mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-11-24 13:20:52 +07:00
aefcf2f4b5
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| amdtopology.c | ||
| cpu_entry_area.c | ||
| debug_pagetables.c | ||
| dump_pagetables.c | ||
| extable.c | ||
| fault.c | ||
| highmem_32.c | ||
| hugetlbpage.c | ||
| ident_map.c | ||
| init_32.c | ||
| init_64.c | ||
| init.c | ||
| iomap_32.c | ||
| ioremap.c | ||
| kasan_init_64.c | ||
| kaslr.c | ||
| kmmio.c | ||
| Makefile | ||
| mem_encrypt_boot.S | ||
| mem_encrypt_identity.c | ||
| mem_encrypt.c | ||
| mm_internal.h | ||
| mmap.c | ||
| mmio-mod.c | ||
| mpx.c | ||
| numa_32.c | ||
| numa_64.c | ||
| numa_emulation.c | ||
| numa_internal.h | ||
| numa.c | ||
| pageattr-test.c | ||
| pageattr.c | ||
| pat_internal.h | ||
| pat_rbtree.c | ||
| pat.c | ||
| pf_in.c | ||
| pf_in.h | ||
| pgtable_32.c | ||
| pgtable.c | ||
| physaddr.c | ||
| physaddr.h | ||
| pkeys.c | ||
| pti.c | ||
| setup_nx.c | ||
| srat.c | ||
| testmmiotrace.c | ||
| tlb.c | ||