2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
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/*
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* Contains CPU feature definitions
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2015 ARM Ltd.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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2015-10-19 20:24:41 +07:00
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "CPU features: " fmt
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2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
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2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
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#include <linux/bsearch.h>
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2016-10-18 17:27:46 +07:00
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#include <linux/cpumask.h>
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2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
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#include <linux/sort.h>
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2016-10-18 17:27:46 +07:00
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#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
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2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
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#include <linux/types.h>
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2017-01-11 04:35:49 +07:00
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
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#include <asm/cpu.h>
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#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
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arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks
At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
safe value of a feature register.
NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
we should be able to handle that when needed.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:50 +07:00
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#include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
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2017-10-31 22:51:10 +07:00
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#include <asm/fpsimd.h>
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2016-02-23 17:31:45 +07:00
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#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
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2015-07-23 01:05:54 +07:00
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#include <asm/processor.h>
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2015-10-19 20:24:42 +07:00
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#include <asm/sysreg.h>
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2017-01-10 00:28:31 +07:00
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#include <asm/traps.h>
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2015-01-29 18:24:05 +07:00
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#include <asm/virt.h>
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2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
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2015-10-19 20:24:41 +07:00
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unsigned long elf_hwcap __read_mostly;
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(elf_hwcap);
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#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
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#define COMPAT_ELF_HWCAP_DEFAULT \
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(COMPAT_HWCAP_HALF|COMPAT_HWCAP_THUMB|\
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COMPAT_HWCAP_FAST_MULT|COMPAT_HWCAP_EDSP|\
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COMPAT_HWCAP_TLS|COMPAT_HWCAP_VFP|\
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COMPAT_HWCAP_VFPv3|COMPAT_HWCAP_VFPv4|\
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COMPAT_HWCAP_NEON|COMPAT_HWCAP_IDIV|\
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COMPAT_HWCAP_LPAE)
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unsigned int compat_elf_hwcap __read_mostly = COMPAT_ELF_HWCAP_DEFAULT;
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unsigned int compat_elf_hwcap2 __read_mostly;
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#endif
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DECLARE_BITMAP(cpu_hwcaps, ARM64_NCAPS);
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2016-07-01 22:53:00 +07:00
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpu_hwcaps);
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2015-10-19 20:24:41 +07:00
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2017-10-31 22:51:09 +07:00
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/*
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* Flag to indicate if we have computed the system wide
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* capabilities based on the boot time active CPUs. This
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* will be used to determine if a new booting CPU should
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* go through the verification process to make sure that it
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* supports the system capabilities, without using a hotplug
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* notifier.
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*/
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static bool sys_caps_initialised;
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static inline void set_sys_caps_initialised(void)
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{
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sys_caps_initialised = true;
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}
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2017-06-22 00:11:23 +07:00
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static int dump_cpu_hwcaps(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long v, void *p)
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{
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/* file-wide pr_fmt adds "CPU features: " prefix */
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pr_emerg("0x%*pb\n", ARM64_NCAPS, &cpu_hwcaps);
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return 0;
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}
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static struct notifier_block cpu_hwcaps_notifier = {
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.notifier_call = dump_cpu_hwcaps
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};
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static int __init register_cpu_hwcaps_dumper(void)
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{
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atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list,
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&cpu_hwcaps_notifier);
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return 0;
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}
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__initcall(register_cpu_hwcaps_dumper);
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2016-09-06 00:25:48 +07:00
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DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_ARRAY_FALSE(cpu_hwcap_keys, ARM64_NCAPS);
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpu_hwcap_keys);
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2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
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#define __ARM64_FTR_BITS(SIGNED, VISIBLE, STRICT, TYPE, SHIFT, WIDTH, SAFE_VAL) \
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2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
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{ \
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2015-11-19 00:08:57 +07:00
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.sign = SIGNED, \
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2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
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.visible = VISIBLE, \
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2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
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.strict = STRICT, \
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.type = TYPE, \
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.shift = SHIFT, \
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.width = WIDTH, \
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.safe_val = SAFE_VAL, \
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}
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arm64: cpufeature: Fix the sign of feature bits
There is a confusion on whether the values of a feature are signed
or not in ARM. This is not clearly mentioned in the ARM ARM either.
We have dealt most of the bits as signed so far, and marked the
rest as unsigned explicitly. This fixed in ARM ARM and will be rolled
out soon.
Here is the criteria in a nutshell:
1) The fields, which are either signed or unsigned, use increasing
numerical values to indicate an increase in functionality. Thus, if a value
of 0x1 indicates the presence of some instructions, then the 0x2 value will
indicate the presence of those instructions plus some additional instructions
or functionality.
2) For ID field values where the value 0x0 defines that a feature is not present,
the number is an unsigned value.
3) For some features where the feature was made optional or removed after the
start of the definition of the architecture, the value 0x0 is used to
indicate the presence of a feature, and 0xF indicates the absence of the
feature. In these cases, the fields are, in effect, holding signed values.
So with these rules applied, we have only the following fields which are signed and
the rest are unsigned.
a) ID_AA64PFR0_EL1: {FP, ASIMD}
b) ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1: {TGran4K, TGran64K}
c) ID_AA64DFR0_EL1: PMUVer (0xf - PMUv3 not implemented)
d) ID_DFR0_EL1: PerfMon
e) ID_MMFR0_EL1: {InnerShr, OuterShr}
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 17:58:14 +07:00
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/* Define a feature with unsigned values */
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2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
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#define ARM64_FTR_BITS(VISIBLE, STRICT, TYPE, SHIFT, WIDTH, SAFE_VAL) \
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__ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_UNSIGNED, VISIBLE, STRICT, TYPE, SHIFT, WIDTH, SAFE_VAL)
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2015-11-19 00:08:57 +07:00
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arm64: cpufeature: Fix the sign of feature bits
There is a confusion on whether the values of a feature are signed
or not in ARM. This is not clearly mentioned in the ARM ARM either.
We have dealt most of the bits as signed so far, and marked the
rest as unsigned explicitly. This fixed in ARM ARM and will be rolled
out soon.
Here is the criteria in a nutshell:
1) The fields, which are either signed or unsigned, use increasing
numerical values to indicate an increase in functionality. Thus, if a value
of 0x1 indicates the presence of some instructions, then the 0x2 value will
indicate the presence of those instructions plus some additional instructions
or functionality.
2) For ID field values where the value 0x0 defines that a feature is not present,
the number is an unsigned value.
3) For some features where the feature was made optional or removed after the
start of the definition of the architecture, the value 0x0 is used to
indicate the presence of a feature, and 0xF indicates the absence of the
feature. In these cases, the fields are, in effect, holding signed values.
So with these rules applied, we have only the following fields which are signed and
the rest are unsigned.
a) ID_AA64PFR0_EL1: {FP, ASIMD}
b) ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1: {TGran4K, TGran64K}
c) ID_AA64DFR0_EL1: PMUVer (0xf - PMUv3 not implemented)
d) ID_DFR0_EL1: PerfMon
e) ID_MMFR0_EL1: {InnerShr, OuterShr}
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 17:58:14 +07:00
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/* Define a feature with a signed value */
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2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
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#define S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(VISIBLE, STRICT, TYPE, SHIFT, WIDTH, SAFE_VAL) \
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__ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_SIGNED, VISIBLE, STRICT, TYPE, SHIFT, WIDTH, SAFE_VAL)
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arm64: cpufeature: Fix the sign of feature bits
There is a confusion on whether the values of a feature are signed
or not in ARM. This is not clearly mentioned in the ARM ARM either.
We have dealt most of the bits as signed so far, and marked the
rest as unsigned explicitly. This fixed in ARM ARM and will be rolled
out soon.
Here is the criteria in a nutshell:
1) The fields, which are either signed or unsigned, use increasing
numerical values to indicate an increase in functionality. Thus, if a value
of 0x1 indicates the presence of some instructions, then the 0x2 value will
indicate the presence of those instructions plus some additional instructions
or functionality.
2) For ID field values where the value 0x0 defines that a feature is not present,
the number is an unsigned value.
3) For some features where the feature was made optional or removed after the
start of the definition of the architecture, the value 0x0 is used to
indicate the presence of a feature, and 0xF indicates the absence of the
feature. In these cases, the fields are, in effect, holding signed values.
So with these rules applied, we have only the following fields which are signed and
the rest are unsigned.
a) ID_AA64PFR0_EL1: {FP, ASIMD}
b) ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1: {TGran4K, TGran64K}
c) ID_AA64DFR0_EL1: PMUVer (0xf - PMUv3 not implemented)
d) ID_DFR0_EL1: PerfMon
e) ID_MMFR0_EL1: {InnerShr, OuterShr}
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 17:58:14 +07:00
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2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
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#define ARM64_FTR_END \
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{ \
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.width = 0, \
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}
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2016-02-05 21:58:50 +07:00
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/* meta feature for alternatives */
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static bool __maybe_unused
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2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
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cpufeature_pan_not_uao(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int __unused);
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2016-02-05 21:58:50 +07:00
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2017-01-10 00:28:32 +07:00
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/*
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* NOTE: Any changes to the visibility of features should be kept in
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* sync with the documentation of the CPU feature register ABI.
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*/
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2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
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static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar0[] = {
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2018-03-12 17:04:14 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_TS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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2017-12-13 17:13:56 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_FHM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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2017-10-19 22:39:02 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_DP_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM4_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_RDM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_ATOMICS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_CRC32_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA1_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR0_AES_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_END,
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};
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2017-03-15 01:13:25 +07:00
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static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = {
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2017-10-19 22:39:02 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_LRCPC_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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2017-03-15 01:13:25 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_END,
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};
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2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
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static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = {
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2017-11-28 01:29:30 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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2018-01-03 18:17:58 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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2018-03-12 17:04:14 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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2017-12-14 21:03:44 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_SVE),
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FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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2018-01-16 02:38:56 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_RAS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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2017-10-19 22:39:02 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
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S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_NI),
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S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_NI),
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2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
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/* Linux doesn't care about the EL3 */
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2017-10-19 22:39:02 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_64BIT_ONLY),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_64BIT_ONLY),
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2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
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ARM64_FTR_END,
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};
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2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
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static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr0[] = {
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2017-10-19 22:39:02 +07:00
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S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN4_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN4_NI),
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S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN64_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN64_NI),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN16_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64MMFR0_TGRAN16_NI),
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ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_BIGENDEL0_SHIFT, 4, 0),
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2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Linux shouldn't care about secure memory */
|
2017-10-19 22:39:02 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_SNSMEM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_BIGENDEL_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_ASID_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Differing PARange is fine as long as all peripherals and memory are mapped
|
|
|
|
* within the minimum PARange of all CPUs
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_PARANGE_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr1[] = {
|
2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_PAN_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
2017-10-19 22:39:02 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_LOR_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_HPD_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_VHE_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_VMIDBITS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_HADBS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr2[] = {
|
2018-03-12 17:04:14 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_AT_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
2017-10-19 22:39:02 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_LVA_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_IESB_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_LSM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_UAO_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_CNP_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
2016-02-05 21:58:47 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_ctr[] = {
|
2018-03-07 22:00:08 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 31, 1, 1), /* RES1 */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, CTR_DIC_SHIFT, 1, 1),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, CTR_IDC_SHIFT, 1, 1),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, CTR_CWG_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, CTR_ERG_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, CTR_DMINLINE_SHIFT, 4, 1),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Linux can handle differing I-cache policies. Userspace JITs will
|
2016-09-09 20:07:08 +07:00
|
|
|
* make use of *minLine.
|
2017-03-11 03:32:22 +07:00
|
|
|
* If we have differing I-cache policies, report it as the weakest - VIPT.
