linux_dsm_epyc7002/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h

383 lines
10 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
#define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user= The initial options are: - on: Unconditionally enabled - off: Unconditionally disabled -auto: Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now) When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this implies that the application to application control follows that state even if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied. Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.de
2018-11-26 01:33:45 +07:00
#include <linux/static_key.h>
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
#include <asm/msr-index.h>
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
/*
* Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
*
* Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
* infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
*
* This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
* mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
* eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
* purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
* allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
*
* We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
* inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
* from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
*/
#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */
/*
* Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
* the optimal version two calls, each with their own speculation
* trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
*/
#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \
mov $(nr/2), reg; \
771: \
call 772f; \
773: /* speculation trap */ \
pause; \
lfence; \
jmp 773b; \
772: \
call 774f; \
775: /* speculation trap */ \
pause; \
lfence; \
jmp 775b; \
774: \
dec reg; \
jnz 771b; \
add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
/*
* This should be used immediately before a retpoline alternative. It tells
* objtool where the retpolines are so that it can make sense of the control
* flow by just reading the original instruction(s) and ignoring the
* alternatives.
*/
.macro ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
.Lannotate_\@:
.pushsection .discard.nospec
.long .Lannotate_\@ - .
.popsection
.endm
/*
* This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells
* objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline
* builds.
*/
.macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
.Lannotate_\@:
.pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe
_ASM_PTR .Lannotate_\@
.popsection
.endm
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
/*
* These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
* Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
* invocation below less ugly.
*/
.macro RETPOLINE_JMP reg:req
call .Ldo_rop_\@
.Lspec_trap_\@:
pause
x86/retpoline: Add LFENCE to the retpoline/RSB filling RSB macros The PAUSE instruction is currently used in the retpoline and RSB filling macros as a speculation trap. The use of PAUSE was originally suggested because it showed a very, very small difference in the amount of cycles/time used to execute the retpoline as compared to LFENCE. On AMD, the PAUSE instruction is not a serializing instruction, so the pause/jmp loop will use excess power as it is speculated over waiting for return to mispredict to the correct target. The RSB filling macro is applicable to AMD, and, if software is unable to verify that LFENCE is serializing on AMD (possible when running under a hypervisor), the generic retpoline support will be used and, so, is also applicable to AMD. Keep the current usage of PAUSE for Intel, but add an LFENCE instruction to the speculation trap for AMD. The same sequence has been adopted by GCC for the GCC generated retpolines. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180113232730.31060.36287.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
2018-01-14 06:27:30 +07:00
lfence
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
jmp .Lspec_trap_\@
.Ldo_rop_\@:
mov \reg, (%_ASM_SP)
ret
.endm
/*
* This is a wrapper around RETPOLINE_JMP so the called function in reg
* returns to the instruction after the macro.
*/
.macro RETPOLINE_CALL reg:req
jmp .Ldo_call_\@
.Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@:
RETPOLINE_JMP \reg
.Ldo_call_\@:
call .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@
.endm
/*
* JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
* indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
* attack.
*/
.macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), \
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
__stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
__stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
#else
jmp *\reg
#endif
.endm
.macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), \
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
__stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\
__stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
#else
call *\reg
#endif
.endm
/*
* A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
* monstrosity above, manually.
*/
.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
__stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \
\ftr
.Lskip_rsb_\@:
#endif
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
.endm
#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
"999:\n\t" \
".pushsection .discard.nospec\n\t" \
".long 999b - .\n\t" \
".popsection\n\t"
#define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
"999:\n\t" \
".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t" \
_ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \
".popsection\n\t"
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
/*
* Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
* which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined.
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
*/
# define CALL_NOSPEC \
ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
ALTERNATIVE_2( \
ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
"call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
"call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \
X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
"lfence;\n" \
ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
"call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
#else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
/*
* For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
* otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
* here, anyway.
*/
# define CALL_NOSPEC \
ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
ALTERNATIVE_2( \
ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
"call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
" jmp 904f;\n" \
" .align 16\n" \
"901: call 903f;\n" \
"902: pause;\n" \
x86/retpoline: Add LFENCE to the retpoline/RSB filling RSB macros The PAUSE instruction is currently used in the retpoline and RSB filling macros as a speculation trap. The use of PAUSE was originally suggested because it showed a very, very small difference in the amount of cycles/time used to execute the retpoline as compared to LFENCE. On AMD, the PAUSE instruction is not a serializing instruction, so the pause/jmp loop will use excess power as it is speculated over waiting for return to mispredict to the correct target. The RSB filling macro is applicable to AMD, and, if software is unable to verify that LFENCE is serializing on AMD (possible when running under a hypervisor), the generic retpoline support will be used and, so, is also applicable to AMD. Keep the current usage of PAUSE for Intel, but add an LFENCE instruction to the speculation trap for AMD. The same sequence has been adopted by GCC for the GCC generated retpolines. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180113232730.31060.36287.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
2018-01-14 06:27:30 +07:00
" lfence;\n" \
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
" jmp 902b;\n" \
" .align 16\n" \
"903: addl $4, %%esp;\n" \
" pushl %[thunk_target];\n" \
" ret;\n" \
" .align 16\n" \
"904: call 901b;\n", \
X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
"lfence;\n" \
ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
"call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
#endif
#else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
# define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
#endif
/* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
x86/speculation: Support Enhanced IBRS on future CPUs Future Intel processors will support "Enhanced IBRS" which is an "always on" mode i.e. IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is enabled once and never disabled. From the specification [1]: "With enhanced IBRS, the predicted targets of indirect branches executed cannot be controlled by software that was executed in a less privileged predictor mode or on another logical processor. As a result, software operating on a processor with enhanced IBRS need not use WRMSR to set IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS after every transition to a more privileged predictor mode. Software can isolate predictor modes effectively simply by setting the bit once. Software need not disable enhanced IBRS prior to entering a sleep state such as MWAIT or HLT." If Enhanced IBRS is supported by the processor then use it as the preferred spectre v2 mitigation mechanism instead of Retpoline. Intel's Retpoline white paper [2] states: "Retpoline is known to be an effective branch target injection (Spectre variant 2) mitigation on Intel processors belonging to family 6 (enumerated by the CPUID instruction) that do not have support for enhanced IBRS. On processors that support enhanced IBRS, it should be used for mitigation instead of retpoline." The reason why Enhanced IBRS is the recommended mitigation on processors which support it is that these processors also support CET which provides a defense against ROP attacks. Retpoline is very similar to ROP techniques and might trigger false positives in the CET defense. If Enhanced IBRS is selected as the mitigation technique for spectre v2, the IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is set once at boot time and never cleared. Kernel also has to make sure that IBRS bit remains set after VMEXIT because the guest might have cleared the bit. This is already covered by the existing x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest() and x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() speculation control functions. Enhanced IBRS still requires IBPB for full mitigation. [1] Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf [2] Retpoline-A-Branch-Target-Injection-Mitigation.pdf Both documents are available at: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511 Originally-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim C Chen <tim.c.chen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533148945-24095-1-git-send-email-sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com
