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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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61dc0f555b
Implement the CPU vulnerabilty show functions for meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.177414879@linutronix.de
92 lines
2.3 KiB
C
92 lines
2.3 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds
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*
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* Cyrix stuff, June 1998 by:
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* - Rafael R. Reilova (moved everything from head.S),
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* <rreilova@ececs.uc.edu>
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* - Channing Corn (tests & fixes),
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* - Andrew D. Balsa (code cleanup).
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*/
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/utsname.h>
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#include <linux/cpu.h>
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#include <asm/bugs.h>
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#include <asm/processor.h>
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#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
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#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
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#include <asm/msr.h>
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#include <asm/paravirt.h>
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#include <asm/alternative.h>
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#include <asm/pgtable.h>
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#include <asm/set_memory.h>
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void __init check_bugs(void)
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{
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identify_boot_cpu();
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if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
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pr_info("CPU: ");
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print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
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/*
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* Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
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*
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* - i386 is no longer supported.
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* - In order to run on anything without a TSC, we need to be
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* compiled for a i486.
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*/
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if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4)
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panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features");
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init_utsname()->machine[1] =
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'0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86);
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alternative_instructions();
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fpu__init_check_bugs();
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#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
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alternative_instructions();
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/*
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* Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
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* There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
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* MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs.
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*
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* Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems
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* very little benefit for that case.
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*/
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if (!direct_gbpages)
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set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
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#endif
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
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ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
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struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
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{
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if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
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return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
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if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
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return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
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return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
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}
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ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
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struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
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{
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if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
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return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
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return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
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}
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ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
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struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
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{
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if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
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return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
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return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
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}
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#endif
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