGLWf4p/qJNaLcl1Uh9AFAlls0vwTHGJyb29uaWVA
a2VybmVsLm9yZwAKCRAk1otyXVSH0IpHB/9gKh1HGwiHCoounV2nrMaIFp9DK+st
pSyiOtDa05Ro2mTJbYcbe/DA3VeI6CXSCzcDsiraSh7XijDISSPi771BO265Ihl2
jykj4xnItZeC8DQJUNU5wFS2Z2XuhsEkoeEDTneqIS8sO6nqQXd17sD1GRca5cBj
8PgGzqLLm69ecwnZMKxLHGOQ1LoQlTiGivCQ2Dd0wmKHD0PRkVt0tnoin+0p7NK5
/rVBXkmo8LfluK++SfnDLJW156ysY593dL1DNOAzMsQg88XCkhuNk4RmPajEGtOP
NG+C+0L7fy4rvudoTpYvKI6jq84zwNkTuCZW6zzvGwYtqRdKy6s83dXe
=LSKy
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'regmap-fix-w1-merge-window' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/regmap
Pull regmap fix from Mark Brown:
"Fix build due to w1 header refactoring
The regmap support for w1 was added shortly before a reorganization of
the w1 headers. While this was noticed before the merge window and
efforts made to get it resolved in what was sent that managed to fall
through the cracks, this cleans up and updates things so we look for
the header in the new location.
It didn't cause build failures as the driver that's going to be the
first user got held up with other review issues"
* tag 'regmap-fix-w1-merge-window' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/regmap:
regmap: regmap-w1: Fix build troubles
This is actually just a small set of mainly bug fixes for the original
merge window code plus a few trivial updates and qedi boot from SAN
support feature patch.
Signed-off-by: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2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=XhC/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi
Pull SCSI fixes from James Bottomley:
"This is actually just a small set of mainly bug fixes for the original
merge window code plus a few trivial updates and qedi boot from SAN
support feature patch"
* tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi:
scsi: libfc: pass an error pointer to fc_disc_error()
scsi: hisi_sas: make several const arrays static
scsi: qla2xxx: Off by one in qlt_ctio_to_cmd()
scsi: sg: fix SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV transfers
scsi: virtio_scsi: always read VPD pages for multiqueue too
scsi: qedf: fix spelling mistake: "offlading" -> "offloading"
scsi: qedi: fix another spelling mistake: "alloction" -> "allocation"
scsi: isci: fix typo in function names
scsi: cxlflash: return -EFAULT if copy_from_user() fails
scsi: qedi: Add support for Boot from SAN over iSCSI offload
Several variables had their types changed from unsigned long to u32,
but the printk()-style format to print them wasn't updated, leading to:
arch/blackfin/kernel/flat.c: In function 'bfin_get_addr_from_rp':
arch/blackfin/kernel/flat.c:35:3: warning: format '%lx' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 2 has type 'u32' [-Wformat]
arch/blackfin/kernel/flat.c: In function 'bfin_put_addr_at_rp':
arch/blackfin/kernel/flat.c:80:3: warning: format '%lx' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 2 has type 'u32' [-Wformat]
Fixes: 468138d785 ("binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fixes: cc5d0db390 ("regmap: Add 1-Wire bus support")
Commit de0d6dbdbd ("w1: Add subsystem kernel public interface")
Fix place off w1.h header file
Cosmetic: Fix company name (local to international)
Signed-off-by: Alex A. Mihaylov <minimumlaw@rambler.ru>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
In file included from include/linux/flat.h:13:0,
from fs/binfmt_flat.c:36:
arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h: In function 'flat_get_addr_from_rp':
arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h:28:3: error: expected ')' before 'val'
val &= 0x00ffffff;
^
arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h:31:1: error: expected expression before '}' token
}
^
In file included from include/linux/flat.h:13:0,
from fs/binfmt_flat.c:36:
arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h:26:6: warning: unused variable 'val' [-Wunused-variable]
u32 val = get_unaligned((__force u32 *)rp);
^
In file included from include/linux/flat.h:13:0,
from fs/binfmt_flat.c:36:
arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h:31:1: warning: no return statement in function returning non-void [-Wreturn-type]
}
^
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Fixes: 468138d785 ("binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Several variables had their types changed from unsigned long to u32, but
the arch-specific implementations of flat_set_persistent() weren't
updated, leading to compiler warnings on blackfin and m68k:
fs/binfmt_flat.c: In function ‘load_flat_file’:
fs/binfmt_flat.c:799: warning: passing argument 2 of ‘flat_set_persistent’ from incompatible pointer type
Fixes: 468138d785 ("binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Several variables had their types changed from unsigned long to u32, but
the printk()-style format to print them wasn't updated, leading to:
fs/binfmt_flat.c: In function ‘load_flat_file’:
fs/binfmt_flat.c:577: warning: format ‘%ld’ expects type ‘long int’, but argument 3 has type ‘u32’
Fixes: 468138d785 ("binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
without incorporating them into the Sphinx tree. The hope is to bring some
uniformity to kernel documentation and, perhaps more importantly, have our
existing docs serve as an example of the desired formatting for those that
will be added later.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=HvQS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'standardize-docs' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation format standardization from Jonathan Corbet:
"This series converts a number of top-level documents to the RST format
without incorporating them into the Sphinx tree. The hope is to bring
some uniformity to kernel documentation and, perhaps more importantly,
have our existing docs serve as an example of the desired formatting
for those that will be added later.
