linux_dsm_epyc7002/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
Dave Hansen e8c24d3a23 x86/pkeys: Allocation/free syscalls
This patch adds two new system calls:

	int pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_access_rights)
	int pkey_free(int pkey);

These implement an "allocator" for the protection keys
themselves, which can be thought of as analogous to the allocator
that the kernel has for file descriptors.  The kernel tracks
which numbers are in use, and only allows operations on keys that
are valid.  A key which was not obtained by pkey_alloc() may not,
for instance, be passed to pkey_mprotect().

These system calls are also very important given the kernel's use
of pkeys to implement execute-only support.  These help ensure
that userspace can never assume that it has control of a key
unless it first asks the kernel.  The kernel does not promise to
preserve PKRU (right register) contents except for allocated
pkeys.

The 'init_access_rights' argument to pkey_alloc() specifies the
rights that will be established for the returned pkey.  For
instance:

	pkey = pkey_alloc(flags, PKEY_DENY_WRITE);

will allocate 'pkey', but also sets the bits in PKRU[1] such that
writing to 'pkey' is already denied.

The kernel does not prevent pkey_free() from successfully freeing
in-use pkeys (those still assigned to a memory range by
pkey_mprotect()).  It would be expensive to implement the checks
for this, so we instead say, "Just don't do it" since sane
software will never do it anyway.

Any piece of userspace calling pkey_alloc() needs to be prepared
for it to fail.  Why?  pkey_alloc() returns the same error code
(ENOSPC) when there are no pkeys and when pkeys are unsupported.
They can be unsupported for a whole host of reasons, so apps must
be prepared for this.  Also, libraries or LD_PRELOADs might steal
keys before an application gets access to them.

This allocation mechanism could be implemented in userspace.
Even if we did it in userspace, we would still need additional
user/kernel interfaces to tell userspace which keys are being
used by the kernel internally (such as for execute-only
mappings).  Having the kernel provide this facility completely
removes the need for these additional interfaces, or having an
implementation of this in userspace at all.

Note that we have to make changes to all of the architectures
that do not use mman-common.h because we use the new
PKEY_DENY_ACCESS/WRITE macros in arch-independent code.

1. PKRU is the Protection Key Rights User register.  It is a
   usermode-accessible register that controls whether writes
   and/or access to each individual pkey is allowed or denied.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160729163015.444FE75F@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2016-09-09 13:02:27 +02:00

