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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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960a8d0183
We will soon remove another level of pointer casting, so let's make sure all type handling involving firmware calls at boot time is correct. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191224151025.32482-12-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
169 lines
4.8 KiB
C
169 lines
4.8 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2014 Oracle Co., Daniel Kiper
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*/
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#include <linux/bitops.h>
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#include <linux/efi.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <xen/xen.h>
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#include <xen/xen-ops.h>
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#include <xen/interface/platform.h>
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#include <asm/page.h>
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#include <asm/setup.h>
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#include <asm/xen/hypercall.h>
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static efi_char16_t vendor[100] __initdata;
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static efi_system_table_t efi_systab_xen __initdata = {
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.hdr = {
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.signature = EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE,
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.revision = 0, /* Initialized later. */
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.headersize = 0, /* Ignored by Linux Kernel. */
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.crc32 = 0, /* Ignored by Linux Kernel. */
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.reserved = 0
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},
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.fw_vendor = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, /* Initialized later. */
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.fw_revision = 0, /* Initialized later. */
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.con_in_handle = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, /* Not used under Xen. */
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.con_in = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, /* Not used under Xen. */
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.con_out_handle = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, /* Not used under Xen. */
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.con_out = NULL, /* Not used under Xen. */
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.stderr_handle = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, /* Not used under Xen. */
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.stderr = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, /* Not used under Xen. */
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.runtime = (efi_runtime_services_t *)EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
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/* Not used under Xen. */
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.boottime = (efi_boot_services_t *)EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
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/* Not used under Xen. */
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.nr_tables = 0, /* Initialized later. */
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.tables = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR /* Initialized later. */
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};
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static efi_system_table_t __init *xen_efi_probe(void)
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{
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struct xen_platform_op op = {
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.cmd = XENPF_firmware_info,
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.u.firmware_info = {
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.type = XEN_FW_EFI_INFO,
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.index = XEN_FW_EFI_CONFIG_TABLE
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}
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};
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union xenpf_efi_info *info = &op.u.firmware_info.u.efi_info;
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if (!xen_initial_domain() || HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op) < 0)
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return NULL;
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/* Here we know that Xen runs on EFI platform. */
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xen_efi_runtime_setup();
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efi_systab_xen.tables = info->cfg.addr;
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efi_systab_xen.nr_tables = info->cfg.nent;
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op.cmd = XENPF_firmware_info;
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op.u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_EFI_INFO;
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op.u.firmware_info.index = XEN_FW_EFI_VENDOR;
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info->vendor.bufsz = sizeof(vendor);
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set_xen_guest_handle(info->vendor.name, vendor);
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if (HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op) == 0) {
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efi_systab_xen.fw_vendor = __pa_symbol(vendor);
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efi_systab_xen.fw_revision = info->vendor.revision;
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} else
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efi_systab_xen.fw_vendor = __pa_symbol(L"UNKNOWN");
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op.cmd = XENPF_firmware_info;
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op.u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_EFI_INFO;
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op.u.firmware_info.index = XEN_FW_EFI_VERSION;
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if (HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op) == 0)
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efi_systab_xen.hdr.revision = info->version;
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op.cmd = XENPF_firmware_info;
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op.u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_EFI_INFO;
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op.u.firmware_info.index = XEN_FW_EFI_RT_VERSION;
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if (HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op) == 0)
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efi.runtime_version = info->version;
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return &efi_systab_xen;
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}
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/*
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* Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
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*
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* Please keep the logic in sync with
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* drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c:efi_get_secureboot().
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*/
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static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)
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{
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static efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
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static efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
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efi_status_t status;
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u8 moksbstate, secboot, setupmode;
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unsigned long size;
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size = sizeof(secboot);
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status = efi.get_variable(L"SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
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NULL, &size, &secboot);
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if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
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return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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goto out_efi_err;
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size = sizeof(setupmode);
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status = efi.get_variable(L"SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
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NULL, &size, &setupmode);
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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goto out_efi_err;
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if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
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return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
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/* See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. */
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size = sizeof(moksbstate);
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status = efi.get_variable(L"MokSBStateRT", &shim_guid,
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NULL, &size, &moksbstate);
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/* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure. */
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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goto secure_boot_enabled;
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if (moksbstate == 1)
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return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
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secure_boot_enabled:
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pr_info("UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
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return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
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out_efi_err:
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pr_err("Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
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return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
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}
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void __init xen_efi_init(struct boot_params *boot_params)
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{
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efi_system_table_t *efi_systab_xen;
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efi_systab_xen = xen_efi_probe();
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if (efi_systab_xen == NULL)
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return;
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strncpy((char *)&boot_params->efi_info.efi_loader_signature, "Xen",
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sizeof(boot_params->efi_info.efi_loader_signature));
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boot_params->efi_info.efi_systab = (__u32)__pa(efi_systab_xen);
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boot_params->efi_info.efi_systab_hi = (__u32)(__pa(efi_systab_xen) >> 32);
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boot_params->secure_boot = xen_efi_get_secureboot();
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set_bit(EFI_BOOT, &efi.flags);
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set_bit(EFI_PARAVIRT, &efi.flags);
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set_bit(EFI_64BIT, &efi.flags);
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}
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