2018-08-02 01:42:25 +07:00
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED,
};
x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user= The initial options are: - on: Unconditionally enabled - off: Unconditionally disabled -auto: Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now) When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this implies that the application to application control follows that state even if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied. Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.de
2018-11-26 01:33:45 +07:00
/* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE,
SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT,
SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED,
x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation Add the PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH option for the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL and PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctls to allow fine grained per task control of indirect branch speculation via STIBP and IBPB. Invocations: Check indirect branch speculation status with - prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0); Enable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); Disable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0); Force disable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0); See Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.866780996@linutronix.de
2018-11-26 01:33:53 +07:00
SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL,
x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode If 'prctl' mode of user space protection from spectre v2 is selected on the kernel command-line, STIBP and IBPB are applied on tasks which restrict their indirect branch speculation via prctl. SECCOMP enables the SSBD mitigation for sandboxed tasks already, so it makes sense to prevent spectre v2 user space to user space attacks as well. The Intel mitigation guide documents how STIPB works: Setting bit 1 (STIBP) of the IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR on a logical processor prevents the predicted targets of indirect branches on any logical processor of that core from being controlled by software that executes (or executed previously) on another logical processor of the same core. Ergo setting STIBP protects the task itself from being attacked from a task running on a different hyper-thread and protects the tasks running on different hyper-threads from being attacked. While the document suggests that the branch predictors are shielded between the logical processors, the observed performance regressions suggest that STIBP simply disables the branch predictor more or less completely. Of course the document wording is vague, but the fact that there is also no requirement for issuing IBPB when STIBP is used points clearly in that direction. The kernel still issues IBPB even when STIBP is used until Intel clarifies the whole mechanism. IBPB is issued when the task switches out, so malicious sandbox code cannot mistrain the branch predictor for the next user space task on the same logical processor. Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.051663132@linutronix.de
2018-11-26 01:33:55 +07:00
SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP,
x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user= The initial options are: - on: Unconditionally enabled - off: Unconditionally disabled -auto: Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now) When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this implies that the application to application control follows that state even if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied. Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.de
2018-11-26 01:33:45 +07:00
};
x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation Contemporary high performance processors use a common industry-wide optimization known as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which loads from addresses to which a recent store has occurred may (speculatively) see an older value. Intel refers to this feature as "Memory Disambiguation" which is part of their "Smart Memory Access" capability. Memory Disambiguation can expose a cache side-channel attack against such speculatively read values. An attacker can create exploit code that allows them to read memory outside of a sandbox environment (for example, malicious JavaScript in a web page), or to perform more complex attacks against code running within the same privilege level, e.g. via the stack. As a first step to mitigate against such attacks, provide two boot command line control knobs: nospec_store_bypass_disable spec_store_bypass_disable=[off,auto,on] By default affected x86 processors will power on with Speculative Store Bypass enabled. Hence the provided kernel parameters are written from the point of view of whether to enable a mitigation or not. The parameters are as follows: - auto - Kernel detects whether your CPU model contains an implementation of Speculative Store Bypass and picks the most appropriate mitigation. - on - disable Speculative Store Bypass - off - enable Speculative Store Bypass [ tglx: Reordered the checks so that the whole evaluation is not done when the CPU does not support RDS ] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-04-26 09:04:21 +07:00
/* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
enum ssb_mitigation {
SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation Add prctl based control for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation and make it the default mitigation for Intel and AMD. Andi Kleen provided the following rationale (slightly redacted): There are multiple levels of impact of Speculative Store Bypass: 1) JITed sandbox. It cannot invoke system calls, but can do PRIME+PROBE and may have call interfaces to other code 2) Native code process. No protection inside the process at this level. 3) Kernel. 4) Between processes. The prctl tries to protect against case (1) doing attacks. If the untrusted code can do random system calls then control is already lost in a much worse way. So there needs to be system call protection in some way (using a JIT not allowing them or seccomp). Or rather if the process can subvert its environment somehow to do the prctl it can already execute arbitrary code, which is much worse than SSB. To put it differently, the point of the prctl is to not allow JITed code to read data it shouldn't read from its JITed sandbox. If it already has escaped its sandbox then it can already read everything it wants in its address space, and do much worse. The ability to control Speculative Store Bypass allows to enable the protection selectively without affecting overall system performance. Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen. Completely rewritten. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2018-04-29 20:26:40 +07:00
SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation Contemporary high performance processors use a common industry-wide optimization known as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which loads from addresses to which a recent store has occurred may (speculatively) see an older value. Intel refers to this feature as "Memory Disambiguation" which is part of their "Smart Memory Access" capability. Memory Disambiguation can expose a cache side-channel attack against such speculatively read values. An attacker can create exploit code that allows them to read memory outside of a sandbox environment (for example, malicious JavaScript in a web page), or to perform more complex attacks against code running within the same privilege level, e.g. via the stack. As a first step to mitigate against such attacks, provide two boot command line control knobs: nospec_store_bypass_disable spec_store_bypass_disable=[off,auto,on] By default affected x86 processors will power on with Speculative Store Bypass enabled. Hence the provided kernel parameters are written from the point of view of whether to enable a mitigation or not. The parameters are as follows: - auto - Kernel detects whether your CPU model contains an implementation of Speculative Store Bypass and picks the most appropriate mitigation. - on - disable Speculative Store Bypass - off - enable Speculative Store Bypass [ tglx: Reordered the checks so that the whole evaluation is not done when the CPU does not support RDS ] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-04-26 09:04:21 +07:00
};
extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
/*
* On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
* can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
* retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
* CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
*/
static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
unsigned long loops;
asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
__stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
"910:"
: "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
: : "memory" );
#endif
}
static __always_inline
void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
{
asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
: : "c" (msr),
"a" ((u32)val),
"d" ((u32)(val >> 32)),
[feature] "i" (feature)
: "memory");
}
static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
{
u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
}
/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
/*
* With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
* before calling into firmware.
*
* (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.)
*/
#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \
do { \
u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; \
\
preempt_disable(); \
alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
} while (0)
#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \
do { \
u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base; \
\
alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
preempt_enable(); \
} while (0)
x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user= The initial options are: - on: Unconditionally enabled - off: Unconditionally disabled -auto: Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now) When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this implies that the application to application control follows that state even if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied. Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.de
2018-11-26 01:33:45 +07:00
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm() The IBPB speculation barrier is issued from switch_mm() when the kernel switches to a user space task with a different mm than the user space task which ran last on the same CPU. An additional optimization is to avoid IBPB when the incoming task can be ptraced by the outgoing task. This optimization only works when switching directly between two user space tasks. When switching from a kernel task to a user space task the optimization fails because the previous task cannot be accessed anymore. So for quite some scenarios the optimization is just adding overhead. The upcoming conditional IBPB support will issue IBPB only for user space tasks which have the TIF_SPEC_IB bit set. This requires to handle the following cases: 1) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set to a user space task (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set. 2) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set to a user space task (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set. This needs to be optimized for the case where the IBPB can be avoided when only kernel threads ran in between user space tasks which belong to the same process. The current check whether two tasks belong to the same context is using the tasks context id. While correct, it's simpler to use the mm pointer because it allows to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into it. The context id based mechanism requires extra storage, which creates worse code. When a task is scheduled out its TIF_SPEC_IB bit is mangled as bit 0 into the per CPU storage which is used to track the last user space mm which was running on a CPU. This bit can be used together with the TIF_SPEC_IB bit of the incoming task to make the decision whether IBPB needs to be issued or not to cover the two cases above. As conditional IBPB is going to be the default, remove the dubious ptrace check for the IBPB always case and simply issue IBPB always when the process changes. Move the storage to a different place in the struct as the original one created a hole. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.466447057@linutronix.de
2018-11-26 01:33:49 +07:00
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user= The initial options are: - on: Unconditionally enabled - off: Unconditionally disabled -auto: Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now) When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this implies that the application to application control follows that state even if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied. Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.de
2018-11-26 01:33:45 +07:00
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 04:46:25 +07:00
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
bpf, x64: implement retpoline for tail call Implement a retpoline [0] for the BPF tail call JIT'ing that converts the indirect jump via jmp %rax that is used to make the long jump into another JITed BPF image. Since this is subject to speculative execution, we need to control the transient instruction sequence here as well when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set, and direct it into a pause + lfence loop. The latter aligns also with what gcc / clang emits (e.g. [1]). JIT dump after patch: # bpftool p d x i 1 0: (18) r2 = map[id:1] 2: (b7) r3 = 0 3: (85) call bpf_tail_call#12 4: (b7) r0 = 2 5: (95) exit With CONFIG_RETPOLINE: # bpftool p d j i 1 [...] 33: cmp %edx,0x24(%rsi) 36: jbe 0x0000000000000072 |* 38: mov 0x24(%rbp),%eax 3e: cmp $0x20,%eax 41: ja 0x0000000000000072 | 43: add $0x1,%eax 46: mov %eax,0x24(%rbp) 4c: mov 0x90(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax 54: test %rax,%rax 57: je 0x0000000000000072 | 59: mov 0x28(%rax),%rax 5d: add $0x25,%rax 61: callq 0x000000000000006d |+ 66: pause | 68: lfence | 6b: jmp 0x0000000000000066 | 6d: mov %rax,(%rsp) | 71: retq | 72: mov $0x2,%eax [...] * relative fall-through jumps in error case + retpoline for indirect jump Without CONFIG_RETPOLINE: # bpftool p d j i 1 [...] 33: cmp %edx,0x24(%rsi) 36: jbe 0x0000000000000063 |* 38: mov 0x24(%rbp),%eax 3e: cmp $0x20,%eax 41: ja 0x0000000000000063 | 43: add $0x1,%eax 46: mov %eax,0x24(%rbp) 4c: mov 0x90(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax 54: test %rax,%rax 57: je 0x0000000000000063 | 59: mov 0x28(%rax),%rax 5d: add $0x25,%rax 61: jmpq *%rax |- 63: mov $0x2,%eax [...] * relative fall-through jumps in error case - plain indirect jump as before [0] https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 [1] https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/commit/a31e654fa107be968b802786d747e962c2fcdb2b Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-02-22 21:12:53 +07:00
/*
* Below is used in the eBPF JIT compiler and emits the byte sequence
* for the following assembly:
*
* With retpolines configured:
*
* callq do_rop
* spec_trap:
* pause
* lfence
* jmp spec_trap
* do_rop:
bpf, x86_32: add eBPF JIT compiler for ia32 The JIT compiler emits ia32 bit instructions. Currently, It supports eBPF only. Classic BPF is supported because of the conversion by BPF core. Almost all instructions from eBPF ISA supported except the following: BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_K BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_K BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_W BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_DW It doesn't support BPF_JMP|BPF_CALL with BPF_PSEUDO_CALL at the moment. IA32 has few general purpose registers, EAX|EDX|ECX|EBX|ESI|EDI. I use EAX|EDX|ECX|EBX as temporary registers to simulate instructions in eBPF ISA, and allocate ESI|EDI to BPF_REG_AX for constant blinding, all others eBPF registers, R0-R10, are simulated through scratch space on stack. The reasons behind the hardware registers allocation policy are: 1:MUL need EAX:EDX, shift operation need ECX, so they aren't fit for general eBPF 64bit register simulation. 2:We need at least 4 registers to simulate most eBPF ISA operations on registers operands instead of on register&memory operands. 3:We need to put BPF_REG_AX on hardware registers, or constant blinding will degrade jit performance heavily. Tested on PC (Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5200U CPU). Testing results on i5-5200U: 1) test_bpf: Summary: 349 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [319/341 JIT'ed] 2) test_progs: Summary: 83 PASSED, 0 FAILED. 3) test_lpm: OK 4) test_lru_map: OK 5) test_verifier: Summary: 828 PASSED, 0 FAILED. Above tests are all done in following two conditions separately: 1:bpf_jit_enable=1 and bpf_jit_harden=0 2:bpf_jit_enable=1 and bpf_jit_harden=2 Below are some numbers for this jit implementation: Note: I run test_progs in kselftest 100 times continuously for every condition, the numbers are in format: total/times=avg. The numbers that test_bpf reports show almost the same relation. a:jit_enable=0 and jit_harden=0 b:jit_enable=1 and jit_harden=0 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:15622/100=156 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:10674/100=106 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:9130/100=91 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:4855/100=48 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:240198/100=2401 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:138912/100=1389 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:137326/100=1373 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:68542/100=685 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:61100/100=611 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:37302/100=373 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:101000/100=1010 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:55030/100=550 c:jit_enable=1 and jit_harden=2 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:10558/100=105 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:5092/100=50 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:131902/100=1319 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:77932/100=779 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:38924/100=389 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:57520/100=575 The numbers show we get 30%~50% improvement. See Documentation/networking/filter.txt for more information. Changelog: Changes v5-v6: 1:Add do {} while (0) to RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT for consistence reason. 2:Clean up non-standard comments, reported by Daniel Borkmann. 3:Fix a memory leak issue, repoted by Daniel Borkmann. Changes v4-v5: 1:Delete is_on_stack, BPF_REG_AX is the only one on real hardware registers, so just check with it. 2:Apply commit 1612a981b766 ("bpf, x64: fix JIT emission for dead code"), suggested by Daniel Borkmann. Changes v3-v4: 1:Fix changelog in commit. I install llvm-6.0, then test_progs willn't report errors. I submit another patch: "bpf: fix misaligned access for BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT program type on x86_32 platform" to fix another problem, after that patch, test_verifier willn't report errors too. 2:Fix clear r0[1] twice unnecessarily in *BPF_IND|BPF_ABS* simulation. Changes v2-v3: 1:Move BPF_REG_AX to real hardware registers for performance reason. 3:Using bpf_load_pointer instead of bpf_jit32.S, suggested by Daniel Borkmann. 4:Delete partial codes in 1c2a088a6626, suggested by Daniel Borkmann. 5:Some bug fixes and comments improvement. Changes v1-v2: 1:Fix bug in emit_ia32_neg64. 2:Fix bug in emit_ia32_arsh_r64. 3:Delete filename in top level comment, suggested by Thomas Gleixner. 4:Delete unnecessary boiler plate text, suggested by Thomas Gleixner. 5:Rewrite some words in changelog. 6:CodingSytle improvement and a little more comments. Signed-off-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-05-03 13:10:43 +07:00
* mov %rax,(%rsp) for x86_64
* mov %edx,(%esp) for x86_32
bpf, x64: implement retpoline for tail call Implement a retpoline [0] for the BPF tail call JIT'ing that converts the indirect jump via jmp %rax that is used to make the long jump into another JITed BPF image. Since this is subject to speculative execution, we need to control the transient instruction sequence here as well when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set, and direct it into a pause + lfence loop. The latter aligns also with what gcc / clang emits (e.g. [1]). JIT dump after patch: # bpftool p d x i 1 0: (18) r2 = map[id:1] 2: (b7) r3 = 0 3: (85) call bpf_tail_call#12 4: (b7) r0 = 2 5: (95) exit With CONFIG_RETPOLINE: # bpftool p d j i 1 [...] 33: cmp %edx,0x24(%rsi) 36: jbe 0x0000000000000072 |* 38: mov 0x24(%rbp),%eax 3e: cmp $0x20,%eax 41: ja 0x0000000000000072 | 43: add $0x1,%eax 46: mov %eax,0x24(%rbp) 4c: mov 0x90(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax 54: test %rax,%rax 57: je 0x0000000000000072 | 59: mov 0x28(%rax),%rax 5d: add $0x25,%rax 61: callq 0x000000000000006d |+ 66: pause | 68: lfence | 6b: jmp 0x0000000000000066 | 6d: mov %rax,(%rsp) | 71: retq | 72: mov $0x2,%eax [...] * relative fall-through jumps in error case + retpoline for indirect jump Without CONFIG_RETPOLINE: # bpftool p d j i 1 [...] 33: cmp %edx,0x24(%rsi) 36: jbe 0x0000000000000063 |* 38: mov 0x24(%rbp),%eax 3e: cmp $0x20,%eax 41: ja 0x0000000000000063 | 43: add $0x1,%eax 46: mov %eax,0x24(%rbp) 4c: mov 0x90(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax 54: test %rax,%rax 57: je 0x0000000000000063 | 59: mov 0x28(%rax),%rax 5d: add $0x25,%rax 61: jmpq *%rax |- 63: mov $0x2,%eax [...] * relative fall-through jumps in error case - plain indirect jump as before [0] https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 [1] https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/commit/a31e654fa107be968b802786d747e962c2fcdb2b Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-02-22 21:12:53 +07:00
* retq
*
* Without retpolines configured:
*
bpf, x86_32: add eBPF JIT compiler for ia32 The JIT compiler emits ia32 bit instructions. Currently, It supports eBPF only. Classic BPF is supported because of the conversion by BPF core. Almost all instructions from eBPF ISA supported except the following: BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_K BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_K BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_W BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_DW It doesn't support BPF_JMP|BPF_CALL with BPF_PSEUDO_CALL at the moment. IA32 has few general purpose registers, EAX|EDX|ECX|EBX|ESI|EDI. I use EAX|EDX|ECX|EBX as temporary registers to simulate instructions in eBPF ISA, and allocate ESI|EDI to BPF_REG_AX for constant blinding, all others eBPF registers, R0-R10, are simulated through scratch space on stack. The reasons behind the hardware registers allocation policy are: 1:MUL need EAX:EDX, shift operation need ECX, so they aren't fit for general eBPF 64bit register simulation. 2:We need at least 4 registers to simulate most eBPF ISA operations on registers operands instead of on register&memory operands. 3:We need to put BPF_REG_AX on hardware registers, or constant blinding will degrade jit performance heavily. Tested on PC (Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5200U CPU). Testing results on i5-5200U: 1) test_bpf: Summary: 349 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [319/341 JIT'ed] 2) test_progs: Summary: 83 PASSED, 0 FAILED. 3) test_lpm: OK 4) test_lru_map: OK 5) test_verifier: Summary: 828 PASSED, 0 FAILED. Above tests are all done in following two conditions separately: 1:bpf_jit_enable=1 and bpf_jit_harden=0 2:bpf_jit_enable=1 and bpf_jit_harden=2 Below are some numbers for this jit implementation: Note: I run test_progs in kselftest 100 times continuously for every condition, the numbers are in format: total/times=avg. The numbers that test_bpf reports show almost the same relation. a:jit_enable=0 and jit_harden=0 b:jit_enable=1 and jit_harden=0 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:15622/100=156 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:10674/100=106 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:9130/100=91 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:4855/100=48 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:240198/100=2401 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:138912/100=1389 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:137326/100=1373 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:68542/100=685 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:61100/100=611 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:37302/100=373 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:101000/100=1010 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:55030/100=550 c:jit_enable=1 and jit_harden=2 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:10558/100=105 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:5092/100=50 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:131902/100=1319 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:77932/100=779 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:38924/100=389 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:57520/100=575 The numbers show we get 30%~50% improvement. See Documentation/networking/filter.txt for more information. Changelog: Changes v5-v6: 1:Add do {} while (0) to RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT for consistence reason. 2:Clean up non-standard comments, reported by Daniel Borkmann. 3:Fix a memory leak issue, repoted by Daniel Borkmann. Changes v4-v5: 1:Delete is_on_stack, BPF_REG_AX is the only one on real hardware registers, so just check with it. 2:Apply commit 1612a981b766 ("bpf, x64: fix JIT emission for dead code"), suggested by Daniel Borkmann. Changes v3-v4: 1:Fix changelog in commit. I install llvm-6.0, then test_progs willn't report errors. I submit another patch: "bpf: fix misaligned access for BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT program type on x86_32 platform" to fix another problem, after that patch, test_verifier willn't report errors too. 2:Fix clear r0[1] twice unnecessarily in *BPF_IND|BPF_ABS* simulation. Changes v2-v3: 1:Move BPF_REG_AX to real hardware registers for performance reason. 3:Using bpf_load_pointer instead of bpf_jit32.S, suggested by Daniel Borkmann. 4:Delete partial codes in 1c2a088a6626, suggested by Daniel Borkmann. 5:Some bug fixes and comments improvement. Changes v1-v2: 1:Fix bug in emit_ia32_neg64. 2:Fix bug in emit_ia32_arsh_r64. 3:Delete filename in top level comment, suggested by Thomas Gleixner. 4:Delete unnecessary boiler plate text, suggested by Thomas Gleixner. 5:Rewrite some words in changelog. 6:CodingSytle improvement and a little more comments. Signed-off-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-05-03 13:10:43 +07:00
* jmp *%rax for x86_64
* jmp *%edx for x86_32
bpf, x64: implement retpoline for tail call Implement a retpoline [0] for the BPF tail call JIT'ing that converts the indirect jump via jmp %rax that is used to make the long jump into another JITed BPF image. Since this is subject to speculative execution, we need to control the transient instruction sequence here as well when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set, and direct it into a pause + lfence loop. The latter aligns also with what gcc / clang emits (e.g. [1]). JIT dump after patch: # bpftool p d x i 1 0: (18) r2 = map[id:1] 2: (b7) r3 = 0 3: (85) call bpf_tail_call#12 4: (b7) r0 = 2 5: (95) exit With CONFIG_RETPOLINE: # bpftool p d j i 1 [...] 33: cmp %edx,0x24(%rsi) 36: jbe 0x0000000000000072 |* 38: mov 0x24(%rbp),%eax 3e: cmp $0x20,%eax 41: ja 0x0000000000000072 | 43: add $0x1,%eax 46: mov %eax,0x24(%rbp) 4c: mov 0x90(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax 54: test %rax,%rax 57: je 0x0000000000000072 | 59: mov 0x28(%rax),%rax 5d: add $0x25,%rax 61: callq 0x000000000000006d |+ 66: pause | 68: lfence | 6b: jmp 0x0000000000000066 | 6d: mov %rax,(%rsp) | 71: retq | 72: mov $0x2,%eax [...] * relative fall-through jumps in error case + retpoline for indirect jump Without CONFIG_RETPOLINE: # bpftool p d j i 1 [...] 33: cmp %edx,0x24(%rsi) 36: jbe 0x0000000000000063 |* 38: mov 0x24(%rbp),%eax 3e: cmp $0x20,%eax 41: ja 0x0000000000000063 | 43: add $0x1,%eax 46: mov %eax,0x24(%rbp) 4c: mov 0x90(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax 54: test %rax,%rax 57: je 0x0000000000000063 | 59: mov 0x28(%rax),%rax 5d: add $0x25,%rax 61: jmpq *%rax |- 63: mov $0x2,%eax [...] * relative fall-through jumps in error case - plain indirect jump as before [0] https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 [1] https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/commit/a31e654fa107be968b802786d747e962c2fcdb2b Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-02-22 21:12:53 +07:00
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
# ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
# define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 17
# define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT() \
bpf, x86_32: add eBPF JIT compiler for ia32 The JIT compiler emits ia32 bit instructions. Currently, It supports eBPF only. Classic BPF is supported because of the conversion by BPF core. Almost all instructions from eBPF ISA supported except the following: BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_K BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_K BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_W BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_DW It doesn't support BPF_JMP|BPF_CALL with BPF_PSEUDO_CALL at the moment. IA32 has few general purpose registers, EAX|EDX|ECX|EBX|ESI|EDI. I use EAX|EDX|ECX|EBX as temporary registers to simulate instructions in eBPF ISA, and allocate ESI|EDI to BPF_REG_AX for constant blinding, all others eBPF registers, R0-R10, are simulated through scratch space on stack. The reasons behind the hardware registers allocation policy are: 1:MUL need EAX:EDX, shift operation need ECX, so they aren't fit for general eBPF 64bit register simulation. 2:We need at least 4 registers to simulate most eBPF ISA operations on registers operands instead of on register&memory operands. 3:We need to put BPF_REG_AX on hardware registers, or constant blinding will degrade jit performance heavily. Tested on PC (Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5200U CPU). Testing results on i5-5200U: 1) test_bpf: Summary: 349 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [319/341 JIT'ed] 2) test_progs: Summary: 83 PASSED, 0 FAILED. 