Mauro has gone through and fixed up a lot of top-level documentation
files to make them conform to the RST format, but without moving or
renaming them in any way. This will help when we incorporate the ones
we want to keep into the Sphinx doctree, but the real purpose is to
bring a bit of uniformity to our documentation and let the top-level
docs serve as examples for those writing new ones"
* tag 'standardize-docs' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (84 commits)
docs: kprobes.txt: Fix whitespacing
tee.txt: standardize document format
cgroup-v2.txt: standardize document format
dell_rbu.txt: standardize document format
zorro.txt: standardize document format
xz.txt: standardize document format
xillybus.txt: standardize document format
vfio.txt: standardize document format
vfio-mediated-device.txt: standardize document format
unaligned-memory-access.txt: standardize document format
this_cpu_ops.txt: standardize document format
svga.txt: standardize document format
static-keys.txt: standardize document format
smsc_ece1099.txt: standardize document format
SM501.txt: standardize document format
siphash.txt: standardize document format
sgi-ioc4.txt: standardize document format
SAK.txt: standardize document format
rpmsg.txt: standardize document format
robust-futexes.txt: standardize document format
...
callers can more safely get random bytes if they can block until the
CRNG is initialized.
Also print a warning if get_random_*() is called before the CRNG is
initialized. By default, only one single-line warning will be printed
per boot. If CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is defined, then a
warning will be printed for each function which tries to get random
bytes before the CRNG is initialized. This can get spammy for certain
architecture types, so it is not enabled by default.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQEzBAABCAAdFiEEK2m5VNv+CHkogTfJ8vlZVpUNgaMFAllqXNUACgkQ8vlZVpUN
gaPtAgf/aUbXZuWYsDQzslHsbzEWi+qz4QgL885/w4L00pEImTTp91Q06SDxWhtB
KPvGnZHS3IofxBh2DC+6AwN6dPMoWDCfYhhO6po3FSz0DiPRIQCTuvOb8fhKY1X7
rTdDq2xtDxPGxJ25bMJtlrgzH2XlXPpVyPUeoc9uh87zUK5aesXpUn9kBniRexoz
ume+M/cDzPKkwNQpbLq8vzhNjoWMVv0FeW2akVvrjkkWko8nZLZ0R/kIyKQlRPdG
LZDXcz0oTHpDS6+ufEo292ZuWm2IGer2YtwHsKyCAsyEWsUqBz2yurtkSj3mAVyC
hHafyS+5WNaGdgBmg0zJxxwn5qxxLg==
=ua7p
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull random updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Add wait_for_random_bytes() and get_random_*_wait() functions so that
callers can more safely get random bytes if they can block until the
CRNG is initialized.
Also print a warning if get_random_*() is called before the CRNG is
initialized. By default, only one single-line warning will be printed
per boot. If CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is defined, then a
warning will be printed for each function which tries to get random
bytes before the CRNG is initialized. This can get spammy for certain
architecture types, so it is not enabled by default"
* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
random: reorder READ_ONCE() in get_random_uXX
random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness
random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
net/route: use get_random_int for random counter
net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random
rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd
ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using
iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use
cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random
random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family
random: add wait_for_random_bytes() API
Pull ->s_options removal from Al Viro:
"Preparations for fsmount/fsopen stuff (coming next cycle). Everything
gets moved to explicit ->show_options(), killing ->s_options off +
some cosmetic bits around fs/namespace.c and friends. Basically, the
stuff needed to work with fsmount series with minimum of conflicts
with other work.
It's not strictly required for this merge window, but it would reduce
the PITA during the coming cycle, so it would be nice to have those
bits and pieces out of the way"
* 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
isofs: Fix isofs_show_options()
VFS: Kill off s_options and helpers
orangefs: Implement show_options
9p: Implement show_options
isofs: Implement show_options
afs: Implement show_options
affs: Implement show_options
befs: Implement show_options
spufs: Implement show_options
bpf: Implement show_options
ramfs: Implement show_options
pstore: Implement show_options
omfs: Implement show_options
hugetlbfs: Implement show_options
VFS: Don't use save/replace_mount_options if not using generic_show_options
VFS: Provide empty name qstr
VFS: Make get_filesystem() return the affected filesystem
VFS: Clean up whitespace in fs/namespace.c and fs/super.c
Provide a function to create a NUL-terminated string from unterminated data
Pull more __copy_.._user elimination from Al Viro.
* 'work.__copy_to_user' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
drm_dp_aux_dev: switch to read_iter/write_iter
Pull uacess-unaligned removal from Al Viro:
"That stuff had just one user, and an exotic one, at that - binfmt_flat
on arm and m68k"
* 'work.uaccess-unaligned' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
kill {__,}{get,put}_user_unaligned()
binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail
