Commit Graph

332 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Andrey Ignatov
46f53a65d2 bpf: Allow narrow loads with offset > 0
Currently BPF verifier allows narrow loads for a context field only with
offset zero. E.g. if there is a __u32 field then only the following
loads are permitted:
  * off=0, size=1 (narrow);
  * off=0, size=2 (narrow);
  * off=0, size=4 (full).

On the other hand LLVM can generate a load with offset different than
zero that make sense from program logic point of view, but verifier
doesn't accept it.

E.g. tools/testing/selftests/bpf/sendmsg4_prog.c has code:

  #define DST_IP4			0xC0A801FEU /* 192.168.1.254 */
  ...
  	if ((ctx->user_ip4 >> 24) == (bpf_htonl(DST_IP4) >> 24) &&

where ctx is struct bpf_sock_addr.

Some versions of LLVM can produce the following byte code for it:

       8:       71 12 07 00 00 00 00 00         r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 7)
       9:       67 02 00 00 18 00 00 00         r2 <<= 24
      10:       18 03 00 00 00 00 00 fe 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00         r3 = 4261412864 ll
      12:       5d 32 07 00 00 00 00 00         if r2 != r3 goto +7 <LBB0_6>

where `*(u8 *)(r1 + 7)` means narrow load for ctx->user_ip4 with size=1
and offset=3 (7 - sizeof(ctx->user_family) = 3). This load is currently
rejected by verifier.

Verifier code that rejects such loads is in bpf_ctx_narrow_access_ok()
what means any is_valid_access implementation, that uses the function,
works this way, e.g. bpf_skb_is_valid_access() for __sk_buff or
sock_addr_is_valid_access() for bpf_sock_addr.

The patch makes such loads supported. Offset can be in [0; size_default)
but has to be multiple of load size. E.g. for __u32 field the following
loads are supported now:
  * off=0, size=1 (narrow);
  * off=1, size=1 (narrow);
  * off=2, size=1 (narrow);
  * off=3, size=1 (narrow);
  * off=0, size=2 (narrow);
  * off=2, size=2 (narrow);
  * off=0, size=4 (full).

Reported-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-11-10 22:29:59 -08:00
Quentin Monnet
a40a26322a bpf: pass prog instead of env to bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep()
Function bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(), called from the kernel BPF
verifier to run a driver-specific callback for preparing for the
verification step for offloaded programs, takes a pointer to a struct
bpf_verifier_env object. However, no driver callback needs the whole
structure at this time: the two drivers supporting this, nfp and
netdevsim, only need a pointer to the struct bpf_prog instance held by
env.

Update the callback accordingly, on kernel side and in these two
drivers.

Signed-off-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-11-10 15:39:54 -08:00
Jiong Wang
e647815a4d bpf: let verifier to calculate and record max_pkt_offset
In check_packet_access, update max_pkt_offset after the offset has passed
__check_packet_access.

It should be safe to use u32 for max_pkt_offset as explained in code
comment.

Also, when there is tail call, the max_pkt_offset of the called program is
unknown, so conservatively set max_pkt_offset to MAX_PACKET_OFF for such
case.

Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-11-09 09:16:31 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann
4d31f30148 bpf: don't set id on after map lookup with ptr_to_map_val return
In the verifier there is no such semantics where registers with
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE type have an id assigned to them. This is only
used in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL and later on nullified once the
test against NULL has been pattern matched and type transformed
into PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.

Fixes: 3e6a4b3e02 ("bpf/verifier: introduce BPF_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-31 16:53:17 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
0962590e55 bpf: fix partial copy of map_ptr when dst is scalar
ALU operations on pointers such as scalar_reg += map_value_ptr are
handled in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(). Problem is however that map_ptr
and range in the register state share a union, so transferring state
through dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range is just buggy as any new
map_ptr in the dst_reg is then truncated (or null) for subsequent
checks. Fix this by adding a raw member and use it for copying state
over to dst_reg.

Fixes: f1174f77b5 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-31 16:53:17 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
b09928b976 bpf: make direct packet write unclone more robust
Given this seems to be quite fragile and can easily slip through the
cracks, lets make direct packet write more robust by requiring that
future program types which allow for such write must provide a prologue
callback. In case of XDP and sk_msg it's noop, thus add a generic noop
handler there. The latter starts out with NULL data/data_end unconditionally
when sg pages are shared.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-25 17:02:06 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
d5563d367c bpf: fix cg_skb types to hint access type in may_access_direct_pkt_data
Commit b39b5f411d ("bpf: add cg_skb_is_valid_access for
BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB") added direct packet access for skbs in
cg_skb program types, however allowed access type was not added to
the may_access_direct_pkt_data() helper. Therefore the latter always
returns false. This is not directly an issue, it just means writes
are unconditionally disabled (which is correct) but also reads.
Latter is relevant in this function when BPF helpers may read direct
packet data which is unconditionally disabled then. Fix it by properly
adding BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB to may_access_direct_pkt_data().

Fixes: b39b5f411d ("bpf: add cg_skb_is_valid_access for BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-25 17:02:06 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
5d66fa7d9e bpf: fix direct packet access for flow dissector progs
Commit d58e468b11 ("flow_dissector: implements flow dissector BPF
hook") added direct packet access for skbs in may_access_direct_pkt_data()
function where this enables read and write access to the skb->data. This
is buggy because without a prologue generator such as bpf_unclone_prologue()
we would allow for writing into cloned skbs. Original intention might have
been to only allow read access where this is not needed (similar as the
flow_dissector_func_proto() indicates which enables only bpf_skb_load_bytes()
as well), therefore this patch fixes it to restrict to read-only.

Fixes: d58e468b11 ("flow_dissector: implements flow dissector BPF hook")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Petar Penkov <ppenkov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-25 17:02:06 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
84430d4232 bpf, verifier: avoid retpoline for map push/pop/peek operation
Extend prior work from 09772d92cd ("bpf: avoid retpoline for
lookup/update/delete calls on maps") to also apply to the recently
added map helpers that perform push/pop/peek operations so that
the indirect call can be avoided.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-20 23:13:32 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
ad38911dcd bpf, verifier: remove unneeded flow key in check_helper_mem_access
They PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS is not used today to be passed into a helper
as memory, so it can be removed from check_helper_mem_access().

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-20 23:13:32 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
4b5defdec3 bpf, verifier: reject xadd on flow key memory
We should not enable xadd operation for flow key memory if not
needed there anyway. There is no such issue as described in the
commit f37a8cb84c ("bpf: reject stores into ctx via st and xadd")
since there's no context rewriter for flow keys today, but it
also shouldn't become part of the user facing behavior to allow
for it. After patch:

  0: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r1 +144)
  1: (b7) r3 = 4096
  2: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r7 +0) += r3
  BPF_XADD stores into R7 flow_keys is not allowed

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-20 23:13:32 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
2a159c6f82 bpf, verifier: fix register type dump in xadd and st
Using reg_type_str[insn->dst_reg] is incorrect since insn->dst_reg
contains the register number but not the actual register type. Add
a small reg_state() helper and use it to get to the type. Also fix
up the test_verifier test cases that have an incorrect errstr.

Fixes: 9d2be44a7f ("bpf: Reuse canonical string formatter for ctx errs")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-20 23:13:32 -07:00
Mauricio Vasquez B
f1a2e44a3a bpf: add queue and stack maps
Queue/stack maps implement a FIFO/LIFO data storage for ebpf programs.
These maps support peek, pop and push operations that are exposed to eBPF
programs through the new bpf_map[peek/pop/push] helpers.  Those operations
are exposed to userspace applications through the already existing
syscalls in the following way:

BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM            -> peek
BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_AND_DELETE_ELEM -> pop
BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM            -> push

Queue/stack maps are implemented using a buffer, tail and head indexes,
hence BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC is not supported.

As opposite to other maps, queue and stack do not use RCU for protecting
maps values, the bpf_map[peek/pop] have a ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE
argument that is a pointer to a memory zone where to save the value of a
map.  Basically the same as ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM, but the size has not
be passed as an extra argument.

Our main motivation for implementing queue/stack maps was to keep track
of a pool of elements, like network ports in a SNAT, however we forsee
other use cases, like for exampling saving last N kernel events in a map
and then analysing from userspace.

Signed-off-by: Mauricio Vasquez B <mauricio.vasquez@polito.it>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-19 13:24:31 -07:00
Mauricio Vasquez B
2ea864c58f bpf/verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE
ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE argument is a pointer to a memory zone
used to save the value of a map.  Basically the same as
ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM, but the size has not be passed as an extra
argument.

This will be used in the following patch that implements some new
helpers that receive a pointer to be filled with a map value.

Signed-off-by: Mauricio Vasquez B <mauricio.vasquez@polito.it>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-10-19 13:24:31 -07:00
David S. Miller
071a234ad7 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Alexei Starovoitov says:

====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2018-10-08

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.

The main changes are:

1) sk_lookup_[tcp|udp] and sk_release helpers from Joe Stringer which allow
BPF programs to perform lookups for sockets in a network namespace. This would
allow programs to determine early on in processing whether the stack is
expecting to receive the packet, and perform some action (eg drop,
forward somewhere) based on this information.

2) per-cpu cgroup local storage from Roman Gushchin.
Per-cpu cgroup local storage is very similar to simple cgroup storage
except all the data is per-cpu. The main goal of per-cpu variant is to
implement super fast counters (e.g. packet counters), which don't require
neither lookups, neither atomic operations in a fast path.
The example of these hybrid counters is in selftests/bpf/netcnt_prog.c

3) allow HW offload of programs with BPF-to-BPF function calls from Quentin Monnet

4) support more than 64-byte key/value in HW offloaded BPF maps from Jakub Kicinski

5) rename of libbpf interfaces from Andrey Ignatov.
libbpf is maturing as a library and should follow good practices in
library design and implementation to play well with other libraries.
This patch set brings consistent naming convention to global symbols.

6) relicense libbpf as LGPL-2.1 OR BSD-2-Clause from Alexei Starovoitov
to let Apache2 projects use libbpf

7) various AF_XDP fixes from Björn and Magnus
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-10-08 23:42:44 -07:00
Quentin Monnet
e4052d06a5 bpf: allow offload of programs with BPF-to-BPF function calls
Now that there is at least one driver supporting BPF-to-BPF function
calls, lift the restriction, in the verifier, on hardware offload of
eBPF programs containing such calls. But prevent jit_subprogs(), still
in the verifier, from being run for offloaded programs.

Signed-off-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-10-08 10:24:13 +02:00
Quentin Monnet
c941ce9c28 bpf: add verifier callback to get stack usage info for offloaded progs
In preparation for BPF-to-BPF calls in offloaded programs, add a new
function attribute to the struct bpf_prog_offload_ops so that drivers
supporting eBPF offload can hook at the end of program verification, and
potentially extract information collected by the verifier.

Implement a minimal callback (returning 0) in the drivers providing the
structs, namely netdevsim and nfp.

This will be useful in the nfp driver, in later commits, to extract the
number of subprograms as well as the stack depth for those subprograms.

Signed-off-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-10-08 10:24:12 +02:00
David S. Miller
72438f8cef Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net 2018-10-06 14:43:42 -07:00
Jann Horn
b799207e1e bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.

That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.

Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.

Fixes: 468f6eafa6 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-10-05 18:41:45 +02:00
Joe Stringer
6acc9b432e bpf: Add helper to retrieve socket in BPF
This patch adds new BPF helper functions, bpf_sk_lookup_tcp() and
bpf_sk_lookup_udp() which allows BPF programs to find out if there is a
socket listening on this host, and returns a socket pointer which the
BPF program can then access to determine, for instance, whether to
forward or drop traffic. bpf_sk_lookup_xxx() may take a reference on the
socket, so when a BPF program makes use of this function, it must
subsequently pass the returned pointer into the newly added sk_release()
to return the reference.

By way of example, the following pseudocode would filter inbound
connections at XDP if there is no corresponding service listening for
the traffic:

  struct bpf_sock_tuple tuple;
  struct bpf_sock_ops *sk;

  populate_tuple(ctx, &tuple); // Extract the 5tuple from the packet
  sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(ctx, &tuple, sizeof tuple, netns, 0);
  if (!sk) {
    // Couldn't find a socket listening for this traffic. Drop.
    return TC_ACT_SHOT;
  }
  bpf_sk_release(sk, 0);
  return TC_ACT_OK;

Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-10-03 02:53:47 +02:00
Joe Stringer
fd978bf7fd bpf: Add reference tracking to verifier
Allow helper functions to acquire a reference and return it into a
register. Specific pointer types such as the PTR_TO_SOCKET will
implicitly represent such a reference. The verifier must ensure that
these references are released exactly once in each path through the
program.

To achieve this, this commit assigns an id to the pointer and tracks it
in the 'bpf_func_state', then when the function or program exits,
verifies that all of the acquired references have been freed. When the
pointer is passed to a function that frees the reference, it is removed
from the 'bpf_func_state` and all existing copies of the pointer in
registers are marked invalid.

Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-10-03 02:53:47 +02:00
Joe Stringer
84dbf35073 bpf: Macrofy stack state copy
An upcoming commit will need very similar copy/realloc boilerplate, so
refactor the existing stack copy/realloc functions into macros to
simplify it.

Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-10-03 02:53:47 +02:00
Joe Stringer
c64b798328 bpf: Add PTR_TO_SOCKET verifier type
Teach the verifier a little bit about a new type of pointer, a
PTR_TO_SOCKET. This pointer type is accessed from BPF through the
'struct bpf_sock' structure.

Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-10-03 02:53:47 +02:00
Joe Stringer
840b9615d6 bpf: Generalize ptr_or_null regs check
This check will be reused by an upcoming commit for conditional jump
checks for sockets. Refactor it a bit to simplify the later commit.

Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-10-03 02:53:47 +02:00
Joe Stringer
9d2be44a7f bpf: Reuse canonical string formatter for ctx errs
The array "reg_type_str" provides canonical formatting of register
types, however a couple of places would previously check whether a
register represented the context and write the name "context" directly.
An upcoming commit will add another pointer type to these statements, so
to provide more accurate error messages in the verifier, update these
error messages to use "reg_type_str" instead.

Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-10-03 02:53:47 +02:00
Joe Stringer
aad2eeaf46 bpf: Simplify ptr_min_max_vals adjustment
An upcoming commit will add another two pointer types that need very
similar behaviour, so generalise this function now.

Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-10-03 02:53:47 +02:00
Joe Stringer
f3709f69b7 bpf: Add iterator for spilled registers
Add this iterator for spilled registers, it concentrates the details of
how to get the current frame's spilled registers into a single macro
while clarifying the intention of the code which is calling the macro.

Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-10-03 02:53:46 +02:00
Roman Gushchin
b741f16303 bpf: introduce per-cpu cgroup local storage
This commit introduced per-cpu cgroup local storage.

Per-cpu cgroup local storage is very similar to simple cgroup storage
(let's call it shared), except all the data is per-cpu.

The main goal of per-cpu variant is to implement super fast
counters (e.g. packet counters), which don't require neither
lookups, neither atomic operations.

>From userspace's point of view, accessing a per-cpu cgroup storage
is similar to other per-cpu map types (e.g. per-cpu hashmaps and
arrays).

Writing to a per-cpu cgroup storage is not atomic, but is performed
by copying longs, so some minimal atomicity is here, exactly
as with other per-cpu maps.

Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-10-01 16:18:32 +02:00
Roman Gushchin
8bad74f984 bpf: extend cgroup bpf core to allow multiple cgroup storage types
In order to introduce per-cpu cgroup storage, let's generalize
bpf cgroup core to support multiple cgroup storage types.
Potentially, per-node cgroup storage can be added later.

This commit is mostly a formal change that replaces
cgroup_storage pointer with a array of cgroup_storage pointers.
It doesn't actually introduce a new storage type,
it will be done later.

Each bpf program is now able to have one cgroup storage of each type.

Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-10-01 16:18:32 +02:00
David S. Miller
105bc1306e Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2018-09-25

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.

The main changes are:

1) Allow for RX stack hardening by implementing the kernel's flow
   dissector in BPF. Idea was originally presented at netconf 2017 [0].
   Quote from merge commit:

     [...] Because of the rigorous checks of the BPF verifier, this
     provides significant security guarantees. In particular, the BPF
     flow dissector cannot get inside of an infinite loop, as with
     CVE-2013-4348, because BPF programs are guaranteed to terminate.
     It cannot read outside of packet bounds, because all memory accesses
     are checked. Also, with BPF the administrator can decide which
     protocols to support, reducing potential attack surface. Rarely
     encountered protocols can be excluded from dissection and the
     program can be updated without kernel recompile or reboot if a
     bug is discovered. [...]

   Also, a sample flow dissector has been implemented in BPF as part
   of this work, from Petar and Willem.

   [0] http://vger.kernel.org/netconf2017_files/rx_hardening_and_udp_gso.pdf

2) Add support for bpftool to list currently active attachment
   points of BPF networking programs providing a quick overview
   similar to bpftool's perf subcommand, from Yonghong.

3) Fix a verifier pruning instability bug where a union member
   from the register state was not cleared properly leading to
   branches not being pruned despite them being valid candidates,
   from Alexei.

4) Various smaller fast-path optimizations in XDP's map redirect
   code, from Jesper.

5) Enable to recognize BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY maps
   in bpftool, from Roman.

6) Remove a duplicate check in libbpf that probes for function
   storage, from Taeung.

7) Fix an issue in test_progs by avoid checking for errno since
   on success its value should not be checked, from Mauricio.

8) Fix unused variable warning in bpf_getsockopt() helper when
   CONFIG_INET is not configured, from Anders.

9) Fix a compilation failure in the BPF sample code's use of
   bpf_flow_keys, from Prashant.

10) Minor cleanups in BPF code, from Yue and Zhong.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-09-25 20:29:38 -07:00
David S. Miller
e366fa4350 Merge ra.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Two new tls tests added in parallel in both net and net-next.

Used Stephen Rothwell's linux-next resolution.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-09-18 09:33:27 -07:00
Petar Penkov
d58e468b11 flow_dissector: implements flow dissector BPF hook
Adds a hook for programs of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR and
attach type BPF_FLOW_DISSECTOR that is executed in the flow dissector
path. The BPF program is per-network namespace.

Signed-off-by: Petar Penkov <ppenkov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-09-14 12:04:33 -07:00
Alexei Starovoitov
dd066823db bpf/verifier: disallow pointer subtraction
Subtraction of pointers was accidentally allowed for unpriv programs
by commit 82abbf8d2f. Revert that part of commit.

Fixes: 82abbf8d2f ("bpf: do not allow root to mangle valid pointers")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-09-12 23:30:02 +02:00
Alexei Starovoitov
a9c676bc8f bpf/verifier: fix verifier instability
Edward Cree says:
In check_mem_access(), for the PTR_TO_CTX case, after check_ctx_access()
has supplied a reg_type, the other members of the register state are set
appropriately.  Previously reg.range was set to 0, but as it is in a
union with reg.map_ptr, which is larger, upper bytes of the latter were
left in place.  This then caused the memcmp() in regsafe() to fail,
preventing some branches from being pruned (and occasionally causing the
same program to take a varying number of processed insns on repeated
verifier runs).

Fix the instability by clearing bpf_reg_state in __mark_reg_[un]known()

Fixes: f1174f77b5 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Debugged-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-09-05 22:21:00 -07:00
Edward Cree
8efea21d33 bpf/verifier: display non-spill stack slot types in print_verifier_state
If a stack slot does not hold a spilled register (STACK_SPILL), then each
 of its eight bytes could potentially have a different slot_type.  This
 information can be important for debugging, and previously we either did
 not print anything for the stack slot, or just printed fp-X=0 in the case
 where its first byte was STACK_ZERO.
Instead, print eight characters with either 0 (STACK_ZERO), m (STACK_MISC)
 or ? (STACK_INVALID) for any stack slot which is neither STACK_SPILL nor
 entirely STACK_INVALID.

Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-08-29 18:52:12 -07:00
Edward Cree
679c782de1 bpf/verifier: per-register parent pointers
By giving each register its own liveness chain, we elide the skip_callee()
 logic.  Instead, each register's parent is the state it inherits from;
 both check_func_call() and prepare_func_exit() automatically connect
 reg states to the correct chain since when they copy the reg state across
 (r1-r5 into the callee as args, and r0 out as the return value) they also
 copy the parent pointer.

Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-08-29 18:52:12 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
f6069b9aa9 bpf: fix redirect to map under tail calls
Commits 109980b894 ("bpf: don't select potentially stale ri->map
from buggy xdp progs") and 7c30013133 ("bpf: fix ri->map_owner
pointer on bpf_prog_realloc") tried to mitigate that buggy programs
using bpf_redirect_map() helper call do not leave stale maps behind.
Idea was to add a map_owner cookie into the per CPU struct redirect_info
which was set to prog->aux by the prog making the helper call as a
proof that the map is not stale since the prog is implicitly holding
a reference to it. This owner cookie could later on get compared with
the program calling into BPF whether they match and therefore the
redirect could proceed with processing the map safely.

In (obvious) hindsight, this approach breaks down when tail calls are
involved since the original caller's prog->aux pointer does not have
to match the one from one of the progs out of the tail call chain,
and therefore the xdp buffer will be dropped instead of redirected.
A way around that would be to fix the issue differently (which also
allows to remove related work in fast path at the same time): once
the life-time of a redirect map has come to its end we use it's map
free callback where we need to wait on synchronize_rcu() for current
outstanding xdp buffers and remove such a map pointer from the
redirect info if found to be present. At that time no program is
using this map anymore so we simply invalidate the map pointers to
NULL iff they previously pointed to that instance while making sure
that the redirect path only reads out the map once.

Fixes: 97f91a7cf0 ("bpf: add bpf_redirect_map helper routine")
Fixes: 109980b894 ("bpf: don't select potentially stale ri->map from buggy xdp progs")
Reported-by: Sebastiano Miano <sebastiano.miano@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-08-17 15:56:23 -07:00
Martin KaFai Lau
2dbb9b9e6d bpf: Introduce BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT
This patch adds a BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT which can select
a SO_REUSEPORT sk from a BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_ARRAY.  Like other
non SK_FILTER/CGROUP_SKB program, it requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT introduces "struct sk_reuseport_kern"
to store the bpf context instead of using the skb->cb[48].

At the SO_REUSEPORT sk lookup time, it is in the middle of transiting
from a lower layer (ipv4/ipv6) to a upper layer (udp/tcp).  At this
point,  it is not always clear where the bpf context can be appended
in the skb->cb[48] to avoid saving-and-restoring cb[].  Even putting
aside the difference between ipv4-vs-ipv6 and udp-vs-tcp.  It is not
clear if the lower layer is only ipv4 and ipv6 in the future and
will it not touch the cb[] again before transiting to the upper
layer.

For example, in udp_gro_receive(), it uses the 48 byte NAPI_GRO_CB
instead of IP[6]CB and it may still modify the cb[] after calling
the udp[46]_lib_lookup_skb().  Because of the above reason, if
sk->cb is used for the bpf ctx, saving-and-restoring is needed
and likely the whole 48 bytes cb[] has to be saved and restored.

Instead of saving, setting and restoring the cb[], this patch opts
to create a new "struct sk_reuseport_kern" and setting the needed
values in there.

The new BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT and "struct sk_reuseport_(kern|md)"
will serve all ipv4/ipv6 + udp/tcp combinations.  There is no protocol
specific usage at this point and it is also inline with the current
sock_reuseport.c implementation (i.e. no protocol specific requirement).

In "struct sk_reuseport_md", this patch exposes data/data_end/len
with semantic similar to other existing usages.  Together
with "bpf_skb_load_bytes()" and "bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative()",
the bpf prog can peek anywhere in the skb.  The "bind_inany" tells
the bpf prog that the reuseport group is bind-ed to a local
INANY address which cannot be learned from skb.

The new "bind_inany" is added to "struct sock_reuseport" which will be
used when running the new "BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT" bpf prog in order
to avoid repeating the "bind INANY" test on
"sk_v6_rcv_saddr/sk->sk_rcv_saddr" every time a bpf prog is run.  It can
only be properly initialized when a "sk->sk_reuseport" enabled sk is
adding to a hashtable (i.e. during "reuseport_alloc()" and
"reuseport_add_sock()").

The new "sk_select_reuseport()" is the main helper that the
bpf prog will use to select a SO_REUSEPORT sk.  It is the only function
that can use the new BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_ARRAY.  As mentioned in
the earlier patch, the validity of a selected sk is checked in
run time in "sk_select_reuseport()".  Doing the check in
verification time is difficult and inflexible (consider the map-in-map
use case).  The runtime check is to compare the selected sk's reuseport_id
with the reuseport_id that we want.  This helper will return -EXXX if the
selected sk cannot serve the incoming request (e.g. reuseport_id
not match).  The bpf prog can decide if it wants to do SK_DROP as its
discretion.

When the bpf prog returns SK_PASS, the kernel will check if a
valid sk has been selected (i.e. "reuse_kern->selected_sk != NULL").
If it does , it will use the selected sk.  If not, the kernel
will select one from "reuse->socks[]" (as before this patch).

The SK_DROP and SK_PASS handling logic will be in the next patch.

Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-08-11 01:58:46 +02:00
Roman Gushchin
cd33943176 bpf: introduce the bpf_get_local_storage() helper function
The bpf_get_local_storage() helper function is used
to get a pointer to the bpf local storage from a bpf program.

It takes a pointer to a storage map and flags as arguments.
Right now it accepts only cgroup storage maps, and flags
argument has to be 0. Further it can be extended to support
other types of local storage: e.g. thread local storage etc.

Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-08-03 00:47:32 +02:00
Roman Gushchin
3e6a4b3e02 bpf/verifier: introduce BPF_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE
BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE maps are special in a way
that the access from the bpf program side is lookup-free.
That means the result is guaranteed to be a valid
pointer to the cgroup storage; no NULL-check is required.

This patch introduces BPF_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE return type,
which is required to cause the verifier accept programs,
which are not checking the map value pointer for being NULL.

Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-08-03 00:47:32 +02:00
Roman Gushchin
de9cbbaadb bpf: introduce cgroup storage maps
This commit introduces BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE maps:
a special type of maps which are implementing the cgroup storage.

>From the userspace point of view it's almost a generic
hash map with the (cgroup inode id, attachment type) pair
used as a key.

The only difference is that some operations are restricted:
  1) a user can't create new entries,
  2) a user can't remove existing entries.

The lookup from userspace is o(log(n)).

Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-08-03 00:47:32 +02:00
Arthur Fabre
fbeb1603bf bpf: verifier: MOV64 don't mark dst reg unbounded
When check_alu_op() handles a BPF_MOV64 between two registers,
it calls check_reg_arg(DST_OP) on the dst register, marking it
as unbounded. If the src and dst register are the same, this
marks the src as unbounded, which can lead to unexpected errors
for further checks that rely on bounds info. For example:

	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_2),
	BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2),
	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),

Results in:

	"math between ctx pointer and register with unbounded
	min value is not allowed"

check_alu_op() now uses check_reg_arg(DST_OP_NO_MARK), and MOVs
that need to mark the dst register (MOVIMM, MOV32) do so.

Added a test case for MOV64 dst == src, and dst != src.

Signed-off-by: Arthur Fabre <afabre@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-07-31 22:09:33 +02:00
David S. Miller
eae249b27f Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2018-07-20

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.

The main changes are:

1) Add sharing of BPF objects within one ASIC: this allows for reuse of
   the same program on multiple ports of a device, and therefore gains
   better code store utilization. On top of that, this now also enables
   sharing of maps between programs attached to different ports of a
   device, from Jakub.

2) Cleanup in libbpf and bpftool's Makefile to reduce unneeded feature
   detections and unused variable exports, also from Jakub.

3) First batch of RCU annotation fixes in prog array handling, i.e.
   there are several __rcu markers which are not correct as well as
   some of the RCU handling, from Roman.

4) Two fixes in BPF sample files related to checking of the prog_cnt
   upper limit from sample loader, from Dan.

5) Minor cleanup in sockmap to remove a set but not used variable,
   from Colin.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-07-20 23:58:30 -07:00
Jakub Kicinski
09728266b6 bpf: offload: rename bpf_offload_dev_match() to bpf_offload_prog_map_match()
A set of new API functions exported for the drivers will soon use
'bpf_offload_dev_' as a prefix.  Rename the bpf_offload_dev_match()
which is internal to the core (used by the verifier) to avoid any
confusion.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-07-18 15:10:34 +02:00
Daniel Borkmann
c7a8978432 bpf: don't leave partial mangled prog in jit_subprogs error path
syzkaller managed to trigger the following bug through fault injection:

  [...]
  [  141.043668] verifier bug. No program starts at insn 3
  [  141.044648] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4072 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1613
                 get_callee_stack_depth kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1612 [inline]
  [  141.044648] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4072 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1613
                 fixup_call_args kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5587 [inline]
  [  141.044648] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4072 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1613
                 bpf_check+0x525e/0x5e60 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5952
  [  141.047355] CPU: 3 PID: 4072 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.18.0-rc4+ #51
  [  141.048446] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
  [  141.049877] Call Trace:
  [  141.050324]  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
  [  141.050324]  dump_stack+0x1c9/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113
  [  141.050950]  ? dump_stack_print_info.cold.2+0x52/0x52 lib/dump_stack.c:60
  [  141.051837]  panic+0x238/0x4e7 kernel/panic.c:184
  [  141.052386]  ? add_taint.cold.5+0x16/0x16 kernel/panic.c:385
  [  141.053101]  ? __warn.cold.8+0x148/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:537
  [  141.053814]  ? __warn.cold.8+0x117/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:530
  [  141.054506]  ? get_callee_stack_depth kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1612 [inline]
  [  141.054506]  ? fixup_call_args kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5587 [inline]
  [  141.054506]  ? bpf_check+0x525e/0x5e60 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5952
  [  141.055163]  __warn.cold.8+0x163/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:538
  [  141.055820]  ? get_callee_stack_depth kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1612 [inline]
  [  141.055820]  ? fixup_call_args kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5587 [inline]
  [  141.055820]  ? bpf_check+0x525e/0x5e60 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5952
  [...]

What happens in jit_subprogs() is that kcalloc() for the subprog func
buffer is failing with NULL where we then bail out. Latter is a plain
return -ENOMEM, and this is definitely not okay since earlier in the
loop we are walking all subprogs and temporarily rewrite insn->off to
remember the subprog id as well as insn->imm to temporarily point the
call to __bpf_call_base + 1 for the initial JIT pass. Thus, bailing
out in such state and handing this over to the interpreter is troublesome
since later/subsequent e.g. find_subprog() lookups are based on wrong
insn->imm.

Therefore, once we hit this point, we need to jump to out_free path
where we undo all changes from earlier loop, so that interpreter can
work on unmodified insn->{off,imm}.

Another point is that should find_subprog() fail in jit_subprogs() due
to a verifier bug, then we also should not simply defer the program to
the interpreter since also here we did partial modifications. Instead
we should just bail out entirely and return an error to the user who is
trying to load the program.

Fixes: 1c2a088a66 ("bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs")
Reported-by: syzbot+7d427828b2ea6e592804@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-07-12 14:00:54 -07:00
Kees Cook
fad953ce0b treewide: Use array_size() in vzalloc()
The vzalloc() function has no 2-factor argument form, so multiplication
factors need to be wrapped in array_size(). This patch replaces cases of:

        vzalloc(a * b)

with:
        vzalloc(array_size(a, b))

as well as handling cases of:

        vzalloc(a * b * c)

with:

        vzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c))

This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:

        vzalloc(4 * 1024)

though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.

Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.

The Coccinelle script used for this was:

// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@

(
  vzalloc(
-	(sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+	sizeof(TYPE) * E
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	(sizeof(THING)) * E
+	sizeof(THING) * E
  , ...)
)

// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@

(
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@

(
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+	array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+	array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+	array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+	array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+	array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+	array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@

  vzalloc(
-	SIZE * COUNT
+	array_size(COUNT, SIZE)
  , ...)

// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@

(
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@

(
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@

(
  vzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
)

// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  vzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	E1 * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
)

// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants.
@@
expression E1, E2;
constant C1, C2;
@@

(
  vzalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
  vzalloc(
-	E1 * E2
+	array_size(E1, E2)
  , ...)
)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-12 16:19:22 -07:00
Kees Cook
6396bb2215 treewide: kzalloc() -> kcalloc()
The kzalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kcalloc(). This
patch replaces cases of:

        kzalloc(a * b, gfp)

with:
        kcalloc(a * b, gfp)

as well as handling cases of:

        kzalloc(a * b * c, gfp)

with:

        kzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)

as it's slightly less ugly than:

        kzalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)

This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:

        kzalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)

though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.

Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.

The Coccinelle script used for this was:

// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	(sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+	sizeof(TYPE) * E
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(sizeof(THING)) * E
+	sizeof(THING) * E
  , ...)
)

// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@

(
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@

- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	SIZE * COUNT
+	COUNT, SIZE
  , ...)

// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
)

// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(E1) * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	E1 * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
)

// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kzalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
  kzalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
  kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kzalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	(E1) * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	(E1) * (E2)
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	E1 * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-12 16:19:22 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
58990d1ff3 bpf: reject passing modified ctx to helper functions
As commit 28e33f9d78 ("bpf: disallow arithmetic operations on
context pointer") already describes, f1174f77b5 ("bpf/verifier:
rework value tracking") removed the specific white-listed cases
we had previously where we would allow for pointer arithmetic in
order to further generalize it, and allow e.g. context access via
modified registers. While the dereferencing of modified context
pointers had been forbidden through 28e33f9d78, syzkaller did
recently manage to trigger several KASAN splats for slab out of
bounds access and use after frees by simply passing a modified
context pointer to a helper function which would then do the bad
access since verifier allowed it in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals().

Rejecting arithmetic on ctx pointer in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals()
generally could break existing programs as there's a valid use
case in tracing in combination with passing the ctx to helpers as
bpf_probe_read(), where the register then becomes unknown at
verification time due to adding a non-constant offset to it. An
access sequence may look like the following:

  offset = args->filename;  /* field __data_loc filename */
  bpf_probe_read(&dst, len, (char *)args + offset); // args is ctx

There are two options: i) we could special case the ctx and as
soon as we add a constant or bounded offset to it (hence ctx type
wouldn't change) we could turn the ctx into an unknown scalar, or
ii) we generalize the sanity test for ctx member access into a
small helper and assert it on the ctx register that was passed
as a function argument. Fwiw, latter is more obvious and less
complex at the same time, and one case that may potentially be
legitimate in future for ctx member access at least would be for
ctx to carry a const offset. Therefore, fix follows approach
from ii) and adds test cases to BPF kselftests.

Fixes: f1174f77b5 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Reported-by: syzbot+3d0b2441dbb71751615e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c8504affd4fdd0c1b626@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+e5190cb881d8660fb1a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+efae31b384d5badbd620@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-06-07 12:37:17 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
bc23105ca0 bpf: fix context access in tracing progs on 32 bit archs
Wang reported that all the testcases for BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT
program type in test_verifier report the following errors on x86_32:

  172/p unpriv: spill/fill of different pointers ldx FAIL
  Unexpected error message!
  0: (bf) r6 = r10
  1: (07) r6 += -8
  2: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+3
  R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R6=fp-8,call_-1 R10=fp0,call_-1
  3: (bf) r2 = r10
  4: (07) r2 += -76
  5: (7b) *(u64 *)(r6 +0) = r2
  6: (55) if r1 != 0x0 goto pc+1
  R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2=fp-76,call_-1 R6=fp-8,call_-1 R10=fp0,call_-1 fp-8=fp
  7: (7b) *(u64 *)(r6 +0) = r1
  8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r6 +0)
  9: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +68)
  invalid bpf_context access off=68 size=8

  378/p check bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period byte load permitted FAIL
  Failed to load prog 'Permission denied'!
  0: (b7) r0 = 0
  1: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r1 +68)
  invalid bpf_context access off=68 size=1

  379/p check bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period half load permitted FAIL
  Failed to load prog 'Permission denied'!
  0: (b7) r0 = 0
  1: (69) r0 = *(u16 *)(r1 +68)
  invalid bpf_context access off=68 size=2

  380/p check bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period word load permitted FAIL
  Failed to load prog 'Permission denied'!
  0: (b7) r0 = 0
  1: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r1 +68)
  invalid bpf_context access off=68 size=4

  381/p check bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period dword load permitted FAIL
  Failed to load prog 'Permission denied'!
  0: (b7) r0 = 0
  1: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +68)
  invalid bpf_context access off=68 size=8

Reason is that struct pt_regs on x86_32 doesn't fully align to 8 byte
boundary due to its size of 68 bytes. Therefore, bpf_ctx_narrow_access_ok()
will then bail out saying that off & (size_default - 1) which is 68 & 7
doesn't cleanly align in the case of sample_period access from struct
bpf_perf_event_data, hence verifier wrongly thinks we might be doing an
unaligned access here though underlying arch can handle it just fine.
Therefore adjust this down to machine size and check and rewrite the
offset for narrow access on that basis. We also need to fix corresponding
pe_prog_is_valid_access(), since we hit the check for off % size != 0
(e.g. 68 % 8 -> 4) in the first and last test. With that in place, progs
for tracing work on x86_32.

Reported-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-06-03 07:46:56 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
09772d92cd bpf: avoid retpoline for lookup/update/delete calls on maps
While some of the BPF map lookup helpers provide a ->map_gen_lookup()
callback for inlining the map lookup altogether it is not available
for every map, so the remaining ones have to call bpf_map_lookup_elem()
helper which does a dispatch to map->ops->map_lookup_elem(). In
times of retpolines, this will control and trap speculative execution
rather than letting it do its work for the indirect call and will
therefore cause a slowdown. Likewise, bpf_map_update_elem() and
bpf_map_delete_elem() do not have an inlined version and need to call
into their map->ops->map_update_elem() resp. map->ops->map_delete_elem()
handlers.

Before:

  # bpftool prog dump xlated id 1
    0: (bf) r2 = r10
    1: (07) r2 += -8
    2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0
    3: (18) r1 = map[id:1]
    5: (85) call __htab_map_lookup_elem#232656
    6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+4
    7: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r0 +35)
    8: (55) if r1 != 0x0 goto pc+1
    9: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +35) = 1
   10: (07) r0 += 56
   11: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+4
   12: (bf) r2 = r0
   13: (18) r1 = map[id:1]
   15: (85) call bpf_map_delete_elem#215008  <-- indirect call via
   16: (95) exit                                 helper

After:

  # bpftool prog dump xlated id 1
    0: (bf) r2 = r10
    1: (07) r2 += -8
    2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0
    3: (18) r1 = map[id:1]
    5: (85) call __htab_map_lookup_elem#233328
    6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+4
    7: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r0 +35)
    8: (55) if r1 != 0x0 goto pc+1
    9: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +35) = 1
   10: (07) r0 += 56
   11: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+4
   12: (bf) r2 = r0
   13: (18) r1 = map[id:1]
   15: (85) call htab_lru_map_delete_elem#238240  <-- direct call
   16: (95) exit

In all three lookup/update/delete cases however we can use the actual
address of the map callback directly if we find that there's only a
single path with a map pointer leading to the helper call, meaning
when the map pointer has not been poisoned from verifier side.
Example code can be seen above for the delete case.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-06-03 07:45:37 -07:00