3) test_lpm: OK 4) test_lru_map: OK 5) test_verifier: Summary: 828 PASSED, 0 FAILED. Above tests are all done in following two conditions separately: 1:bpf_jit_enable=1 and bpf_jit_harden=0 2:bpf_jit_enable=1 and bpf_jit_harden=2 Below are some numbers for this jit implementation: Note: I run test_progs in kselftest 100 times continuously for every condition, the numbers are in format: total/times=avg. The numbers that test_bpf reports show almost the same relation. a:jit_enable=0 and jit_harden=0 b:jit_enable=1 and jit_harden=0 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:15622/100=156 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:10674/100=106 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:9130/100=91 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:4855/100=48 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:240198/100=2401 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:138912/100=1389 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:137326/100=1373 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:68542/100=685 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:61100/100=611 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:37302/100=373 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:101000/100=1010 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:55030/100=550 c:jit_enable=1 and jit_harden=2 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:10558/100=105 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:5092/100=50 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:131902/100=1319 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:77932/100=779 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:38924/100=389 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:57520/100=575 The numbers show we get 30%~50% improvement. See Documentation/networking/filter.txt for more information. Changelog: Changes v5-v6: 1:Add do {} while (0) to RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT for consistence reason. 2:Clean up non-standard comments, reported by Daniel Borkmann. 3:Fix a memory leak issue, repoted by Daniel Borkmann. Changes v4-v5: 1:Delete is_on_stack, BPF_REG_AX is the only one on real hardware registers, so just check with it. 2:Apply commit 1612a981b766 ("bpf, x64: fix JIT emission for dead code"), suggested by Daniel Borkmann. Changes v3-v4: 1:Fix changelog in commit. I install llvm-6.0, then test_progs willn't report errors. I submit another patch: "bpf: fix misaligned access for BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT program type on x86_32 platform" to fix another problem, after that patch, test_verifier willn't report errors too. 2:Fix clear r0[1] twice unnecessarily in *BPF_IND|BPF_ABS* simulation. Changes v2-v3: 1:Move BPF_REG_AX to real hardware registers for performance reason. 3:Using bpf_load_pointer instead of bpf_jit32.S, suggested by Daniel Borkmann. 4:Delete partial codes in 1c2a088a6626, suggested by Daniel Borkmann. 5:Some bug fixes and comments improvement. Changes v1-v2: 1:Fix bug in emit_ia32_neg64. 2:Fix bug in emit_ia32_arsh_r64. 3:Delete filename in top level comment, suggested by Thomas Gleixner. 4:Delete unnecessary boiler plate text, suggested by Thomas Gleixner. 5:Rewrite some words in changelog. 6:CodingSytle improvement and a little more comments. Signed-off-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-05-03 13:10:43 +07:00
do { \
bpf, x64: implement retpoline for tail call Implement a retpoline [0] for the BPF tail call JIT'ing that converts the indirect jump via jmp %rax that is used to make the long jump into another JITed BPF image. Since this is subject to speculative execution, we need to control the transient instruction sequence here as well when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set, and direct it into a pause + lfence loop. The latter aligns also with what gcc / clang emits (e.g. [1]). JIT dump after patch: # bpftool p d x i 1 0: (18) r2 = map[id:1] 2: (b7) r3 = 0 3: (85) call bpf_tail_call#12 4: (b7) r0 = 2 5: (95) exit With CONFIG_RETPOLINE: # bpftool p d j i 1 [...] 33: cmp %edx,0x24(%rsi) 36: jbe 0x0000000000000072 |* 38: mov 0x24(%rbp),%eax 3e: cmp $0x20,%eax 41: ja 0x0000000000000072 | 43: add $0x1,%eax 46: mov %eax,0x24(%rbp) 4c: mov 0x90(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax 54: test %rax,%rax 57: je 0x0000000000000072 | 59: mov 0x28(%rax),%rax 5d: add $0x25,%rax 61: callq 0x000000000000006d |+ 66: pause | 68: lfence | 6b: jmp 0x0000000000000066 | 6d: mov %rax,(%rsp) | 71: retq | 72: mov $0x2,%eax [...] * relative fall-through jumps in error case + retpoline for indirect jump Without CONFIG_RETPOLINE: # bpftool p d j i 1 [...] 33: cmp %edx,0x24(%rsi) 36: jbe 0x0000000000000063 |* 38: mov 0x24(%rbp),%eax 3e: cmp $0x20,%eax 41: ja 0x0000000000000063 | 43: add $0x1,%eax 46: mov %eax,0x24(%rbp) 4c: mov 0x90(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax 54: test %rax,%rax 57: je 0x0000000000000063 | 59: mov 0x28(%rax),%rax 5d: add $0x25,%rax 61: jmpq *%rax |- 63: mov $0x2,%eax [...] * relative fall-through jumps in error case - plain indirect jump as before [0] https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 [1] https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/commit/a31e654fa107be968b802786d747e962c2fcdb2b Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-02-22 21:12:53 +07:00
EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7); /* callq do_rop */ \
/* spec_trap: */ \
EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90); /* pause */ \
EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */ \
EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9); /* jmp spec_trap */ \
/* do_rop: */ \
EMIT4(0x48, 0x89, 0x04, 0x24); /* mov %rax,(%rsp) */ \
bpf, x86_32: add eBPF JIT compiler for ia32 The JIT compiler emits ia32 bit instructions. Currently, It supports eBPF only. Classic BPF is supported because of the conversion by BPF core. Almost all instructions from eBPF ISA supported except the following: BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_K BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_K BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_W BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_DW It doesn't support BPF_JMP|BPF_CALL with BPF_PSEUDO_CALL at the moment. IA32 has few general purpose registers, EAX|EDX|ECX|EBX|ESI|EDI. I use EAX|EDX|ECX|EBX as temporary registers to simulate instructions in eBPF ISA, and allocate ESI|EDI to BPF_REG_AX for constant blinding, all others eBPF registers, R0-R10, are simulated through scratch space on stack. The reasons behind the hardware registers allocation policy are: 1:MUL need EAX:EDX, shift operation need ECX, so they aren't fit for general eBPF 64bit register simulation. 2:We need at least 4 registers to simulate most eBPF ISA operations on registers operands instead of on register&memory operands. 3:We need to put BPF_REG_AX on hardware registers, or constant blinding will degrade jit performance heavily. Tested on PC (Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5200U CPU). Testing results on i5-5200U: 1) test_bpf: Summary: 349 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [319/341 JIT'ed] 2) test_progs: Summary: 83 PASSED, 0 FAILED. 3) test_lpm: OK 4) test_lru_map: OK 5) test_verifier: Summary: 828 PASSED, 0 FAILED. Above tests are all done in following two conditions separately: 1:bpf_jit_enable=1 and bpf_jit_harden=0 2:bpf_jit_enable=1 and bpf_jit_harden=2 Below are some numbers for this jit implementation: Note: I run test_progs in kselftest 100 times continuously for every condition, the numbers are in format: total/times=avg. The numbers that test_bpf reports show almost the same relation. a:jit_enable=0 and jit_harden=0 b:jit_enable=1 and jit_harden=0 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:15622/100=156 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:10674/100=106 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:9130/100=91 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:4855/100=48 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:240198/100=2401 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:138912/100=1389 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:137326/100=1373 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:68542/100=685 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:61100/100=611 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:37302/100=373 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:101000/100=1010 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:55030/100=550 c:jit_enable=1 and jit_harden=2 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:10558/100=105 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:5092/100=50 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:131902/100=1319 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:77932/100=779 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:38924/100=389 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:57520/100=575 The numbers show we get 30%~50% improvement. See Documentation/networking/filter.txt for more information. Changelog: Changes v5-v6: 1:Add do {} while (0) to RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT for consistence reason. 