linux_dsm_epyc7002/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
 * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation
 * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation
 */

#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/tpm.h>
#include <linux/tpm_command.h>

#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>

static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
	{HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1},
	{HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256},
	{HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384},
	{HASH_ALGO_SHA512, TPM_ALG_SHA512},
	{HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
};

/**
 * tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer.
 *
 * @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance
 * @session_handle: session handle
 * @nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used
 * @nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used
 * @attributes: the session attributes
 * @hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used
 * @hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used
 */
static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle,
				 const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len,
				 u8 attributes,
				 const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len)
{
	tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len);
	tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle);
	tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len);

	if (nonce && nonce_len)
		tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len);

	tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes);
	tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len);

	if (hmac && hmac_len)
		tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len);
}

/**
 * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key
 *
 * @chip: TPM chip to use
 * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
 * @options: authentication values and other options
 *
 * Return: < 0 on error and 0 on success.
 */
int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
		      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
		      struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
	unsigned int blob_len;
	struct tpm_buf buf;
	u32 hash;
	int i;
	int rc;

	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) {
		if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) {
			hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id;
			break;
		}
	}

	if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map))
		return -EINVAL;

	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
	if (rc)
		return rc;

	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle);
	tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
			     NULL /* nonce */, 0,
			     0 /* session_attributes */,
			     options->keyauth /* hmac */,
			     TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);

	/* sensitive */
	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE + payload->key_len + 1);

	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
	tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1);
	tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len);
	tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable);

	/* public */
	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len);
	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash);

	/* policy */
	if (options->policydigest_len) {
		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len);
		tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest,
			       options->policydigest_len);
	} else {
		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH);
		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
	}

	/* public parameters */
	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL);
	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);

	/* outside info */
	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);

	/* creation PCR */
	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);

	if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
		rc = -E2BIG;
		goto out;
	}

	rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
	if (rc)
		goto out;

	blob_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
	if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) {
		rc = -E2BIG;
		goto out;
	}
	if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 + blob_len) {
		rc = -EFAULT;
		goto out;
	}

	memcpy(payload->blob, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], blob_len);
	payload->blob_len = blob_len;

out:
	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);

	if (rc > 0) {
		if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HASH)
			rc = -EINVAL;
		else
			rc = -EPERM;
	}

	return rc;
}

/**
 * tpm2_load_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Load command
 *
 * @chip: TPM chip to use
 * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
 * @options: authentication values and other options
 * @blob_handle: returned blob handle
 *
 * Return: 0 on success.
 *        -E2BIG on wrong payload size.
 *        -EPERM on tpm error status.
 *        < 0 error from tpm_send.
 */
static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
			 struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
			 struct trusted_key_options *options,
			 u32 *blob_handle)
{
	struct tpm_buf buf;
	unsigned int private_len;
	unsigned int public_len;
	unsigned int blob_len;
	int rc;

	private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[0]);
	if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2))
		return -E2BIG;

	public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[2 + private_len]);
	blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4;
	if (blob_len > payload->blob_len)
		return -E2BIG;

	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
	if (rc)
		return rc;

	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle);
	tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
			     NULL /* nonce */, 0,
			     0 /* session_attributes */,
			     options->keyauth /* hmac */,
			     TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);

	tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len);

	if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
		rc = -E2BIG;
		goto out;
	}

	rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
	if (!rc)
		*blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
			(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);

out:
	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);

	if (rc > 0)
		rc = -EPERM;

	return rc;
}

/**
 * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command
 *
 * @chip: TPM chip to use
 * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
 * @options: authentication values and other options
 * @blob_handle: blob handle
 *
 * Return: 0 on success
 *         -EPERM on tpm error status
 *         < 0 error from tpm_send
 */
static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
			   struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
			   u32 blob_handle)
{
	struct tpm_buf buf;
	u16 data_len;
	u8 *data;
	int rc;

	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL);
	if (rc)
		return rc;

	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle);
	tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf,
			     options->policyhandle ?
			     options->policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW,
			     NULL /* nonce */, 0,
			     TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
			     options->blobauth /* hmac */,
			     TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);

	rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
	if (rc > 0)
		rc = -EPERM;

	if (!rc) {
		data_len = be16_to_cpup(
			(__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]);
		if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE ||  data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1) {
			rc = -EFAULT;
			goto out;
		}

		if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6 + data_len) {
			rc = -EFAULT;
			goto out;
		}
		data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6];

		memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1);
		payload->key_len = data_len - 1;
		payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1];
	}

out:
	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
	return rc;
}

/**
 * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key
 *
 * @chip: TPM chip to use
 * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
 * @options: authentication values and other options
 *
 * Return: Same as with tpm_send.
 */
int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
			struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
			struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
	u32 blob_handle;
	int rc;

	rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
	if (rc)
		return rc;

	rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle);
	tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);

	return rc;
}