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-11 03:32:22 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_EXACT, 14, 2, ICACHE_POLICY_VIPT), /* L1Ip */
|
2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 0, 4, 0), /* IminLine */
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:10 +07:00
|
|
|
struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0 = {
|
|
|
|
.name = "SYS_CTR_EL0",
|
|
|
|
.ftr_bits = ftr_ctr
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_mmfr0[] = {
|
2017-10-19 22:39:02 +07:00
|
|
|
S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 28, 4, 0xf), /* InnerShr */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 24, 4, 0), /* FCSE */
|
2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 20, 4, 0), /* AuxReg */
|
2017-10-19 22:39:02 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 16, 4, 0), /* TCM */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 12, 4, 0), /* ShareLvl */
|
|
|
|
S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 8, 4, 0xf), /* OuterShr */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 4, 4, 0), /* PMSA */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 0, 4, 0), /* VMSA */
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64dfr0[] = {
|
2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 36, 28, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64DFR0_PMSVER_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64DFR0_CTX_CMPS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64DFR0_WRPS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64DFR0_BRPS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
2016-07-25 22:17:52 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We can instantiate multiple PMU instances with different levels
|
|
|
|
* of support.
|
2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64DFR0_PMUVER_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64DFR0_TRACEVER_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64DFR0_DEBUGVER_SHIFT, 4, 0x6),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_mvfr2[] = {
|
2017-10-19 22:39:02 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 4, 4, 0), /* FPMisc */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 0, 4, 0), /* SIMDMisc */
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_dczid[] = {
|
2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 4, 1, 1), /* DZP */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 0, 4, 0), /* BS */
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_isar5[] = {
|
2017-10-19 22:39:02 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_ISAR5_RDM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_ISAR5_CRC32_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_ISAR5_SHA2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_ISAR5_SHA1_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_ISAR5_AES_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_ISAR5_SEVL_SHIFT, 4, 0),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_mmfr4[] = {
|
2017-10-19 22:39:02 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 4, 4, 0), /* ac2 */
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_pfr0[] = {
|
2017-10-19 22:39:02 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 12, 4, 0), /* State3 */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 8, 4, 0), /* State2 */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 4, 4, 0), /* State1 */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 0, 4, 0), /* State0 */
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_dfr0[] = {
|
2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 28, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 24, 4, 0xf), /* PerfMon */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 20, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 16, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 12, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 8, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 4, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 0, 4, 0),
|
2016-01-26 17:58:13 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-31 22:51:10 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_zcr[] = {
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE,
|
|
|
|
ZCR_ELx_LEN_SHIFT, ZCR_ELx_LEN_SIZE, 0), /* LEN */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Common ftr bits for a 32bit register with all hidden, strict
|
|
|
|
* attributes, with 4bit feature fields and a default safe value of
|
|
|
|
* 0. Covers the following 32bit registers:
|
|
|
|
* id_isar[0-4], id_mmfr[1-3], id_pfr1, mvfr[0-1]
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_generic_32bits[] = {
|
2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 28, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 24, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 20, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 16, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 12, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 8, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 4, 4, 0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 0, 4, 0),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-10 00:28:26 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Table for a single 32bit feature value */
|
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_single32[] = {
|
2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 0, 32, 0),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-10 00:28:26 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_raz[] = {
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_END,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:09 +07:00
|
|
|
#define ARM64_FTR_REG(id, table) { \
|
|
|
|
.sys_id = id, \
|
|
|
|
.reg = &(struct arm64_ftr_reg){ \
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
.name = #id, \
|
|
|
|
.ftr_bits = &((table)[0]), \
|
2016-08-31 17:31:09 +07:00
|
|
|
}}
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:09 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct __ftr_reg_entry {
|
|
|
|
u32 sys_id;
|
|
|
|
struct arm64_ftr_reg *reg;
|
|
|
|
} arm64_ftr_regs[] = {
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 1 */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_PFR0_EL1, ftr_id_pfr0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_PFR1_EL1, ftr_generic_32bits),
|
2016-01-26 17:58:13 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_DFR0_EL1, ftr_id_dfr0),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_MMFR0_EL1, ftr_id_mmfr0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_MMFR1_EL1, ftr_generic_32bits),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_MMFR2_EL1, ftr_generic_32bits),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_MMFR3_EL1, ftr_generic_32bits),
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 2 */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_ISAR0_EL1, ftr_generic_32bits),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_ISAR1_EL1, ftr_generic_32bits),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_ISAR2_EL1, ftr_generic_32bits),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_ISAR3_EL1, ftr_generic_32bits),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_ISAR4_EL1, ftr_generic_32bits),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_ISAR5_EL1, ftr_id_isar5),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_MMFR4_EL1, ftr_id_mmfr4),
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 3 */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_MVFR0_EL1, ftr_generic_32bits),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_MVFR1_EL1, ftr_generic_32bits),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_MVFR2_EL1, ftr_mvfr2),
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 4 */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64pfr0),
|
2017-01-10 00:28:26 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, ftr_raz),
|
2017-10-31 22:51:10 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, ftr_raz),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 5 */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64dfr0),
|
2017-01-10 00:28:26 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64DFR1_EL1, ftr_raz),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 6 */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar0),
|
2017-03-15 01:13:25 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar1),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 7 */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64mmfr0),
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, ftr_id_aa64mmfr1),
|
2016-02-05 21:58:47 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1, ftr_id_aa64mmfr2),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-31 22:51:10 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Op1 = 0, CRn = 1, CRm = 2 */
|
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ZCR_EL1, ftr_zcr),
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Op1 = 3, CRn = 0, CRm = 0 */
|
2016-08-31 17:31:10 +07:00
|
|
|
{ SYS_CTR_EL0, &arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0 },
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_DCZID_EL0, ftr_dczid),
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Op1 = 3, CRn = 14, CRm = 0 */
|
2017-01-10 00:28:26 +07:00
|
|
|
ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_CNTFRQ_EL0, ftr_single32),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int search_cmp_ftr_reg(const void *id, const void *regp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-08-31 17:31:09 +07:00
|
|
|
return (int)(unsigned long)id - (int)((const struct __ftr_reg_entry *)regp)->sys_id;
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* get_arm64_ftr_reg - Lookup a feature register entry using its
|
|
|
|
* sys_reg() encoding. With the array arm64_ftr_regs sorted in the
|
|
|
|
* ascending order of sys_id , we use binary search to find a matching
|
|
|
|
* entry.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* returns - Upon success, matching ftr_reg entry for id.
|
|
|
|
* - NULL on failure. It is upto the caller to decide
|
|
|
|
* the impact of a failure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static struct arm64_ftr_reg *get_arm64_ftr_reg(u32 sys_id)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-08-31 17:31:09 +07:00
|
|
|
const struct __ftr_reg_entry *ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = bsearch((const void *)(unsigned long)sys_id,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
arm64_ftr_regs,
|
|
|
|
ARRAY_SIZE(arm64_ftr_regs),
|
|
|
|
sizeof(arm64_ftr_regs[0]),
|
|
|
|
search_cmp_ftr_reg);
|
2016-08-31 17:31:09 +07:00
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret->reg;
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static u64 arm64_ftr_set_value(const struct arm64_ftr_bits *ftrp, s64 reg,
|
|
|
|
s64 ftr_val)
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u64 mask = arm64_ftr_mask(ftrp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
reg &= ~mask;
|
|
|
|
reg |= (ftr_val << ftrp->shift) & mask;
|
|
|
|
return reg;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static s64 arm64_ftr_safe_value(const struct arm64_ftr_bits *ftrp, s64 new,
|
|
|
|
s64 cur)
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s64 ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ftrp->type) {
|
|
|
|
case FTR_EXACT:
|
|
|
|
ret = ftrp->safe_val;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case FTR_LOWER_SAFE:
|
|
|
|
ret = new < cur ? new : cur;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case FTR_HIGHER_SAFE:
|
|
|
|
ret = new > cur ? new : cur;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void __init sort_ftr_regs(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-08-31 17:31:09 +07:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check that the array is sorted so that we can do the binary search */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(arm64_ftr_regs); i++)
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(arm64_ftr_regs[i].sys_id < arm64_ftr_regs[i - 1].sys_id);
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Initialise the CPU feature register from Boot CPU values.
|
|
|
|
* Also initiliases the strict_mask for the register.
|
2017-01-10 00:28:24 +07:00
|
|
|
* Any bits that are not covered by an arm64_ftr_bits entry are considered
|
|
|
|
* RES0 for the system-wide value, and must strictly match.
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void __init init_cpu_ftr_reg(u32 sys_reg, u64 new)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u64 val = 0;
|
|
|
|
u64 strict_mask = ~0x0ULL;
|
2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
|
|
|
u64 user_mask = 0;
|
2017-01-10 00:28:24 +07:00
|
|
|
u64 valid_mask = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
const struct arm64_ftr_bits *ftrp;
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
struct arm64_ftr_reg *reg = get_arm64_ftr_reg(sys_reg);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!reg);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (ftrp = reg->ftr_bits; ftrp->width; ftrp++) {
|
2017-01-10 00:28:24 +07:00
|
|
|
u64 ftr_mask = arm64_ftr_mask(ftrp);
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
s64 ftr_new = arm64_ftr_value(ftrp, new);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
val = arm64_ftr_set_value(ftrp, val, ftr_new);
|
2017-01-10 00:28:24 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
valid_mask |= ftr_mask;
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!ftrp->strict)
|
2017-01-10 00:28:24 +07:00
|
|
|
strict_mask &= ~ftr_mask;
|
2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
|
|
|
if (ftrp->visible)
|
|
|
|
user_mask |= ftr_mask;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
reg->user_val = arm64_ftr_set_value(ftrp,
|
|
|
|
reg->user_val,
|
|
|
|
ftrp->safe_val);
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-01-10 00:28:24 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
val &= valid_mask;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
reg->sys_val = val;
|
|
|
|
reg->strict_mask = strict_mask;
|
2017-01-10 00:28:30 +07:00
|
|
|
reg->user_mask = user_mask;
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:30 +07:00
|
|
|
extern const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[];
|
2018-03-26 21:12:41 +07:00
|
|
|
static void __init setup_boot_cpu_capabilities(void);
|
2018-03-26 21:12:30 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
void __init init_cpu_features(struct cpuinfo_arm64 *info)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Before we start using the tables, make sure it is sorted */
|
|
|
|
sort_ftr_regs();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_CTR_EL0, info->reg_ctr);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_DCZID_EL0, info->reg_dczid);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_CNTFRQ_EL0, info->reg_cntfrq);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64dfr0);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64DFR1_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64dfr1);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64isar0);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64isar1);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64mmfr0);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64mmfr1);
|
2016-02-05 21:58:47 +07:00
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64mmfr2);
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64pfr0);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64pfr1);
|
2017-10-31 22:51:10 +07:00
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64zfr0);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (id_aa64pfr0_32bit_el0(info->reg_id_aa64pfr0)) {
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_DFR0_EL1, info->reg_id_dfr0);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_ISAR0_EL1, info->reg_id_isar0);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_ISAR1_EL1, info->reg_id_isar1);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_ISAR2_EL1, info->reg_id_isar2);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_ISAR3_EL1, info->reg_id_isar3);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_ISAR4_EL1, info->reg_id_isar4);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_ISAR5_EL1, info->reg_id_isar5);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_MMFR0_EL1, info->reg_id_mmfr0);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_MMFR1_EL1, info->reg_id_mmfr1);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_MMFR2_EL1, info->reg_id_mmfr2);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_MMFR3_EL1, info->reg_id_mmfr3);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_PFR0_EL1, info->reg_id_pfr0);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_PFR1_EL1, info->reg_id_pfr1);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_MVFR0_EL1, info->reg_mvfr0);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_MVFR1_EL1, info->reg_mvfr1);
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_MVFR2_EL1, info->reg_mvfr2);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-31 22:51:10 +07:00
|
|
|
if (id_aa64pfr0_sve(info->reg_id_aa64pfr0)) {
|
|
|
|
init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ZCR_EL1, info->reg_zcr);
|
|
|
|
sve_init_vq_map();
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-03-26 21:12:29 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2018-03-26 21:12:41 +07:00
|
|
|
* Detect and enable early CPU capabilities based on the boot CPU,
|
|
|
|
* after we have initialised the CPU feature infrastructure.
|
2018-03-26 21:12:29 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-03-26 21:12:41 +07:00
|
|
|
setup_boot_cpu_capabilities();
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
static void update_cpu_ftr_reg(struct arm64_ftr_reg *reg, u64 new)
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-08-31 17:31:08 +07:00
|
|
|
const struct arm64_ftr_bits *ftrp;
|
2015-10-19 20:24:45 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (ftrp = reg->ftr_bits; ftrp->width; ftrp++) {
|
|
|
|
s64 ftr_cur = arm64_ftr_value(ftrp, reg->sys_val);
|
|
|
|
s64 ftr_new = arm64_ftr_value(ftrp, new);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ftr_cur == ftr_new)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* Find a safe value */
|
|
|
|
ftr_new = arm64_ftr_safe_value(ftrp, ftr_new, ftr_cur);
|
|
|
|
reg->sys_val = arm64_ftr_set_value(ftrp, reg->sys_val, ftr_new);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
static int check_update_ftr_reg(u32 sys_id, int cpu, u64 val, u64 boot)
|
2015-10-19 20:24:42 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
struct arm64_ftr_reg *regp = get_arm64_ftr_reg(sys_id);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!regp);
|
|
|
|
update_cpu_ftr_reg(regp, val);
|
|
|
|
if ((boot & regp->strict_mask) == (val & regp->strict_mask))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
pr_warn("SANITY CHECK: Unexpected variation in %s. Boot CPU: %#016llx, CPU%d: %#016llx\n",
|
|
|
|
regp->name, boot, cpu, val);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Update system wide CPU feature registers with the values from a
|
|
|
|
* non-boot CPU. Also performs SANITY checks to make sure that there
|
|
|
|
* aren't any insane variations from that of the boot CPU.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void update_cpu_features(int cpu,
|
|
|
|
struct cpuinfo_arm64 *info,
|
|
|
|
struct cpuinfo_arm64 *boot)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int taint = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The kernel can handle differing I-cache policies, but otherwise
|
|
|
|
* caches should look identical. Userspace JITs will make use of
|
|
|
|
* *minLine.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_CTR_EL0, cpu,
|
|
|
|
info->reg_ctr, boot->reg_ctr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Userspace may perform DC ZVA instructions. Mismatched block sizes
|
|
|
|
* could result in too much or too little memory being zeroed if a
|
|
|
|
* process is preempted and migrated between CPUs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_DCZID_EL0, cpu,
|
|
|
|
info->reg_dczid, boot->reg_dczid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If different, timekeeping will be broken (especially with KVM) */
|
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_CNTFRQ_EL0, cpu,
|
|
|
|
info->reg_cntfrq, boot->reg_cntfrq);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The kernel uses self-hosted debug features and expects CPUs to
|
|
|
|
* support identical debug features. We presently need CTX_CMPs, WRPs,
|
|
|
|
* and BRPs to be identical.
|
|
|
|
* ID_AA64DFR1 is currently RES0.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, cpu,
|
|
|
|
info->reg_id_aa64dfr0, boot->reg_id_aa64dfr0);
|
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64DFR1_EL1, cpu,
|
|
|
|
info->reg_id_aa64dfr1, boot->reg_id_aa64dfr1);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Even in big.LITTLE, processors should be identical instruction-set
|
|
|
|
* wise.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, cpu,
|
|
|
|
info->reg_id_aa64isar0, boot->reg_id_aa64isar0);
|
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, cpu,
|
|
|
|
info->reg_id_aa64isar1, boot->reg_id_aa64isar1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Differing PARange support is fine as long as all peripherals and
|
|
|
|
* memory are mapped within the minimum PARange of all CPUs.
|
|
|
|
* Linux should not care about secure memory.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, cpu,
|
|
|
|
info->reg_id_aa64mmfr0, boot->reg_id_aa64mmfr0);
|
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, cpu,
|
|
|
|
info->reg_id_aa64mmfr1, boot->reg_id_aa64mmfr1);
|
2016-02-05 21:58:47 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1, cpu,
|
|
|
|
info->reg_id_aa64mmfr2, boot->reg_id_aa64mmfr2);
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* EL3 is not our concern.
|
|
|
|
* ID_AA64PFR1 is currently RES0.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, cpu,
|
|
|
|
info->reg_id_aa64pfr0, boot->reg_id_aa64pfr0);
|
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, cpu,
|
|
|
|
info->reg_id_aa64pfr1, boot->reg_id_aa64pfr1);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-31 22:51:10 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, cpu,
|
|
|
|
info->reg_id_aa64zfr0, boot->reg_id_aa64zfr0);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
* If we have AArch32, we care about 32-bit features for compat.
|
|
|
|
* If the system doesn't support AArch32, don't update them.
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-23 22:14:39 +07:00
|
|
|
if (id_aa64pfr0_32bit_el0(read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1)) &&
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
id_aa64pfr0_32bit_el0(info->reg_id_aa64pfr0)) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_DFR0_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_id_dfr0, boot->reg_id_dfr0);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_ISAR0_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_id_isar0, boot->reg_id_isar0);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_ISAR1_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_id_isar1, boot->reg_id_isar1);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_ISAR2_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_id_isar2, boot->reg_id_isar2);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_ISAR3_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_id_isar3, boot->reg_id_isar3);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_ISAR4_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_id_isar4, boot->reg_id_isar4);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_ISAR5_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_id_isar5, boot->reg_id_isar5);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Regardless of the value of the AuxReg field, the AIFSR, ADFSR, and
|
|
|
|
* ACTLR formats could differ across CPUs and therefore would have to
|
|
|
|
* be trapped for virtualization anyway.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_MMFR0_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_id_mmfr0, boot->reg_id_mmfr0);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_MMFR1_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_id_mmfr1, boot->reg_id_mmfr1);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_MMFR2_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_id_mmfr2, boot->reg_id_mmfr2);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_MMFR3_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_id_mmfr3, boot->reg_id_mmfr3);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_PFR0_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_id_pfr0, boot->reg_id_pfr0);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_PFR1_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_id_pfr1, boot->reg_id_pfr1);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_MVFR0_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_mvfr0, boot->reg_mvfr0);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_MVFR1_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_mvfr1, boot->reg_mvfr1);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_MVFR2_EL1, cpu,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
info->reg_mvfr2, boot->reg_mvfr2);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:35 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-10-31 22:51:10 +07:00
|
|
|
if (id_aa64pfr0_sve(info->reg_id_aa64pfr0)) {
|
|
|
|
taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ZCR_EL1, cpu,
|
|
|
|
info->reg_zcr, boot->reg_zcr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Probe vector lengths, unless we already gave up on SVE */
|
|
|
|
if (id_aa64pfr0_sve(read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1)) &&
|
|
|
|
!sys_caps_initialised)
|
|
|
|
sve_update_vq_map();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 20:24:46 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Mismatched CPU features are a recipe for disaster. Don't even
|
|
|
|
* pretend to support them.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-06-05 17:40:23 +07:00
|
|
|
if (taint) {
|
|
|
|
pr_warn_once("Unsupported CPU feature variation detected.\n");
|
|
|
|
add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-19 20:24:42 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-23 22:14:39 +07:00
|
|
|
u64 read_sanitised_ftr_reg(u32 id)
|
2015-10-19 20:24:47 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct arm64_ftr_reg *regp = get_arm64_ftr_reg(id);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We shouldn't get a request for an unsupported register */
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!regp);
|
|
|
|
return regp->sys_val;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 00:32:15 +07:00
|
|
|
#define read_sysreg_case(r) \
|
|
|
|
case r: return read_sysreg_s(r)
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-03-23 22:14:39 +07:00
|
|
|
* __read_sysreg_by_encoding() - Used by a STARTING cpu before cpuinfo is populated.