276 lines
7.0 KiB
C

#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMU_CONTEXT_H
#define _ASM_X86_MMU_CONTEXT_H
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/mm_types.h>
#include <linux/pkeys.h>
#include <trace/events/tlb.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#include <asm/mpx.h>
#ifndef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
static inline void paravirt_activate_mm(struct mm_struct *prev,
struct mm_struct *next)
{
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_PARAVIRT */
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
extern struct static_key rdpmc_always_available;
static inline void load_mm_cr4(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
if (static_key_false(&rdpmc_always_available) ||
atomic_read(&mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed))
cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
else
cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
}
#else
static inline void load_mm_cr4(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
/*
* ldt_structs can be allocated, used, and freed, but they are never
* modified while live.
*/
struct ldt_struct {
/*
* Xen requires page-aligned LDTs with special permissions. This is
* needed to prevent us from installing evil descriptors such as
* call gates. On native, we could merge the ldt_struct and LDT
* allocations, but it's not worth trying to optimize.
*/
struct desc_struct *entries;
int size;
};
/*
* Used for LDT copy/destruction.
*/
int init_new_context_ldt(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm);
void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm);
#else /* CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL */
static inline int init_new_context_ldt(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void destroy_context_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
#endif
static inline void load_mm_ldt(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
struct ldt_struct *ldt;
/* lockless_dereference synchronizes with smp_store_release */
ldt = lockless_dereference(mm->context.ldt);
/*
* Any change to mm->context.ldt is followed by an IPI to all
* CPUs with the mm active. The LDT will not be freed until
* after the IPI is handled by all such CPUs. This means that,
* if the ldt_struct changes before we return, the values we see
* will be safe, and the new values will be loaded before we run
* any user code.
*
* NB: don't try to convert this to use RCU without extreme care.
* We would still need IRQs off, because we don't want to change
* the local LDT after an IPI loaded a newer value than the one
* that we can see.
*/
if (unlikely(ldt))
set_ldt(ldt->entries, ldt->size);
else
clear_LDT();
#else
clear_LDT();
#endif
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(preemptible());
}
static inline void enter_lazy_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.state) == TLBSTATE_OK)
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.state, TLBSTATE_LAZY);
#endif
}
static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
/* pkey 0 is the default and always allocated */
mm->context.pkey_allocation_map = 0x1;
/* -1 means unallocated or invalid */
mm->context.execute_only_pkey = -1;
}
#endif
init_new_context_ldt(tsk, mm);
return 0;
}
static inline void destroy_context(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
destroy_context_ldt(mm);
}
extern void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
struct task_struct *tsk);
extern void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
struct task_struct *tsk);
#define switch_mm_irqs_off switch_mm_irqs_off
#define activate_mm(prev, next) \
do { \
paravirt_activate_mm((prev), (next)); \
switch_mm((prev), (next), NULL); \
} while (0);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
#define deactivate_mm(tsk, mm) \
do { \
lazy_load_gs(0); \
} while (0)
#else
#define deactivate_mm(tsk, mm) \
do { \
load_gs_index(0); \
loadsegment(fs, 0); \
} while (0)
#endif
static inline void arch_dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *oldmm,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
paravirt_arch_dup_mmap(oldmm, mm);
}
static inline void arch_exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
paravirt_arch_exit_mmap(mm);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static inline bool is_64bit_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
return !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) ||
!(mm->context.ia32_compat == TIF_IA32);
}
#else
static inline bool is_64bit_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
return false;
}
#endif
static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
mpx_mm_init(mm);
}
static inline void arch_unmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
/*
* mpx_notify_unmap() goes and reads a rarely-hot
* cacheline in the mm_struct. That can be expensive
* enough to be seen in profiles.
*
* The mpx_notify_unmap() call and its contents have been
* observed to affect munmap() performance on hardware
* where MPX is not present.
*
* The unlikely() optimizes for the fast case: no MPX
* in the CPU, or no MPX use in the process. Even if
* we get this wrong (in the unlikely event that MPX
* is widely enabled on some system) the overhead of
* MPX itself (reading bounds tables) is expected to
* overwhelm the overhead of getting this unlikely()
* consistently wrong.
*/
if (unlikely(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
mpx_notify_unmap(mm, vma, start, end);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
static inline int vma_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned long vma_pkey_mask = VM_PKEY_BIT0 | VM_PKEY_BIT1 |
VM_PKEY_BIT2 | VM_PKEY_BIT3;
return (vma->vm_flags & vma_pkey_mask) >> VM_PKEY_SHIFT;
}
#else
static inline int vma_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
static inline bool __pkru_allows_pkey(u16 pkey, bool write)
{
u32 pkru = read_pkru();
if (!__pkru_allows_read(pkru, pkey))
return false;
if (write && !__pkru_allows_write(pkru, pkey))
return false;
return true;
}
/*
* We only want to enforce protection keys on the current process
* because we effectively have no access to PKRU for other
* processes or any way to tell *which * PKRU in a threaded
* process we could use.
*
* So do not enforce things if the VMA is not from the current
* mm, or if we are in a kernel thread.
*/
static inline bool vma_is_foreign(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (!current->mm)
return true;
/*
* Should PKRU be enforced on the access to this VMA? If
* the VMA is from another process, then PKRU has no
* relevance and should not be enforced.
*/
if (current->mm != vma->vm_mm)
return true;
return false;
}
static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
bool write, bool execute, bool foreign)
{
/* pkeys never affect instruction fetches */
if (execute)
return true;
/* allow access if the VMA is not one from this process */
if (foreign || vma_is_foreign(vma))
return true;
return __pkru_allows_pkey(vma_pkey(vma), write);
}
static inline bool arch_pte_access_permitted(pte_t pte, bool write)
{
return __pkru_allows_pkey(pte_flags_pkey(pte_flags(pte)), write);
}
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMU_CONTEXT_H */