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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-27 13:55:23 +07:00
7d8b6c6375
This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565
plus fixing it a different way...
We found, when trying to run an application from an application which
had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined
capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those
undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status.
Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4
capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set
eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps
less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are
undefined future capabilities.
The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a
time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl()
we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task
which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all
things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits
higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.
So the 'parent' will look something like:
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: 0000000000000000
CapEff: 0000000000000000
CapBnd: ffffffc000000000
All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that
aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do...
So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely
and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps
it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what
the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does.
They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of
you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls execve()
the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset
however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child
task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are
'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't
have.
The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a
subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a
subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that
the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It
also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity.
The solution here:
1) stop hiding capability bits in status
This makes debugging easier!
2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you
don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init
and you won't get them in any other task either.
This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which
made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other
things)
3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use
~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility.
This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run.
4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as
again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward
compatibility.
This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
447 lines
12 KiB
C
447 lines
12 KiB
C
/*
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* linux/kernel/capability.c
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1997 Andrew Main <zefram@fysh.org>
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*
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* Integrated into 2.1.97+, Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
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* 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net>
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*/
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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/*
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* Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities
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*/
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const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
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int file_caps_enabled = 1;
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static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str)
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{
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file_caps_enabled = 0;
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return 1;
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}
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__setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable);
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/*
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* More recent versions of libcap are available from:
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*
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* http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/
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*/
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static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void)
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{
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char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
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pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities (legacy support in use)\n",
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get_task_comm(name, current));
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}
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/*
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* Version 2 capabilities worked fine, but the linux/capability.h file
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* that accompanied their introduction encouraged their use without
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* the necessary user-space source code changes. As such, we have
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* created a version 3 with equivalent functionality to version 2, but
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* with a header change to protect legacy source code from using
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* version 2 when it wanted to use version 1. If your system has code
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* that trips the following warning, it is using version 2 specific
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* capabilities and may be doing so insecurely.
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*
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* The remedy is to either upgrade your version of libcap (to 2.10+,
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* if the application is linked against it), or recompile your
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* application with modern kernel headers and this warning will go
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* away.
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*/
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static void warn_deprecated_v2(void)
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{
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char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
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pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses deprecated v2 capabilities in a way that may be insecure\n",
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get_task_comm(name, current));
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}
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/*
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* Version check. Return the number of u32s in each capability flag
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* array, or a negative value on error.
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*/
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static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy)
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{
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__u32 version;
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if (get_user(version, &header->version))
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return -EFAULT;
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switch (version) {
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case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1:
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warn_legacy_capability_use();
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*tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
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break;
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case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2:
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warn_deprecated_v2();
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/*
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* fall through - v3 is otherwise equivalent to v2.
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*/
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case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3:
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*tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3;
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break;
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default:
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if (put_user((u32)_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
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return -EFAULT;
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* The only thing that can change the capabilities of the current
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* process is the current process. As such, we can't be in this code
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* at the same time as we are in the process of setting capabilities
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* in this process. The net result is that we can limit our use of
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* locks to when we are reading the caps of another process.
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*/
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static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
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kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp)
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{
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int ret;
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if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) {
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struct task_struct *target;
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rcu_read_lock();
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target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
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if (!target)
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ret = -ESRCH;
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else
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ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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} else
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ret = security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp);
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process.
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* @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
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* target pid data
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* @dataptr: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
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* and inheritable capabilities that are returned
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*
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* Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
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*/
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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pid_t pid;
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unsigned tocopy;
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kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP;
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ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy);
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if ((dataptr == NULL) || (ret != 0))
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return ((dataptr == NULL) && (ret == -EINVAL)) ? 0 : ret;
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if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
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return -EFAULT;
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if (pid < 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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ret = cap_get_target_pid(pid, &pE, &pI, &pP);
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if (!ret) {
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struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
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unsigned i;
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for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
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kdata[i].effective = pE.cap[i];
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kdata[i].permitted = pP.cap[i];
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kdata[i].inheritable = pI.cap[i];
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}
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/*
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* Note, in the case, tocopy < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S,
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* we silently drop the upper capabilities here. This
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* has the effect of making older libcap
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* implementations implicitly drop upper capability
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* bits when they perform a: capget/modify/capset
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* sequence.
