Now that the associative-array library properly heads dependency chains,
the various smp_read_barrier_depends() calls in security/keys/keyring.c
are no longer needed. This commit therefore removes them.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Only IPSEC routes have a non-NULL dst->child pointer. And IPSEC
routes are identified by a non-NULL dst->xfrm pointer.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The syzbot/syzkaller automated tests found a problem in
security_context_to_sid_core() during early boot (before we load the
SELinux policy) where we could potentially feed context strings without
NUL terminators into the strcmp() function.
We already guard against this during normal operation (after the SELinux
policy has been loaded) by making a copy of the context strings and
explicitly adding a NUL terminator to the end. The patch extends this
protection to the early boot case (no loaded policy) by moving the context
copy earlier in security_context_to_sid_core().
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-By: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel
superblock flags.
The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the
moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to.
Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call,
while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags.
The script to do this was:
# places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be
# touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but
# there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags.
FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \
include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h"
# the list of MS_... constants
SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \
DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \
POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \
I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \
ACTIVE NOUSER"
SED_PROG=
for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done
# we want files that contain at least one of MS_...,
# with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded.
L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c')
for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
- The final conversion of timer wheel timers to timer_setup().
A few manual conversions and a large coccinelle assisted sweep and
the removal of the old initialization mechanisms and the related
code.
- Remove the now unused VSYSCALL update code
- Fix permissions of /proc/timer_list. I still need to get rid of that
file completely
- Rename a misnomed clocksource function and remove a stale declaration
* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (27 commits)
m68k/macboing: Fix missed timer callback assignment
treewide: Remove TIMER_FUNC_TYPE and TIMER_DATA_TYPE casts
timer: Remove redundant __setup_timer*() macros
timer: Pass function down to initialization routines
timer: Remove unused data arguments from macros
timer: Switch callback prototype to take struct timer_list * argument
timer: Pass timer_list pointer to callbacks unconditionally
Coccinelle: Remove setup_timer.cocci
timer: Remove setup_*timer() interface
timer: Remove init_timer() interface
treewide: setup_timer() -> timer_setup() (2 field)
treewide: setup_timer() -> timer_setup()
treewide: init_timer() -> setup_timer()
treewide: Switch DEFINE_TIMER callbacks to struct timer_list *
s390: cmm: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
lightnvm: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/net: cris: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drm/vc4: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
block/laptop_mode: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
net/atm/mpc: Avoid open-coded assignment of timer callback function
...
Pull keys update from James Morris:
"There's nothing too controversial here:
- Doc fix for keyctl_read().
- time_t -> time64_t replacement.
- Set the module licence on things to prevent tainting"
* 'next-keys' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
pkcs7: Set the module licence to prevent tainting
security: keys: Replace time_t with time64_t for struct key_preparsed_payload
security: keys: Replace time_t/timespec with time64_t
KEYS: fix in-kernel documentation for keyctl_read()
This changes all DEFINE_TIMER() callbacks to use a struct timer_list
pointer instead of unsigned long. Since the data argument has already been
removed, none of these callbacks are using their argument currently, so
this renames the argument to "unused".
Done using the following semantic patch:
@match_define_timer@
declarer name DEFINE_TIMER;
identifier _timer, _callback;
@@
DEFINE_TIMER(_timer, _callback);
@change_callback depends on match_define_timer@
identifier match_define_timer._callback;
type _origtype;
identifier _origarg;
@@
void
-_callback(_origtype _origarg)
+_callback(struct timer_list *unused)
{ ... }
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
It used to be that unconfined would never attach. However that is not
the case anymore as some special profiles can be marked as unconfined,
that are not the namespaces unconfined profile, and may have an
attachment.
Fixes: f1bd904175 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Profiles that have an undecidable overlap in their attachments are
being incorrectly handled. Instead of failing to attach the first one
encountered is being used.
eg.
profile A /** { .. }
profile B /*foo { .. }
have an unresolvable longest left attachment, they both have an exact
match on / and then have an overlapping expression that has no clear
winner.
Currently the winner will be the profile that is loaded first which
can result in non-deterministic behavior. Instead in this situation
the exec should fail.
Fixes: 898127c34e ("AppArmor: functions for domain transitions")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Fixes: d07881d2ed ("apparmor: move new_null_profile to after profile lookup fns()")
Reported-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The boolean variable 'stop' is being set but never read. This
is a redundant variable and can be removed.
Cleans up clang warning: Value stored to 'stop' is never read
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Bool initializations should use true and false. Bool tests don't need
comparisons.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Meyer <thomas@m3y3r.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
gcc-4.4 points out suspicious code in compute_mnt_perms, where
the aa_perms structure is only partially initialized before getting
returned:
security/apparmor/mount.c: In function 'compute_mnt_perms':
security/apparmor/mount.c:227: error: 'perms.prompt' is used uninitialized in this function
security/apparmor/mount.c:227: error: 'perms.hide' is used uninitialized in this function
security/apparmor/mount.c:227: error: 'perms.cond' is used uninitialized in this function
security/apparmor/mount.c:227: error: 'perms.complain' is used uninitialized in this function
security/apparmor/mount.c:227: error: 'perms.stop' is used uninitialized in this function
security/apparmor/mount.c:227: error: 'perms.deny' is used uninitialized in this function
Returning or assigning partially initialized structures is a bit tricky,
in particular it is explicitly allowed in c99 to assign a partially
initialized structure to another, as long as only members are read that
have been initialized earlier. Looking at what various compilers do here,
the version that produced the warning copied uninitialized stack data,
while newer versions (and also clang) either set the other members to
zero or don't update the parts of the return buffer that are not modified
in the temporary structure, but they never warn about this.
In case of apparmor, it seems better to be a little safer and always
initialize the aa_perms structure. Most users already do that, this
changes the remaining ones, including the one instance that I got the
warning for.
Fixes: fa488437d0f9 ("apparmor: add mount mediation")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Trivial fix to spelling mistake in comment and also with text in
audit_resource call.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
A few years ago the FSF moved and "59 Temple Place" is wrong. Having this
still in our source files feels old and unmaintained.
Let's take the license statement serious and not confuse users.
As https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-howto.html suggests, we replace the
postal address with "<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>" in the security
directory.
Signed-off-by: Martin Kepplinger <martink@posteo.de>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit b65a9cfc2c ("Untangling ima mess, part 2: deal with counters")
moved the call of ima_file_check() from may_open() to do_filp_open() at a
point where the file descriptor is already opened.
This breaks the assumption made by IMA that file descriptors being closed
belong to files whose access was granted by ima_file_check(). The
consequence is that security.ima and security.evm are updated with good
values, regardless of the current appraisal status.
For example, if a file does not have security.ima, IMA will create it after
opening the file for writing, even if access is denied. Access to the file
will be allowed afterwards.
Avoid this issue by checking the appraisal status before updating
security.ima.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Summary of modules changes for the 4.15 merge window:
- Treewide module_param_call() cleanup, fix up set/get function
prototype mismatches, from Kees Cook
- Minor code cleanups
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'modules-for-v4.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux
Pull module updates from Jessica Yu:
"Summary of modules changes for the 4.15 merge window:
- treewide module_param_call() cleanup, fix up set/get function
prototype mismatches, from Kees Cook
- minor code cleanups"
* tag 'modules-for-v4.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux:
module: Do not paper over type mismatches in module_param_call()
treewide: Fix function prototypes for module_param_call()
module: Prepare to convert all module_param_call() prototypes
kernel/module: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in add_module_usage()
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Seven SELinux patches for v4.15, although five of the seven are small
build fixes and cleanups.
Of the remaining two patches, the only one worth really calling out is
Eric's fix for the SELinux filesystem xattr set/remove code; the other
patch simply converts the SELinux hash table implementation to use
kmem_cache.
Eric's setxattr/removexattr tweak converts SELinux back to calling the
commoncap implementations when the xattr is not SELinux related. The
immediate win is to fixup filesystem capabilities in user namespaces,
but it makes things a bit saner overall; more information in the
commit description"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20171113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: remove extraneous initialization of slots_used and max_chain_len
selinux: remove redundant assignment to len
selinux: remove redundant assignment to str
selinux: fix build warning
selinux: fix build warning by removing the unused sid variable
selinux: Perform both commoncap and selinux xattr checks
selinux: Use kmem_cache for hashtab_node
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights:
1) Maintain the TCP retransmit queue using an rbtree, with 1GB
windows at 100Gb this really has become necessary. From Eric
Dumazet.
2) Multi-program support for cgroup+bpf, from Alexei Starovoitov.
3) Perform broadcast flooding in hardware in mv88e6xxx, from Andrew
Lunn.
4) Add meter action support to openvswitch, from Andy Zhou.
5) Add a data meta pointer for BPF accessible packets, from Daniel
Borkmann.
6) Namespace-ify almost all TCP sysctl knobs, from Eric Dumazet.
7) Turn on Broadcom Tags in b53 driver, from Florian Fainelli.
8) More work to move the RTNL mutex down, from Florian Westphal.
9) Add 'bpftool' utility, to help with bpf program introspection.
From Jakub Kicinski.
10) Add new 'cpumap' type for XDP_REDIRECT action, from Jesper
Dangaard Brouer.
11) Support 'blocks' of transformations in the packet scheduler which
can span multiple network devices, from Jiri Pirko.
12) TC flower offload support in cxgb4, from Kumar Sanghvi.
13) Priority based stream scheduler for SCTP, from Marcelo Ricardo
Leitner.
14) Thunderbolt networking driver, from Amir Levy and Mika Westerberg.
15) Add RED qdisc offloadability, and use it in mlxsw driver. From
Nogah Frankel.
16) eBPF based device controller for cgroup v2, from Roman Gushchin.
17) Add some fundamental tracepoints for TCP, from Song Liu.
18) Remove garbage collection from ipv6 route layer, this is a
significant accomplishment. From Wei Wang.
19) Add multicast route offload support to mlxsw, from Yotam Gigi"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (2177 commits)
tcp: highest_sack fix
geneve: fix fill_info when link down
bpf: fix lockdep splat
net: cdc_ncm: GetNtbFormat endian fix
openvswitch: meter: fix NULL pointer dereference in ovs_meter_cmd_reply_start
netem: remove unnecessary 64 bit modulus
netem: use 64 bit divide by rate
tcp: Namespace-ify sysctl_tcp_default_congestion_control
net: Protect iterations over net::fib_notifier_ops in fib_seq_sum()
ipv6: set all.accept_dad to 0 by default
uapi: fix linux/tls.h userspace compilation error
usbnet: ipheth: prevent TX queue timeouts when device not ready
vhost_net: conditionally enable tx polling
uapi: fix linux/rxrpc.h userspace compilation errors
net: stmmac: fix LPI transitioning for dwmac4
atm: horizon: Fix irq release error
net-sysfs: trigger netlink notification on ifalias change via sysfs
openvswitch: Using kfree_rcu() to simplify the code
openvswitch: Make local function ovs_nsh_key_attr_size() static
openvswitch: Fix return value check in ovs_meter_cmd_features()
...
The 'struct key_preparsed_payload' will use 'time_t' which we will
try to remove in the kernel, since 'time_t' is not year 2038 safe on
32bits systems.
Thus this patch replaces 'time_t' with 'time64_t' which is year 2038
safe on 32 bits system for 'struct key_preparsed_payload', moreover
we should use the 'TIME64_MAX' macro to initialize the 'time64_t'
type variable.
Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The 'struct key' will use 'time_t' which we try to remove in the
kernel, since 'time_t' is not year 2038 safe on 32bit systems.
Also the 'struct keyring_search_context' will use 'timespec' type
to record current time, which is also not year 2038 safe on 32bit
systems.
Thus this patch replaces 'time_t' with 'time64_t' which is year 2038
safe for 'struct key', and replace 'timespec' with 'time64_t' for the
'struct keyring_search_context', since we only look at the the seconds
part of 'timespec' variable. Moreover we also change the codes where
using the 'time_t' and 'timespec', and we can get current time by
ktime_get_real_seconds() instead of current_kernel_time(), and use
'TIME64_MAX' macro to initialize the 'time64_t' type variable.
Especially in proc.c file, we have replaced 'unsigned long' and 'timespec'
type with 'u64' and 'time64_t' type to save the timeout value, which means
user will get one 'u64' type timeout value by issuing proc_keys_show()
function.
Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.15:
API:
- Disambiguate EBUSY when queueing crypto request by adding ENOSPC.
This change touches code outside the crypto API.
- Reset settings when empty string is written to rng_current.
Algorithms:
- Add OSCCA SM3 secure hash.
Drivers:
- Remove old mv_cesa driver (replaced by marvell/cesa).
- Enable rfc3686/ecb/cfb/ofb AES in crypto4xx.
- Add ccm/gcm AES in crypto4xx.
- Add support for BCM7278 in iproc-rng200.
- Add hash support on Exynos in s5p-sss.
- Fix fallback-induced error in vmx.
- Fix output IV in atmel-aes.
- Fix empty GCM hash in mediatek.
Others:
- Fix DoS potential in lib/mpi.
- Fix potential out-of-order issues with padata"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (162 commits)
lib/mpi: call cond_resched() from mpi_powm() loop
crypto: stm32/hash - Fix return issue on update
crypto: dh - Remove pointless checks for NULL 'p' and 'g'
crypto: qat - Clean up error handling in qat_dh_set_secret()
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'key' or 'g' size longer than 'p'
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'p' to be 0
crypto: dh - Fix double free of ctx->p
hwrng: iproc-rng200 - Add support for BCM7278
dt-bindings: rng: Document BCM7278 RNG200 compatible
crypto: chcr - Replace _manual_ swap with swap macro
crypto: marvell - Add a NULL entry at the end of mv_cesa_plat_id_table[]
hwrng: virtio - Virtio RNG devices need to be re-registered after suspend/resume
crypto: atmel - remove empty functions
crypto: ecdh - remove empty exit()
MAINTAINERS: update maintainer for qat
crypto: caam - remove unused param of ctx_map_to_sec4_sg()
crypto: caam - remove unneeded edesc zeroization
crypto: atmel-aes - Reset the controller before each use
crypto: atmel-aes - properly set IV after {en,de}crypt
hwrng: core - Reset user selected rng by writing "" to rng_current
...
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Yet another big pile of changes:
- More year 2038 work from Arnd slowly reaching the point where we
need to think about the syscalls themself.
- A new timer function which allows to conditionally (re)arm a timer
only when it's either not running or the new expiry time is sooner
than the armed expiry time. This allows to use a single timer for
multiple timeout requirements w/o caring about the first expiry
time at the call site.
- A new NMI safe accessor to clock real time for the printk timestamp
work. Can be used by tracing, perf as well if required.
- A large number of timer setup conversions from Kees which got
collected here because either maintainers requested so or they
simply got ignored. As Kees pointed out already there are a few
trivial merge conflicts and some redundant commits which was
unavoidable due to the size of this conversion effort.
- Avoid a redundant iteration in the timer wheel softirq processing.
- Provide a mechanism to treat RTC implementations depending on their
hardware properties, i.e. don't inflict the write at the 0.5
seconds boundary which originates from the PC CMOS RTC to all RTCs.
No functional change as drivers need to be updated separately.
- The usual small updates to core code clocksource drivers. Nothing
really exciting"
* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (111 commits)
timers: Add a function to start/reduce a timer
pstore: Use ktime_get_real_fast_ns() instead of __getnstimeofday()
timer: Prepare to change all DEFINE_TIMER() callbacks
netfilter: ipvs: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
scsi: qla2xxx: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
block/aoe: discover_timer: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
ide: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drbd: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
mailbox: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
crypto: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/pcmcia: omap1: Fix error in automated timer conversion
ARM: footbridge: Fix typo in timer conversion
drivers/sgi-xp: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/pcmcia: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/memstick: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
drivers/macintosh: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
hwrng/xgene-rng: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
auxdisplay: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
sparc/led: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
mips: ip22/32: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
...
Pull core locking updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle are:
- Another attempt at enabling cross-release lockdep dependency
tracking (automatically part of CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING=y), this time
with better performance and fewer false positives. (Byungchul Park)
- Introduce lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled()/disabled() and convert
open-coded equivalents to lockdep variants. (Frederic Weisbecker)
- Add down_read_killable() and use it in the VFS's iterate_dir()
method. (Kirill Tkhai)
- Convert remaining uses of ACCESS_ONCE() to
READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE(). Most of the conversion was Coccinelle
driven. (Mark Rutland, Paul E. McKenney)
- Get rid of lockless_dereference(), by strengthening Alpha atomics,
strengthening READ_ONCE() with smp_read_barrier_depends() and thus
being able to convert users of lockless_dereference() to
READ_ONCE(). (Will Deacon)
- Various micro-optimizations:
- better PV qspinlocks (Waiman Long),
- better x86 barriers (Michael S. Tsirkin)
- better x86 refcounts (Kees Cook)
- ... plus other fixes and enhancements. (Borislav Petkov, Juergen
Gross, Miguel Bernal Marin)"
* 'locking-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (70 commits)
locking/x86: Use LOCK ADD for smp_mb() instead of MFENCE
rcu: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
netpoll: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
timers/posix-cpu-timers: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
sched/clock, sched/cputime: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
irq_work: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
irq/timings: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
perf/core: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
x86: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
smp/core: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
timers/hrtimer: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
timers/nohz: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
workqueue: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
irq/softirqs: Use lockdep to assert IRQs are disabled/enabled
locking/lockdep: Add IRQs disabled/enabled assertion APIs: lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled()/disabled()
locking/pvqspinlock: Implement hybrid PV queued/unfair locks
locking/rwlocks: Fix comments
x86/paravirt: Set up the virt_spin_lock_key after static keys get initialized
block, locking/lockdep: Assign a lock_class per gendisk used for wait_for_completion()
workqueue: Remove now redundant lock acquisitions wrt. workqueue flushes
...
Pull security subsystem integrity updates from James Morris:
"There is a mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, preparatory code for
new functionality and new functionality.
Commit 26ddabfe96 ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is
loaded") enabled EVM without loading a symmetric key, but was limited
to defining the x509 certificate pathname at build. Included in this
set of patches is the ability of enabling EVM, without loading the EVM
symmetric key, from userspace. New is the ability to prevent the
loading of an EVM symmetric key."
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: Remove redundant conditional operator
ima: Fix bool initialization/comparison
ima: check signature enforcement against cmdline param instead of CONFIG
module: export module signature enforcement status
ima: fix hash algorithm initialization
EVM: Only complain about a missing HMAC key once
EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded
EVM: Include security.apparmor in EVM measurements
ima: call ima_file_free() prior to calling fasync
integrity: use kernel_read_file_from_path() to read x509 certs
ima: always measure and audit files in policy
ima: don't remove the securityfs policy file
vfs: fix mounting a filesystem with i_version
Pull general security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"TPM (from Jarkko):
- essential clean up for tpm_crb so that ARM64 and x86 versions do
not distract each other as much as before
- /dev/tpm0 rejects now too short writes (shorter buffer than
specified in the command header
- use DMA-safe buffer in tpm_tis_spi
- otherwise mostly minor fixes.
Smack:
- base support for overlafs
Capabilities:
- BPRM_FCAPS fixes, from Richard Guy Briggs:
The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing
setuid application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected
as it was supposed to be limited to when the file system actually
had capabilities in an extended attribute. It lists all
capabilities making the event really ugly to parse what is
happening. The PATH record correctly records the setuid bit and
owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on set*id.
TOMOYO:
- Y2038 timestamping fixes"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits)
MAINTAINERS: update the IMA, EVM, trusted-keys, encrypted-keys entries
Smack: Base support for overlayfs
MAINTAINERS: remove David Safford as maintainer for encrypted+trusted keys
tomoyo: fix timestamping for y2038
capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
capabilities: invert logic for clarity
capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
capabilities: move audit log decision to function
capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
tpm, tpm_tis: use ARRAY_SIZE() to define TPM_HID_USR_IDX
tpm: fix duplicate inline declaration specifier
tpm: fix type of a local variables in tpm_tis_spi.c
tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_map_command()
tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl()
tpm-dev-common: Reject too short writes
...
Simple cases of overlapping changes in the packet scheduler.
Must easier to resolve this time.
Which probably means that I screwed it up somehow.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
A non-zero value is converted to 1 when assigned to a bool variable, so the
conditional operator in is_ima_appraise_enabled is redundant.
The value of a comparison operator is either 1 or 0 so the conditional
operator in ima_inode_setxattr is redundant as well.
Confirmed that the patch is correct by comparing the object file from
before and after the patch. They are identical.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Bool initializations should use true and false. Bool tests don't need
comparisons.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Meyer <thomas@m3y3r.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
When the user requests MODULE_CHECK policy and its kernel is compiled
with CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE not set, all modules would not load, just
those loaded in initram time. One option the user would have would be
set a kernel cmdline param (module.sig_enforce) to true, but the IMA
module check code doesn't rely on this value, it checks just
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE.
This patch solves this problem checking for the exported value of
module.sig_enforce cmdline param intead of CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE,
which holds the effective value (CONFIG || param).
Signed-off-by: Bruno E. O. Meneguele <brdeoliv@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The hash_setup function always sets the hash_setup_done flag, even
when the hash algorithm is invalid. This prevents the default hash
algorithm defined as CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH from being used.
This patch sets hash_setup_done flag only for valid hash algorithms.
Fixes: e7a2ad7eb6 "ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash
algorithms"
Signed-off-by: Boshi Wang <wangboshi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
A system can validate EVM digital signatures without requiring an HMAC
key, but every EVM validation will generate a kernel error. Change this
so we only generate an error once.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
EVM will only perform validation once a key has been loaded. This key
may either be a symmetric trusted key (for HMAC validation and creation)
or the public half of an asymmetric key (for digital signature
validation). The /sys/kernel/security/evm interface allows userland to
signal that a symmetric key has been loaded, but does not allow userland
to signal that an asymmetric public key has been loaded.
This patch extends the interface to permit userspace to pass a bitmask
of loaded key types. It also allows userspace to block loading of a
symmetric key in order to avoid a compromised system from being able to
load an additional key type later.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Apparmor will be gaining support for security.apparmor labels, and it
would be helpful to include these in EVM validation now so appropriate
signatures can be generated even before full support is merged.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <John.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 and CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509 options permit
loading x509 signed certificates onto the trusted keyrings without
verifying the x509 certificate file's signature.
This patch replaces the call to the integrity_read_file() specific
function with the common kernel_read_file_from_path() function.
To avoid verifying the file signature, this patch defines
READING_X509_CERTFICATE.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
All files matching a "measure" rule must be included in the IMA
measurement list, even when the file hash cannot be calculated.
Similarly, all files matching an "audit" rule must be audited, even when
the file hash can not be calculated.
The file data hash field contained in the IMA measurement list template
data will contain 0's instead of the actual file hash digest.
Note:
In general, adding, deleting or in anyway changing which files are
included in the IMA measurement list is not a good idea, as it might
result in not being able to unseal trusted keys sealed to a specific
TPM PCR value. This patch not only adds file measurements that were
not previously measured, but specifies that the file hash value for
these files will be 0's.
As the IMA measurement list ordering is not consistent from one boot
to the next, it is unlikely that anyone is sealing keys based on the
IMA measurement list. Remote attestation servers should be able to
process these new measurement records, but might complain about
these unknown records.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
The securityfs policy file is removed unless additional rules can be
appended to the IMA policy (CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY), regardless as
to whether the policy is configured so that it can be displayed.
This patch changes this behavior, removing the securityfs policy file,
only if CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY is also not enabled.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This came in yesterday, and I have verified our regression tests
were missing this and it can cause an oops. Please apply.
There is a an off-by-one comparision on sig against MAXMAPPED_SIG
that can lead to a read outside the sig_map array if sig
is MAXMAPPED_SIG. Fix this.
Verified that the check is an out of bounds case that can cause an oops.
Revised: add comparison fix to second case
Fixes: cd1dbf76b2 ("apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is non-functional change to prepare the device cgroup code
for adding eBPF-based controller for cgroups v2.
The patch performs the following changes:
1) __devcgroup_inode_permission() and devcgroup_inode_mknod()
are moving to the device-cgroup.h and converting into static inline.
2) __devcgroup_check_permission() is exported.
3) devcgroup_check_permission() wrapper is introduced to be used
by both existing and new bpf-based implementations.
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Rename device type and access type constants defined in
security/device_cgroup.c by adding the DEVCG_ prefix.
The reason behind this renaming is to make them global namespace
friendly, as they will be moved to the corresponding header file
by following patches.
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Files removed in 'net-next' had their license header updated
in 'net'. We take the remove from 'net-next'.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
ima starts several async crypto ops and waits for their completions.
Move it over to generic code doing the same.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'spdx_identifiers-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull initial SPDX identifiers from Greg KH:
"License cleanup: add SPDX license identifiers to some files
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the
'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally
binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate
text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart
and Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset
of the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to
license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied
to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of
the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver)
producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.
Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review
of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537
files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the
scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license
identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any
determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with
the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained
>5 lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that
was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that
became the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected
a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply
(and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases,
confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.
The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in
part, so they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot
checks in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect
the correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial
patch version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch
license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the
applied SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>"
* tag 'spdx_identifiers-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with a license
License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with no license
License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When calling keyctl_read() on a key of type "trusted", if the
user-supplied buffer was too small, the kernel ignored the buffer length
and just wrote past the end of the buffer, potentially corrupting
userspace memory. Fix it by instead returning the size required, as per
the documentation for keyctl_read().
We also don't even fill the buffer at all in this case, as this is
slightly easier to implement than doing a short read, and either
behavior appears to be permitted. It also makes it match the behavior
of the "encrypted" key type.
Fixes: d00a1c72f7 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.38+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Commit e645016abc ("KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer
in keyring_read()") made keyring_read() stop corrupting userspace memory
when the user-supplied buffer is too small. However it also made the
return value in that case be the short buffer size rather than the size
required, yet keyctl_read() is actually documented to return the size
required. Therefore, switch it over to the documented behavior.
Note that for now we continue to have it fill the short buffer, since it
did that before (pre-v3.13) and dump_key_tree_aux() in keyutils arguably
relies on it.
Fixes: e645016abc ("KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer in keyring_read()")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Supply the Smack module hooks in support of overlayfs.
Ensure that the Smack label of new files gets the correct
value when a directory is transmuting. Original implementation
by Romanini Daniele, with a few tweaks added.
Signed-off-by: Romanini Daniele <daniele.romanini@aalto.fi>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Several function prototypes for the set/get functions defined by
module_param_call() have a slightly wrong argument types. This fixes
those in an effort to clean up the calls when running under type-enforced
compiler instrumentation for CFI. This is the result of running the
following semantic patch:
@match_module_param_call_function@
declarer name module_param_call;
identifier _name, _set_func, _get_func;
expression _arg, _mode;
@@
module_param_call(_name, _set_func, _get_func, _arg, _mode);
@fix_set_prototype
depends on match_module_param_call_function@
identifier match_module_param_call_function._set_func;
identifier _val, _param;
type _val_type, _param_type;
@@
int _set_func(
-_val_type _val
+const char * _val
,
-_param_type _param
+const struct kernel_param * _param
) { ... }
@fix_get_prototype
depends on match_module_param_call_function@
identifier match_module_param_call_function._get_func;
identifier _val, _param;
type _val_type, _param_type;
@@
int _get_func(
-_val_type _val
+char * _val
,
-_param_type _param
+const struct kernel_param * _param
) { ... }
Two additional by-hand changes are included for places where the above
Coccinelle script didn't notice them:
drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c
fs/lockd/svc.c
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Several conflicts here.
NFP driver bug fix adding nfp_netdev_is_nfp_repr() check to
nfp_fl_output() needed some adjustments because the code block is in
an else block now.
Parallel additions to net/pkt_cls.h and net/sch_generic.h
A bug fix in __tcp_retransmit_skb() conflicted with some of
the rbtree changes in net-next.
The tc action RCU callback fixes in 'net' had some overlap with some
of the recent tcf_block reworking.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This reverts commit 651e28c553.
This caused a regression:
"The specific problem is that dnsmasq refuses to start on openSUSE Leap
42.2. The specific cause is that and attempt to open a PF_LOCAL socket
gets EACCES. This means that networking doesn't function on a system
with a 4.14-rc2 system."
Sadly, the developers involved seemed to be in denial for several weeks
about this, delaying the revert. This has not been a good release for
the security subsystem, and this area needs to change development
practices.
Reported-and-bisected-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Tracked-by: Thorsten Leemhuis <regressions@leemhuis.info>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There were quite a few overlapping sets of changes here.
Daniel's bug fix for off-by-ones in the new BPF branch instructions,
along with the added allowances for "data_end > ptr + x" forms
collided with the metadata additions.
Along with those three changes came veritifer test cases, which in
their final form I tried to group together properly. If I had just
trimmed GIT's conflict tags as-is, this would have split up the
meta tests unnecessarily.
In the socketmap code, a set of preemption disabling changes
overlapped with the rename of bpf_compute_data_end() to
bpf_compute_data_pointers().
Changes were made to the mv88e6060.c driver set addr method
which got removed in net-next.
The hyperv transport socket layer had a locking change in 'net'
which overlapped with a change of socket state macro usage
in 'net-next'.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tomoyo uses an open-coded version of time_to_tm() to create a timestamp
from the current time as read by get_seconds(). This will overflow and
give wrong results on 32-bit systems in 2038.
To correct this, this changes the code to use ktime_get_real_seconds()
and the generic time64_to_tm() function that are both y2038-safe.
Using the library function avoids adding an expensive 64-bit division
in this code and can benefit from any optimizations we do in common
code.
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Introduce a bpf object related check when sending and receiving files
through unix domain socket as well as binder. It checks if the receiving
process have privilege to read/write the bpf map or use the bpf program.
This check is necessary because the bpf maps and programs are using a
anonymous inode as their shared inode so the normal way of checking the
files and sockets when passing between processes cannot work properly on
eBPF object. This check only works when the BPF_SYSCALL is configured.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls. This
implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a sid that
identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the object,
selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The creation
of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook and new
cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the
userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps.
The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection
for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can
read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides
that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf
syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The
actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and
how the cmd should be checked.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The existing condition tested for process effective capabilities set by
file attributes but intended to ignore the change if the result was
unsurprisingly an effective full set in the case root is special with a
setuid root executable file and we are root.
Stated again:
- When you execute a setuid root application, it is no surprise and
expected that it got all capabilities, so we do not want capabilities
recorded.
if (pE_grew && !(pE_fullset && (eff_root || real_root) && root_priveleged) )
Now make sure we cover other cases:
- If something prevented a setuid root app getting all capabilities and
it wound up with one capability only, then it is a surprise and should
be logged. When it is a setuid root file, we only want capabilities
when the process does not get full capabilities..
root_priveleged && setuid_root && !pE_fullset
- Similarly if a non-setuid program does pick up capabilities due to
file system based capabilities, then we want to know what capabilities
were picked up. When it has file system based capabilities we want
the capabilities.
!is_setuid && (has_fcap && pP_gained)
- If it is a non-setuid file and it gets ambient capabilities, we want
the capabilities.
!is_setuid && pA_gained
- These last two are combined into one due to the common first parameter.
Related: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both real
root and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the
BPRM_FCAPS record with audit syscalls. This meant that any setuid root
applications would print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't
necessary, cluttering the event output, since the SYSCALL and PATH
records indicated the presence of the setuid bit and effective root user
id.
Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the
unnecessary record.
Ref: commit 3fc689e96c ("Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS")
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The way the logic was presented, it was awkward to read and verify.
Invert the logic using DeMorgan's Law to be more easily able to read and
understand.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Remove a layer of conditional logic to make the use of conditions
easier to read and analyse.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Move the audit log decision logic to its own function to isolate the
complexity in one place.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Introduce a number of inlines to make the use of the negation of
uid_eq() easier to read and analyse.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT
easier to read.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Rename has_cap to has_fcap to clarify it applies to file capabilities
since the entire source file is about capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Introduce macros cap_gained, cap_grew, cap_full to make the use of the
negation of is_subset() easier to read and analyse.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Factor out the case of privileged root from the function
cap_bprm_set_creds() to make the latter easier to read and analyse.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The pointer fs_ns is assigned from inode->i_ib->s_user_ns before
a null pointer check on inode, hence if inode is actually null we
will get a null pointer dereference on this assignment. Fix this
by only dereferencing inode after the null pointer check on
inode.
Detected by CoverityScan CID#1455328 ("Dereference before null check")
Fixes: 8db6c34f1d ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
In proc_keys_show(), the key semaphore is not held, so the key ->flags
and ->expiry can be changed concurrently. We therefore should read them
atomically just once.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Similar to the case for key_validate(), we should load the key ->expiry
once atomically in keyring_search_iterator(), since it can be changed
concurrently with the flags whenever the key semaphore isn't held.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In key_validate(), load the flags and expiry time once atomically, since
these can change concurrently if key_validate() is called without the
key semaphore held. And we don't want to get inconsistent results if a
variable is referenced multiple times. For example, key->expiry was
referenced in both 'if (key->expiry)' and in 'if (now.tv_sec >=
key->expiry)', making it theoretically possible to see a spurious
EKEYEXPIRED while the expiration time was being removed, i.e. set to 0.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Currently, when passed a key that already exists, add_key() will call the
key's ->update() method if such exists. But this is heavily broken in the
case where the key is uninstantiated because it doesn't call
__key_instantiate_and_link(). Consequently, it doesn't do most of the
things that are supposed to happen when the key is instantiated, such as
setting the instantiation state, clearing KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT and
awakening tasks waiting on it, and incrementing key->user->nikeys.
It also never takes key_construction_mutex, which means that
->instantiate() can run concurrently with ->update() on the same key. In
the case of the "user" and "logon" key types this causes a memory leak, at
best. Maybe even worse, the ->update() methods of the "encrypted" and
"trusted" key types actually just dereference a NULL pointer when passed an
uninstantiated key.
Change key_create_or_update() to wait interruptibly for the key to finish
construction before continuing.
This patch only affects *uninstantiated* keys. For now we still allow a
negatively instantiated key to be updated (thereby positively
instantiating it), although that's broken too (the next patch fixes it)
and I'm not sure that anyone actually uses that functionality either.
Here is a simple reproducer for the bug using the "encrypted" key type
(requires CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS=y), though as noted above the bug
pertained to more than just the "encrypted" key type:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(void)
{
int ringid = keyctl_join_session_keyring(NULL);
if (fork()) {
for (;;) {
const char payload[] = "update user:foo 32";
usleep(rand() % 10000);
add_key("encrypted", "desc", payload, sizeof(payload), ringid);
keyctl_clear(ringid);
}
} else {
for (;;)
request_key("encrypted", "desc", "callout_info", ringid);
}
}
It causes:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
IP: encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170
PGD 7a178067 P4D 7a178067 PUD 77269067 PMD 0
PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 340 Comm: reproduce Tainted: G D 4.14.0-rc1-00025-g428490e38b2e #796
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff8a467a39a340 task.stack: ffffb15c40770000
RIP: 0010:encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170
RSP: 0018:ffffb15c40773de8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8a467a275b00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffff8a467a275b14 RDI: ffffffffb742f303
RBP: ffffb15c40773e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8a467a275b17
R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8a4677057180 R15: ffff8a467a275b0f
FS: 00007f5d7fb08700(0000) GS:ffff8a467f200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000077262005 CR4: 00000000001606f0
Call Trace:
key_create_or_update+0x2bc/0x460
SyS_add_key+0x10c/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7f5d7f211259
RSP: 002b:00007ffed03904c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f8
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000003b2a7955 RCX: 00007f5d7f211259
RDX: 00000000004009e4 RSI: 00000000004009ff RDI: 0000000000400a04
RBP: 0000000068db8bad R08: 000000003b2a7955 R09: 0000000000000004
R10: 000000000000001a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400868
R13: 00007ffed03905d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 77 28 e8 64 34 1f 00 45 31 c0 31 c9 48 8d 55 c8 48 89 df 48 8d 75 d0 e8 ff f9 ff ff 85 c0 41 89 c4 0f 88 84 00 00 00 4c 8b 7d c8 <49> 8b 75 18 4c 89 ff e8 24 f8 ff ff 85 c0 41 89 c4 78 6d 49 8b
RIP: encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170 RSP: ffffb15c40773de8
CR2: 0000000000000018
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.12+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b145 ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
The recent rework introduced a possible randconfig build failure
when CONFIG_CRYPTO configured to only allow modules:
security/keys/big_key.o: In function `big_key_crypt':
big_key.c:(.text+0x29f): undefined reference to `crypto_aead_setkey'
security/keys/big_key.o: In function `big_key_init':
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x1a): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_aead'
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x45): undefined reference to `crypto_aead_setauthsize'
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x77): undefined reference to `crypto_destroy_tfm'
crypto/gcm.o: In function `gcm_hash_crypt_remain_continue':
gcm.c:(.text+0x167): undefined reference to `crypto_ahash_finup'
crypto/gcm.o: In function `crypto_gcm_exit_tfm':
gcm.c:(.text+0x847): undefined reference to `crypto_destroy_tfm'
When we 'select CRYPTO' like the other users, we always get a
configuration that builds.
Fixes: 428490e38b ("security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Variables slots_used and max_chain_len are being initialized to zero
twice. Remove the second set of initializations in the for loop.
Cleans up the clang warnings:
Value stored to 'slots_used' is never read
Value stored to 'max_chain_len' is never read
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The variable len is being set to zero and this value is never
being read since len is being set to a different value just
a few lines later. Remove this redundant assignment. Cleans
up clang warning: Value stored to 'len' is never read
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
str is being assigned to an empty string but str is never being
read after that, so the assignment is redundant and can be removed.
Moving the declaration of str to a more localised block, cleans up
clang warning: "Value stored to 'str' is never read"
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A key of type "encrypted" references a "master key" which is used to
encrypt and decrypt the encrypted key's payload. However, when we
accessed the master key's payload, we failed to handle the case where
the master key has been revoked, which sets the payload pointer to NULL.
Note that request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a
window where the key can be revoked before we acquire its semaphore.
Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was
already revoked at the time it was requested.
This was an issue for master keys of type "user" only. Master keys can
also be of type "trusted", but those cannot be revoked.
Fixes: 7e70cb4978 ("keys: add new key-type encrypted")
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.38+]
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
The lockdep subsystem provides a robust way to assert that a lock is
held, so use that instead of write_can_lock, which can give incorrect
results for qrwlocks.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507055129-12300-1-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This patch make selinux_task_prlimit() static since it is not used
anywhere else.
This fix the following build warning:
security/selinux/hooks.c:3981:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'selinux_task_prlimit' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch remove the unused variable sid
This fix the following build warning:
security/selinux/hooks.c:2921:6: warning: variable 'sid' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When selinux is loaded the relax permission checks for writing
security.capable are not honored. Which keeps file capabilities
from being used in user namespaces.
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> writes:
> Originally SELinux called the cap functions directly since there was no
> stacking support in the infrastructure and one had to manually stack a
> secondary module internally. inode_setxattr and inode_removexattr
> however were special cases because the cap functions would check
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN for any non-capability attributes in the security.*
> namespace, and we don't want to impose that requirement on setting
> security.selinux. Thus, we inlined the capabilities logic into the
> selinux hook functions and adapted it appropriately.
Now that the permission checks in commoncap have evolved this
inlining of their contents has become a problem. So restructure
selinux_inode_removexattr, and selinux_inode_setxattr to call
both the corresponding cap_inode_ function and dentry_has_perm
when the attribute is not a selinux security xattr. This ensures
the policies of both commoncap and selinux are enforced.
This results in smack and selinux having the same basic structure
for setxattr and removexattr. Performing their own special permission
checks when it is their modules xattr being written to, and deferring
to commoncap when that is not the case. Then finally performing their
generic module policy on all xattr writes.
This structure is fine when you only consider stacking with the
commoncap lsm, but it becomes a problem if two lsms that don't want
the commoncap security checks on their own attributes need to be
stack. This means there will need to be updates in the future as lsm
stacking is improved, but at least now the structure between smack and
selinux is common making the code easier to refactor.
This change also has the effect that selinux_linux_setotherxattr becomes
unnecessary so it is removed.
Fixes: 8db6c34f1d ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Fixes: 7bbf0e052b76 ("[PATCH] selinux merge")
Historical Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
security_inode_getsecurity() provides the text string value
of a security attribute. It does not provide a "secctx".
The code in xattr_getsecurity() that calls security_inode_getsecurity()
and then calls security_release_secctx() happened to work because
SElinux and Smack treat the attribute and the secctx the same way.
It fails for cap_inode_getsecurity(), because that module has no
secctx that ever needs releasing. It turns out that Smack is the
one that's doing things wrong by not allocating memory when instructed
to do so by the "alloc" parameter.
The fix is simple enough. Change the security_release_secctx() to
kfree() because it isn't a secctx being returned by
security_inode_getsecurity(). Change Smack to allocate the string when
told to do so.
Note: this also fixes memory leaks for LSMs which implement
inode_getsecurity but not release_secctx, such as capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
From David Howells:
"There are two sets of patches here:
(1) A bunch of core keyrings bug fixes from Eric Biggers.
(2) Fixing big_key to use safe crypto from Jason A. Donenfeld."
This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with
get_random_bytes_wait, so that we wouldn't use bad randomness at boot
time. But, upon looking further, it appears that there were even deeper
underlying cryptographic problems, and that this seems to have been
committed with very little crypto review. So, I rewrote the whole thing,
trying to keep to the conventions introduced by the previous author, to
fix these cryptographic flaws.
It makes no sense to seed crypto/rng at boot time and then keep
using it like this, when in fact there's already get_random_bytes_wait,
which can ensure there's enough entropy and be a much more standard way
of generating keys. Since this sensitive material is being stored
untrusted, using ECB and no authentication is simply not okay at all. I
find it surprising and a bit horrifying that this code even made it past
basic crypto review, which perhaps points to some larger issues. This
patch moves from using AES-ECB to using AES-GCM. Since keys are uniquely
generated each time, we can set the nonce to zero. There was also a race
condition in which the same key would be reused at the same time in
different threads. A mutex fixes this issue now.
So, to summarize, this commit fixes the following vulnerabilities:
* Low entropy key generation, allowing an attacker to potentially
guess or predict keys.
* Unauthenticated encryption, allowing an attacker to modify the
cipher text in particular ways in order to manipulate the plaintext,
which is is even more frightening considering the next point.
* Use of ECB mode, allowing an attacker to trivially swap blocks or
compare identical plaintext blocks.
* Key re-use.
* Faulty memory zeroing.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Error paths forgot to zero out sensitive material, so this patch changes
some kfrees into a kzfrees.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
kmemdup() is preferred to kmalloc() followed by memcpy().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
When checking for permission to view keys whilst reading from
/proc/keys, we should use the credentials with which the /proc/keys file
was opened. This is because, in a classic type of exploit, it can be
possible to bypass checks for the *current* credentials by passing the
file descriptor to a suid program.
Following commit 34dbbcdbf6 ("Make file credentials available to the
seqfile interfaces") we can finally fix it. So let's do it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In key_user_lookup(), if there is no key_user for the given uid, we drop
key_user_lock, allocate a new key_user, and search the tree again. But
we failed to set 'parent' to NULL at the beginning of the second search.
If the tree were to be empty for the second search, the insertion would
be done with an invalid 'parent', scribbling over freed memory.
Fortunately this can't actually happen currently because the tree always
contains at least the root_key_user. But it still should be fixed to
make the code more robust.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16a ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Userspace can call keyctl_read() on a keyring to get the list of IDs of
keys in the keyring. But if the user-supplied buffer is too small, the
kernel would write the full list anyway --- which will corrupt whatever
userspace memory happened to be past the end of the buffer. Fix it by
only filling the space that is available.
Fixes: b2a4df200d ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.13+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In keyctl_read_key(), if key_permission() were to return an error code
other than EACCES, we would leak a the reference to the key. This can't
actually happen currently because key_permission() can only return an
error code other than EACCES if security_key_permission() does, only
SELinux and Smack implement that hook, and neither can return an error
code other than EACCES. But it should still be fixed, as it is a bug
waiting to happen.
Fixes: 29db919063 ("[PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management [try #3]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In keyctl_assume_authority(), if keyctl_change_reqkey_auth() were to
fail, we would leak the reference to the 'authkey'. Currently this can
only happen if prepare_creds() fails to allocate memory. But it still
should be fixed, as it is a more severe bug waiting to happen.
This patch also moves the read of 'authkey->serial' to before the
reference to the authkey is dropped. Doing the read after dropping the
reference is very fragile because it assumes we still hold another
reference to the key. (Which we do, in current->cred->request_key_auth,
but there's no reason not to write it in the "obviously correct" way.)
Fixes: d84f4f992c ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
If key_instantiate_and_link() were to fail (which fortunately isn't
possible currently), the call to key_revoke(authkey) would crash with a
NULL pointer dereference in request_key_auth_revoke() because the key
has not yet been instantiated.
Fix this by removing the call to key_revoke(). key_put() is sufficient,
as it's not possible for an uninstantiated authkey to have been used for
anything yet.
Fixes: b5f545c880 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In request_key_auth_new(), if key_alloc() or key_instantiate_and_link()
were to fail, we would leak a reference to the 'struct cred'. Currently
this can only happen if key_alloc() fails to allocate memory. But it
still should be fixed, as it is a more severe bug waiting to happen.
Fix it by cleaning things up to use a helper function which frees a
'struct request_key_auth' correctly.
Fixes: d84f4f992c ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Pull misc security layer update from James Morris:
"This is the remaining 'general' change in the security tree for v4.14,
following the direct merging of SELinux (+ TOMOYO), AppArmor, and
seccomp.
That's everything now for the security tree except IMA, which will
follow shortly (I've been traveling for the past week with patchy
internet)"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: fix description of values returned by cap_inode_need_killpriv
cap_inode_need_killpriv returns 1 if security.capability exists and
has a value and inode_killpriv() is required, 0 otherwise. Fix the
description of the return value to reflect this.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
- in preparation for secid mapping add support for absolute root view
based labels
- add base infastructure for socket mediation
- add mount mediation
- add signal mediation
+ minor cleanups and changes
- be defensive, ensure unconfined profiles have dfas initialized
- add more debug asserts to apparmorfs
- enable policy unpacking to audit different reasons for failure
- cleanup conditional check for label in label_print
- Redundant condition: prev_ns. in [label.c:1498]
+ Bug Fixes
- fix regression in apparmorfs DAC access permissions
- fix build failure on sparc caused by undeclared signals
- fix sparse report of incorrect type assignment when freeing label proxies
- fix race condition in null profile creation
- Fix an error code in aafs_create()
- Fix logical error in verify_header()
- Fix shadowed local variable in unpack_trans_table()
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2017-09-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"This is the apparmor pull request, similar to SELinux and seccomp.
It's the same series that I was sent to James' security tree + one
regression fix that was found after the series was sent to James and
would have been sent for v4.14-rc2.
Features:
- in preparation for secid mapping add support for absolute root view
based labels
- add base infastructure for socket mediation
- add mount mediation
- add signal mediation
minor cleanups and changes:
- be defensive, ensure unconfined profiles have dfas initialized
- add more debug asserts to apparmorfs
- enable policy unpacking to audit different reasons for failure
- cleanup conditional check for label in label_print
- Redundant condition: prev_ns. in [label.c:1498]
Bug Fixes:
- fix regression in apparmorfs DAC access permissions
- fix build failure on sparc caused by undeclared signals
- fix sparse report of incorrect type assignment when freeing label proxies
- fix race condition in null profile creation
- Fix an error code in aafs_create()
- Fix logical error in verify_header()
- Fix shadowed local variable in unpack_trans_table()"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2017-09-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: fix apparmorfs DAC access permissions
apparmor: fix build failure on sparc caused by undeclared signals
apparmor: fix incorrect type assignment when freeing proxies
apparmor: ensure unconfined profiles have dfas initialized
apparmor: fix race condition in null profile creation
apparmor: move new_null_profile to after profile lookup fns()
apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation
apparmor: add more debug asserts to apparmorfs
apparmor: make policy_unpack able to audit different info messages
apparmor: add support for absolute root view based labels
apparmor: cleanup conditional check for label in label_print
apparmor: add mount mediation
apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals
apparmor: Redundant condition: prev_ns. in [label.c:1498]
apparmor: Fix an error code in aafs_create()
apparmor: Fix logical error in verify_header()
apparmor: Fix shadowed local variable in unpack_trans_table()
The DAC access permissions for several apparmorfs files are wrong.
.access - needs to be writable by all tasks to perform queries
the others in the set only provide a read fn so should be read only.
With policy namespace virtualization all apparmor needs to control
the permission and visibility checks directly which means DAC
access has to be allowed for all user, group, and other.
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1713103
Fixes: c97204baf8 ("apparmor: rename apparmor file fns and data to indicate use")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
In file included from security/apparmor/ipc.c:23:0:
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:26:3: error: 'SIGSTKFLT' undeclared here (not in a function)
[SIGSTKFLT] = 16, /* -, 16, - */
^
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:26:3: error: array index in initializer not of integer type
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:26:3: note: (near initialization for 'sig_map')
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:51:3: error: 'SIGUNUSED' undeclared here (not in a function)
[SIGUNUSED] = 34, /* -, 31, - */
^
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:51:3: error: array index in initializer not of integer type
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:51:3: note: (near initialization for 'sig_map')
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Fixes: c6bf1adaecaa ("apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
sparse reports
poisoning the proxy->label before freeing the struct is resulting in
a sparse build warning.
../security/apparmor/label.c:52:30: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces)
../security/apparmor/label.c:52:30: expected struct aa_label [noderef] <asn:4>*label
../security/apparmor/label.c:52:30: got struct aa_label *<noident>
fix with RCU_INIT_POINTER as this is one of those cases where
rcu_assign_pointer() is not needed.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Generally unconfined has early bailout tests and does not need the
dfas initialized, however if an early bailout test is ever missed
it will result in an oops.
Be defensive and initialize the unconfined profile to have null dfas
(no permission) so if an early bailout test is missed we fail
closed (no perms granted) instead of oopsing.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
There is a race when null- profile is being created between the
initial lookup/creation of the profile and lock/addition of the
profile. This could result in multiple version of a profile being
added to the list which need to be removed/replaced.
Since these are learning profile their is no affect on mediation.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
new_null_profile will need to use some of the profile lookup fns()
so move instead of doing forward fn declarations.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Switch unpack auditing to using the generic name field in the audit
struct and make it so we can start adding new info messages about
why an unpack failed.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
With apparmor policy virtualization based on policy namespace View's
we don't generally want/need absolute root based views, however there
are cases like debugging and some secid based conversions where
using a root based view is important.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Add signal mediation where the signal can be mediated based on the
signal, direction, or the label or the peer/target. The signal perms
are verified on a cross check to ensure policy consistency in the case
of incremental policy load/replacement.
The optimization of skipping the cross check when policy is guaranteed
to be consistent (single compile unit) remains to be done.
policy rules have the form of
SIGNAL_RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'signal' [ SIGNAL ACCESS PERMISSIONS ]
[ SIGNAL SET ] [ SIGNAL PEER ]
SIGNAL ACCESS PERMISSIONS = SIGNAL ACCESS | SIGNAL ACCESS LIST
SIGNAL ACCESS LIST = '(' Comma or space separated list of SIGNAL
ACCESS ')'
SIGNAL ACCESS = ( 'r' | 'w' | 'rw' | 'read' | 'write' | 'send' |
'receive' )
SIGNAL SET = 'set' '=' '(' SIGNAL LIST ')'
SIGNAL LIST = Comma or space separated list of SIGNALS
SIGNALS = ( 'hup' | 'int' | 'quit' | 'ill' | 'trap' | 'abrt' |
'bus' | 'fpe' | 'kill' | 'usr1' | 'segv' | 'usr2' |
'pipe' | 'alrm' | 'term' | 'stkflt' | 'chld' | 'cont' |
'stop' | 'stp' | 'ttin' | 'ttou' | 'urg' | 'xcpu' |
'xfsz' | 'vtalrm' | 'prof' | 'winch' | 'io' | 'pwr' |
'sys' | 'emt' | 'exists' | 'rtmin+0' ... 'rtmin+32'
)
SIGNAL PEER = 'peer' '=' AARE
eg.
signal, # allow all signals
signal send set=(hup, kill) peer=foo,
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
We accidentally forgot to set the error code on this path. It means we
return NULL instead of an error pointer. I looked through a bunch of
callers and I don't think it really causes a big issue, but the
documentation says we're supposed to return error pointers here.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
verify_header() is currently checking whether interface version is less
than 5 *and* greater than 7, which always evaluates to false. Instead it
should check whether it is less than 5 *or* greater than 7.
Signed-off-by: Christos Gkekas <chris.gekas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
with W=2:
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c: In function ‘unpack_trans_table’:
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:469: warning: declaration of ‘pos’ shadows a previous local
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:451: warning: shadowed declaration is here
Rename the old "pos" to "saved_pos" to fix this.
Fixes: 5379a33120 ("apparmor: support v7 transition format compatible with label_parse")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
During random test as own device to check slub account,
we found some slack memory from hashtab_node(kmalloc-64).
By using kzalloc(), middle of test result like below:
allocated size 240768
request size 45144
slack size 195624
allocation count 3762
So, we want to use kmem_cache_zalloc() and that
can reduce memory size 52byte(slack size/alloc count) per each struct.
Signed-off-by: Kyeongdon Kim <kyeongdon.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull more set_fs removal from Al Viro:
"Christoph's 'use kernel_read and friends rather than open-coding
set_fs()' series"
* 'work.set_fs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs: unexport vfs_readv and vfs_writev
fs: unexport vfs_read and vfs_write
fs: unexport __vfs_read/__vfs_write
lustre: switch to kernel_write
gadget/f_mass_storage: stop messing with the address limit
mconsole: switch to kernel_read
btrfs: switch write_buf to kernel_write
net/9p: switch p9_fd_read to kernel_write
mm/nommu: switch do_mmap_private to kernel_read
serial2002: switch serial2002_tty_write to kernel_{read/write}
fs: make the buf argument to __kernel_write a void pointer
fs: fix kernel_write prototype
fs: fix kernel_read prototype
fs: move kernel_read to fs/read_write.c
fs: move kernel_write to fs/read_write.c
autofs4: switch autofs4_write to __kernel_write
ashmem: switch to ->read_iter
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"A relatively quiet period for SELinux, 11 patches with only two/three
having any substantive changes.
These noteworthy changes include another tweak to the NNP/nosuid
handling, per-file labeling for cgroups, and an object class fix for
AF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets; the rest of the changes are minor tweaks or
administrative updates (Stephen's email update explains the file
explosion in the diffstat).
Everything passes the selinux-testsuite"
[ Also a couple of small patches from the security tree from Tetsuo
Handa for Tomoyo and LSM cleanup. The separation of security policy
updates wasn't all that clean - Linus ]
* tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: constify nf_hook_ops
selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs
lsm_audit: update my email address
selinux: update my email address
MAINTAINERS: update the NetLabel and Labeled Networking information
selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches
selinux: Generalize support for NNP/nosuid SELinux domain transitions
selinux: genheaders should fail if too many permissions are defined
selinux: update the selinux info in MAINTAINERS
credits: update Paul Moore's info
selinux: Assign proper class to PF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets
tomoyo: Update URLs in Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/tomoyo.rst
LSM: Remove security_task_create() hook.
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"Life has been busy and I have not gotten half as much done this round
as I would have liked. I delayed it so that a minor conflict
resolution with the mips tree could spend a little time in linux-next
before I sent this pull request.
This includes two long delayed user namespace changes from Kirill
Tkhai. It also includes a very useful change from Serge Hallyn that
allows the security capability attribute to be used inside of user
namespaces. The practical effect of this is people can now untar
tarballs and install rpms in user namespaces. It had been suggested to
generalize this and encode some of the namespace information
information in the xattr name. Upon close inspection that makes the
things that should be hard easy and the things that should be easy
more expensive.
Then there is my bugfix/cleanup for signal injection that removes the
magic encoding of the siginfo union member from the kernel internal
si_code. The mips folks reported the case where I had used FPE_FIXME
me is impossible so I have remove FPE_FIXME from mips, while at the
same time including a return statement in that case to keep gcc from
complaining about unitialized variables.
I almost finished the work to get make copy_siginfo_to_user a trivial
copy to user. The code is available at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git neuter-copy_siginfo_to_user-v3
But I did not have time/energy to get the code posted and reviewed
before the merge window opened.
I was able to see that the security excuse for just copying fields
that we know are initialized doesn't work in practice there are buggy
initializations that don't initialize the proper fields in siginfo. So
we still sometimes copy unitialized data to userspace"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
mips/signal: In force_fcr31_sig return in the impossible case
signal: Remove kernel interal si_code magic
fcntl: Don't use ambiguous SIG_POLL si_codes
prctl: Allow local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file
security: Use user_namespace::level to avoid redundant iterations in cap_capable()
userns,pidns: Verify the userns for new pid namespaces
signal/testing: Don't look for __SI_FAULT in userspace
signal/mips: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/sparc: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/ia64: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/alpha: Document a conflict with SI_USER for SIGTRAP
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20170907' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"A small pull request for audit this time, only four patches and only
two with any real code changes.
Those two changes are the removal of a pointless SELinux AVC
initialization audit event and a fix to improve the audit timestamp
overhead.
The other two patches are comment cleanup and administrative updates,
nothing very exciting.
Everything passes our tests"
* tag 'audit-pr-20170907' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: update the function comments
selinux: remove AVC init audit log message
audit: update the audit info in MAINTAINERS
audit: Reduce overhead using a coarse clock
running set*id processes. To do this, the bprm_secureexec LSM hook is
collapsed into the bprm_set_creds hook so the secureexec-ness of an exec
can be determined early enough to make decisions about rlimits and the
resulting memory layouts. Other logic acting on the secureexec-ness of an
exec is similarly consolidated. Capabilities needed some special handling,
but the refactoring removed other special handling, so that was a wash.
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Merge tag 'secureexec-v4.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull secureexec update from Kees Cook:
"This series has the ultimate goal of providing a sane stack rlimit
when running set*id processes.
To do this, the bprm_secureexec LSM hook is collapsed into the
bprm_set_creds hook so the secureexec-ness of an exec can be
determined early enough to make decisions about rlimits and the
resulting memory layouts. Other logic acting on the secureexec-ness of
an exec is similarly consolidated. Capabilities needed some special
handling, but the refactoring removed other special handling, so that
was a wash"
* tag 'secureexec-v4.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing
exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec
exec: Consolidate dumpability logic
smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing
exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal
exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability
LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook
commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds
commoncap: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
smack: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
selinux: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag
exec: Correct comments about "point of no return"
exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds
In the process of normalizing audit log messages, it was noticed that the AVC
initialization code registered an audit log KERNEL record that didn't fit the
standard format. In the process of attempting to normalize it it was
determined that this record was not even necessary. Remove it.
Ref: http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=149614868525826&w=2
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/48
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Make the position an in/out argument like all the other read/write
helpers and and make the buf argument a void pointer.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Use proper ssize_t and size_t types for the return value and count
argument, move the offset last and make it an in/out argument like
all other read/write helpers, and make the buf argument a void pointer
to get rid of lots of casts in the callers.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
host.
However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a
vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct
vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (that is, the uid_t in user
namespace which mounted the filesystem, usually init_user_ns) of the
root id in whose namespaces the file capabilities may take effect.
When a task asks to write a v2 security.capability xattr, if it is
privileged with respect to the userns which mounted the filesystem, then
nothing should change. Otherwise, the kernel will transparently rewrite
the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid. This is done during the
execution of setxattr() to catch user-space-initiated capability writes.
Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as
its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns,
will run the file with capabilities.
Similarly when asking to read file capabilities, a v3 capability will
be presented as v2 if it applies to the caller's namespace.
If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a uid for
the xattr so long as the uid is valid in its own user namespace, and it
is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP over its namespace. The kernel will
translate that rootid to an absolute uid, and write that to disk. After
this, a task in the writer's namespace will not be able to use those
capabilities (unless rootid was 0), but a task in a namespace where the
given uid is root will.
Only a single security.capability xattr may exist at a time for a given
file. A task may overwrite an existing xattr so long as it is
privileged over the inode. Note this is a departure from previous
semantics, which required privilege to remove a security.capability
xattr. This check can be re-added if deemed useful.
This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and
allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving
the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent
namespace.
Example using tar:
$ cp /bin/sleep sleepx
$ mkdir b1 b2
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b1
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b2
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -cf b1/sleepx.tar sleepx
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -C b2 -xf b1/sleepx.tar
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- getcap b2/sleepx
b2/sleepx = cap_sys_admin+ep
# /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/getv3xattr b2/sleepx
v3 xattr, rootid is 100001
A patch to linux-test-project adding a new set of tests for this
functionality is in the nsfscaps branch at github.com/hallyn/ltp
Changelog:
Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite()
Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns
(From ebiederm: mar 28 2017)
commoncap.c: fix typos - s/v4/v3
get_vfs_caps_from_disk: clarify the fs_ns root access check
nsfscaps: change the code split for cap_inode_setxattr()
Apr 09 2017:
don't return v3 cap for caps owned by current root.
return a v2 cap for a true v2 cap in non-init ns
Apr 18 2017:
. Change the flow of fscap writing to support s_user_ns writing.
. Remove refuse_fcap_overwrite(). The value of the previous
xattr doesn't matter.
Apr 24 2017:
. incorporate Eric's incremental diff
. move cap_convert_nscap to setxattr and simplify its usage
May 8, 2017:
. fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecurity
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
nf_hook_ops are not supposed to change at runtime. nf_register_net_hooks
and nf_unregister_net_hooks are working with const nf_hook_ops.
So mark the non-const nf_hook_ops structs as const.
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for cgroupfs. For instance,
this allows to label the "release_agent" file within each
cgroup mount and limit writes to it.
Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <amurdaca@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line and merge tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists.
MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists.
MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There is a strange __GFP_NOMEMALLOC usage pattern in SELinux,
specifically GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC which doesn't make much
sense. GFP_ATOMIC on its own allows to access memory reserves while
__GFP_NOMEMALLOC dictates we cannot use memory reserves. Replace this
with the much more sane GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC code as we can tolerate
memory allocation failures in that code.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As systemd ramps up enabling NNP (NoNewPrivileges) for system services,
it is increasingly breaking SELinux domain transitions for those services
and their descendants. systemd enables NNP not only for services whose
unit files explicitly specify NoNewPrivileges=yes but also for services
whose unit files specify any of the following options in combination with
running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. specifying User= or a
CapabilityBoundingSet= without CAP_SYS_ADMIN): SystemCallFilter=,
SystemCallArchitectures=, RestrictAddressFamilies=, RestrictNamespaces=,
PrivateDevices=, ProtectKernelTunables=, ProtectKernelModules=,
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=, or RestrictRealtime= as per the systemd.exec(5)
man page.
The end result is bad for the security of both SELinux-disabled and
SELinux-enabled systems. Packagers have to turn off these
options in the unit files to preserve SELinux domain transitions. For
users who choose to disable SELinux, this means that they miss out on
at least having the systemd-supported protections. For users who keep
SELinux enabled, they may still be missing out on some protections
because it isn't necessarily guaranteed that the SELinux policy for
that service provides the same protections in all cases.
commit 7b0d0b40cd ("selinux: Permit bounded transitions under
NO_NEW_PRIVS or NOSUID.") allowed bounded transitions under NNP in
order to support limited usage for sandboxing programs. However,
defining typebounds for all of the affected service domains
is impractical to implement in policy, since typebounds requires us
to ensure that each domain is allowed everything all of its descendant
domains are allowed, and this has to be repeated for the entire chain
of domain transitions. There is no way to clone all allow rules from
descendants to their ancestors in policy currently, and doing so would
be undesirable even if it were practical, as it requires leaking
permissions to objects and operations into ancestor domains that could
weaken their own security in order to allow them to the descendants
(e.g. if a descendant requires execmem permission, then so do all of
its ancestors; if a descendant requires execute permission to a file,
then so do all of its ancestors; if a descendant requires read to a
symbolic link or temporary file, then so do all of its ancestors...).
SELinux domains are intentionally not hierarchical / bounded in this
manner normally, and making them so would undermine their protections
and least privilege.
We have long had a similar tension with SELinux transitions and nosuid
mounts, albeit not as severe. Users often have had to choose between
retaining nosuid on a mount and allowing SELinux domain transitions on
files within those mounts. This likewise leads to unfortunate tradeoffs
in security.
Decouple NNP/nosuid from SELinux transitions, so that we don't have to
make a choice between them. Introduce a nnp_nosuid_transition policy
capability that enables transitions under NNP/nosuid to be based on
a permission (nnp_transition for NNP; nosuid_transition for nosuid)
between the old and new contexts in addition to the current support
for bounded transitions. Domain transitions can then be allowed in
policy without requiring the parent to be a strict superset of all of
its children.
With this change, systemd unit files can be left unmodified from upstream.
SELinux-disabled and SELinux-enabled users will benefit from retaining any
of the systemd-provided protections. SELinux policy will only need to
be adapted to enable the new policy capability and to allow the
new permissions between domain pairs as appropriate.
NB: Allowing nnp_transition between two contexts opens up the potential
for the old context to subvert the new context by installing seccomp
filters before the execve. Allowing nosuid_transition between two contexts
opens up the potential for a context transition to occur on a file from
an untrusted filesystem (e.g. removable media or remote filesystem). Use
with care.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This removes the redundant pdeath_signal clearing in Smack: the check in
smack_bprm_committing_creds() matches the check in smack_bprm_set_creds()
(which used to be in the now-removed smack_bprm_securexec() hook) and
since secureexec is now being checked for clearing pdeath_signal, this
is redundant to the common exec code.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This removes the bprm_secureexec hook since the logic has been folded into
the bprm_set_creds hook for all LSMs now.
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Instead of a separate function, open-code the cap_elevated test, which
lets us entirely remove bprm->cap_effective (to use the local "effective"
variable instead), and more accurately examine euid/egid changes via the
existing local "is_setid".
The following LTP tests were run to validate the changes:
# ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap
# ./runltp -f securebits
# ./runltp -f cap_bounds
# ./runltp -f filecaps
All kernel selftests for capabilities and exec continue to pass as well.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
The commoncap implementation of the bprm_secureexec hook is the only LSM
that depends on the final call to its bprm_set_creds hook (since it may
be called for multiple files, it ignores bprm->called_set_creds). As a
result, it cannot safely _clear_ bprm->secureexec since other LSMs may
have set it. Instead, remove the bprm_secureexec hook by introducing a
new flag to bprm specific to commoncap: cap_elevated. This is similar to
cap_effective, but that is used for a specific subset of elevated
privileges, and exists solely to track state from bprm_set_creds to
bprm_secureexec. As such, it will be removed in the next patch.
Here, set the new bprm->cap_elevated flag when setuid/setgid has happened
from bprm_fill_uid() or fscapabilities have been prepared. This temporarily
moves the bprm_secureexec hook to a static inline. The helper will be
removed in the next patch; this makes the step easier to review and bisect,
since this does not introduce any changes to inputs nor outputs to the
"elevated privileges" calculation.
The new flag is merged with the bprm->secureexec flag in setup_new_exec()
since this marks the end of any further prepare_binprm() calls.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
The Smack bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
via bprm->called_set_creds).
Here, the test can just happen at the end of the bprm_set_creds hook,
and the bprm_secureexec hook can be dropped.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The SELinux bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
via bprm->called_set_creds).
Here, the test can just happen at the end of the bprm_set_creds hook,
and the bprm_secureexec hook can be dropped.
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
The AppArmor bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
via bprm->called_set_creds).
Here, all the comments describe how secureexec is actually calculated
during bprm_set_creds, so this actually does it, drops the bprm flag that
was being used internally by AppArmor, and drops the bprm_secureexec hook.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
The cred_prepared bprm flag has a misleading name. It has nothing to do
with the bprm_prepare_cred hook, and actually tracks if bprm_set_creds has
been called. Rename this flag and improve its comment.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
We no longer place these on a list so they can be const.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
For PF_UNIX, SOCK_RAW is synonymous with SOCK_DGRAM (cf.
net/unix/af_unix.c). This is a tad obscure, but libpcap uses it.
Signed-off-by: Luis Ressel <aranea@aixah.de>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When ns->level is not larger then cred->user_ns->level,
then ns can't be cred->user_ns's descendant, and
there is no a sense to search in parents.
So, break the cycle earlier and skip needless iterations.
v2: Change comment on suggested by Andy Lutomirski.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.
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Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull structure randomization updates from Kees Cook:
"Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.
This is the rest of what was staged in -next for the gcc-plugins, and
comes in three patches, largest first:
- mark "easy" structs with __randomize_layout
- mark task_struct with an optional anonymous struct to isolate the
__randomize_layout section
- mark structs to opt _out_ of automated marking (which will come
later)
And, FWIW, this continues to pass allmodconfig (normal and patched to
enable gcc-plugins) builds of x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, and
s390 for me"
* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
task_struct: Allow randomized layout
randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
After rcu conversions performance degradation in forward tests isn't that
noticeable anymore.
See next patch for some numbers.
A followup patcg could then also remove genid from the policies
as we do not cache bundles anymore.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since commit a79be23860 ("selinux: Use task_alloc hook rather than
task_create hook") changed to use task_alloc hook, task_create hook is
no longer used.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Syscalls must validate that their reserved arguments are zero and return
EINVAL otherwise. Otherwise, it will be impossible to actually use them
for anything in the future because existing programs may be passing
garbage in. This is standard practice when adding new APIs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc
_FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer
overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the
size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc,
it covers buffer reads in addition to writes.
GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a
much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read
overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based
on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and
allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need
for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper
overhead.
This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and
some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in
regular use at runtime too.
Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity,
as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally:
* Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet
place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of
the source buffer.
* Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat.
* It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for
some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like
glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative
approach to avoid likely compatibility issues.
* The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config
option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough
time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed.
Kees said:
"This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have
blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size
argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for
out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already"
[arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de
[keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast
[keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Reasonably busy this cycle, but perhaps not as busy as in the 4.12
merge window:
1) Several optimizations for UDP processing under high load from
Paolo Abeni.
2) Support pacing internally in TCP when using the sch_fq packet
scheduler for this is not practical. From Eric Dumazet.
3) Support mutliple filter chains per qdisc, from Jiri Pirko.
4) Move to 1ms TCP timestamp clock, from Eric Dumazet.
5) Add batch dequeueing to vhost_net, from Jason Wang.
6) Flesh out more completely SCTP checksum offload support, from
Davide Caratti.
7) More plumbing of extended netlink ACKs, from David Ahern, Pablo
Neira Ayuso, and Matthias Schiffer.
8) Add devlink support to nfp driver, from Simon Horman.
9) Add RTM_F_FIB_MATCH flag to RTM_GETROUTE queries, from Roopa
Prabhu.
10) Add stack depth tracking to BPF verifier and use this information
in the various eBPF JITs. From Alexei Starovoitov.
11) Support XDP on qed device VFs, from Yuval Mintz.
12) Introduce BPF PROG ID for better introspection of installed BPF
programs. From Martin KaFai Lau.
13) Add bpf_set_hash helper for TC bpf programs, from Daniel Borkmann.
14) For loads, allow narrower accesses in bpf verifier checking, from
Yonghong Song.
15) Support MIPS in the BPF selftests and samples infrastructure, the
MIPS eBPF JIT will be merged in via the MIPS GIT tree. From David
Daney.
16) Support kernel based TLS, from Dave Watson and others.
17) Remove completely DST garbage collection, from Wei Wang.
18) Allow installing TCP MD5 rules using prefixes, from Ivan
Delalande.
19) Add XDP support to Intel i40e driver, from Björn Töpel
20) Add support for TC flower offload in nfp driver, from Simon
Horman, Pieter Jansen van Vuuren, Benjamin LaHaise, Jakub
Kicinski, and Bert van Leeuwen.
21) IPSEC offloading support in mlx5, from Ilan Tayari.
22) Add HW PTP support to macb driver, from Rafal Ozieblo.
23) Networking refcount_t conversions, From Elena Reshetova.
24) Add sock_ops support to BPF, from Lawrence Brako. This is useful
for tuning the TCP sockopt settings of a group of applications,
currently via CGROUPs"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1899 commits)
net: phy: dp83867: add workaround for incorrect RX_CTRL pin strap
dt-bindings: phy: dp83867: provide a workaround for incorrect RX_CTRL pin strap
cxgb4: Support for get_ts_info ethtool method
cxgb4: Add PTP Hardware Clock (PHC) support
cxgb4: time stamping interface for PTP
nfp: default to chained metadata prepend format
nfp: remove legacy MAC address lookup
nfp: improve order of interfaces in breakout mode
net: macb: remove extraneous return when MACB_EXT_DESC is defined
bpf: add missing break in for the TCP_BPF_SNDCWND_CLAMP case
bpf: fix return in load_bpf_file
mpls: fix rtm policy in mpls_getroute
net, ax25: convert ax25_cb.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, ax25: convert ax25_route.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, ax25: convert ax25_uid_assoc.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_ep_common.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_transport.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_chunk.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_datamsg.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_auth_bytes.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
...
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
- a major update for AppArmor. From JJ:
* several bug fixes and cleanups
* the patch to add symlink support to securityfs that was floated
on the list earlier and the apparmorfs changes that make use of
securityfs symlinks
* it introduces the domain labeling base code that Ubuntu has been
carrying for several years, with several cleanups applied. And it
converts the current mediation over to using the domain labeling
base, which brings domain stacking support with it. This finally
will bring the base upstream code in line with Ubuntu and provide
a base to upstream the new feature work that Ubuntu carries.
* This does _not_ contain any of the newer apparmor mediation
features/controls (mount, signals, network, keys, ...) that
Ubuntu is currently carrying, all of which will be RFC'd on top
of this.
- Notable also is the Infiniband work in SELinux, and the new file:map
permission. From Paul:
"While we're down to 21 patches for v4.13 (it was 31 for v4.12),
the diffstat jumps up tremendously with over 2k of line changes.
Almost all of these changes are the SELinux/IB work done by
Daniel Jurgens; some other noteworthy changes include a NFS v4.2
labeling fix, a new file:map permission, and reporting of policy
capabilities on policy load"
There's also now genfscon labeling support for tracefs, which was
lost in v4.1 with the separation from debugfs.
- Smack incorporates a safer socket check in file_receive, and adds a
cap_capable call in privilege check.
- TPM as usual has a bunch of fixes and enhancements.
- Multiple calls to security_add_hooks() can now be made for the same
LSM, to allow LSMs to have hook declarations across multiple files.
- IMA now supports different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from
the boot command line.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (126 commits)
apparmor: put back designators in struct initialisers
seccomp: Switch from atomic_t to recount_t
seccomp: Adjust selftests to avoid double-join
seccomp: Clean up core dump logic
IMA: update IMA policy documentation to include pcr= option
ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature
ima: Simplify policy_func_show.
integrity: Small code improvements
ima: fix get_binary_runtime_size()
ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse template data
ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers
ima: introduce ima_parse_buf()
ima: Add cgroups2 to the defaults list
ima: use memdup_user_nul
ima: fix up #endif comments
IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selection
ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled()
ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option
ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures
ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policies
...
around. Highlights include:
- Conversion of a bunch of security documentation into RST
- The conversion of the remaining DocBook templates by The Amazing
Mauro Machine. We can now drop the entire DocBook build chain.
- The usual collection of fixes and minor updates.
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Merge tag 'docs-4.13' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"There has been a fair amount of activity in the docs tree this time
around. Highlights include:
- Conversion of a bunch of security documentation into RST
- The conversion of the remaining DocBook templates by The Amazing
Mauro Machine. We can now drop the entire DocBook build chain.
- The usual collection of fixes and minor updates"
* tag 'docs-4.13' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (90 commits)
scripts/kernel-doc: handle DECLARE_HASHTABLE
Documentation: atomic_ops.txt is core-api/atomic_ops.rst
Docs: clean up some DocBook loose ends
Make the main documentation title less Geocities
Docs: Use kernel-figure in vidioc-g-selection.rst
Docs: fix table problems in ras.rst
Docs: Fix breakage with Sphinx 1.5 and upper
Docs: Include the Latex "ifthen" package
doc/kokr/howto: Only send regression fixes after -rc1
docs-rst: fix broken links to dynamic-debug-howto in kernel-parameters
doc: Document suitability of IBM Verse for kernel development
Doc: fix a markup error in coding-style.rst
docs: driver-api: i2c: remove some outdated information
Documentation: DMA API: fix a typo in a function name
Docs: Insert missing space to separate link from text
doc/ko_KR/memory-barriers: Update control-dependencies example
Documentation, kbuild: fix typo "minimun" -> "minimum"
docs: Fix some formatting issues in request-key.rst
doc: ReSTify keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
doc: ReSTify keys-request-key.txt
...
Pull scheduler updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- Add the SYSTEM_SCHEDULING bootup state to move various scheduler
debug checks earlier into the bootup. This turns silent and
sporadically deadly bugs into nice, deterministic splats. Fix some
of the splats that triggered. (Thomas Gleixner)
- A round of restructuring and refactoring of the load-balancing and
topology code (Peter Zijlstra)
- Another round of consolidating ~20 of incremental scheduler code
history: this time in terms of wait-queue nomenclature. (I didn't
get much feedback on these renaming patches, and we can still
easily change any names I might have misplaced, so if anyone hates
a new name, please holler and I'll fix it.) (Ingo Molnar)
- sched/numa improvements, fixes and updates (Rik van Riel)
- Another round of x86/tsc scheduler clock code improvements, in hope
of making it more robust (Peter Zijlstra)
- Improve NOHZ behavior (Frederic Weisbecker)
- Deadline scheduler improvements and fixes (Luca Abeni, Daniel
Bristot de Oliveira)
- Simplify and optimize the topology setup code (Lauro Ramos
Venancio)
- Debloat and decouple scheduler code some more (Nicolas Pitre)
- Simplify code by making better use of llist primitives (Byungchul
Park)
- ... plus other fixes and improvements"
* 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (103 commits)
sched/cputime: Refactor the cputime_adjust() code
sched/debug: Expose the number of RT/DL tasks that can migrate
sched/numa: Hide numa_wake_affine() from UP build
sched/fair: Remove effective_load()
sched/numa: Implement NUMA node level wake_affine()
sched/fair: Simplify wake_affine() for the single socket case
sched/numa: Override part of migrate_degrades_locality() when idle balancing
sched/rt: Move RT related code from sched/core.c to sched/rt.c
sched/deadline: Move DL related code from sched/core.c to sched/deadline.c
sched/cpuset: Only offer CONFIG_CPUSETS if SMP is enabled
sched/fair: Spare idle load balancing on nohz_full CPUs
nohz: Move idle balancer registration to the idle path
sched/loadavg: Generalize "_idle" naming to "_nohz"
sched/core: Drop the unused try_get_task_struct() helper function
sched/fair: WARN() and refuse to set buddy when !se->on_rq
sched/debug: Fix SCHED_WARN_ON() to return a value on !CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG as well
sched/wait: Disambiguate wq_entry->task_list and wq_head->task_list naming
sched/wait: Move bit_wait_table[] and related functionality from sched/core.c to sched/wait_bit.c
sched/wait: Split out the wait_bit*() APIs from <linux/wait.h> into <linux/wait_bit.h>
sched/wait: Re-adjust macro line continuation backslashes in <linux/wait.h>
...
- introduce the new uuid_t/guid_t types that are going to replace
the somewhat confusing uuid_be/uuid_le types and make the terminology
fit the various specs, as well as the userspace libuuid library.
(me, based on a previous version from Amir)
- consolidated generic uuid/guid helper functions lifted from XFS
and libnvdimm (Amir and me)
- conversions to the new types and helpers (Amir, Andy and me)
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Merge tag 'uuid-for-4.13' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/uuid
Pull uuid subsystem from Christoph Hellwig:
"This is the new uuid subsystem, in which Amir, Andy and I have started
consolidating our uuid/guid helpers and improving the types used for
them. Note that various other subsystems have pulled in this tree, so
I'd like it to go in early.
UUID/GUID summary:
- introduce the new uuid_t/guid_t types that are going to replace the
somewhat confusing uuid_be/uuid_le types and make the terminology
fit the various specs, as well as the userspace libuuid library.
(me, based on a previous version from Amir)
- consolidated generic uuid/guid helper functions lifted from XFS and
libnvdimm (Amir and me)
- conversions to the new types and helpers (Amir, Andy and me)"
* tag 'uuid-for-4.13' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/uuid: (34 commits)
ACPI: hns_dsaf_acpi_dsm_guid can be static
mmc: sdhci-pci: make guid intel_dsm_guid static
uuid: Take const on input of uuid_is_null() and guid_is_null()
thermal: int340x_thermal: fix compile after the UUID API switch
thermal: int340x_thermal: Switch to use new generic UUID API
acpi: always include uuid.h
ACPI: Switch to use generic guid_t in acpi_evaluate_dsm()
ACPI / extlog: Switch to use new generic UUID API
ACPI / bus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
ACPI / APEI: Switch to use new generic UUID API
acpi, nfit: Switch to use new generic UUID API
MAINTAINERS: add uuid entry
tmpfs: generate random sb->s_uuid
scsi_debug: switch to uuid_t
nvme: switch to uuid_t
sysctl: switch to use uuid_t
partitions/ldm: switch to use uuid_t
overlayfs: use uuid_t instead of uuid_be
fs: switch ->s_uuid to uuid_t
ima/policy: switch to use uuid_t
...
This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are
structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or
contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists,
workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise
sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling
and will be covered in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Fixes: 8014370f12 ("apparmor: move path_link mediation to using labels")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Two entries being added at the same time to the IFLA
policy table, whilst parallel bug fixes to decnet
routing dst handling overlapping with the dst gc removal
in net-next.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If the file doesn't have an xattr, ima_appraise_measurement sets cause to
"missing-hash" while if there's an xattr but it's a digest instead of a
signature it sets cause to "IMA-signature-required".
Fix it by setting cause to "IMA-signature-required" in both cases.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
If the func_tokens array uses the same indices as enum ima_hooks,
policy_func_show can be a lot simpler, and the func_* enum becomes
unnecessary.
Also, if we use the same macro trick used by kernel_read_file_id_str we can
use one hooks list for both the enum and the string array, making sure they
are always in sync (suggested by Mimi Zohar).
Finally, by using the printf pattern for the function token directly
instead of using the pt macro we can simplify policy_func_show even further
and avoid needing a temporary buffer.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
These changes are too small to warrant their own patches:
The keyid and sig_size members of struct signature_v2_hdr are in BE format,
so use a type that makes this assumption explicit. Also, use beXX_to_cpu
instead of __beXX_to_cpu to read them.
Change integrity_kernel_read to take a void * buffer instead of char *
buffer, so that callers don't have to use a cast if they provide a buffer
that isn't a char *.
Add missing #endif comment in ima.h pointing out which macro it refers to.
Add missing fall through comment in ima_appraise.c.
Constify mask_tokens and func_tokens arrays.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Remove '+ 1' from 'size += strlen(entry->template_desc->name) + 1;',
as the template name is sent to userspace without the '\0' character.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The binary_field_data structure definition has been removed from
ima_restore_template_data(). The lengths and data pointers are directly
stored into the template_data array of the ima_template_entry structure.
For template data, both the number of fields and buffer end checks can
be done, as these information are known (respectively from the template
descriptor, and from the measurement header field).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The binary_hdr_v1 and binary_data_v1 structures defined in
ima_restore_measurement_list() have been replaced with an array of four
ima_field_data structures where pcr, digest, template name and
template data lengths and pointers are stored.
The length of pcr and digest in the ima_field_data array and the bits
in the bitmap are set before ima_parse_buf() is called. The ENFORCE_FIELDS
bit is set for all entries except the last one (there is still data to
parse), and ENFORCE_BUFEND is set only for the last entry.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
ima_parse_buf() takes as input the buffer start and end pointers, and
stores the result in a static array of ima_field_data structures,
where the len field contains the length parsed from the buffer, and
the data field contains the address of the buffer just after the length.
Optionally, the function returns the current value of the buffer pointer
and the number of array elements written.
A bitmap has been added as parameter of ima_parse_buf() to handle
the cases where the length is not prepended to data. Each bit corresponds
to an element of the ima_field_data array. If a bit is set, the length
is not parsed from the buffer, but is read from the corresponding element
of the array (the length must be set before calling the function).
ima_parse_buf() can perform three checks upon request by callers,
depending on the enforce mask passed to it:
- ENFORCE_FIELDS: matching of number of fields (length-data combination)
- there must be enough data in the buffer to parse the number of fields
requested (output: current value of buffer pointer)
- ENFORCE_BUFEND: matching of buffer end
- the ima_field_data array must be large enough to contain lengths and
data pointers for the amount of data requested (output: number
of fields written)
- ENFORCE_FIELDS | ENFORCE_BUFEND: matching of both
Use cases
- measurement entry header: ENFORCE_FIELDS | ENFORCE_BUFEND
- four fields must be parsed: pcr, digest, template name, template data
- ENFORCE_BUFEND is enforced only for the last measurement entry
- template digest (Crypto Agile): ENFORCE_BUFEND
- since only the total template digest length is known, the function
parses length-data combinations until the buffer end is reached
- template data: ENFORCE_FIELDS | ENFORCE_BUFEND
- since the number of fields and the total template data length
are known, the function can perform both checks
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cgroups2 is beginning to show up in wider usage. Add it to the default
nomeasure/noappraise list like other filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Use memdup_user_nul() helper instead of open-coding to simplify the
code.
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
While reading the code, I noticed that these #endif comments don't match
how they're actually nested. This patch fixes that.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
IMA uses the hash algorithm too early to be able to use a module.
Require the selected hash algorithm to be built-in.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Only return enabled if in enforcing mode, not fix or log modes.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Changes:
- Define is_ima_appraise_enabled() as a bool (Thiago Bauermann)
The builtin "ima_appraise_tcb" policy should require file signatures for
at least a few of the hooks (eg. kernel modules, firmware, and the kexec
kernel image), but changing it would break the existing userspace/kernel
ABI.
This patch defines a new builtin policy named "secure_boot", which
can be specified on the "ima_policy=" boot command line, independently
or in conjunction with the "ima_appraise_tcb" policy, by specifing
ima_policy="appraise_tcb | secure_boot". The new appraisal rules
requiring file signatures will be added prior to the "ima_appraise_tcb"
rules.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Changelog:
- Reference secure boot in the new builtin policy name. (Thiago Bauermann)
Add support for providing multiple builtin policies on the "ima_policy="
boot command line. Use "|" as the delimitor separating the policy names.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
New NEWCACHEREPORT message type to be used for cache reports sent
via Netlink, effectively allowing splitting cache report reception from
mroute programming.
Suggested-by: Ryan Halbrook <halbrook@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Gomes <julien@arista.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In kernel version 4.1, tracefs was separated from debugfs into its
own filesystem. Prior to this split, files in
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing could be labeled during filesystem
creation using genfscon or later from userspace using setxattr. This
change re-enables support for genfscon labeling.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The wait_bit*() types and APIs are mixed into wait.h, but they
are a pretty orthogonal extension of wait-queues.
Furthermore, only about 50 kernel files use these APIs, while
over 1000 use the regular wait-queue functionality.
So clean up the main wait.h by moving the wait-bit functionality
out of it, into a separate .h and .c file:
include/linux/wait_bit.h for types and APIs
kernel/sched/wait_bit.c for the implementation
Update all header dependencies.
This reduces the size of wait.h rather significantly, by about 30%.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This patch is based on a discussion generated by an earlier patch
from Tetsuo Handa:
* https://marc.info/?t=149035659300001&r=1&w=2
The double free problem involves the mnt_opts field of the
security_mnt_opts struct, selinux_parse_opts_str() frees the memory
on error, but doesn't set the field to NULL so if the caller later
attempts to call security_free_mnt_opts() we trigger the problem.
In order to play it safe we change selinux_parse_opts_str() to call
security_free_mnt_opts() on error instead of free'ing the memory
directly. This should ensure that everything is handled correctly,
regardless of what the caller may do.
Fixes: e000752989 ("LSM/SELinux: Interfaces to allow FS to control mount options")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This is a temporary step, towards using the file->ctx for delegation,
and also helps speed up file queries, until the permission lookup
cache is introduced.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The cross check permission helper macros will help simplify code
that does cross task permission checks like ptrace.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on
the context and converting the label to a singular profile where
possible.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Begin moving apparmor to using broader domain labels, that will allow
run time computation of domain type splitting via "stacking" of
profiles into a domain label vec.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Instead of running file revalidation lazily when read/write are called
copy selinux and revalidate the file table on exec. This avoids
extra mediation overhead in read/write and also prevents file handles
being passed through to a grand child unchecked.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
There are still a few places where profile replacement fails to update
and a stale profile is used for mediation. Fix this by moving to
accessing the current label through a critical section that will
always ensure mediation is using the current label regardless of
whether the tasks cred has been updated or not.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
There is no reason to have the small stubs that don't use domain
private functions in domain.c, instead move them to lsm.c and make
them static.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The data being queried isn't always the current profile and a lookup
relative to the current profile should be done.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The namespace being passed into the replace/remove profiles fns() is
not the view, but the namespace specified by the inode from the
file hook (if present) or the loading tasks ns, if accessing the
top level virtualized load/replace file interface.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Currently lookups are restricted to a single ns component in the
path. However when namespaces are allowed to have separate views, and
scopes this will not be sufficient, as it will be possible to have
a multiple component ns path in scope.
Add some ns lookup fns() to allow this and use them.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Allow userspace to query a profile about permissions, through the
transaction interface that is already used to allow userspace to
query about key,value data.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The simple_transaction interface is slow. It requires 4 syscalls
(open, write, read, close) per query and shares a single lock for each
queries.
So replace its use with a compatible in multi_transaction interface.
It allows for a faster 2 syscall pattern per query. After an initial
open, an arbitrary number of writes and reads can be issued. Each
write will reset the query with new data that can be read. Reads do
not clear the data, and can be issued multiple times, and used with
seek, until a new write is performed which will reset the data
available and the seek position.
Note: this keeps the single lock design, if needed moving to a per
file lock will have to come later.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
gsettings mediation needs to be able to determine if apparmor supports
label data queries. A label data query can be done to test for support
but its failure is indistinguishable from other failures, making it an
unreliable indicator.
Fix by making support of label data queries available as a flag in the
apparmorfs features dir tree.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When setting up namespaces for containers its easier for them to use
an fs interface to create the namespace for the containers
policy. Allow mkdir/rmdir under the policy/namespaces/ dir to be used
to create and remove namespaces.
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1611078
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Add a policy revision file to find the current revision of a ns's policy.
There is a revision file per ns, as well as a virtualized global revision
file in the base apparmor fs directory. The global revision file when
opened will provide the revision of the opening task namespace.
The revision file can be waited on via select/poll to detect apparmor
policy changes from the last read revision of the opened file. This
means that the revision file must be read after the select/poll other
wise update data will remain ready for reading.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When an NFSv4 client performs a mount operation, it first mounts the
NFSv4 root and then does path walk to the exported path and performs a
submount on that, cloning the security mount options from the root's
superblock to the submount's superblock in the process.
Unless the NFS server has an explicit fsid=0 export with the
"security_label" option, the NFSv4 root superblock will not have
SBLABEL_MNT set, and neither will the submount superblock after cloning
the security mount options. As a result, setxattr's of security labels
over NFSv4.2 will fail. In a similar fashion, NFSv4.2 mounts mounted
with the context= mount option will not show the correct labels because
the nfs_server->caps flags of the cloned superblock will still have
NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL set.
Allowing the NFSv4 client to enable or disable SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
behavior will ensure that the SBLABEL_MNT flag has the correct value
when the client traverses from an exported path without the
"security_label" option to one with the "security_label" option and
vice versa. Similarly, checking to see if SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS is
set upon return from security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() and clearing
NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL if necessary will allow the correct labels to
be displayed for NFSv4.2 mounts mounted with the context= mount option.
Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/35
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The allocated size for each ebitmap_node is 192byte by kzalloc().
Then, ebitmap_node size is fixed, so it's possible to use only 144byte
for each object by kmem_cache_zalloc().
It can reduce some dynamic allocation size.
Signed-off-by: Junil Lee <junil0814.lee@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
If a key's refcount is dropped to zero between key_lookup() peeking at
the refcount and subsequently attempting to increment it, refcount_inc()
will see a zero refcount. Here, refcount_inc() will WARN_ONCE(), and
will *not* increment the refcount, which will remain zero.
Once key_lookup() drops key_serial_lock, it is possible for the key to
be freed behind our back.
This patch uses refcount_inc_not_zero() to perform the peek and increment
atomically.
Fixes: fff292914d ("security, keys: convert key.usage from atomic_t to refcount_t")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The initial Diffie-Hellman computation made direct use of the MPI
library because the crypto module did not support DH at the time. Now
that KPP is implemented, KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE should use it to get rid of
duplicate code and leverage possible hardware acceleration.
This fixes an issue whereby the input to the KDF computation would
include additional uninitialized memory when the result of the
Diffie-Hellman computation was shorter than the input prime number.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Accessing a 'u8[4]' through a '__be32 *' violates alignment rules. Just
make the counter a __be32 instead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
If userspace called KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE with kdf_params containing NULL
otherinfo but nonzero otherinfolen, the kernel would allocate a buffer
for the otherinfo, then feed it into the KDF without initializing it.
Fix this by always doing the copy from userspace (which will fail with
EFAULT in this scenario).
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Requesting "digest_null" in the keyctl_kdf_params caused an infinite
loop in kdf_ctr() because the "null" hash has a digest size of 0. Fix
it by rejecting hash algorithms with a digest size of 0.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
While a 'struct key' itself normally does not contain sensitive
information, Documentation/security/keys.txt actually encourages this:
"Having a payload is not required; and the payload can, in fact,
just be a value stored in the struct key itself."
In case someone has taken this advice, or will take this advice in the
future, zero the key structure before freeing it. We might as well, and
as a bonus this could make it a bit more difficult for an adversary to
determine which keys have recently been in use.
This is safe because the key_jar cache does not use a constructor.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any
potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it
is freed. Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which
the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing
the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
For keys of type "encrypted", consistently zero sensitive key material
before freeing it. This was already being done for the decrypted
payloads of encrypted keys, but not for the master key and the keys
derived from the master key.
Out of an abundance of caution and because it is trivial to do so, also
zero buffers containing the key payload in encrypted form, although
depending on how the encrypted-keys feature is used such information
does not necessarily need to be kept secret.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Zero the payloads of user and logon keys before freeing them. This
prevents sensitive key material from being kept around in the slab
caches after a key is released.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Before returning from add_key() or one of the keyctl() commands that
takes in a key payload, zero the temporary buffer that was allocated to
hold the key payload copied from userspace. This may contain sensitive
key material that should not be kept around in the slab caches.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a
NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's
->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods. Various key
types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did
not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a
NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was
present. Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero
rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail
with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
MACs should, in general, be compared using crypto_memneq() to prevent
timing attacks.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The encrypted-keys module was using a single global HMAC transform,
which could be rekeyed by multiple threads concurrently operating on
different keys, causing incorrect HMAC values to be calculated. Fix
this by allocating a new HMAC transform whenever we need to calculate a
HMAC. Also simplify things a bit by allocating the shash_desc's using
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() for both the HMAC and unkeyed hashes.
The following script reproduces the bug:
keyctl new_session
keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s
for i in $(seq 2); do
(
set -e
for j in $(seq 1000); do
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "new user:master 25" @s)
datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "load $datablob" @s)
keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null
done
) &
done
Output with bug:
[ 439.691094] encrypted_key: bad hmac (-22)
add_key: Invalid argument
add_key: Invalid argument
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a
data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected,
e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a
master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end
of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also
clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.]
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Since v4.9, the crypto API cannot (normally) be used to encrypt/decrypt
stack buffers because the stack may be virtually mapped. Fix this for
the padding buffers in encrypted-keys by using ZERO_PAGE for the
encryption padding and by allocating a temporary heap buffer for the
decryption padding.
Tested with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y:
keyctl new_session
keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "new user:master 25" @s)
datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
keyctl unlink $keyid
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "load $datablob" @s)
datablob2="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
[ "$datablob" = "$datablob2" ] && echo "Success!"
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
In join_session_keyring(), if install_session_keyring_to_cred() were to
fail, we would leak the keyring reference, just like in the bug fixed by
commit 23567fd052 ("KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in
join_session_keyring()"). Fortunately this cannot happen currently, but
we really should be more careful. Do this by adding and using a new
error label at which the keyring reference is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Omit an extra message for a memory allocation failure in this function.
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Link: http://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/LCJ16-Refactor_Strings-WSang_0.pdf
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
With the new standardized functions, we can replace all ACCESS_ONCE()
calls across relevant security/keyrings/.
ACCESS_ONCE() does not work reliably on non-scalar types. For example
gcc 4.6 and 4.7 might remove the volatile tag for such accesses during
the SRA (scalar replacement of aggregates) step:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58145
Update the new calls regardless of if it is a scalar type, this is
cleaner than having three alternatives.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT is defined in arch-specific Kconfigs and is missing for
several 64-bit architectures : mips, parisc, tile.
At the moment and for those architectures, calling in 32-bit userspace the
keyctl syscall would return an ENOSYS error.
This patch moves the CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT option to security/keys/Kconfig, to
make sure the compatibility wrapper is registered by default for any 64-bit
architecture as long as it is configured with CONFIG_COMPAT.
[DH: Modified to remove arm64 compat enablement also as requested by Eric
Biggers]
Signed-off-by: Bilal Amarni <bilal.amarni@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Virtualize the apparmor policy/ directory so that the current
namespace affects what part of policy is seen. To do this convert to
using apparmorfs for policy namespace files and setup a magic symlink
in the securityfs apparmor dir to access those files.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
prefixes are used for fns/data that are not static to apparmorfs.c
with the prefixes being
aafs - special magic apparmorfs for policy namespace data
aa_sfs - for fns/data that go into securityfs
aa_fs - for fns/data that may be used in the either of aafs or
securityfs
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
AppArmor policy needs to be able to be resolved based on the policy
namespace a task is confined by. Add a base apparmorfs filesystem that
(like nsfs) will exist as a kern mount and be accessed via jump_link
through a securityfs file.
Setup the base apparmorfs fns and data, but don't use it yet.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should
be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace
and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Dynamically allocating buffers is problematic and is an extra layer
that is a potntial point of failure and can slow down mediation.
Change path lookup to use the preallocated per cpu buffers.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When using a strictly POSIX-compliant shell, "-n #define ..." gets
written into the file. Use "printf '%s'" to avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Schneider <qsx@qsx.re>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
We can either return PTR_ERR(NULL) or a PTR_ERR(a valid pointer) here.
Returning NULL is probably not good, but since this happens at boot
then we are probably already toasted if we were to hit this bug in real
life. In other words, it seems like a very low severity bug to me.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Two single characters (line breaks) should be put into a sequence.
Thus use the corresponding function "seq_putc".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
A bit of data was put into a sequence by two separate function calls.
Print the same data by a single function call instead.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
For some file systems we still memcpy into it, but in various places this
already allows us to use the proper uuid helpers. More to come..
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (Changes to IMA/EVM)
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
This helper was only used by IMA of all things, which would get spurious
errors if CONFIG_BLOCK is disabled. Just opencode the call there.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
It will allow us to remove the old netfilter hook api in the near future.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Use cap_capable() rather than capable() in the Smack privilege
check as the former does not invoke other security module
privilege check, while the later does. This becomes important
when stacking. It may be a problem even with minor modules.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The check of S_ISSOCK() in smack_file_receive() is not
appropriate if the passed descriptor is a socket.
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tyco.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
It will allow us to remove the old netfilter hook api in the near future.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
It is likely that the SID for the same PKey will be requested many
times. To reduce the time to modify QPs and process MADs use a cache to
store PKey SIDs.
This code is heavily based on the "netif" and "netport" concept
originally developed by James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> and Paul Moore
<paul@paul-moore.com> (see security/selinux/netif.c and
security/selinux/netport.c for more information)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a type for Infiniband ports and an access vector for subnet
management packets. Implement the ib_port_smp hook to check that the
caller has permission to send and receive SMPs on the end port specified
by the device name and port. Add interface to query the SID for a IB
port, which walks the IB_PORT ocontexts to find an entry for the
given name and port.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a type and access vector for PKeys. Implement the ib_pkey_access
hook to check that the caller has permission to access the PKey on the
given subnet prefix. Add an interface to get the PKey SID. Walk the PKey
ocontexts to find an entry for the given subnet prefix and pkey.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Implement and attach hooks to allocate and free Infiniband object
security structures.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Support for Infiniband requires the addition of two new object contexts,
one for infiniband PKeys and another IB Ports. Added handlers to read
and write the new ocontext types when reading or writing a binary policy
representation.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a MAD
agent. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys and sending
and receiving SMPs.
When sending or receiving a MAD check that the agent has permission to
access the PKey for the Subnet Prefix of the port.
During MAD and snoop agent registration for SMI QPs check that the
calling process has permission to access the manage the subnet and
register a callback with the LSM to be notified of policy changes. When
notificaiton of a policy change occurs recheck permission and set a flag
indicating sending and receiving SMPs is allowed.
When sending and receiving MADs check that the agent has access to the
SMI if it's on an SMI QP. Because security policy can change it's
possible permission was allowed when creating the agent, but no longer
is.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
[PM: remove the LSM hook init code]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers
can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce
events.
Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a
connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes.
Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all
QPs on that device when the notification is received.
Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC
cache changes or setenforce is cleared.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for
permission to access a PKey.
Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP.
This context is used for controlling access to PKeys.
When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index,
or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the
PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared
make sure all handles to the QP also have access.
Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init
transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path
independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the
previous settings and the new ones.
In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet
prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on
each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must
have access enforced for the new cache settings.
These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association
with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails,
and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and
PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the
modify fails.
1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate
path insert that QP into the appropriate lists.
2. Check permission to access the new settings.
3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP.
4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations.
4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations.
If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and
check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state
and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the
QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that
owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is
marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving
the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared.
Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction.
The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while
the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security
struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security
structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being
taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it
could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that
flow before cleaning up the structure.
If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into
the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control
is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy
flow.
To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security
related functionality.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The check is already performed in ocontext_read() when the policy is
loaded. Removing the array also fixes the following warning when
building with clang:
security/selinux/hooks.c:338:20: error: variable 'labeling_behaviors'
is not needed and will not be emitted
[-Werror,-Wunneeded-internal-declaration]
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Log the state of SELinux policy capabilities when a policy is loaded.
For each policy capability known to the kernel, log the policy capability
name and the value set in the policy. For policy capabilities that are
set in the loaded policy but unknown to the kernel, log the policy
capability index, since this is the only information presently available
in the policy.
Sample output with a policy created with a new capability defined
that is not known to the kernel:
SELinux: policy capability network_peer_controls=1
SELinux: policy capability open_perms=1
SELinux: policy capability extended_socket_class=1
SELinux: policy capability always_check_network=0
SELinux: policy capability cgroup_seclabel=0
SELinux: unknown policy capability 5
Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/32
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
open permission is currently only defined for files in the kernel
(COMMON_FILE_PERMS rather than COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS). Construction of
an artificial test case that tries to open a socket via /proc/pid/fd will
generate a recvfrom avc denial because recvfrom and open happen to map to
the same permission bit in socket vs file classes.
open of a socket via /proc/pid/fd is not supported by the kernel regardless
and will ultimately return ENXIO. But we hit the permission check first and
can thus produce these odd/misleading denials. Omit the open check when
operating on a socket.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a map permission check on mmap so that we can distinguish memory mapped
access (since it has different implications for revocation). When a file
is opened and then read or written via syscalls like read(2)/write(2),
we revalidate access on each read/write operation via
selinux_file_permission() and therefore can revoke access if the
process context, the file context, or the policy changes in such a
manner that access is no longer allowed. When a file is opened and then
memory mapped via mmap(2) and then subsequently read or written directly
in memory, we presently have no way to revalidate or revoke access.
The purpose of a separate map permission check on mmap(2) is to permit
policy to prohibit memory mapping of specific files for which we need
to ensure that every access is revalidated, particularly useful for
scenarios where we expect the file to be relabeled at runtime in order
to reflect state changes (e.g. cross-domain solution, assured pipeline
without data copying).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SELinux uses CAP_MAC_ADMIN to control the ability to get or set a raw,
uninterpreted security context unknown to the currently loaded security
policy. When performing these checks, we only want to perform a base
capabilities check and a SELinux permission check. If any other
modules that implement a capable hook are stacked with SELinux, we do
not want to require them to also have to authorize CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
since it may have different implications for their security model.
Rework the CAP_MAC_ADMIN checks within SELinux to only invoke the
capabilities module and the SELinux permission checking.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Return an error code without storing it in an intermediate variable.
* Delete the local variable "rc" and the jump label "out" which became
unnecessary with this refactoring.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace five goto statements (and previous variable assignments) by
direct returns after a memory allocation failure in this function.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch is a preparation for getting rid of task_create hook because
task_alloc hook which can do what task_create hook can do was revived.
Creating a new thread is unlikely prohibited by security policy, for
fork()/execve()/exit() is fundamental of how processes are managed in
Unix. If a program is known to create a new thread, it is likely that
permission to create a new thread is given to that program. Therefore,
a situation where security_task_create() returns an error is likely that
the program was exploited and lost control. Even if SELinux failed to
check permission to create a thread at security_task_create(), SELinux
can later check it at security_task_alloc(). Since the new thread is not
yet visible from the rest of the system, nobody can do bad things using
the new thread. What we waste will be limited to some initialization
steps such as dup_task_struct(), copy_creds() and audit_alloc() in
copy_process(). We can tolerate these overhead for unlikely situation.
Therefore, this patch changes SELinux to use task_alloc hook rather than
task_create hook so that we can remove task_create hook.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The commit d69dece5f5 ("LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm") extend
security_add_hooks() with a new parameter to register the LSM name,
which may be useful to make the list of currently loaded LSM available
to userspace. However, there is no clean way for an LSM to split its
hook declarations into multiple files, which may reduce the mess with
all the included files (needed for LSM hook argument types) and make the
source code easier to review and maintain.
This change allows an LSM to register multiple times its hook while
keeping a consistent list of LSM names as described in
Documentation/security/LSM.txt . The list reflects the order in which
checks are made. This patch only check for the last registered LSM. If
an LSM register multiple times its hooks, interleaved with other LSM
registrations (which should not happen), its name will still appear in
the same order that the hooks are called, hence multiple times.
To sum up, "capability,selinux,foo,foo" will be replaced with
"capability,selinux,foo", however "capability,foo,selinux,foo" will
remain as is.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted bits and pieces from various people. No common topic in this
pile, sorry"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs/affs: add rename exchange
fs/affs: add rename2 to prepare multiple methods
Make stat/lstat/fstatat pass AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT to vfs_statx()
fs: don't set *REFERENCED on single use objects
fs: compat: Remove warning from COMPATIBLE_IOCTL
remove pointless extern of atime_need_update_rcu()
fs: completely ignore unknown open flags
fs: add a VALID_OPEN_FLAGS
fs: remove _submit_bh()
fs: constify tree_descr arrays passed to simple_fill_super()
fs: drop duplicate header percpu-rwsem.h
fs/affs: bugfix: Write files greater than page size on OFS
fs/affs: bugfix: enable writes on OFS disks
fs/affs: remove node generation check
fs/affs: import amigaffs.h
fs/affs: bugfix: make symbolic links work again
CURRENT_TIME macro is not y2038 safe on 32 bit systems.
The patch replaces all the uses of CURRENT_TIME by current_time().
This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions vfs
timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them y2038 safe.
current_time() is also planned to be transitioned to y2038 safe behavior
along with this change.
CURRENT_TIME macro will be deleted before merging the aforementioned
change.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1491613030-11599-11-git-send-email-deepa.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There are many code paths opencoding kvmalloc. Let's use the helper
instead. The main difference to kvmalloc is that those users are
usually not considering all the aspects of the memory allocator. E.g.
allocation requests <= 32kB (with 4kB pages) are basically never failing
and invoke OOM killer to satisfy the allocation. This sounds too
disruptive for something that has a reasonable fallback - the vmalloc.
On the other hand those requests might fallback to vmalloc even when the
memory allocator would succeed after several more reclaim/compaction
attempts previously. There is no guarantee something like that happens
though.
This patch converts many of those places to kv[mz]alloc* helpers because
they are more conservative.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306103327.2766-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> # Xen bits
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Andreas Dilger <andreas.dilger@intel.com> # Lustre
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> # KVM/s390
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> # nvdim
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> # btrfs
Acked-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> # Ceph
Acked-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> # mlx4
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> # mlx5
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>
Cc: Santosh Raspatur <santosh@chelsio.com>
Cc: Hariprasad S <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Cc: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Cc: Oleg Drokin <oleg.drokin@intel.com>
Cc: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "kvmalloc", v5.
There are many open coded kmalloc with vmalloc fallback instances in the
tree. Most of them are not careful enough or simply do not care about
the underlying semantic of the kmalloc/page allocator which means that
a) some vmalloc fallbacks are basically unreachable because the kmalloc
part will keep retrying until it succeeds b) the page allocator can
invoke a really disruptive steps like the OOM killer to move forward
which doesn't sound appropriate when we consider that the vmalloc
fallback is available.
As it can be seen implementing kvmalloc requires quite an intimate
knowledge if the page allocator and the memory reclaim internals which
strongly suggests that a helper should be implemented in the memory
subsystem proper.
Most callers, I could find, have been converted to use the helper
instead. This is patch 6. There are some more relying on __GFP_REPEAT
in the networking stack which I have converted as well and Eric Dumazet
was not opposed [2] to convert them as well.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170130094940.13546-1-mhocko@kernel.org
[2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485273626.16328.301.camel@edumazet-glaptop3.roam.corp.google.com
This patch (of 9):
Using kmalloc with the vmalloc fallback for larger allocations is a
common pattern in the kernel code. Yet we do not have any common helper
for that and so users have invented their own helpers. Some of them are
really creative when doing so. Let's just add kv[mz]alloc and make sure
it is implemented properly. This implementation makes sure to not make
a large memory pressure for > PAGE_SZE requests (__GFP_NORETRY) and also
to not warn about allocation failures. This also rules out the OOM
killer as the vmalloc is a more approapriate fallback than a disruptive
user visible action.
This patch also changes some existing users and removes helpers which
are specific for them. In some cases this is not possible (e.g.
ext4_kvmalloc, libcfs_kvzalloc) because those seems to be broken and
require GFP_NO{FS,IO} context which is not vmalloc compatible in general
(note that the page table allocation is GFP_KERNEL). Those need to be
fixed separately.
While we are at it, document that __vmalloc{_node} about unsupported gfp
mask because there seems to be a lot of confusion out there.
kvmalloc_node will warn about GFP_KERNEL incompatible (which are not
superset) flags to catch new abusers. Existing ones would have to die
slowly.
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: f2fs fixup]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320163735.332e64b7@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306103032.2540-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> [ext4 part]
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
IMA:
- provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules
KEYS:
- add a system blacklist keyring
- add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction
functionality to userland via keyctl()
LSM:
- harden LSM API with __ro_after_init
- add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux
- revive security_task_alloc hook
TPM:
- implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits)
tpm: Fix reference count to main device
tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks
tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs
tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant
keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF
apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly
apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot
apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836
apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK
security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages
apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings
Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().
smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()
KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining
KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain
KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type
KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check
KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type
...
Pull networking updates from David Millar:
"Here are some highlights from the 2065 networking commits that
happened this development cycle:
1) XDP support for IXGBE (John Fastabend) and thunderx (Sunil Kowuri)
2) Add a generic XDP driver, so that anyone can test XDP even if they
lack a networking device whose driver has explicit XDP support
(me).
3) Sparc64 now has an eBPF JIT too (me)
4) Add a BPF program testing framework via BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN (Alexei
Starovoitov)
5) Make netfitler network namespace teardown less expensive (Florian
Westphal)
6) Add symmetric hashing support to nft_hash (Laura Garcia Liebana)
7) Implement NAPI and GRO in netvsc driver (Stephen Hemminger)
8) Support TC flower offload statistics in mlxsw (Arkadi Sharshevsky)
9) Multiqueue support in stmmac driver (Joao Pinto)
10) Remove TCP timewait recycling, it never really could possibly work
well in the real world and timestamp randomization really zaps any
hint of usability this feature had (Soheil Hassas Yeganeh)
11) Support level3 vs level4 ECMP route hashing in ipv4 (Nikolay
Aleksandrov)
12) Add socket busy poll support to epoll (Sridhar Samudrala)
13) Netlink extended ACK support (Johannes Berg, Pablo Neira Ayuso,
and several others)
14) IPSEC hw offload infrastructure (Steffen Klassert)"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (2065 commits)
tipc: refactor function tipc_sk_recv_stream()
tipc: refactor function tipc_sk_recvmsg()
net: thunderx: Optimize page recycling for XDP
net: thunderx: Support for XDP header adjustment
net: thunderx: Add support for XDP_TX
net: thunderx: Add support for XDP_DROP
net: thunderx: Add basic XDP support
net: thunderx: Cleanup receive buffer allocation
net: thunderx: Optimize CQE_TX handling
net: thunderx: Optimize RBDR descriptor handling
net: thunderx: Support for page recycling
ipx: call ipxitf_put() in ioctl error path
net: sched: add helpers to handle extended actions
qed*: Fix issues in the ptp filter config implementation.
qede: Fix concurrency issue in PTP Tx path processing.
stmmac: Add support for SIMATIC IOT2000 platform
net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
tcp: fix wraparound issue in tcp_lp
bpf, arm64: fix jit branch offset related to ldimm64
bpf, arm64: implement jiting of BPF_XADD
...
guide for user-space API documents, rather sparsely populated at the
moment, but it's a start. Markus improved the infrastructure for
converting diagrams. Mauro has converted much of the USB documentation
over to RST. Plus the usual set of fixes, improvements, and tweaks.
There's a bit more than the usual amount of reaching out of Documentation/
to fix comments elsewhere in the tree; I have acks for those where I could
get them.
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Merge tag 'docs-4.12' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation update from Jonathan Corbet:
"A reasonably busy cycle for documentation this time around. There is a
new guide for user-space API documents, rather sparsely populated at
the moment, but it's a start. Markus improved the infrastructure for
converting diagrams. Mauro has converted much of the USB documentation
over to RST. Plus the usual set of fixes, improvements, and tweaks.
There's a bit more than the usual amount of reaching out of
Documentation/ to fix comments elsewhere in the tree; I have acks for
those where I could get them"
* tag 'docs-4.12' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (74 commits)
docs: Fix a couple typos
docs: Fix a spelling error in vfio-mediated-device.txt
docs: Fix a spelling error in ioctl-number.txt
MAINTAINERS: update file entry for HSI subsystem
Documentation: allow installing man pages to a user defined directory
Doc/PM: Sync with intel_powerclamp code behavior
zr364xx.rst: usb/devices is now at /sys/kernel/debug/
usb.rst: move documentation from proc_usb_info.txt to USB ReST book
convert philips.txt to ReST and add to media docs
docs-rst: usb: update old usbfs-related documentation
arm: Documentation: update a path name
docs: process/4.Coding.rst: Fix a couple of document refs
docs-rst: fix usb cross-references
usb: gadget.h: be consistent at kernel doc macros
usb: composite.h: fix two warnings when building docs
usb: get rid of some ReST doc build errors
usb.rst: get rid of some Sphinx errors
usb/URB.txt: convert to ReST and update it
usb/persist.txt: convert to ReST and add to driver-api book
usb/hotplug.txt: convert to ReST and add to driver-api book
...
Pull uaccess unification updates from Al Viro:
"This is the uaccess unification pile. It's _not_ the end of uaccess
work, but the next batch of that will go into the next cycle. This one
mostly takes copy_from_user() and friends out of arch/* and gets the
zero-padding behaviour in sync for all architectures.
Dealing with the nocache/writethrough mess is for the next cycle;
fortunately, that's x86-only. Same for cleanups in iov_iter.c (I am
sold on access_ok() in there, BTW; just not in this pile), same for
reducing __copy_... callsites, strn*... stuff, etc. - there will be a
pile about as large as this one in the next merge window.
This one sat in -next for weeks. -3KLoC"
* 'work.uaccess' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (96 commits)
HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY is unconditional now
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RAW_COPY_USER is unconditional now
m32r: switch to RAW_COPY_USER
hexagon: switch to RAW_COPY_USER
microblaze: switch to RAW_COPY_USER
get rid of padding, switch to RAW_COPY_USER
ia64: get rid of copy_in_user()
ia64: sanitize __access_ok()
ia64: get rid of 'segment' argument of __do_{get,put}_user()
ia64: get rid of 'segment' argument of __{get,put}_user_check()
ia64: add extable.h
powerpc: get rid of zeroing, switch to RAW_COPY_USER
esas2r: don't open-code memdup_user()
alpha: fix stack smashing in old_adjtimex(2)
don't open-code kernel_setsockopt()
mips: switch to RAW_COPY_USER
mips: get rid of tail-zeroing in primitives
mips: make copy_from_user() zero tail explicitly
mips: clean and reorder the forest of macros...
mips: consolidate __invoke_... wrappers
...
simple_fill_super() is passed an array of tree_descr structures which
describe the files to create in the filesystem's root directory. Since
these arrays are never modified intentionally, they should be 'const' so
that they are placed in .rodata and benefit from memory protection.
This patch updates the function signature and all users, and also
constifies tree_descr.name.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Both conflict were simple overlapping changes.
In the kaweth case, Eric Dumazet's skb_cow() bug fix overlapped the
conversion of the driver in net-next to use in-netdev stats.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Fixes: d84f4f992c ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This fixes CVE-2017-6951.
Userspace should not be able to do things with the "dead" key type as it
doesn't have some of the helper functions set upon it that the kernel
needs. Attempting to use it may cause the kernel to crash.
Fix this by changing the name of the type to ".dead" so that it's rejected
up front on userspace syscalls by key_get_type_from_user().
Though this doesn't seem to affect recent kernels, it does affect older
ones, certainly those prior to:
commit c06cfb08b8
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue Sep 16 17:36:06 2014 +0100
KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
which went in before 3.18-rc1.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
This fixes CVE-2016-9604.
Keyrings whose name begin with a '.' are special internal keyrings and so
userspace isn't allowed to create keyrings by this name to prevent
shadowing. However, the patch that added the guard didn't fix
KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING. Not only can that create dot-named keyrings,
it can also subscribe to them as a session keyring if they grant SEARCH
permission to the user.
This, for example, allows a root process to set .builtin_trusted_keys as
its session keyring, at which point it has full access because now the
possessor permissions are added. This permits root to add extra public
keys, thereby bypassing module verification.
This also affects kexec and IMA.
This can be tested by (as root):
keyctl session .builtin_trusted_keys
keyctl add user a a @s
keyctl list @s
which on my test box gives me:
2 keys in keyring:
180010936: ---lswrv 0 0 asymmetric: Build time autogenerated kernel key: ae3d4a31b82daa8e1a75b49dc2bba949fd992a05
801382539: --alswrv 0 0 user: a
Fix this by rejecting names beginning with a '.' in the keyctl.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Select CONFIG_CRYPTO in addition to CONFIG_HASH to ensure that
also CONFIG_HASH2 is selected. Both are needed for the shash
cipher support required for the KDF operation.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Boot parameters are written before apparmor is ready to answer whether
the user is policy_view_capable(). Setting the parameters at boot results
in an oops and failure to boot. Setting the parameters at boot is
obviously allowed so skip the permission check when apparmor is not
initialized.
While we are at it move the more complicated check to last.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Once the loop on lines 836-853 is complete and exits normally, ent is a
pointer to the dummy list head value. The derefernces accessible from eg
the goto fail on line 860 or the various goto fail_lock's afterwards thus
seem incorrect.
Reported-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
When building the kernel with clang, the compiler fails to build
security/apparmor/crypto.c with the following error:
security/apparmor/crypto.c:36:8: error: fields must have a constant
size: 'variable length array in structure' extension will never be
supported
char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(apparmor_tfm)];
^
Since commit a0a77af141 ("crypto: LLVMLinux: Add macro to remove use
of VLAIS in crypto code"), include/crypto/hash.h defines
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK to work around this issue. Use it in aa_calc_hash()
and aa_calc_profile_hash().
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add the _APPARMOR substring to reference the intended Kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: Valentin Rothberg <valentinrothberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
security/apparmor/lib.c:132:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'aa_policy_init' with return type bool
Return statements in functions returning bool should use
true/false instead of 1/0.
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/misc/boolreturn.cocci
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Since all callers of smk_netlbl_mls() are GFP_KERNEL context
(smk_set_cipso() calls memdup_user_nul(), init_smk_fs() calls
__kernfs_new_node(), smk_import_entry() calls kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL)),
it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from netlbl_catmap_setbit().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
smack_parse_opts_str() calls kfree(opts->mnt_opts) when kcalloc() for
opts->mnt_opts_flags failed. But it should not have called it because
security_free_mnt_opts() will call kfree(opts->mnt_opts).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
fixes: 3bf2789cad ("smack: allow mount opts setting over filesystems with binary mount data")
Cc: Vivek Trivedi <t.vivek@samsung.com>
Cc: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a
counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other
information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by
the caller.
The KDF is implemented using the hash support from the kernel crypto API.
The implementation uses the symmetric hash support as the input to the
hash operation is usually very small. The caller is allowed to specify
the hash name that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing
the use of all supported hashes provided with the kernel crypto API.
As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to
the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size.
The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space
code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with
SP800-56A.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Keyrings recently gained restrict_link capabilities that allow
individual keys to be validated prior to linking. This functionality
was only available using internal kernel APIs.
With the KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING command existing keyrings can be
configured to check the content of keys before they are linked, and
then allow or disallow linkage of that key to the keyring.
To restrict a keyring, call:
keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring, const char *type,
const char *restriction)
where 'type' is the name of a registered key type and 'restriction' is a
string describing how key linkage is to be restricted. The restriction
option syntax is specific to each key type.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
The keyring restrict callback was sometimes called before
__key_link_begin and sometimes after, which meant that the keyring
semaphores were not always held during the restrict callback.
If the semaphores are consistently acquired before checking link
restrictions, keyring contents cannot be changed after the restrict
check is complete but before the evaluated key is linked to the keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to
the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the
restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the
restriction.
The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are
unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted
to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by
unregistering key types.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring
pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this
argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature
expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring.
Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key
pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that
decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth
argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
This pointer type needs to be returned from a lookup function, and
without a typedef the syntax gets cumbersome.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
We removed this initialization as a cleanup but it is probably required.
The concern is that "nel" can be zero. I'm not an expert on SELinux
code but I think it looks possible to write an SELinux policy which
triggers this bug. GCC doesn't catch this, but my static checker does.
Fixes: 9c312e79d6 ("selinux: Delete an unnecessary variable initialisation in range_read()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Prepare to mark sensitive kernel structures for randomization by making
sure they're using designated initializers. These were identified during
allyesconfig builds of x86, arm, and arm64, with most initializer fixes
extracted from grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
'perms' will never be NULL since it isn't a plain pointer but an array
of u32 values.
This fixes the following warning when building with clang:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:158:16: error: address of array
'p_in->perms' will always evaluate to 'true'
[-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion]
while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A string which did not contain data format specifications should be put
into a sequence. Thus use the corresponding function "seq_puts".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
Comparison to NULL could be written !…
Thus fix affected source code places.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation
indicated that an array data structure should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kmalloc_array".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