|
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
|
|
|
* Read the system register on the current CPU
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-23 22:14:39 +07:00
|
|
|
static u64 __read_sysreg_by_encoding(u32 sys_id)
|
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (sys_id) {
|
2017-02-03 00:32:15 +07:00
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_PFR0_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_PFR1_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_DFR0_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_MMFR0_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_MMFR1_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_MMFR2_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_MMFR3_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_ISAR0_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_ISAR1_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_ISAR2_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_ISAR3_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_ISAR4_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_ISAR5_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_MVFR0_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_MVFR1_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_MVFR2_EL1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64DFR0_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64DFR1_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_CNTFRQ_EL0);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_CTR_EL0);
|
|
|
|
read_sysreg_case(SYS_DCZID_EL0);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-30 17:50:04 +07:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/irqchip/arm-gic-v3.h>
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-21 19:23:29 +07:00
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
|
|
feature_matches(u64 reg, const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-01-26 17:58:16 +07:00
|
|
|
int val = cpuid_feature_extract_field(reg, entry->field_pos, entry->sign);
|
2015-07-21 19:23:29 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return val >= entry->min_field_value;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 20:24:51 +07:00
|
|
|
static bool
|
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
|
|
|
has_cpuid_feature(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
|
2015-10-19 20:24:51 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u64 val;
|
2015-06-12 18:06:36 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
|
|
|
WARN_ON(scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU && preemptible());
|
|
|
|
if (scope == SCOPE_SYSTEM)
|
2017-03-23 22:14:39 +07:00
|
|
|
val = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(entry->sys_reg);
|
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
|
|
|
else
|
2017-03-23 22:14:39 +07:00
|
|
|
val = __read_sysreg_by_encoding(entry->sys_reg);
|
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 20:24:51 +07:00
|
|
|
return feature_matches(val, entry);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-07-23 01:05:54 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
|
|
|
static bool has_useable_gicv3_cpuif(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
|
2015-09-30 17:50:04 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bool has_sre;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope))
|
2015-09-30 17:50:04 +07:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
has_sre = gic_enable_sre();
|
|
|
|
if (!has_sre)
|
|
|
|
pr_warn_once("%s present but disabled by higher exception level\n",
|
|
|
|
entry->desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return has_sre;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
|
|
|
static bool has_no_hw_prefetch(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int __unused)
|
2016-02-02 19:46:24 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u32 midr = read_cpuid_id();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Cavium ThunderX pass 1.x and 2.x */
|
2017-01-13 20:12:09 +07:00
|
|
|
return MIDR_IS_CPU_MODEL_RANGE(midr, MIDR_THUNDERX,
|
|
|
|
MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0),
|
|
|
|
MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(1, MIDR_REVISION_MASK));
|
2016-02-02 19:46:24 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-08 20:56:21 +07:00
|
|
|
static bool has_no_fpsimd(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int __unused)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-03-23 22:14:39 +07:00
|
|
|
u64 pfr0 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
|
2016-11-08 20:56:21 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return cpuid_feature_extract_signed_field(pfr0,
|
|
|
|
ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT) < 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-07 22:00:08 +07:00
|
|
|
static bool has_cache_idc(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
|
|
|
|
int __unused)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_CTR_EL0) & BIT(CTR_IDC_SHIFT);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool has_cache_dic(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
|
|
|
|
int __unused)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_CTR_EL0) & BIT(CTR_DIC_SHIFT);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-14 21:38:19 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
|
|
|
|
static int __kpti_forced; /* 0: not forced, >0: forced on, <0: forced off */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:40 +07:00
|
|
|
int scope)
|
2017-11-14 21:38:19 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-03-26 21:12:45 +07:00
|
|
|
/* List of CPUs that are not vulnerable and don't need KPTI */
|
|
|
|
static const struct midr_range kpti_safe_list[] = {
|
|
|
|
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2),
|
|
|
|
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN),
|
2018-04-23 17:41:33 +07:00
|
|
|
{ /* sentinel */ }
|
2018-03-26 21:12:45 +07:00
|
|
|
};
|
2018-01-29 18:59:56 +07:00
|
|
|
char const *str = "command line option";
|
2017-11-28 01:29:30 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2018-01-29 18:59:56 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For reasons that aren't entirely clear, enabling KPTI on Cavium
|
|
|
|
* ThunderX leads to apparent I-cache corruption of kernel text, which
|
|
|
|
* ends as well as you might imagine. Don't even try.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456)) {
|
|
|
|
str = "ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456";
|
|
|
|
__kpti_forced = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Forced? */
|
2017-11-14 21:38:19 +07:00
|
|
|
if (__kpti_forced) {
|
2018-01-29 18:59:56 +07:00
|
|
|
pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation forced %s by %s\n",
|
|
|
|
__kpti_forced > 0 ? "ON" : "OFF", str);
|
2017-11-14 21:38:19 +07:00
|
|
|
return __kpti_forced > 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Useful for KASLR robustness */
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-19 19:22:48 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Don't force KPTI for CPUs that are not vulnerable */
|
2018-03-26 21:12:45 +07:00
|
|
|
if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list))
|
2018-01-19 19:22:48 +07:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-28 01:29:30 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Defer to CPU feature registers */
|
2018-03-26 21:12:40 +07:00
|
|
|
return !has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
|
2017-11-14 21:38:19 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:28 +07:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
|
2018-02-07 05:22:50 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
typedef void (kpti_remap_fn)(int, int, phys_addr_t);
|
|
|
|
extern kpti_remap_fn idmap_kpti_install_ng_mappings;
|
|
|
|
kpti_remap_fn *remap_fn;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool kpti_applied = false;
|
|
|
|
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (kpti_applied)
|
2018-03-26 21:12:28 +07:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2018-02-07 05:22:50 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
remap_fn = (void *)__pa_symbol(idmap_kpti_install_ng_mappings);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cpu_install_idmap();
|
|
|
|
remap_fn(cpu, num_online_cpus(), __pa_symbol(swapper_pg_dir));
|
|
|
|
cpu_uninstall_idmap();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!cpu)
|
|
|
|
kpti_applied = true;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:28 +07:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2018-02-07 05:22:50 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-14 21:38:19 +07:00
|
|
|
static int __init parse_kpti(char *str)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bool enabled;
|
|
|
|
int ret = strtobool(str, &enabled);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__kpti_forced = enabled ? 1 : -1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-06-22 16:25:25 +07:00
|
|
|
early_param("kpti", parse_kpti);
|
2017-11-14 21:38:19 +07:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:48 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM
|
|
|
|
static inline void __cpu_enable_hw_dbm(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u64 tcr = read_sysreg(tcr_el1) | TCR_HD;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
write_sysreg(tcr, tcr_el1);
|
|
|
|
isb();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:49 +07:00
|
|
|
static bool cpu_has_broken_dbm(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* List of CPUs which have broken DBM support. */
|
|
|
|
static const struct midr_range cpus[] = {
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1024718
|
|
|
|
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A55, 0, 0, 1, 0), // A55 r0p0 -r1p0
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{},
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), cpus);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:48 +07:00
|
|
|
static bool cpu_can_use_dbm(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-03-26 21:12:49 +07:00
|
|
|
return has_cpuid_feature(cap, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) &&
|
|
|
|
!cpu_has_broken_dbm();
|
2018-03-26 21:12:48 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void cpu_enable_hw_dbm(struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (cpu_can_use_dbm(cap))
|
|
|
|
__cpu_enable_hw_dbm();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool has_hw_dbm(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap,
|
|
|
|
int __unused)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static bool detected = false;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* DBM is a non-conflicting feature. i.e, the kernel can safely
|
|
|
|
* run a mix of CPUs with and without the feature. So, we
|
|
|
|
* unconditionally enable the capability to allow any late CPU
|
|
|
|
* to use the feature. We only enable the control bits on the
|
|
|
|
* CPU, if it actually supports.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We have to make sure we print the "feature" detection only
|
|
|
|
* when at least one CPU actually uses it. So check if this CPU
|
|
|
|
* can actually use it and print the message exactly once.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This is safe as all CPUs (including secondary CPUs - due to the
|
|
|
|
* LOCAL_CPU scope - and the hotplugged CPUs - via verification)
|
|
|
|
* goes through the "matches" check exactly once. Also if a CPU
|
|
|
|
* matches the criteria, it is guaranteed that the CPU will turn
|
|
|
|
* the DBM on, as the capability is unconditionally enabled.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!detected && cpu_can_use_dbm(cap)) {
|
|
|
|
detected = true;
|
|
|
|
pr_info("detected: Hardware dirty bit management\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-27 17:51:12 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_VHE
|
|
|
|
static bool runs_at_el2(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int __unused)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return is_kernel_in_hyp_mode();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:28 +07:00
|
|
|
static void cpu_copy_el2regs(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
|
2018-01-08 22:38:06 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Copy register values that aren't redirected by hardware.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Before code patching, we only set tpidr_el1, all CPUs need to copy
|
|
|
|
* this value to tpidr_el2 before we patch the code. Once we've done
|
|
|
|
* that, freshly-onlined CPUs will set tpidr_el2, so we don't need to
|
|
|
|
* do anything here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!alternatives_applied)
|
|
|
|
write_sysreg(read_sysreg(tpidr_el1), tpidr_el2);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-03-27 17:51:12 +07:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2018-01-08 22:38:06 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
|
2015-06-12 18:06:36 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.desc = "GIC system register CPU interface",
|
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_HAS_SYSREG_GIC_CPUIF,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
|
2015-09-30 17:50:04 +07:00
|
|
|
.matches = has_useable_gicv3_cpuif,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:51 +07:00
|
|
|
.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1,
|
|
|
|
.field_pos = ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT,
|
2016-01-26 17:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
.sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
|
2015-07-21 19:23:29 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_field_value = 1,
|
2015-06-12 18:06:36 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
2015-07-23 01:05:54 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PAN
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.desc = "Privileged Access Never",
|
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_HAS_PAN,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:51 +07:00
|
|
|
.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
|
|
|
|
.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1,
|
|
|
|
.field_pos = ID_AA64MMFR1_PAN_SHIFT,
|
2016-01-26 17:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
.sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
|
2015-07-23 01:05:54 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_field_value = 1,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:28 +07:00
|
|
|
.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_pan,
|
2015-07-23 01:05:54 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PAN */
|
2015-07-27 22:23:58 +07:00
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_AS_LSE) && defined(CONFIG_ARM64_LSE_ATOMICS)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.desc = "LSE atomic instructions",
|
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_HAS_LSE_ATOMICS,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
|
2015-10-19 20:24:51 +07:00
|
|
|
.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
|
|
|
|
.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1,
|
|
|
|
.field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR0_ATOMICS_SHIFT,
|
2016-01-26 17:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
.sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
|
2015-07-27 22:23:58 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_field_value = 2,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_AS_LSE && CONFIG_ARM64_LSE_ATOMICS */
|
2016-02-02 19:46:24 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.desc = "Software prefetching using PRFM",
|
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_HAS_NO_HW_PREFETCH,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:39 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_WEAK_LOCAL_CPU_FEATURE,
|
2016-02-02 19:46:24 +07:00
|
|
|
.matches = has_no_hw_prefetch,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-02-05 21:58:48 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_UAO
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.desc = "User Access Override",
|
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_HAS_UAO,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
|
2016-02-05 21:58:48 +07:00
|
|
|
.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
|
|
|
|
.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1,
|
|
|
|
.field_pos = ID_AA64MMFR2_UAO_SHIFT,
|
|
|
|
.min_field_value = 1,
|
2017-01-10 01:14:02 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We rely on stop_machine() calling uao_thread_switch() to set
|
|
|
|
* UAO immediately after patching.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-02-05 21:58:48 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_UAO */
|
2016-02-05 21:58:50 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PAN
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_ALT_PAN_NOT_UAO,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
|
2016-02-05 21:58:50 +07:00
|
|
|
.matches = cpufeature_pan_not_uao,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PAN */
|
2018-03-26 21:12:42 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_VHE
|
2015-01-29 18:24:05 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.desc = "Virtualization Host Extensions",
|
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:42 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_STRICT_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE,
|
2015-01-29 18:24:05 +07:00
|
|
|
.matches = runs_at_el2,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:28 +07:00
|
|
|
.cpu_enable = cpu_copy_el2regs,
|
2015-01-29 18:24:05 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
2018-03-26 21:12:42 +07:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_VHE */
|
2016-04-18 16:28:36 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.desc = "32-bit EL0 Support",
|
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
|
2016-04-18 16:28:36 +07:00
|
|
|
.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
|
|
|
|
.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1,
|
|
|
|
.sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
|
|
|
|
.field_pos = ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_SHIFT,
|
|
|
|
.min_field_value = ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_32BIT_64BIT,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-11-14 21:38:19 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-11-28 01:29:30 +07:00
|
|
|
.desc = "Kernel page table isolation (KPTI)",
|
2017-11-14 21:38:19 +07:00
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:40 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_RESTRICTED_CPU_LOCAL_FEATURE,
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The ID feature fields below are used to indicate that
|
|
|
|
* the CPU doesn't need KPTI. See unmap_kernel_at_el0 for
|
|
|
|
* more details.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1,
|
|
|
|
.field_pos = ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT,
|
|
|
|
.min_field_value = 1,
|
2017-11-14 21:38:19 +07:00
|
|
|
.matches = unmap_kernel_at_el0,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:28 +07:00
|
|
|
.cpu_enable = kpti_install_ng_mappings,
|
2017-11-14 21:38:19 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2016-11-08 20:56:21 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* FP/SIMD is not implemented */
|
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_HAS_NO_FPSIMD,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
|
2016-11-08 20:56:21 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_field_value = 0,
|
|
|
|
.matches = has_no_fpsimd,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2017-07-25 17:55:42 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PMEM
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.desc = "Data cache clean to Point of Persistence",
|
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_HAS_DCPOP,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
|
2017-07-25 17:55:42 +07:00
|
|
|
.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
|
|
|
|
.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1,
|
|
|
|
.field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT,
|
|
|
|
.min_field_value = 1,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2017-10-31 22:51:19 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SVE
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.desc = "Scalable Vector Extension",
|
2018-03-26 21:12:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
|
2017-10-31 22:51:19 +07:00
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_SVE,
|
|
|
|
.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1,
|
|
|
|
.sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
|
|
|
|
.field_pos = ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT,
|
|
|
|
.min_field_value = ID_AA64PFR0_SVE,
|
|
|
|
.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:28 +07:00
|
|
|
.cpu_enable = sve_kernel_enable,
|
2017-10-31 22:51:19 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SVE */
|
2018-01-16 02:38:56 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_RAS_EXTN
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.desc = "RAS Extension Support",
|
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
|
2018-01-16 02:38:56 +07:00
|
|
|
.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
|
|
|
|
.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1,
|
|
|
|
.sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
|
|
|
|
.field_pos = ID_AA64PFR0_RAS_SHIFT,
|
|
|
|
.min_field_value = ID_AA64PFR0_RAS_V1,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:28 +07:00
|
|
|
.cpu_enable = cpu_clear_disr,
|
2018-01-16 02:38:56 +07:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_RAS_EXTN */
|
2018-03-07 22:00:08 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.desc = "Data cache clean to the PoU not required for I/D coherence",
|
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_HAS_CACHE_IDC,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
|
2018-03-07 22:00:08 +07:00
|
|
|
.matches = has_cache_idc,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.desc = "Instruction cache invalidation not required for I/D coherence",
|
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_HAS_CACHE_DIC,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
|
2018-03-07 22:00:08 +07:00
|
|
|
.matches = has_cache_dic,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2018-03-26 21:12:48 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Since we turn this on always, we don't want the user to
|
|
|
|
* think that the feature is available when it may not be.
|
|
|
|
* So hide the description.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* .desc = "Hardware pagetable Dirty Bit Management",
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_WEAK_LOCAL_CPU_FEATURE,
|
|
|
|
.capability = ARM64_HW_DBM,
|
|
|
|
.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1,
|
|
|
|
.sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
|
|
|
|
.field_pos = ID_AA64MMFR1_HADBS_SHIFT,
|
|
|
|
.min_field_value = 2,
|
|
|
|
.matches = has_hw_dbm,
|
|
|
|
.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_hw_dbm,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
{},
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
arm64: capabilities: Prepare for fine grained capabilities
We use arm64_cpu_capabilities to represent CPU ELF HWCAPs exposed
to the userspace and the CPU hwcaps used by the kernel, which
include cpu features and CPU errata work arounds. Capabilities
have some properties that decide how they should be treated :
1) Detection, i.e scope : A cap could be "detected" either :
- if it is present on at least one CPU (SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
Or
- if it is present on all the CPUs (SCOPE_SYSTEM)
2) When is it enabled ? - A cap is treated as "enabled" when the
system takes some action based on whether the capability is detected or
not. e.g, setting some control register, patching the kernel code.
Right now, we treat all caps are enabled at boot-time, after all
the CPUs are brought up by the kernel. But there are certain caps,
which are enabled early during the boot (e.g, VHE, GIC_CPUIF for NMI)
and kernel starts using them, even before the secondary CPUs are brought
up. We would need a way to describe this for each capability.
3) Conflict on a late CPU - When a CPU is brought up, it is checked
against the caps that are known to be enabled on the system (via
verify_local_cpu_capabilities()). Based on the state of the capability
on the CPU vs. that of System we could have the following combinations
of conflict.
x-----------------------------x
| Type | System | Late CPU |
------------------------------|
| a | y | n |
------------------------------|
| b | n | y |
x-----------------------------x
Case (a) is not permitted for caps which are system features, which the
system expects all the CPUs to have (e.g VHE). While (a) is ignored for
all errata work arounds. However, there could be exceptions to the plain
filtering approach. e.g, KPTI is an optional feature for a late CPU as
long as the system already enables it.
Case (b) is not permitted for errata work arounds which requires some
work around, which cannot be delayed. And we ignore (b) for features.
Here, yet again, KPTI is an exception, where if a late CPU needs KPTI we
are too late to enable it (because we change the allocation of ASIDs
etc).
So this calls for a lot more fine grained behavior for each capability.
And if we define all the attributes to control their behavior properly,
we may be able to use a single table for the CPU hwcaps (which cover
errata and features, not the ELF HWCAPs). This is a prepartory step
to get there. More bits would be added for the properties listed above.
We are going to use a bit-mask to encode all the properties of a
capabilities. This patch encodes the "SCOPE" of the capability.
As such there is no change in how the capabilities are treated.
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-03-26 21:12:31 +07:00
|
|
|
#define HWCAP_CAP(reg, field, s, min_value, cap_type, cap) \
|
2015-10-19 20:24:52 +07:00
|
|
|
{ \
|
|
|
|
.desc = #cap, \
|
2018-03-26 21:12:32 +07:00
|
|
|
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, \
|
2015-10-19 20:24:52 +07:00
|
|
|
.matches = has_cpuid_feature, \
|
|
|
|
.sys_reg = reg, \
|
|
|
|
.field_pos = field, \
|
2016-01-26 17:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
.sign = s, \
|
2015-10-19 20:24:52 +07:00
|
|
|
.min_field_value = min_value, \
|
arm64: capabilities: Prepare for fine grained capabilities
We use arm64_cpu_capabilities to represent CPU ELF HWCAPs exposed
to the userspace and the CPU hwcaps used by the kernel, which
include cpu features and CPU errata work arounds. Capabilities
have some properties that decide how they should be treated :
1) Detection, i.e scope : A cap could be "detected" either :
- if it is present on at least one CPU (SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
Or
- if it is present on all the CPUs (SCOPE_SYSTEM)
2) When is it enabled ? - A cap is treated as "enabled" when the
system takes some action based on whether the capability is detected or
not. e.g, setting some control register, patching the kernel code.
Right now, we treat all caps are enabled at boot-time, after all
the CPUs are brought up by the kernel. But there are certain caps,
which are enabled early during the boot (e.g, VHE, GIC_CPUIF for NMI)
and kernel starts using them, even before the secondary CPUs are brought
up. We would need a way to describe this for each capability.
3) Conflict on a late CPU - When a CPU is brought up, it is checked
against the caps that are known to be enabled on the system (via
verify_local_cpu_capabilities()). Based on the state of the capability
on the CPU vs. that of System we could have the following combinations
of conflict.
x-----------------------------x
| Type | System | Late CPU |
------------------------------|
| a | y | n |
------------------------------|
| b | n | y |
x-----------------------------x
Case (a) is not permitted for caps which are system features, which the
system expects all the CPUs to have (e.g VHE). While (a) is ignored for
all errata work arounds. However, there could be exceptions to the plain
filtering approach. e.g, KPTI is an optional feature for a late CPU as
long as the system already enables it.
Case (b) is not permitted for errata work arounds which requires some
work around, which cannot be delayed. And we ignore (b) for features.
Here, yet again, KPTI is an exception, where if a late CPU needs KPTI we
are too late to enable it (because we change the allocation of ASIDs
etc).
So this calls for a lot more fine grained behavior for each capability.
And if we define all the attributes to control their behavior properly,
we may be able to use a single table for the CPU hwcaps (which cover
errata and features, not the ELF HWCAPs). This is a prepartory step
to get there. More bits would be added for the properties listed above.
We are going to use a bit-mask to encode all the properties of a
capabilities. This patch encodes the "SCOPE" of the capability.
As such there is no change in how the capabilities are treated.
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-03-26 21:12:31 +07:00
|
|
|
.hwcap_type = cap_type, \
|
2015-10-19 20:24:52 +07:00
|
|
|
.hwcap = cap, \
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-18 16:28:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_elf_hwcaps[] = {
|
2016-01-26 17:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_AES_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 2, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_PMULL),
|
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_AES_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_AES),
|
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA1_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SHA1),
|
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA2_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SHA2),
|
2017-10-11 20:01:02 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA2_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 2, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SHA512),
|
2016-01-26 17:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_CRC32_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_CRC32),
|
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_ATOMICS_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 2, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ATOMICS),
|
2017-01-12 23:37:28 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_RDM_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMDRDM),
|
2017-10-11 20:01:02 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SHA3_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SHA3),
|
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM3_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SM3),
|
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_SM4_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SM4),
|
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_DP_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMDDP),
|
2017-12-13 17:13:56 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_FHM_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMDFHM),
|
2018-03-12 17:04:14 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_TS_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_FLAGM),
|
2016-01-26 17:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 0, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_FP),
|
2016-01-26 22:52:46 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_FPHP),
|
2016-01-26 17:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 0, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMD),
|
2016-01-26 22:52:46 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ASIMDHP),
|
2018-03-12 17:04:14 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_DIT_SHIFT, FTR_SIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_DIT),
|
2017-07-25 17:55:40 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_DCPOP),
|
2017-03-15 01:13:25 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_JSCVT),
|
2017-03-15 01:13:26 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_FCMA),
|
2017-03-15 01:13:27 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR1_LRCPC_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_LRCPC),
|
2018-03-12 17:04:14 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR1_LRCPC_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 2, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_ILRCPC),
|
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1, ID_AA64MMFR2_AT_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_USCAT),
|
2017-10-31 22:51:19 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SVE
|
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, ID_AA64PFR0_SVE, CAP_HWCAP, HWCAP_SVE),
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2016-04-18 16:28:33 +07:00
|
|
|
{},
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities compat_elf_hwcaps[] = {
|
2015-10-19 20:24:52 +07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
2016-01-26 17:58:15 +07:00
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_ISAR5_EL1, ID_ISAR5_AES_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 2, CAP_COMPAT_HWCAP2, COMPAT_HWCAP2_PMULL),
|
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_ISAR5_EL1, ID_ISAR5_AES_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_COMPAT_HWCAP2, COMPAT_HWCAP2_AES),
|
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_ISAR5_EL1, ID_ISAR5_SHA1_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_COMPAT_HWCAP2, COMPAT_HWCAP2_SHA1),
|
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_ISAR5_EL1, ID_ISAR5_SHA2_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_COMPAT_HWCAP2, COMPAT_HWCAP2_SHA2),
|
|
|
|
HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_ISAR5_EL1, ID_ISAR5_CRC32_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, 1, CAP_COMPAT_HWCAP2, COMPAT_HWCAP2_CRC32),
|
2015-10-19 20:24:52 +07:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{},
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-18 16:28:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static void __init cap_set_elf_hwcap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap)
|
2015-10-19 20:24:52 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (cap->hwcap_type) {
|
|
|
|
case CAP_HWCAP:
|
|
|
|
elf_hwcap |= cap->hwcap;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
|
|
case CAP_COMPAT_HWCAP:
|
|
|
|
compat_elf_hwcap |= (u32)cap->hwcap;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CAP_COMPAT_HWCAP2:
|
|
|
|
compat_elf_hwcap2 |= (u32)cap->hwcap;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON(1);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check if we have a particular HWCAP enabled */
|
2016-04-18 16:28:32 +07:00
|
|
|
static bool cpus_have_elf_hwcap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap)
|
2015-10-19 20:24:52 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bool rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (cap->hwcap_type) {
|
|
|
|
case CAP_HWCAP:
|
|
|
|
rc = (elf_hwcap & cap->hwcap) != 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
|
|
case CAP_COMPAT_HWCAP:
|
|
|
|
rc = (compat_elf_hwcap & (u32)cap->hwcap) != 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CAP_COMPAT_HWCAP2:
|
|
|
|
rc = (compat_elf_hwcap2 & (u32)cap->hwcap) != 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON(1);
|
|
|
|
rc = false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-18 16:28:33 +07:00
|
|
|
static void __init setup_elf_hwcaps(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *hwcaps)
|
2015-10-19 20:24:52 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-01-10 00:28:31 +07:00
|
|
|
/* We support emulation of accesses to CPU ID feature registers */
|
|
|
|
elf_hwcap |= HWCAP_CPUID;
|
2016-04-18 16:28:33 +07:00
|
|
|
for (; hwcaps->matches; hwcaps++)
|
arm64: capabilities: Prepare for fine grained capabilities
We use arm64_cpu_capabilities to represent CPU ELF HWCAPs exposed
to the userspace and the CPU hwcaps used by the kernel, which
include cpu features and CPU errata work arounds. Capabilities
have some properties that decide how they should be treated :
1) Detection, i.e scope : A cap could be "detected" either :
- if it is present on at least one CPU (SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
Or
- if it is present on all the CPUs (SCOPE_SYSTEM)
2) When is it enabled ? - A cap is treated as "enabled" when the
system takes some action based on whether the capability is detected or
not. e.g, setting some control register, patching the kernel code.