2:Clean up non-standard comments, reported by Daniel Borkmann. 3:Fix a memory leak issue, repoted by Daniel Borkmann. Changes v4-v5: 1:Delete is_on_stack, BPF_REG_AX is the only one on real hardware registers, so just check with it. 2:Apply commit 1612a981b766 ("bpf, x64: fix JIT emission for dead code"), suggested by Daniel Borkmann. Changes v3-v4: 1:Fix changelog in commit. I install llvm-6.0, then test_progs willn't report errors. I submit another patch: "bpf: fix misaligned access for BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT program type on x86_32 platform" to fix another problem, after that patch, test_verifier willn't report errors too. 2:Fix clear r0[1] twice unnecessarily in *BPF_IND|BPF_ABS* simulation. Changes v2-v3: 1:Move BPF_REG_AX to real hardware registers for performance reason. 3:Using bpf_load_pointer instead of bpf_jit32.S, suggested by Daniel Borkmann. 4:Delete partial codes in 1c2a088a6626, suggested by Daniel Borkmann. 5:Some bug fixes and comments improvement. Changes v1-v2: 1:Fix bug in emit_ia32_neg64. 2:Fix bug in emit_ia32_arsh_r64. 3:Delete filename in top level comment, suggested by Thomas Gleixner. 4:Delete unnecessary boiler plate text, suggested by Thomas Gleixner. 5:Rewrite some words in changelog. 6:CodingSytle improvement and a little more comments. Signed-off-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-05-03 13:10:43 +07:00
EMIT1(0xC3); /* retq */ \
} while (0)
# else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
# define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT() \
bpf, x86_32: add eBPF JIT compiler for ia32 The JIT compiler emits ia32 bit instructions. Currently, It supports eBPF only. Classic BPF is supported because of the conversion by BPF core. Almost all instructions from eBPF ISA supported except the following: BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_K BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_K BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_W BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_DW It doesn't support BPF_JMP|BPF_CALL with BPF_PSEUDO_CALL at the moment. IA32 has few general purpose registers, EAX|EDX|ECX|EBX|ESI|EDI. I use EAX|EDX|ECX|EBX as temporary registers to simulate instructions in eBPF ISA, and allocate ESI|EDI to BPF_REG_AX for constant blinding, all others eBPF registers, R0-R10, are simulated through scratch space on stack. The reasons behind the hardware registers allocation policy are: 1:MUL need EAX:EDX, shift operation need ECX, so they aren't fit for general eBPF 64bit register simulation. 2:We need at least 4 registers to simulate most eBPF ISA operations on registers operands instead of on register&memory operands. 3:We need to put BPF_REG_AX on hardware registers, or constant blinding will degrade jit performance heavily. Tested on PC (Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5200U CPU). Testing results on i5-5200U: 1) test_bpf: Summary: 349 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [319/341 JIT'ed] 2) test_progs: Summary: 83 PASSED, 0 FAILED. 3) test_lpm: OK 4) test_lru_map: OK 5) test_verifier: Summary: 828 PASSED, 0 FAILED. Above tests are all done in following two conditions separately: 1:bpf_jit_enable=1 and bpf_jit_harden=0 2:bpf_jit_enable=1 and bpf_jit_harden=2 Below are some numbers for this jit implementation: Note: I run test_progs in kselftest 100 times continuously for every condition, the numbers are in format: total/times=avg. The numbers that test_bpf reports show almost the same relation. a:jit_enable=0 and jit_harden=0 b:jit_enable=1 and jit_harden=0 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:15622/100=156 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:10674/100=106 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:9130/100=91 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:4855/100=48 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:240198/100=2401 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:138912/100=1389 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:137326/100=1373 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:68542/100=685 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:61100/100=611 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:37302/100=373 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:101000/100=1010 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:55030/100=550 c:jit_enable=1 and jit_harden=2 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:10558/100=105 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:5092/100=50 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:131902/100=1319 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:77932/100=779 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:38924/100=389 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:57520/100=575 The numbers show we get 30%~50% improvement. See Documentation/networking/filter.txt for more information. Changelog: Changes v5-v6: 1:Add do {} while (0) to RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT for consistence reason. 2:Clean up non-standard comments, reported by Daniel Borkmann. 3:Fix a memory leak issue, repoted by Daniel Borkmann. Changes v4-v5: 1:Delete is_on_stack, BPF_REG_AX is the only one on real hardware registers, so just check with it. 2:Apply commit 1612a981b766 ("bpf, x64: fix JIT emission for dead code"), suggested by Daniel Borkmann. Changes v3-v4: 1:Fix changelog in commit. I install llvm-6.0, then test_progs willn't report errors. I submit another patch: "bpf: fix misaligned access for BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT program type on x86_32 platform" to fix another problem, after that patch, test_verifier willn't report errors too. 2:Fix clear r0[1] twice unnecessarily in *BPF_IND|BPF_ABS* simulation. Changes v2-v3: 1:Move BPF_REG_AX to real hardware registers for performance reason. 3:Using bpf_load_pointer instead of bpf_jit32.S, suggested by Daniel Borkmann. 4:Delete partial codes in 1c2a088a6626, suggested by Daniel Borkmann. 5:Some bug fixes and comments improvement. Changes v1-v2: 1:Fix bug in emit_ia32_neg64. 2:Fix bug in emit_ia32_arsh_r64. 3:Delete filename in top level comment, suggested by Thomas Gleixner. 4:Delete unnecessary boiler plate text, suggested by Thomas Gleixner. 5:Rewrite some words in changelog. 6:CodingSytle improvement and a little more comments. Signed-off-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-05-03 13:10:43 +07:00
do { \
EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7); /* call do_rop */ \
/* spec_trap: */ \
EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90); /* pause */ \
EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */ \
EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9); /* jmp spec_trap */ \
/* do_rop: */ \
EMIT3(0x89, 0x14, 0x24); /* mov %edx,(%esp) */ \
EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ \
} while (0)
# endif
bpf, x86_32: add eBPF JIT compiler for ia32 The JIT compiler emits ia32 bit instructions. Currently, It supports eBPF only. Classic BPF is supported because of the conversion by BPF core. Almost all instructions from eBPF ISA supported except the following: BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_K BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_K BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_W BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_DW It doesn't support BPF_JMP|BPF_CALL with BPF_PSEUDO_CALL at the moment. IA32 has few general purpose registers, EAX|EDX|ECX|EBX|ESI|EDI. I use EAX|EDX|ECX|EBX as temporary registers to simulate instructions in eBPF ISA, and allocate ESI|EDI to BPF_REG_AX for constant blinding, all others eBPF registers, R0-R10, are simulated through scratch space on stack. The reasons behind the hardware registers allocation policy are: 1:MUL need EAX:EDX, shift operation need ECX, so they aren't fit for general eBPF 64bit register simulation. 2:We need at least 4 registers to simulate most eBPF ISA operations on registers operands instead of on register&memory operands. 3:We need to put BPF_REG_AX on hardware registers, or constant blinding will degrade jit performance heavily. Tested on PC (Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5200U CPU). Testing results on i5-5200U: 1) test_bpf: Summary: 349 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [319/341 JIT'ed] 2) test_progs: Summary: 83 PASSED, 0 FAILED. 3) test_lpm: OK 4) test_lru_map: OK 5) test_verifier: Summary: 828 PASSED, 0 FAILED. Above tests are all done in following two conditions separately: 1:bpf_jit_enable=1 and bpf_jit_harden=0 2:bpf_jit_enable=1 and bpf_jit_harden=2 Below are some numbers for this jit implementation: Note: I run test_progs in kselftest 100 times continuously for every condition, the numbers are in format: total/times=avg. The numbers that test_bpf reports show almost the same relation. a:jit_enable=0 and jit_harden=0 b:jit_enable=1 and jit_harden=0 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:15622/100=156 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:10674/100=106 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:9130/100=91 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:4855/100=48 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:240198/100=2401 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:138912/100=1389 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:137326/100=1373 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:68542/100=685 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:61100/100=611 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:37302/100=373 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:101000/100=1010 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:55030/100=550 c:jit_enable=1 and jit_harden=2 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv4:10558/100=105 test_pkt_access:PASS:ipv6:5092/100=50 test_xdp:PASS:ipv4:131902/100=1319 test_xdp:PASS:ipv6:77932/100=779 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv4:38924/100=389 test_l4lb:PASS:ipv6:57520/100=575 The numbers show we get 30%~50% improvement. See Documentation/networking/filter.txt for more information. Changelog: Changes v5-v6: 1:Add do {} while (0) to RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT for consistence reason. 2:Clean up non-standard comments, reported by Daniel Borkmann. 3:Fix a memory leak issue, repoted by Daniel Borkmann. Changes v4-v5: 1:Delete is_on_stack, BPF_REG_AX is the only one on real hardware registers, so just check with it. 2:Apply commit 1612a981b766 ("bpf, x64: fix JIT emission for dead code"), suggested by Daniel Borkmann. Changes v3-v4: 1:Fix changelog in commit. I install llvm-6.0, then test_progs willn't report errors. I submit another patch: "bpf: fix misaligned access for BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT program type on x86_32 platform" to fix another problem, after that patch, test_verifier willn't report errors too. 2:Fix clear r0[1] twice unnecessarily in *BPF_IND|BPF_ABS* simulation. Changes v2-v3: 1:Move BPF_REG_AX to real hardware registers for performance reason. 3:Using bpf_load_pointer instead of bpf_jit32.S, suggested by Daniel Borkmann. 4:Delete partial codes in 1c2a088a6626, suggested by Daniel Borkmann. 5:Some bug fixes and comments improvement. Changes v1-v2: 1:Fix bug in emit_ia32_neg64. 2:Fix bug in emit_ia32_arsh_r64. 3:Delete filename in top level comment, suggested by Thomas Gleixner. 4:Delete unnecessary boiler plate text, suggested by Thomas Gleixner. 5:Rewrite some words in changelog. 6:CodingSytle improvement and a little more comments. Signed-off-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-05-03 13:10:43 +07:00
#else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
# ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
# define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 2
# define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT() \
EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0); /* jmp *%rax */
# else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
# define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT() \
EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2) /* jmp *%edx */
# endif
bpf, x64: implement retpoline for tail call Implement a retpoline [0] for the BPF tail call JIT'ing that converts the indirect jump via jmp %rax that is used to make the long jump into another JITed BPF image. Since this is subject to speculative execution, we need to control the transient instruction sequence here as well when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set, and direct it into a pause + lfence loop. The latter aligns also with what gcc / clang emits (e.g. [1]). JIT dump after patch: # bpftool p d x i 1 0: (18) r2 = map[id:1] 2: (b7) r3 = 0 3: (85) call bpf_tail_call#12 4: (b7) r0 = 2 5: (95) exit With CONFIG_RETPOLINE: # bpftool p d j i 1 [...] 33: cmp %edx,0x24(%rsi) 36: jbe 0x0000000000000072 |* 38: mov 0x24(%rbp),%eax 3e: cmp $0x20,%eax 41: ja 0x0000000000000072 | 43: add $0x1,%eax 46: mov %eax,0x24(%rbp) 4c: mov 0x90(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax 54: test %rax,%rax 57: je 0x0000000000000072 | 59: mov 0x28(%rax),%rax 5d: add $0x25,%rax 61: callq 0x000000000000006d |+ 66: pause | 68: lfence | 6b: jmp 0x0000000000000066 | 6d: mov %rax,(%rsp) | 71: retq | 72: mov $0x2,%eax [...] * relative fall-through jumps in error case + retpoline for indirect jump Without CONFIG_RETPOLINE: # bpftool p d j i 1 [...] 33: cmp %edx,0x24(%rsi) 36: jbe 0x0000000000000063 |* 38: mov 0x24(%rbp),%eax 3e: cmp $0x20,%eax 41: ja 0x0000000000000063 | 43: add $0x1,%eax 46: mov %eax,0x24(%rbp) 4c: mov 0x90(%rsi,%rdx,8),%rax 54: test %rax,%rax 57: je 0x0000000000000063 | 59: mov 0x28(%rax),%rax 5d: add $0x25,%rax 61: jmpq *%rax |- 63: mov $0x2,%eax [...] * relative fall-through jumps in error case - plain indirect jump as before [0] https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 [1] https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/commit/a31e654fa107be968b802786d747e962c2fcdb2b Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-02-22 21:12:53 +07:00
#endif
#endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */