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f035083055
And rely on the fact that it's 0 to assume that machines without a PCH will have PCH_NONE as dev_priv->pch_type. Just today I finally realized that HAS_PCH_IBX is true for machines without a PCH. IMHO this is totally counter-intuitive and I don't think it's a good idea to assume that we're going to check for HAS_PCH_IBX only after we check for HAS_PCH_SPLIT. I believe that in the future we'll have more PCH types and checks like: if (HAS_PCH_IBX(dev) || HAS_PCH_CPT(dev)) will become more and more common. There's a good chance that we may break non-PCH machines by adding these checks in code that runs on all machines. I also believe that the HAS_PCH_SPLIT check will become less common as we add more and more different PCH types. We'll probably start replacing checks like: if (HAS_PCH_SPLIT(dev)) foo(); else bar(); with: if (HAS_PCH_NEW(dev)) baz(); else if (HAS_PCH_OLD(dev) || HAS_PCH_IBX(dev)) foo(); else bar(); and this may break gen 2/3/4. As far as we have investigated, this patch will affect the behavior of intel_hdmi_dpms and intel_dp_link_down on gen 4. In both functions the code inside the HAS_PCH_IBX check is for IBX-specific workarounds, so we should be safe. If we start bisecting gen 2/3/4 bugs to this commit we should consider replacing the HAS_PCH_IBX checks with something else. V2: Improve commit message, list possible side effects and solution. Signed-off-by: Paulo Zanoni <paulo.r.zanoni@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> |
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ast | ||
cirrus | ||
exynos | ||
gma500 | ||
i2c | ||
i810 | ||
i915 | ||
mga | ||
mgag200 | ||
nouveau | ||
r128 | ||
radeon | ||
savage | ||
sis | ||
tdfx | ||
ttm | ||
udl | ||
via | ||
vmwgfx | ||
ati_pcigart.c | ||
drm_agpsupport.c | ||
drm_auth.c | ||
drm_buffer.c | ||
drm_bufs.c | ||
drm_cache.c | ||
drm_context.c | ||
drm_crtc_helper.c | ||
drm_crtc.c | ||
drm_debugfs.c | ||
drm_dma.c | ||
drm_dp_i2c_helper.c | ||
drm_drv.c | ||
drm_edid_load.c | ||
drm_edid_modes.h | ||
drm_edid.c | ||
drm_encoder_slave.c | ||
drm_fb_helper.c | ||
drm_fops.c | ||
drm_gem.c | ||
drm_global.c | ||
drm_hashtab.c | ||
drm_info.c | ||
drm_ioc32.c | ||
drm_ioctl.c | ||
drm_irq.c | ||
drm_lock.c | ||
drm_memory.c | ||
drm_mm.c | ||
drm_modes.c | ||
drm_pci.c | ||
drm_platform.c | ||
drm_prime.c | ||
drm_proc.c | ||
drm_scatter.c | ||
drm_stub.c | ||
drm_sysfs.c | ||
drm_trace_points.c | ||
drm_trace.h | ||
drm_usb.c | ||
drm_vm.c | ||
Kconfig | ||
Makefile | ||
README.drm |
************************************************************ * For the very latest on DRI development, please see: * * http://dri.freedesktop.org/ * ************************************************************ The Direct Rendering Manager (drm) is a device-independent kernel-level device driver that provides support for the XFree86 Direct Rendering Infrastructure (DRI). The DRM supports the Direct Rendering Infrastructure (DRI) in four major ways: 1. The DRM provides synchronized access to the graphics hardware via the use of an optimized two-tiered lock. 2. The DRM enforces the DRI security policy for access to the graphics hardware by only allowing authenticated X11 clients access to restricted regions of memory. 3. The DRM provides a generic DMA engine, complete with multiple queues and the ability to detect the need for an OpenGL context switch. 4. The DRM is extensible via the use of small device-specific modules that rely extensively on the API exported by the DRM module. Documentation on the DRI is available from: http://dri.freedesktop.org/wiki/Documentation http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=387 http://dri.sourceforge.net/doc/ For specific information about kernel-level support, see: The Direct Rendering Manager, Kernel Support for the Direct Rendering Infrastructure http://dri.sourceforge.net/doc/drm_low_level.html Hardware Locking for the Direct Rendering Infrastructure http://dri.sourceforge.net/doc/hardware_locking_low_level.html A Security Analysis of the Direct Rendering Infrastructure http://dri.sourceforge.net/doc/security_low_level.html