Right now, we treat all caps are enabled at boot-time, after all
the CPUs are brought up by the kernel. But there are certain caps,
which are enabled early during the boot (e.g, VHE, GIC_CPUIF for NMI)
and kernel starts using them, even before the secondary CPUs are brought
up. We would need a way to describe this for each capability.
3) Conflict on a late CPU - When a CPU is brought up, it is checked
against the caps that are known to be enabled on the system (via
verify_local_cpu_capabilities()). Based on the state of the capability
on the CPU vs. that of System we could have the following combinations
of conflict.
x-----------------------------x
| Type | System | Late CPU |
------------------------------|
| a | y | n |
------------------------------|
| b | n | y |
x-----------------------------x
Case (a) is not permitted for caps which are system features, which the
system expects all the CPUs to have (e.g VHE). While (a) is ignored for
all errata work arounds. However, there could be exceptions to the plain
filtering approach. e.g, KPTI is an optional feature for a late CPU as
long as the system already enables it.
Case (b) is not permitted for errata work arounds which requires some
work around, which cannot be delayed. And we ignore (b) for features.
Here, yet again, KPTI is an exception, where if a late CPU needs KPTI we
are too late to enable it (because we change the allocation of ASIDs
etc).
So this calls for a lot more fine grained behavior for each capability.
And if we define all the attributes to control their behavior properly,
we may be able to use a single table for the CPU hwcaps (which cover
errata and features, not the ELF HWCAPs). This is a prepartory step
to get there. More bits would be added for the properties listed above.
We are going to use a bit-mask to encode all the properties of a
capabilities. This patch encodes the "SCOPE" of the capability.
As such there is no change in how the capabilities are treated.
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-03-26 21:12:31 +07:00
|
|
|
if (hwcaps->matches(hwcaps, cpucap_default_scope(hwcaps)))
|
2016-04-18 16:28:33 +07:00
|
|
|
cap_set_elf_hwcap(hwcaps);
|
2015-10-19 20:24:52 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-09 23:12:18 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check if the current CPU has a given feature capability.
|
|
|
|
* Should be called from non-preemptible context.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static bool __this_cpu_has_cap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap_array,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int cap)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(preemptible()))
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-16 02:38:54 +07:00
|
|
|
for (caps = cap_array; caps->matches; caps++)
|
arm64: capabilities: Handle shared entries
Some capabilities have different criteria for detection and associated
actions based on the matching criteria, even though they all share the
same capability bit. So far we have used multiple entries with the same
capability bit to handle this. This is prone to errors, as the
cpu_enable is invoked for each entry, irrespective of whether the
detection rule applies to the CPU or not. And also this complicates
other helpers, e.g, __this_cpu_has_cap.
This patch adds a wrapper entry to cover all the possible variations
of a capability by maintaining list of matches + cpu_enable callbacks.
To avoid complicating the prototypes for the "matches()", we use
arm64_cpu_capabilities maintain the list and we ignore all the other
fields except the matches & cpu_enable.
This ensures :
1) The capabilitiy is set when at least one of the entry detects
2) Action is only taken for the entries that "matches".
This avoids explicit checks in the cpu_enable() take some action.
The only constraint here is that, all the entries should have the
same "type" (i.e, scope and conflict rules).
If a cpu_enable() method is associated with multiple matches for a
single capability, care should be taken that either the match criteria
are mutually exclusive, or that the method is robust against being
called multiple times.
This also reverts the changes introduced by commit 67948af41f2e6818ed
("arm64: capabilities: Handle duplicate entries for a capability").
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-03-26 21:12:46 +07:00
|
|
|
if (caps->capability == cap)
|
|
|
|
return caps->matches(caps, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-09 23:12:18 +07:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:38 +07:00
|
|
|
static void __update_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps,
|
|
|
|
u16 scope_mask, const char *info)
|
2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-03-26 21:12:34 +07:00
|
|
|
scope_mask &= ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK;
|
2016-04-18 16:28:33 +07:00
|
|
|
for (; caps->matches; caps++) {
|
2018-03-26 21:12:34 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!(caps->type & scope_mask) ||
|
|
|
|
!caps->matches(caps, cpucap_default_scope(caps)))
|
2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-18 16:28:33 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!cpus_have_cap(caps->capability) && caps->desc)
|
|
|
|
pr_info("%s %s\n", info, caps->desc);
|
|
|
|
cpus_set_cap(caps->capability);
|
2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-19 20:24:49 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:38 +07:00
|
|
|
static void update_cpu_capabilities(u16 scope_mask)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
__update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, scope_mask, "detected:");
|
|
|
|
__update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, scope_mask,
|
|
|
|
"enabling workaround for");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:28 +07:00
|
|
|
static int __enable_cpu_capability(void *arg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap = arg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cap->cpu_enable(cap);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 20:24:49 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks
At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
safe value of a feature register.
NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
we should be able to handle that when needed.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
* Run through the enabled capabilities and enable() it on all active
|
|
|
|
* CPUs
|
2015-10-19 20:24:49 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-03-26 21:12:30 +07:00
|
|
|
static void __init
|
2018-03-26 21:12:38 +07:00
|
|
|
__enable_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps,
|
|
|
|
u16 scope_mask)
|
2015-10-19 20:24:49 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-03-26 21:12:34 +07:00
|
|
|
scope_mask &= ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK;
|
arm64/cpufeature: don't use mutex in bringup path
Currently, cpus_set_cap() calls static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(), which
must take the jump_label mutex.
We call cpus_set_cap() in the secondary bringup path, from the idle
thread where interrupts are disabled. Taking a mutex in this path "is a
NONO" regardless of whether it's contended, and something we must avoid.
We didn't spot this until recently, as ___might_sleep() won't warn for
this case until all CPUs have been brought up.
This patch avoids taking the mutex in the secondary bringup path. The
poking of static keys is deferred until enable_cpu_capabilities(), which
runs in a suitable context on the boot CPU. To account for the static
keys being set later, cpus_have_const_cap() is updated to use another
static key to check whether the const cap keys have been initialised,
falling back to the caps bitmap until this is the case.
This means that users of cpus_have_const_cap() gain should only gain a
single additional NOP in the fast path once the const caps are
initialised, but should always see the current cap value.
The hyp code should never dereference the caps array, since the caps are
initialized before we run the module initcall to initialise hyp. A check
is added to the hyp init code to document this requirement.
This change will sidestep a number of issues when the upcoming hotplug
locking rework is merged.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyniger <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Sewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2017-05-16 21:18:05 +07:00
|
|
|
for (; caps->matches; caps++) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned int num = caps->capability;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:34 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!(caps->type & scope_mask) || !cpus_have_cap(num))
|
arm64/cpufeature: don't use mutex in bringup path
Currently, cpus_set_cap() calls static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(), which
must take the jump_label mutex.
We call cpus_set_cap() in the secondary bringup path, from the idle
thread where interrupts are disabled. Taking a mutex in this path "is a
NONO" regardless of whether it's contended, and something we must avoid.
We didn't spot this until recently, as ___might_sleep() won't warn for
this case until all CPUs have been brought up.
This patch avoids taking the mutex in the secondary bringup path. The
poking of static keys is deferred until enable_cpu_capabilities(), which
runs in a suitable context on the boot CPU. To account for the static
keys being set later, cpus_have_const_cap() is updated to use another
static key to check whether the const cap keys have been initialised,
falling back to the caps bitmap until this is the case.
This means that users of cpus_have_const_cap() gain should only gain a
single additional NOP in the fast path once the const caps are
initialised, but should always see the current cap value.
The hyp code should never dereference the caps array, since the caps are
initialized before we run the module initcall to initialise hyp. A check
is added to the hyp init code to document this requirement.
This change will sidestep a number of issues when the upcoming hotplug
locking rework is merged.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyniger <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Sewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2017-05-16 21:18:05 +07:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure cpus_have_const_cap(num) works */
|
|
|
|
static_branch_enable(&cpu_hwcap_keys[num]);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:28 +07:00
|
|
|
if (caps->cpu_enable) {
|
2016-10-18 17:27:46 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2018-03-26 21:12:41 +07:00
|
|
|
* Capabilities with SCOPE_BOOT_CPU scope are finalised
|
|
|
|
* before any secondary CPU boots. Thus, each secondary
|
|
|
|
* will enable the capability as appropriate via
|
|
|
|
* check_local_cpu_capabilities(). The only exception is
|
|
|
|
* the boot CPU, for which the capability must be
|
|
|
|
* enabled here. This approach avoids costly
|
|
|
|
* stop_machine() calls for this case.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Otherwise, use stop_machine() as it schedules the
|
|
|
|
* work allowing us to modify PSTATE, instead of
|
|
|
|
* on_each_cpu() which uses an IPI, giving us a PSTATE
|
|
|
|
* that disappears when we return.
|
2016-10-18 17:27:46 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-03-26 21:12:41 +07:00
|
|
|
if (scope_mask & SCOPE_BOOT_CPU)
|
|
|
|
caps->cpu_enable(caps);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
stop_machine(__enable_cpu_capability,
|
|
|
|
(void *)caps, cpu_online_mask);
|
arm64/cpufeature: don't use mutex in bringup path
Currently, cpus_set_cap() calls static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(), which
must take the jump_label mutex.
We call cpus_set_cap() in the secondary bringup path, from the idle
thread where interrupts are disabled. Taking a mutex in this path "is a
NONO" regardless of whether it's contended, and something we must avoid.
We didn't spot this until recently, as ___might_sleep() won't warn for
this case until all CPUs have been brought up.
