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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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f8a00cef17
Currently, you can use /proc/self/task/*/stack to cause a stack walk on
a task you control while it is running on another CPU. That means that
the stack can change under the stack walker. The stack walker does
have guards against going completely off the rails and into random
kernel memory, but it can interpret random data from your kernel stack
as instruction pointers and stack pointers. This can cause exposure of
kernel stack contents to userspace.
Restrict the ability to inspect kernel stacks of arbitrary tasks to root
in order to prevent a local attacker from exploiting racy stack unwinding
to leak kernel task stack contents. See the added comment for a longer
rationale.
There don't seem to be any users of this userspace API that can't
gracefully bail out if reading from the file fails. Therefore, I believe
that this change is unlikely to break things. In the case that this patch
does end up needing a revert, the next-best solution might be to fake a
single-entry stack based on wchan.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180927153316.200286-1-jannh@google.com
Fixes:
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||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| array.c | ||
| base.c | ||
| cmdline.c | ||
| consoles.c | ||
| cpuinfo.c | ||
| devices.c | ||
| fd.c | ||
| fd.h | ||
| generic.c | ||
| inode.c | ||
| internal.h | ||
| interrupts.c | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| kcore.c | ||
| kmsg.c | ||
| loadavg.c | ||
| Makefile | ||
| meminfo.c | ||
| namespaces.c | ||
| nommu.c | ||
| page.c | ||
| proc_net.c | ||
| proc_sysctl.c | ||
| proc_tty.c | ||
| root.c | ||
| self.c | ||
| softirqs.c | ||
| stat.c | ||
| task_mmu.c | ||
| task_nommu.c | ||
| thread_self.c | ||
| uptime.c | ||
| util.c | ||
| version.c | ||
| vmcore.c | ||