L1 is responsible for dirtying GUEST_GRP1 if it writes GUEST_BNDCFGS.
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM unconditionally intercepts WRMSR to MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR. In the
unlikely event that L1 allows L2 to write L1's MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, but
but saves L2's value on VM-Exit, update vmcs12 during L2's WRMSR so as
to eliminate the need to VMREAD the value from vmcs02 on nested VM-Exit.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For L2, KVM always intercepts WRMSR to SYSENTER MSRs. Update vmcs12 in
the WRMSR handler so that they don't need to be (re)read from vmcs02 on
every nested VM-Exit.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
As alluded to by the TODO comment, KVM unconditionally intercepts writes
to the PAT MSR. In the unlikely event that L1 allows L2 to write L1's
PAT directly but saves L2's PAT on VM-Exit, update vmcs12 when L2 writes
the PAT. This eliminates the need to VMREAD the value from vmcs02 on
VM-Exit as vmcs12 is already up to date in all situations.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
If nested_get_vmcs12_pages() fails to map L1's APIC_ACCESS_ADDR into
L2, then it disables SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES in vmcs02.
In other words, the APIC_ACCESS_ADDR in vmcs02 is guaranteed to be
written with the correct value before being consumed by hardware, drop
the unneessary VMWRITE.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR in vmcs02 is guaranteed to be updated before
it is consumed by hardware, either in nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode()
or via the KVM_REQ_GET_VMCS12_PAGES callback. Avoid an extra VMWRITE
and only stuff a bad value into vmcs02 when mapping vmcs12's address
fails. This also eliminates the need for extra comments to connect the
dots between prepare_vmcs02_early() and nested_get_vmcs12_pages().
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
... as a malicious userspace can run a toy guest to generate invalid
virtual-APIC page addresses in L1, i.e. flood the kernel log with error
messages.
Fixes: 690908104e ("KVM: nVMX: allow tests to use bad virtual-APIC page address")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02, there is no need to update
state tracking for values that aren't tied to any particular VMCS as
the per-vCPU values are already up-to-date (vmx_switch_vmcs() can only
be called when the vCPU is loaded).
Avoiding the update eliminates a RDMSR, and potentially a RDPKRU and
posted-interrupt update (cmpxchg64() and more).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02, KVM isn't actually switching
between guest and host. If guest state is already loaded (the likely,
if not guaranteed, case), keep the guest state loaded and manually swap
the loaded_cpu_state pointer after propagating saved host state to the
new vmcs0{1,2}.
Avoiding the switch between guest and host reduces the latency of
switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02 by several hundred cycles, and
reduces the roundtrip time of a nested VM by upwards of 1000 cycles.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
vmx->loaded_cpu_state can only be NULL or equal to vmx->loaded_vmcs,
so change it to a bool. Because the direction of the bool is
now the opposite of vmx->guest_msrs_dirty, change the direction of
vmx->guest_msrs_dirty so that they match.
Finally, do not imply that MSRs have to be reloaded when
vmx->guest_state_loaded is false; instead, set vmx->guest_msrs_ready
to false explicitly in vmx_prepare_switch_to_host.
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Emulation of GUEST_PML_INDEX for a nested VMM is a bit weird. Because
L0 flushes the PML on every VM-Exit, the value in vmcs02 at the time of
VM-Enter is a constant -1, regardless of what L1 thinks/wants.
Fixes: 09abe32002 ("KVM: nVMX: split pieces of prepare_vmcs02() to prepare_vmcs02_early()")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM doesn't yet support SGX virtualization, i.e. writes a constant value
to ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP so that it can intercept ENCLS and inject a #UD.
Fixes: 0b665d3040 ("KVM: vmx: Inject #UD for SGX ENCLS instruction in guest")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
If L1 does not set VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS, then L1's BNDCFGS value must
be propagated to vmcs02 since KVM always runs with VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS
when MPX is supported. Because the value effectively comes from vmcs01,
vmcs02 must be updated even if vmcs12 is clean.
Fixes: 62cf9bd811 ("KVM: nVMX: Fix emulation of VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The behavior of WRMSR is in no way dependent on whether or not KVM
consumes the value.
Fixes: 4566654bb9 ("KVM: vmx: Inject #GP on invalid PAT CR")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
These function do not prepare the entire state of the vmcs02, only the
rarely needed parts. Rename them to make this clearer.
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Many guest fields are rarely read (or written) by VMMs, i.e. likely
aren't accessed between runs of a nested VMCS. Delay pulling rarely
accessed guest fields from vmcs02 until they are VMREAD or until vmcs12
is dirtied. The latter case is necessary because nested VM-Entry will
consume all manner of fields when vmcs12 is dirty, e.g. for consistency
checks.
Note, an alternative to synchronizing all guest fields on VMREAD would
be to read *only* the field being accessed, but switching VMCS pointers
is expensive and odds are good if one guest field is being accessed then
others will soon follow, or that vmcs12 will be dirtied due to a VMWRITE
(see above). And the full synchronization results in slightly cleaner
code.
Note, although GUEST_PDPTRs are relevant only for a 32-bit PAE guest,
they are accessed quite frequently for said guests, and a separate patch
is in flight to optimize away GUEST_PDTPR synchronziation for non-PAE
guests.
Skipping rarely accessed guest fields reduces the latency of a nested
VM-Exit by ~200 cycles.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
So that future optimizations related to shadowed fields don't need to
define their own switch statement.
Add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to ensure at least one of the types (RW vs RO) is
defined when including vmcs_shadow_fields.h (guess who keeps mistyping
SHADOW_FIELD_RO as SHADOW_FIELD_R0).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Nested virtualization involves copying data between many different types
of VMCSes, e.g. vmcs02, vmcs12, shadow VMCS and eVMCS. Rename a variety
of functions and flags to document both the source and destination of
each sync.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
... to make it more obvious that sync_vmcs12() is invoked on all nested
VM-Exits, e.g. hiding sync_vmcs12() in prepare_vmcs12() makes it appear
that guest state is NOT propagated to vmcs12 for a normal VM-Exit.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The vmcs12 fields offsets are constant and known at compile time. Store
the associated offset for each shadowed field to avoid the costly lookup
in vmcs_field_to_offset() when copying between vmcs12 and the shadow
VMCS. Avoiding the costly lookup reduces the latency of copying by
~100 cycles in each direction.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
VMMs frequently read the guest's CS and SS AR bytes to detect 64-bit
mode and CPL respectively, but effectively never write said fields once
the VM is initialized. Intercepting VMWRITEs for the two fields saves
~55 cycles in copy_shadow_to_vmcs12().
Because some Intel CPUs, e.g. Haswell, drop the reserved bits of the
guest access rights fields on VMWRITE, exposing the fields to L1 for
VMREAD but not VMWRITE leads to inconsistent behavior between L1 and L2.
On hardware that drops the bits, L1 will see the stripped down value due
to reading the value from hardware, while L2 will see the full original
value as stored by KVM. To avoid such an inconsistency, emulate the
behavior on all CPUS, but only for intercepted VMWRITEs so as to avoid
introducing pointless latency into copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(), e.g. if the
emulation were added to vmcs12_write_any().
Since the AR_BYTES emulation is done only for intercepted VMWRITE, if a
future patch (re)exposed AR_BYTES for both VMWRITE and VMREAD, then KVM
would end up with incosistent behavior on pre-Haswell hardware, e.g. KVM
would drop the reserved bits on intercepted VMWRITE, but direct VMWRITE
to the shadow VMCS would not drop the bits. Add a WARN in the shadow
field initialization to detect any attempt to expose an AR_BYTES field
without updating vmcs12_write_any().
Note, emulation of the AR_BYTES reserved bit behavior is based on a
patch[1] from Jim Mattson that applied the emulation to all writes to
vmcs12 so that live migration across different generations of hardware
would not introduce divergent behavior. But given that live migration
of nested state has already been enabled, that ship has sailed (not to
mention that no sane VMM will be affected by this behavior).
[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10483321/
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Allowing L1 to VMWRITE read-only fields is only beneficial in a double
nesting scenario, e.g. no sane VMM will VMWRITE VM_EXIT_REASON in normal
non-nested operation. Intercepting RO fields means KVM doesn't need to
sync them from the shadow VMCS to vmcs12 when running L2. The obvious
downside is that L1 will VM-Exit more often when running L3, but it's
likely safe to assume most folks would happily sacrifice a bit of L3
performance, which may not even be noticeable in the grande scheme, to
improve L2 performance across the board.
Not intercepting fields tagged read-only also allows for additional
optimizations, e.g. marking GUEST_{CS,SS}_AR_BYTES as SHADOW_FIELD_RO
since those fields are rarely written by a VMMs, but read frequently.
When utilizing a shadow VMCS with asymmetric R/W and R/O bitmaps, fields
that cause VM-Exit on VMWRITE but not VMREAD need to be propagated to
the shadow VMCS during VMWRITE emulation, otherwise a subsequence VMREAD
from L1 will consume a stale value.
Note, KVM currently utilizes asymmetric bitmaps when "VMWRITE any field"
is not exposed to L1, but only so that it can reject the VMWRITE, i.e.
propagating the VMWRITE to the shadow VMCS is a new requirement, not a
bug fix.
Eliminating the copying of RO fields reduces the latency of nested
VM-Entry (copy_shadow_to_vmcs12()) by ~100 cycles (plus 40-50 cycles
if/when the AR_BYTES fields are exposed RO).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Per commit 1b6269db3f ("KVM: VMX: Handle NMIs before enabling
interrupts and preemption"), NMIs are handled directly in vmx_vcpu_run()
to "make sure we handle NMI on the current cpu, and that we don't
service maskable interrupts before non-maskable ones". The other
exceptions handled by complete_atomic_exit(), e.g. async #PF and #MC,
have similar requirements, and are located there to avoid extra VMREADs
since VMX bins hardware exceptions and NMIs into a single exit reason.
Clean up the code and eliminate the vaguely named complete_atomic_exit()
by moving the interrupts-disabled exception and NMI handling into the
existing handle_external_intrs() callback, and rename the callback to
a more appropriate name. Rename VMexit handlers throughout so that the
atomic and non-atomic counterparts have similar names.
In addition to improving code readability, this also ensures the NMI
handler is run with the host's debug registers loaded in the unlikely
event that the user is debugging NMIs. Accuracy of the last_guest_tsc
field is also improved when handling NMIs (and #MCs) as the handler
will run after updating said field.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
[Naming cleanups. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
VMX can conditionally call kvm_{before,after}_interrupt() since KVM
always uses "ack interrupt on exit" and therefore explicitly handles
interrupts as opposed to blindly enabling irqs.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Although the kernel may use multiple IDTs, KVM should only ever see the
"real" IDT, e.g. the early init IDT is long gone by the time KVM runs
and the debug stack IDT is only used for small windows of time in very
specific flows.
Before commit a547c6db4d ("KVM: VMX: Enable acknowledge interupt on
vmexit"), the kernel's IDT base was consumed by KVM only when setting
constant VMCS state, i.e. to set VMCS.HOST_IDTR_BASE. Because constant
host state is done once per vCPU, there was ostensibly no need to cache
the kernel's IDT base.
When support for "ack interrupt on exit" was introduced, KVM added a
second consumer of the IDT base as handling already-acked interrupts
requires directly calling the interrupt handler, i.e. KVM uses the IDT
base to find the address of the handler. Because interrupts are a fast
path, KVM cached the IDT base to avoid having to VMREAD HOST_IDTR_BASE.
Presumably, the IDT base was cached on a per-vCPU basis simply because
the existing code grabbed the IDT base on a per-vCPU (VMCS) basis.
Note, all post-boot IDTs use the same handlers for external interrupts,
i.e. the "ack interrupt on exit" use of the IDT base would be unaffected
even if the cached IDT somehow did not match the current IDT. And as
for the original use case of setting VMCS.HOST_IDTR_BASE, if any of the
above analysis is wrong then KVM has had a bug since the beginning of
time since KVM has effectively been caching the IDT at vCPU creation
since commit a8b732ca01c ("[PATCH] kvm: userspace interface").
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Generic x86 code invokes the kvm_x86_ops external interrupt handler on
all VM-Exits regardless of the actual exit type. Use the already-cached
EXIT_REASON to determine if the VM-Exit was due to an interrupt, thus
avoiding an extra VMREAD (to query VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO) for all other
types of VM-Exit.
In addition to avoiding the extra VMREAD, checking the EXIT_REASON
instead of VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO makes it more obvious that
vmx_handle_external_intr() is called for all VM-Exits, e.g. someone
unfamiliar with the flow might wonder under what condition(s)
VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO does not contain a valid interrupt, which is
simply not possible since KVM always runs with "ack interrupt on exit".
WARN once if VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO doesn't contain a valid interrupt on
an EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT VM-Exit, as such a condition would indicate a
hardware bug.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The reason for skipping handling of NMI and #MC in handle_exception is
the same, namely they are handled earlier by vmx_complete_atomic_exit.
Calling the machine check handler (which just returns 1) is misleading,
don't do it.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
A previous fix to prevent KVM from consuming stale VMCS state after a
failed VM-Entry inadvertantly blocked KVM's handling of machine checks
that occur during VM-Entry.
Per Intel's SDM, a #MC during VM-Entry is handled in one of three ways,
depending on when the #MC is recognoized. As it pertains to this bug
fix, the third case explicitly states EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY
is handled like any other VM-Exit during VM-Entry, i.e. sets bit 31 to
indicate the VM-Entry failed.
If a machine-check event occurs during a VM entry, one of the following occurs:
- The machine-check event is handled as if it occurred before the VM entry:
...
- The machine-check event is handled after VM entry completes:
...
- A VM-entry failure occurs as described in Section 26.7. The basic
exit reason is 41, for "VM-entry failure due to machine-check event".
Explicitly handle EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY as a one-off case in
vmx_vcpu_run() instead of binning it into vmx_complete_atomic_exit().
Doing so allows vmx_vcpu_run() to handle VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY
in a sane fashion and also simplifies vmx_complete_atomic_exit() since
VMCS.VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO is guaranteed to be fresh.
Fixes: b060ca3b2e ("kvm: vmx: Handle VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure properly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Make it available to AMD hosts as well, just in case someone is trying
to use an Intel processor's CPUID setup.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
In function apic_mmio_write(), the offset has been checked in:
* apic_mmio_in_range()
* offset & 0xf
These two ensures offset is in range [0x010, 0xff0].
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richardw.yang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
apic_clear_vector() is the counterpart of kvm_lapic_set_vector(),
while they have different naming convention.
Rename it and move together to arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h. Also fix one typo
in comment by hand.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richardw.yang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
On delivering irq to apic, we iterate on vcpu and do the check like
this:
kvm_apic_present(vcpu)
kvm_lapic_enabled(vpu)
kvm_apic_present(vcpu) && kvm_apic_sw_enabled(vcpu->arch.apic)
Since we have already checked kvm_apic_present(), it is reasonable to
replace kvm_lapic_enabled() with kvm_apic_sw_enabled().
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richardw.yang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add an MSRs which allows the guest to disable
host polling (specifically the cpuidle-haltpoll,
when performing polling in the guest, disables
host side polling).
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
There is an imperfection in get_vmx_mem_address(): access length is ignored
when checking the limit. To fix this, pass access length as a function argument.
The access length is usually obvious since it is used by callers after
get_vmx_mem_address() call, but for vmread/vmwrite it depends on the
state of 64-bit mode.
Signed-off-by: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Intel SDM vol. 3, 5.3:
The processor causes a
general-protection exception (or, if the segment is SS, a stack-fault
exception) any time an attempt is made to access the following addresses
in a segment:
- A byte at an offset greater than the effective limit
- A word at an offset greater than the (effective-limit – 1)
- A doubleword at an offset greater than the (effective-limit – 3)
- A quadword at an offset greater than the (effective-limit – 7)
Therefore, the generic limit checking error condition must be
exn = (off > limit + 1 - access_len) = (off + access_len - 1 > limit)
but not
exn = (off + access_len > limit)
as for now.
Also avoid integer overflow of `off` at 32-bit KVM by casting it to u64.
Note: access length is currently sizeof(u64) which is incorrect. This
will be fixed in the subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add support to expose Intel V2 Extended Topology Enumeration Leaf for
some new systems with multiple software-visible die within each package.
Because unimplemented and unexposed leaves should be explicitly reported
as zero, there is no need to limit cpuid.0.eax to the maximum value of
feature configuration but limit it to the highest leaf implemented in
the current code. A single clamping seems sufficient and cheaper.
Co-developed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Make all code consistent with kvm_deliver_exception_payload() by using
appropriate symbolic constant instead of hard-coded number.
Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Even when asynchronous page fault is disabled, KVM does not want to pause
the host if a guest triggers a page fault; instead it will put it into
an artificial HLT state that allows running other host processes while
allowing interrupt delivery into the guest.
However, the way this feature is triggered is a bit confusing.
First, it is not used for page faults while a nested guest is
running: but this is not an issue since the artificial halt
is completely invisible to the guest, either L1 or L2. Second,
it is used even if kvm_halt_in_guest() returns true; in this case,
the guest probably should not pay the additional latency cost of the
artificial halt, and thus we should handle the page fault in a
completely synchronous way.
By introducing a new function kvm_can_deliver_async_pf, this patch
commonizes the code that chooses whether to deliver an async page fault
(kvm_arch_async_page_not_present) and the code that chooses whether a
page fault should be handled synchronously (kvm_can_do_async_pf).
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
It doesn't seem as if there is any particular need for kvm_lock to be a
spinlock, so convert the lock to a mutex so that sleepable functions (in
particular cond_resched()) can be called while holding it.
Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
__vmcs_writel uses volatile asm, so there is no need to insert another
one between the first and the second call to __vmcs_writel in order
to prevent unwanted code moves for 32bit targets.
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
One of the more common cases of allocation size calculations is finding
the size of a structure that has a zero-sized array at the end, along
with memory for some number of elements for that array. For example:
struct foo {
int stuff;
struct boo entry[];
};
instance = kzalloc(sizeof(struct foo) + count * sizeof(struct boo), GFP_KERNEL);
Instead of leaving these open-coded and prone to type mistakes, we can
now use the new struct_size() helper:
instance = kzalloc(struct_size(instance, entry, count), GFP_KERNEL);
This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
While upstream gcc doesn't detect conflicts on cc (yet), it really
should, and hence "cc" should not be specified for asm()-s also having
"=@cc<cond>" outputs. (It is quite pointless anyway to specify a "cc"
clobber in x86 inline assembly, since the compiler assumes it to be
always clobbered, and has no means [yet] to suppress this behavior.)
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Fixes: bbc0b82392 ("KVM: nVMX: Capture VM-Fail via CC_{SET,OUT} in nested early checks")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This is the same as vm_vcpu_add_default, but it also takes a
kvm_vcpu_init struct pointer.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This allows aarch64 tests to run on more targets, such as the Arm
simulator that doesn't like KVM_ARM_TARGET_GENERIC_V8. And it also
allows aarch64 tests to provide vcpu features in struct kvm_vcpu_init.
Additionally it drops the unused memslot parameters.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Make sure we complete the I/O after determining we have a ucall,
which is I/O. Also allow the *uc parameter to optionally be NULL.
It's quite possible that a test case will only care about the
return value, like for example when looping on a check for
UCALL_DONE.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
MSR IA32_MISC_ENABLE bit 18, according to SDM:
| When this bit is set to 0, the MONITOR feature flag is not set (CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] = 0).
| This indicates that MONITOR/MWAIT are not supported.
|
| Software attempts to execute MONITOR/MWAIT will cause #UD when this bit is 0.
|
| When this bit is set to 1 (default), MONITOR/MWAIT are supported (CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] = 1).
The CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] ought to mirror the value of the MSR bit,
CPUID.01H:ECX[bit 3] is a better guard than kvm_mwait_in_guest().
kvm_mwait_in_guest() affects the behavior of MONITOR/MWAIT, not its
guest visibility.
This patch implements toggling of the CPUID bit based on guest writes
to the MSR.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
[Fixes for backwards compatibility - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Allow guest reads CORE cstate when exposing host CPU power management capabilities
to the guest. PKG cstate is restricted to avoid a guest to get the whole package
information in multi-tenant scenario.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Commit b31c114b (KVM: X86: Provide a capability to disable PAUSE intercepts)
forgot to add the KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE into api doc. This patch adds
it.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
1. Using X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES to enumerate the existence of
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES to avoid using rdmsrl_safe().
2. Since kvm_get_arch_capabilities() is only used in this file, making
it static.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