This patch avoids taking the mutex in the secondary bringup path. The
poking of static keys is deferred until enable_cpu_capabilities(), which
runs in a suitable context on the boot CPU. To account for the static
keys being set later, cpus_have_const_cap() is updated to use another
static key to check whether the const cap keys have been initialised,
falling back to the caps bitmap until this is the case.
This means that users of cpus_have_const_cap() gain should only gain a
single additional NOP in the fast path once the const caps are
initialised, but should always see the current cap value.
The hyp code should never dereference the caps array, since the caps are
initialized before we run the module initcall to initialise hyp. A check
is added to the hyp init code to document this requirement.
This change will sidestep a number of issues when the upcoming hotplug
locking rework is merged.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyniger <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Sewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2017-05-16 21:18:05 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks
At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
safe value of a feature register.
NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
we should be able to handle that when needed.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:38 +07:00
|
|
|
static void __init enable_cpu_capabilities(u16 scope_mask)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
__enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_features, scope_mask);
|
|
|
|
__enable_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, scope_mask);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:33 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Run through the list of capabilities to check for conflicts.
|
|
|
|
* If the system has already detected a capability, take necessary
|
|
|
|
* action on this CPU.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns "false" on conflicts.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
arm64: capabilities: Handle shared entries
Some capabilities have different criteria for detection and associated
actions based on the matching criteria, even though they all share the
same capability bit. So far we have used multiple entries with the same
capability bit to handle this. This is prone to errors, as the
cpu_enable is invoked for each entry, irrespective of whether the
detection rule applies to the CPU or not. And also this complicates
other helpers, e.g, __this_cpu_has_cap.
This patch adds a wrapper entry to cover all the possible variations
of a capability by maintaining list of matches + cpu_enable callbacks.
To avoid complicating the prototypes for the "matches()", we use
arm64_cpu_capabilities maintain the list and we ignore all the other
fields except the matches & cpu_enable.
This ensures :
1) The capabilitiy is set when at least one of the entry detects
2) Action is only taken for the entries that "matches".
This avoids explicit checks in the cpu_enable() take some action.
The only constraint here is that, all the entries should have the
same "type" (i.e, scope and conflict rules).
If a cpu_enable() method is associated with multiple matches for a
single capability, care should be taken that either the match criteria
are mutually exclusive, or that the method is robust against being
called multiple times.
This also reverts the changes introduced by commit 67948af41f2e6818ed
("arm64: capabilities: Handle duplicate entries for a capability").
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-03-26 21:12:46 +07:00
|
|
|
__verify_local_cpu_caps(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps,
|
2018-03-26 21:12:34 +07:00
|
|
|
u16 scope_mask)
|
2018-03-26 21:12:33 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bool cpu_has_cap, system_has_cap;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:34 +07:00
|
|
|
scope_mask &= ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
|
arm64: capabilities: Handle shared entries
Some capabilities have different criteria for detection and associated
actions based on the matching criteria, even though they all share the
same capability bit. So far we have used multiple entries with the same
capability bit to handle this. This is prone to errors, as the
cpu_enable is invoked for each entry, irrespective of whether the
detection rule applies to the CPU or not. And also this complicates
other helpers, e.g, __this_cpu_has_cap.
This patch adds a wrapper entry to cover all the possible variations
of a capability by maintaining list of matches + cpu_enable callbacks.
To avoid complicating the prototypes for the "matches()", we use
arm64_cpu_capabilities maintain the list and we ignore all the other
fields except the matches & cpu_enable.
This ensures :
1) The capabilitiy is set when at least one of the entry detects
2) Action is only taken for the entries that "matches".
This avoids explicit checks in the cpu_enable() take some action.
The only constraint here is that, all the entries should have the
same "type" (i.e, scope and conflict rules).
If a cpu_enable() method is associated with multiple matches for a
single capability, care should be taken that either the match criteria
are mutually exclusive, or that the method is robust against being
called multiple times.
This also reverts the changes introduced by commit 67948af41f2e6818ed
("arm64: capabilities: Handle duplicate entries for a capability").
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-03-26 21:12:46 +07:00
|
|
|
for (; caps->matches; caps++) {
|
2018-03-26 21:12:34 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!(caps->type & scope_mask))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
arm64: capabilities: Handle shared entries
Some capabilities have different criteria for detection and associated
actions based on the matching criteria, even though they all share the
same capability bit. So far we have used multiple entries with the same
capability bit to handle this. This is prone to errors, as the
cpu_enable is invoked for each entry, irrespective of whether the
detection rule applies to the CPU or not. And also this complicates
other helpers, e.g, __this_cpu_has_cap.
This patch adds a wrapper entry to cover all the possible variations
of a capability by maintaining list of matches + cpu_enable callbacks.
To avoid complicating the prototypes for the "matches()", we use
arm64_cpu_capabilities maintain the list and we ignore all the other
fields except the matches & cpu_enable.
This ensures :
1) The capabilitiy is set when at least one of the entry detects
2) Action is only taken for the entries that "matches".
This avoids explicit checks in the cpu_enable() take some action.
The only constraint here is that, all the entries should have the
same "type" (i.e, scope and conflict rules).
If a cpu_enable() method is associated with multiple matches for a
single capability, care should be taken that either the match criteria
are mutually exclusive, or that the method is robust against being
called multiple times.
This also reverts the changes introduced by commit 67948af41f2e6818ed
("arm64: capabilities: Handle duplicate entries for a capability").
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-03-26 21:12:46 +07:00
|
|
|
cpu_has_cap = caps->matches(caps, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU);
|
2018-03-26 21:12:33 +07:00
|
|
|
system_has_cap = cpus_have_cap(caps->capability);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (system_has_cap) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check if the new CPU misses an advertised feature,
|
|
|
|
* which is not safe to miss.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!cpu_has_cap && !cpucap_late_cpu_optional(caps))
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We have to issue cpu_enable() irrespective of
|
|
|
|
* whether the CPU has it or not, as it is enabeld
|
|
|
|
* system wide. It is upto the call back to take
|
|
|
|
* appropriate action on this CPU.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (caps->cpu_enable)
|
|
|
|
caps->cpu_enable(caps);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check if the CPU has this capability if it isn't
|
|
|
|
* safe to have when the system doesn't.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (cpu_has_cap && !cpucap_late_cpu_permitted(caps))
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (caps->matches) {
|
|
|
|
pr_crit("CPU%d: Detected conflict for capability %d (%s), System: %d, CPU: %d\n",
|
|
|
|
smp_processor_id(), caps->capability,
|
|
|
|
caps->desc, system_has_cap, cpu_has_cap);
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:38 +07:00
|
|
|
static bool verify_local_cpu_caps(u16 scope_mask)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return __verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_errata, scope_mask) &&
|
|
|
|
__verify_local_cpu_caps(arm64_features, scope_mask);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks
At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
safe value of a feature register.
NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
we should be able to handle that when needed.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2016-02-23 17:31:45 +07:00
|
|
|
* Check for CPU features that are used in early boot
|
|
|
|
* based on the Boot CPU value.
|
arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks
At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
safe value of a feature register.
NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
we should be able to handle that when needed.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-02-23 17:31:45 +07:00
|
|
|
static void check_early_cpu_features(void)
|
arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks
At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
safe value of a feature register.
NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
we should be able to handle that when needed.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-02-23 17:31:45 +07:00
|
|
|
verify_cpu_asid_bits();
|
2018-03-26 21:12:41 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Early features are used by the kernel already. If there
|
|
|
|
* is a conflict, we cannot proceed further.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!verify_local_cpu_caps(SCOPE_BOOT_CPU))
|
|
|
|
cpu_panic_kernel();
|
arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks
At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
safe value of a feature register.
NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
we should be able to handle that when needed.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-07-21 19:23:28 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-18 16:28:33 +07:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
verify_local_elf_hwcaps(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
|
|
|
for (; caps->matches; caps++)
|
|
|
|
if (cpus_have_elf_hwcap(caps) && !caps->matches(caps, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
|
2016-04-18 16:28:33 +07:00
|
|
|
pr_crit("CPU%d: missing HWCAP: %s\n",
|
|
|
|
smp_processor_id(), caps->desc);
|
|
|
|
cpu_die_early();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-31 22:51:10 +07:00
|
|
|
static void verify_sve_features(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u64 safe_zcr = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ZCR_EL1);
|
|
|
|
u64 zcr = read_zcr_features();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int safe_len = safe_zcr & ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int len = zcr & ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len < safe_len || sve_verify_vq_map()) {
|
|
|
|
pr_crit("CPU%d: SVE: required vector length(s) missing\n",
|
|
|
|
smp_processor_id());
|
|
|
|
cpu_die_early();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Add checks on other ZCR bits here if necessary */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:30 +07:00
|
|
|
|
arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks
At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
safe value of a feature register.
NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
we should be able to handle that when needed.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Run through the enabled system capabilities and enable() it on this CPU.
|
|
|
|
* The capabilities were decided based on the available CPUs at the boot time.
|
|
|
|
* Any new CPU should match the system wide status of the capability. If the
|
|
|
|
* new CPU doesn't have a capability which the system now has enabled, we
|
|
|
|
* cannot do anything to fix it up and could cause unexpected failures. So
|
|
|
|
* we park the CPU.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-09-09 20:07:10 +07:00
|
|
|
static void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void)
|
arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks
At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
safe value of a feature register.
NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
we should be able to handle that when needed.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-03-26 21:12:41 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The capabilities with SCOPE_BOOT_CPU are checked from
|
|
|
|
* check_early_cpu_features(), as they need to be verified
|
|
|
|
* on all secondary CPUs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!verify_local_cpu_caps(SCOPE_ALL & ~SCOPE_BOOT_CPU))
|
2018-03-26 21:12:35 +07:00
|
|
|
cpu_die_early();
|
2018-03-26 21:12:38 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-09-09 20:07:10 +07:00
|
|
|
verify_local_elf_hwcaps(arm64_elf_hwcaps);
|
2017-10-31 22:51:10 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-09-09 20:07:10 +07:00
|
|
|
if (system_supports_32bit_el0())
|
|
|
|
verify_local_elf_hwcaps(compat_elf_hwcaps);
|
2017-10-31 22:51:10 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (system_supports_sve())
|
|
|
|
verify_sve_features();
|
2016-09-09 20:07:10 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks
At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
safe value of a feature register.
NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
we should be able to handle that when needed.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2016-09-09 20:07:10 +07:00
|
|
|
void check_local_cpu_capabilities(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* All secondary CPUs should conform to the early CPU features
|
|
|
|
* in use by the kernel based on boot CPU.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-02-23 17:31:45 +07:00
|
|
|
check_early_cpu_features();
|
|
|
|
|
arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks
At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
safe value of a feature register.
NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
we should be able to handle that when needed.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2016-09-09 20:07:10 +07:00
|
|
|
* If we haven't finalised the system capabilities, this CPU gets
|
2018-03-26 21:12:37 +07:00
|
|
|
* a chance to update the errata work arounds and local features.
|
2016-09-09 20:07:10 +07:00
|
|
|
* Otherwise, this CPU should verify that it has all the system
|
|
|
|
* advertised capabilities.
|
arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks
At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
safe value of a feature register.
NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
we should be able to handle that when needed.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-03-26 21:12:38 +07:00
|
|
|
if (!sys_caps_initialised)
|
|
|
|
update_cpu_capabilities(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU);
|
|
|
|
else
|
2016-09-09 20:07:10 +07:00
|
|
|
verify_local_cpu_capabilities();
|
2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:41 +07:00
|
|
|
static void __init setup_boot_cpu_capabilities(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Detect capabilities with either SCOPE_BOOT_CPU or SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU */
|
|
|
|
update_cpu_capabilities(SCOPE_BOOT_CPU | SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU);
|
|
|
|
/* Enable the SCOPE_BOOT_CPU capabilities alone right away */
|
|
|
|
enable_cpu_capabilities(SCOPE_BOOT_CPU);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
arm64/cpufeature: don't use mutex in bringup path
Currently, cpus_set_cap() calls static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(), which
must take the jump_label mutex.
We call cpus_set_cap() in the secondary bringup path, from the idle
thread where interrupts are disabled. Taking a mutex in this path "is a
NONO" regardless of whether it's contended, and something we must avoid.
We didn't spot this until recently, as ___might_sleep() won't warn for
this case until all CPUs have been brought up.
This patch avoids taking the mutex in the secondary bringup path. The
poking of static keys is deferred until enable_cpu_capabilities(), which
runs in a suitable context on the boot CPU. To account for the static
keys being set later, cpus_have_const_cap() is updated to use another
static key to check whether the const cap keys have been initialised,
falling back to the caps bitmap until this is the case.
This means that users of cpus_have_const_cap() gain should only gain a
single additional NOP in the fast path once the const caps are
initialised, but should always see the current cap value.
The hyp code should never dereference the caps array, since the caps are
initialized before we run the module initcall to initialise hyp. A check
is added to the hyp init code to document this requirement.
This change will sidestep a number of issues when the upcoming hotplug
locking rework is merged.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyniger <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Sewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2017-05-16 21:18:05 +07:00
|
|
|
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(arm64_const_caps_ready);
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(arm64_const_caps_ready);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void __init mark_const_caps_ready(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static_branch_enable(&arm64_const_caps_ready);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-30 22:39:52 +07:00
|
|
|
extern const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool this_cpu_has_cap(unsigned int cap)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (__this_cpu_has_cap(arm64_features, cap) ||
|
|
|
|
__this_cpu_has_cap(arm64_errata, cap));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:38 +07:00
|
|
|
static void __init setup_system_capabilities(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We have finalised the system-wide safe feature
|
|
|
|
* registers, finalise the capabilities that depend
|
2018-03-26 21:12:41 +07:00
|
|
|
* on it. Also enable all the available capabilities,
|
|
|
|
* that are not enabled already.
|
2018-03-26 21:12:38 +07:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
update_cpu_capabilities(SCOPE_SYSTEM);
|
2018-03-26 21:12:41 +07:00
|
|
|
enable_cpu_capabilities(SCOPE_ALL & ~SCOPE_BOOT_CPU);
|
2018-03-26 21:12:38 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 20:24:41 +07:00
|
|
|
void __init setup_cpu_features(void)
|
2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-10-19 20:24:41 +07:00
|
|
|
u32 cwg;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:38 +07:00
|
|
|
setup_system_capabilities();
|
arm64/cpufeature: don't use mutex in bringup path
Currently, cpus_set_cap() calls static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(), which
must take the jump_label mutex.
We call cpus_set_cap() in the secondary bringup path, from the idle
thread where interrupts are disabled. Taking a mutex in this path "is a
NONO" regardless of whether it's contended, and something we must avoid.
We didn't spot this until recently, as ___might_sleep() won't warn for
this case until all CPUs have been brought up.
This patch avoids taking the mutex in the secondary bringup path. The
poking of static keys is deferred until enable_cpu_capabilities(), which
runs in a suitable context on the boot CPU. To account for the static
keys being set later, cpus_have_const_cap() is updated to use another
static key to check whether the const cap keys have been initialised,
falling back to the caps bitmap until this is the case.
This means that users of cpus_have_const_cap() gain should only gain a
single additional NOP in the fast path once the const caps are
initialised, but should always see the current cap value.
The hyp code should never dereference the caps array, since the caps are
initialized before we run the module initcall to initialise hyp. A check
is added to the hyp init code to document this requirement.
This change will sidestep a number of issues when the upcoming hotplug
locking rework is merged.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyniger <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Sewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2017-05-16 21:18:05 +07:00
|
|
|
mark_const_caps_ready();
|
2016-04-18 16:28:33 +07:00
|
|
|
setup_elf_hwcaps(arm64_elf_hwcaps);
|
2016-04-18 16:28:37 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (system_supports_32bit_el0())
|
|
|
|
setup_elf_hwcaps(compat_elf_hwcaps);
|
arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks
At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
safe value of a feature register.
NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
we should be able to handle that when needed.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2018-02-22 01:18:21 +07:00
|
|
|
if (system_uses_ttbr0_pan())
|
|
|
|
pr_info("emulated: Privileged Access Never (PAN) using TTBR0_EL1 switching\n");
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-31 22:51:10 +07:00
|
|
|
sve_setup();
|
arm64: signal: Report signal frame size to userspace via auxv
Stateful CPU architecture extensions may require the signal frame
to grow to a size that exceeds the arch's MINSIGSTKSZ #define.
However, changing this #define is an ABI break.
To allow userspace the option of determining the signal frame size
in a more forwards-compatible way, this patch adds a new auxv entry
tagged with AT_MINSIGSTKSZ, which provides the maximum signal frame
size that the process can observe during its lifetime.
If AT_MINSIGSTKSZ is absent from the aux vector, the caller can
assume that the MINSIGSTKSZ #define is sufficient. This allows for
a consistent interface with older kernels that do not provide
AT_MINSIGSTKSZ.
The idea is that libc could expose this via sysconf() or some
similar mechanism.
There is deliberately no AT_SIGSTKSZ. The kernel knows nothing
about userspace's own stack overheads and should not pretend to
know.
For arm64:
The primary motivation for this interface is the Scalable Vector
Extension, which can require at least 4KB or so of extra space
in the signal frame for the largest hardware implementations.
To determine the correct value, a "Christmas tree" mode (via the
add_all argument) is added to setup_sigframe_layout(), to simulate
addition of all possible records to the signal frame at maximum
possible size.
If this procedure goes wrong somehow, resulting in a stupidly large
frame layout and hence failure of sigframe_alloc() to allocate a
record to the frame, then this is indicative of a kernel bug. In
this case, we WARN() and no attempt is made to populate
AT_MINSIGSTKSZ for userspace.
For arm64 SVE:
The SVE context block in the signal frame needs to be considered
too when computing the maximum possible signal frame size.
Because the size of this block depends on the vector length, this
patch computes the size based not on the thread's current vector
length but instead on the maximum possible vector length: this
determines the maximum size of SVE context block that can be
observed in any signal frame for the lifetime of the process.
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2018-06-01 17:10:14 +07:00
|
|
|
minsigstksz_setup();
|
2017-10-31 22:51:10 +07:00
|
|
|
|
arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks
At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
safe value of a feature register.
NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
we should be able to handle that when needed.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2015-10-19 20:24:50 +07:00
|
|
|
/* Advertise that we have computed the system capabilities */
|
|
|
|
set_sys_caps_initialised();
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 20:24:41 +07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check for sane CTR_EL0.CWG value.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
cwg = cache_type_cwg();
|
|
|
|
if (!cwg)
|
2018-05-11 19:33:12 +07:00
|
|
|
pr_warn("No Cache Writeback Granule information, assuming %d\n",
|
|
|
|
ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN);
|
2015-03-27 20:09:23 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-02-05 21:58:50 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool __maybe_unused
|
2016-04-22 18:25:31 +07:00
|
|
|
cpufeature_pan_not_uao(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int __unused)
|
2016-02-05 21:58:50 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-11-08 20:56:20 +07:00
|
|
|
return (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_PAN) && !cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_UAO));
|
2016-02-05 21:58:50 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-01-10 00:28:31 +07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We emulate only the following system register space.
|
|
|
|
* Op0 = 0x3, CRn = 0x0, Op1 = 0x0, CRm = [0, 4 - 7]
|
|
|
|
* See Table C5-6 System instruction encodings for System register accesses,
|
|
|
|
* ARMv8 ARM(ARM DDI 0487A.f) for more details.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline bool __attribute_const__ is_emulated(u32 id)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (sys_reg_Op0(id) == 0x3 &&
|
|
|
|
sys_reg_CRn(id) == 0x0 &&
|
|
|
|
sys_reg_Op1(id) == 0x0 &&
|
|
|
|
(sys_reg_CRm(id) == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
((sys_reg_CRm(id) >= 4) && (sys_reg_CRm(id) <= 7))));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* With CRm == 0, reg should be one of :
|
|
|
|
* MIDR_EL1, MPIDR_EL1 or REVIDR_EL1.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline int emulate_id_reg(u32 id, u64 *valp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (id) {
|
|
|
|
case SYS_MIDR_EL1:
|
|
|
|
*valp = read_cpuid_id();
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SYS_MPIDR_EL1:
|
|
|
|
*valp = SYS_MPIDR_SAFE_VAL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SYS_REVIDR_EL1:
|
|
|
|
/* IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED values are emulated with 0 */
|
|
|
|
*valp = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int emulate_sys_reg(u32 id, u64 *valp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct arm64_ftr_reg *regp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!is_emulated(id))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (sys_reg_CRm(id) == 0)
|
|
|
|
return emulate_id_reg(id, valp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
regp = get_arm64_ftr_reg(id);
|
|
|
|
if (regp)
|
|
|
|
*valp = arm64_ftr_reg_user_value(regp);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The untracked registers are either IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED
|
|
|
|
* (e.g, ID_AFR0_EL1) or reserved RAZ.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
*valp = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int emulate_mrs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 insn)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
u32 sys_reg, dst;
|
|
|
|
u64 val;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* sys_reg values are defined as used in mrs/msr instruction.
|
|
|
|
* shift the imm value to get the encoding.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
sys_reg = (u32)aarch64_insn_decode_immediate(AARCH64_INSN_IMM_16, insn) << 5;
|
|
|
|
rc = emulate_sys_reg(sys_reg, &val);
|
|
|
|
if (!rc) {
|
|
|
|
dst = aarch64_insn_decode_register(AARCH64_INSN_REGTYPE_RT, insn);
|
2017-02-09 22:19:20 +07:00
|
|
|
pt_regs_write_reg(regs, dst, val);
|
2017-10-25 16:04:33 +07:00
|
|
|
arm64_skip_faulting_instruction(regs, AARCH64_INSN_SIZE);
|
2017-01-10 00:28:31 +07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct undef_hook mrs_hook = {
|
|
|
|
.instr_mask = 0xfff00000,
|
|
|
|
.instr_val = 0xd5300000,
|
|
|
|
.pstate_mask = COMPAT_PSR_MODE_MASK,
|
|
|
|
.pstate_val = PSR_MODE_EL0t,
|
|
|
|
.fn = emulate_mrs,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init enable_mrs_emulation(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
register_undef_hook(&mrs_hook);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-06 20:16:52 +07:00
|
|
|
core_initcall(enable_mrs_emulation);
|
2018-01-16 02:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 21:12:28 +07:00
|
|
|
void cpu_clear_disr(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
|
2018-01-16 02:38:59 +07:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Firmware may have left a deferred SError in this register. */
|
|
|
|
write_sysreg_s(0, SYS_DISR_EL1);
|
|
|
|
}
|