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*
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* This behavior is considered fail-safe
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* behavior. Upgrading the application to a newer
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* version of libcap will enable access to the newer
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* capabilities.
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*
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* An alternative would be to return an error here
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* (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to
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* unexpectedly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts
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* before modification is attempted and the application
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* fails.
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*/
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if (copy_to_user(dataptr, kdata, tocopy
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* sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
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return -EFAULT;
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}
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}
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* sys_capset - set capabilities for a process or (*) a group of processes
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* @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
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* target pid data
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* @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
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* and inheritable capabilities
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*
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* Set capabilities for the current process only. The ability to any other
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* process(es) has been deprecated and removed.
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*
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* The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as:
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*
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* I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted
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* P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted
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* E: must be set to a subset of new permitted
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*
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* Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
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*/
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
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{
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struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
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unsigned i, tocopy, copybytes;
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kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
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struct cred *new;
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int ret;
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pid_t pid;
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ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy);
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if (ret != 0)
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return ret;
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if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
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return -EFAULT;
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/* may only affect current now */
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if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current))
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return -EPERM;
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copybytes = tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct);
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if (copybytes > sizeof(kdata))
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return -EFAULT;
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if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, copybytes))
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return -EFAULT;
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for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
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effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective;
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permitted.cap[i] = kdata[i].permitted;
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inheritable.cap[i] = kdata[i].inheritable;
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}
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while (i < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) {
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effective.cap[i] = 0;
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permitted.cap[i] = 0;
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inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
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i++;
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}
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effective.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
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permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
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inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
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new = prepare_creds();
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if (!new)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(),
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&effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error;
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audit_log_capset(new, current_cred());
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return commit_creds(new);
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error:
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abort_creds(new);
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
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* @t: The task in question
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* @ns: target user namespace
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* @cap: The capability to be tested for
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*
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* Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
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* currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
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*
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* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
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*/
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bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
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struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
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{
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int ret;
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rcu_read_lock();
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ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return (ret == 0);
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}
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/**
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* has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
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* @t: The task in question
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* @cap: The capability to be tested for
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*
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* Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
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* currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
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*
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* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
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*/
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bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
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{
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return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
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}
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/**
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* has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
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* in a specific user ns.
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* @t: The task in question
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* @ns: target user namespace
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* @cap: The capability to be tested for
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*
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* Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
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* currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
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* Do not write an audit message for the check.
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*
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* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
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*/
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bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
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struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
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{
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int ret;
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rcu_read_lock();
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ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return (ret == 0);
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}
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/**
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* has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) in the
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* initial user ns
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* @t: The task in question
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* @cap: The capability to be tested for
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*
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* Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
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* currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an
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* audit message for the check.
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*
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* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
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*/
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bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
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{
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return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
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}
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/**
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* ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
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* @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
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* @cap: The capability to be tested for
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*
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* Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
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* available for use, false if not.
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*
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* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
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* assumption that it's about to be used.
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*/
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bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
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{
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if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
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pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
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BUG();
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}
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if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
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current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
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/**
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* file_ns_capable - Determine if the file's opener had a capability in effect
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* @file: The file we want to check
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* @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
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* @cap: The capability to be tested for
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*
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* Return true if task that opened the file had a capability in effect
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* when the file was opened.
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*
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* This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not
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* actually be privileged.
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*/
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bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns,
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int cap)
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{
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap)))
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return false;
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if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0)
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return true;
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return false;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable);
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/**
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* capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
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* @cap: The capability to be tested for
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*
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* Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
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* available for use, false if not.
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*
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* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
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* assumption that it's about to be used.
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*/
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bool capable(int cap)
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{
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return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
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/**
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* capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped
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* @inode: The inode in question
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* @cap: The capability in question
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*
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* Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at
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* its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are
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* mapped into the current user namespace.
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*/
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bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
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{
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struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
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return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
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kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid);
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