linux_dsm_epyc7002/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_decl.h

181 lines
5.0 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* Declarations of procedures and variables shared between files
* in arch/ppc/mm/.
*
* Derived from arch/ppc/mm/init.c:
* Copyright (C) 1995-1996 Gary Thomas (gdt@linuxppc.org)
*
* Modifications by Paul Mackerras (PowerMac) (paulus@cs.anu.edu.au)
* and Cort Dougan (PReP) (cort@cs.nmt.edu)
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
*
* Derived from "arch/i386/mm/init.c"
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 Linus Torvalds
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
*/
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <asm/mmu.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_MMU_NOHASH
#include <asm/trace.h>
/*
* On 40x and 8xx, we directly inline tlbia and tlbivax
*/
#if defined(CONFIG_40x) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_8xx)
static inline void _tlbil_all(void)
{
asm volatile ("sync; tlbia; isync" : : : "memory");
trace_tlbia(MMU_NO_CONTEXT);
}
static inline void _tlbil_pid(unsigned int pid)
{
asm volatile ("sync; tlbia; isync" : : : "memory");
trace_tlbia(pid);
}
#define _tlbil_pid_noind(pid) _tlbil_pid(pid)
#else /* CONFIG_40x || CONFIG_PPC_8xx */
extern void _tlbil_all(void);
extern void _tlbil_pid(unsigned int pid);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E
extern void _tlbil_pid_noind(unsigned int pid);
#else
#define _tlbil_pid_noind(pid) _tlbil_pid(pid)
#endif
#endif /* !(CONFIG_40x || CONFIG_PPC_8xx) */
/*
* On 8xx, we directly inline tlbie, on others, it's extern
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_8xx
static inline void _tlbil_va(unsigned long address, unsigned int pid,
unsigned int tsize, unsigned int ind)
{
asm volatile ("tlbie %0; sync" : : "r" (address) : "memory");
trace_tlbie(0, 0, address, pid, 0, 0, 0);
}
#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E)
extern void _tlbil_va(unsigned long address, unsigned int pid,
unsigned int tsize, unsigned int ind);
#else
extern void __tlbil_va(unsigned long address, unsigned int pid);
static inline void _tlbil_va(unsigned long address, unsigned int pid,
unsigned int tsize, unsigned int ind)
{
__tlbil_va(address, pid);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_8xx */
#if defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_47x)
extern void _tlbivax_bcast(unsigned long address, unsigned int pid,
unsigned int tsize, unsigned int ind);
#else
static inline void _tlbivax_bcast(unsigned long address, unsigned int pid,
unsigned int tsize, unsigned int ind)
{
BUG();
}
#endif
static inline void print_system_hash_info(void) {}
#else /* CONFIG_PPC_MMU_NOHASH */
extern void hash_preload(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
bool is_exec, unsigned long trap);
extern void _tlbie(unsigned long address);
extern void _tlbia(void);
void print_system_hash_info(void);
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_MMU_NOHASH */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC32
extern void mapin_ram(void);
extern void setbat(int index, unsigned long virt, phys_addr_t phys,
unsigned int size, pgprot_t prot);
extern int __map_without_bats;
extern unsigned int rtas_data, rtas_size;
struct hash_pte;
extern struct hash_pte *Hash;
extern u8 early_hash[];
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC32 */
extern unsigned long ioremap_bot;
extern unsigned long __max_low_memory;
extern phys_addr_t __initial_memory_limit_addr;
extern phys_addr_t total_memory;
extern phys_addr_t total_lowmem;
extern phys_addr_t memstart_addr;
extern phys_addr_t lowmem_end_addr;
#ifdef CONFIG_WII
extern unsigned long wii_hole_start;
extern unsigned long wii_hole_size;
extern unsigned long wii_mmu_mapin_mem2(unsigned long top);
extern void wii_memory_fixups(void);
#endif
/* ...and now those things that may be slightly different between processor
* architectures. -- Dan
*/
2016-02-09 23:07:50 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC32
extern void MMU_init_hw(void);
void MMU_init_hw_patch(void);
unsigned long mmu_mapin_ram(unsigned long base, unsigned long top);
2016-02-09 23:07:50 +07:00
#endif
2016-02-09 23:07:50 +07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E
extern unsigned long map_mem_in_cams(unsigned long ram, int max_cam_idx,
bool dryrun);
extern unsigned long calc_cam_sz(unsigned long ram, unsigned long virt,
phys_addr_t phys);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC32
extern void adjust_total_lowmem(void);
extern int switch_to_as1(void);
extern void restore_to_as0(int esel, int offset, void *dt_ptr, int bootcpu);
#endif
extern void loadcam_entry(unsigned int index);
extern void loadcam_multi(int first_idx, int num, int tmp_idx);
struct tlbcam {
u32 MAS0;
u32 MAS1;
unsigned long MAS2;
u32 MAS3;
u32 MAS7;
};
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_32) || defined(CONFIG_FSL_BOOKE) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_8xx)
/* 6xx have BATS */
/* FSL_BOOKE have TLBCAM */
/* 8xx have LTLB */
phys_addr_t v_block_mapped(unsigned long va);
unsigned long p_block_mapped(phys_addr_t pa);
#else
static inline phys_addr_t v_block_mapped(unsigned long va) { return 0; }
static inline unsigned long p_block_mapped(phys_addr_t pa) { return 0; }
#endif
powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Today, STRICT_KERNEL_RWX is based on the use of regular pages to map kernel pages. On Book3s 32, it has three consequences: - Using pages instead of BAT for mapping kernel linear memory severely impacts performance. - Exec protection is not effective because no-execute cannot be set at page level (except on 603 which doesn't have hash tables) - Write protection is not effective because PP bits do not provide RO mode for kernel-only pages (except on 603 which handles it in software via PAGE_DIRTY) On the 603+, we have: - Independent IBAT and DBAT allowing limitation of exec parts. - NX bit can be set in segment registers to forbit execution on memory mapped by pages. - RO mode on DBATs even for kernel-only blocks. On the 601, there is nothing much we can do other than warn the user about it, because: - BATs are common to instructions and data. - BAT do not provide RO mode for kernel-only blocks. - segment registers don't have the NX bit. In order to use IBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns _etext to BAT block sizes (128kb) - Set NX bit in kernel segment register (Except on vmalloc area when CONFIG_MODULES is selected) - Maps kernel text with IBATs. In order to use DBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns RW DATA to BAT block sizes (4M) - Maps kernel RO area with write prohibited DBATs - Maps remaining memory with remaining DBATs Here is what we get with this patch on a 832x when activating STRICT_KERNEL_RWX: Symbols: c0000000 T _stext c0680000 R __start_rodata c0680000 R _etext c0800000 T __init_begin c0800000 T _sinittext ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/block_address_translation ---[ Instruction Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc03fffff 0x00000000 Kernel EXEC coherent 1: 0xc0400000-0xc05fffff 0x00400000 Kernel EXEC coherent 2: 0xc0600000-0xc067ffff 0x00600000 Kernel EXEC coherent 3: - 4: - 5: - 6: - 7: - ---[ Data Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0ffffff 0x00800000 Kernel RW coherent 2: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: - ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/segment_registers ---[ User Segments ]--- 0x00000000-0x0fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa085d0 0x10000000-0x1fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa086e1 0x20000000-0x2fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa087f2 0x30000000-0x3fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08903 0x40000000-0x4fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08a14 0x50000000-0x5fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08b25 0x60000000-0x6fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08c36 0x70000000-0x7fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08d47 0x80000000-0x8fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08e58 0x90000000-0x9fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08f69 0xa0000000-0xafffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0907a 0xb0000000-0xbfffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0918b ---[ Kernel Segments ]--- 0xc0000000-0xcfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ccc 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ddd 0xe0000000-0xefffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000eee 0xf0000000-0xffffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000fff Aligning _etext to 128kb allows to map up to 32Mb text with 8 IBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 2Mb + 1Mb + 512kb + 256kb + 128kb (+ 128kb) = 32Mb (A 9th IBAT is unneeded as 32Mb would need only a single 32Mb block) Aligning data to 4M allows to map up to 512Mb data with 8 DBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 4Mb + 32Mb + 64Mb + 128Mb + 256Mb = 512Mb Because some processors only have 4 BATs and because some targets need DBATs for mapping other areas, the following patch will allow to modify _etext and data alignment. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-02-22 02:08:49 +07:00
