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![]() syzbot reported following splat:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2063 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in compat_copy_entries+0x128b/0x1380 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155
Read of size 4 at addr ffffc900004461f4 by task syz-executor267/7937
CPU: 1 PID: 7937 Comm: syz-executor267 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2063 [inline]
compat_copy_entries+0x128b/0x1380 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155
compat_do_replace+0x344/0x720 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2249
compat_do_ebt_set_ctl+0x22f/0x27e net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2333
[..]
Because padding isn't considered during computation of ->buf_user_offset,
"total" is decremented by fewer bytes than it should.
Therefore, the first part of
if (*total < sizeof(*entry) || entry->next_offset < sizeof(*entry))
will pass, -- it should not have. This causes oob access:
entry->next_offset is past the vmalloced size.
Reject padding and check that computed user offset (sum of ebt_entry
structure plus all individual matches/watchers/targets) is same
value that userspace gave us as the offset of the next entry.
Reported-by: syzbot+f68108fed972453a0ad4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes:
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.. | ||
netfilter | ||
br_arp_nd_proxy.c | ||
br_device.c | ||
br_fdb.c | ||
br_forward.c | ||
br_if.c | ||
br_input.c | ||
br_ioctl.c | ||
br_mdb.c | ||
br_multicast.c | ||
br_netfilter_hooks.c | ||
br_netfilter_ipv6.c | ||
br_netlink_tunnel.c | ||
br_netlink.c | ||
br_nf_core.c | ||
br_private_stp.h | ||
br_private_tunnel.h | ||
br_private.h | ||
br_stp_bpdu.c | ||
br_stp_if.c | ||
br_stp_timer.c | ||
br_stp.c | ||
br_switchdev.c | ||
br_sysfs_br.c | ||
br_sysfs_if.c | ||
br_vlan_tunnel.c | ||
br_vlan.c | ||
br.c | ||
Kconfig | ||
Makefile |