#if defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_32) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_8xx)
powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Today, STRICT_KERNEL_RWX is based on the use of regular pages to map kernel pages. On Book3s 32, it has three consequences: - Using pages instead of BAT for mapping kernel linear memory severely impacts performance. - Exec protection is not effective because no-execute cannot be set at page level (except on 603 which doesn't have hash tables) - Write protection is not effective because PP bits do not provide RO mode for kernel-only pages (except on 603 which handles it in software via PAGE_DIRTY) On the 603+, we have: - Independent IBAT and DBAT allowing limitation of exec parts. - NX bit can be set in segment registers to forbit execution on memory mapped by pages. - RO mode on DBATs even for kernel-only blocks. On the 601, there is nothing much we can do other than warn the user about it, because: - BATs are common to instructions and data. - BAT do not provide RO mode for kernel-only blocks. - segment registers don't have the NX bit. In order to use IBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns _etext to BAT block sizes (128kb) - Set NX bit in kernel segment register (Except on vmalloc area when CONFIG_MODULES is selected) - Maps kernel text with IBATs. In order to use DBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns RW DATA to BAT block sizes (4M) - Maps kernel RO area with write prohibited DBATs - Maps remaining memory with remaining DBATs Here is what we get with this patch on a 832x when activating STRICT_KERNEL_RWX: Symbols: c0000000 T _stext c0680000 R __start_rodata c0680000 R _etext c0800000 T __init_begin c0800000 T _sinittext ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/block_address_translation ---[ Instruction Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc03fffff 0x00000000 Kernel EXEC coherent 1: 0xc0400000-0xc05fffff 0x00400000 Kernel EXEC coherent 2: 0xc0600000-0xc067ffff 0x00600000 Kernel EXEC coherent 3: - 4: - 5: - 6: - 7: - ---[ Data Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0ffffff 0x00800000 Kernel RW coherent 2: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: - ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/segment_registers ---[ User Segments ]--- 0x00000000-0x0fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa085d0 0x10000000-0x1fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa086e1 0x20000000-0x2fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa087f2 0x30000000-0x3fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08903 0x40000000-0x4fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08a14 0x50000000-0x5fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08b25 0x60000000-0x6fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08c36 0x70000000-0x7fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08d47 0x80000000-0x8fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08e58 0x90000000-0x9fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08f69 0xa0000000-0xafffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0907a 0xb0000000-0xbfffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0918b ---[ Kernel Segments ]--- 0xc0000000-0xcfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ccc 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ddd 0xe0000000-0xefffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000eee 0xf0000000-0xffffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000fff Aligning _etext to 128kb allows to map up to 32Mb text with 8 IBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 2Mb + 1Mb + 512kb + 256kb + 128kb (+ 128kb) = 32Mb (A 9th IBAT is unneeded as 32Mb would need only a single 32Mb block) Aligning data to 4M allows to map up to 512Mb data with 8 DBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 4Mb + 32Mb + 64Mb + 128Mb + 256Mb = 512Mb Because some processors only have 4 BATs and because some targets need DBATs for mapping other areas, the following patch will allow to modify _etext and data alignment. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-02-22 02:08:49 +07:00
void mmu_mark_initmem_nx(void);
void mmu_mark_rodata_ro(void);
#else
static inline void mmu_mark_initmem_nx(void) { }
static inline void mmu_mark_rodata_ro(void) { }
#endif