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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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2cdcc357c2
arm64:allmodconfig fails to build as follows.
In file included from include/acpi/platform/aclinux.h:74:0,
from include/acpi/platform/acenv.h:173,
from include/acpi/acpi.h:56,
from include/linux/acpi.h:37,
from ./arch/arm64/include/asm/dma-mapping.h:21,
from include/linux/dma-mapping.h:86,
from include/linux/skbuff.h:34,
from include/crypto/algapi.h:18,
from crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c:16:
include/linux/ctype.h:15:12: error: expected ‘;’, ‘,’ or ‘)’
before numeric constant
#define _X 0x40 /* hex digit */
^
crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c:123:47: note: in expansion of macro ‘_X’
static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
^
crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c: In function ‘RSA_verify_signature’:
crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c:256:2: error:
implicit declaration of function ‘RSA_I2OSP’
The problem is caused by an unrelated include file change, resulting in
the inclusion of ctype.h on arm64. This in turn causes the local variable
_X to conflict with macro _X used in ctype.h.
Fixes: b6197b93fa
("arm64 : Introduce support for ACPI _CCA object")
Cc: Suthikulpanit, Suravee <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
279 lines
6.7 KiB
C
279 lines
6.7 KiB
C
/* RSA asymmetric public-key algorithm [RFC3447]
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RSA: "fmt
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <crypto/algapi.h>
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#include "public_key.h"
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MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
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MODULE_DESCRIPTION("RSA Public Key Algorithm");
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#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
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pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
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#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
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pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
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/*
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* Hash algorithm OIDs plus ASN.1 DER wrappings [RFC4880 sec 5.2.2].
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*/
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static const u8 RSA_digest_info_MD5[] = {
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0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0C, 0x06, 0x08,
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0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, /* OID */
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10
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};
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static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA1[] = {
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0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
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0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
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};
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static const u8 RSA_digest_info_RIPE_MD_160[] = {
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0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
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0x2B, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
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};
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static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA224[] = {
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0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
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0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C
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};
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static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA256[] = {
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0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
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0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
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};
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static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA384[] = {
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0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
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0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
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};
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static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA512[] = {
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0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
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0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
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0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
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};
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static const struct {
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const u8 *data;
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size_t size;
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} RSA_ASN1_templates[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
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#define _(X) { RSA_digest_info_##X, sizeof(RSA_digest_info_##X) }
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[HASH_ALGO_MD5] = _(MD5),
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[HASH_ALGO_SHA1] = _(SHA1),
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[HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_160] = _(RIPE_MD_160),
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[HASH_ALGO_SHA256] = _(SHA256),
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[HASH_ALGO_SHA384] = _(SHA384),
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[HASH_ALGO_SHA512] = _(SHA512),
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[HASH_ALGO_SHA224] = _(SHA224),
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#undef _
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};
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/*
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* RSAVP1() function [RFC3447 sec 5.2.2]
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*/
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static int RSAVP1(const struct public_key *key, MPI s, MPI *_m)
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{
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MPI m;
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int ret;
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/* (1) Validate 0 <= s < n */
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if (mpi_cmp_ui(s, 0) < 0) {
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kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s < 0]");
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return -EBADMSG;
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}
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if (mpi_cmp(s, key->rsa.n) >= 0) {
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kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s >= n]");
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return -EBADMSG;
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}
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m = mpi_alloc(0);
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if (!m)
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return -ENOMEM;
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/* (2) m = s^e mod n */
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ret = mpi_powm(m, s, key->rsa.e, key->rsa.n);
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if (ret < 0) {
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mpi_free(m);
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return ret;
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}
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*_m = m;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Integer to Octet String conversion [RFC3447 sec 4.1]
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*/
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static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **pX)
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{
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unsigned X_size, x_size;
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int X_sign;
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u8 *X;
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/* Make sure the string is the right length. The number should begin
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* with { 0x00, 0x01, ... } so we have to account for 15 leading zero
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* bits not being reported by MPI.
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*/
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x_size = mpi_get_nbits(x);
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pr_devel("size(x)=%u xLen*8=%zu\n", x_size, xLen * 8);
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if (x_size != xLen * 8 - 15)
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return -ERANGE;
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X = mpi_get_buffer(x, &X_size, &X_sign);
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if (!X)
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return -ENOMEM;
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if (X_sign < 0) {
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kfree(X);
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return -EBADMSG;
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}
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if (X_size != xLen - 1) {
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kfree(X);
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return -EBADMSG;
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}
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*pX = X;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Perform the RSA signature verification.
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* @H: Value of hash of data and metadata
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* @EM: The computed signature value
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* @k: The size of EM (EM[0] is an invalid location but should hold 0x00)
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* @hash_size: The size of H
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* @asn1_template: The DigestInfo ASN.1 template
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* @asn1_size: Size of asm1_template[]
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*/
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static int RSA_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k, size_t hash_size,
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const u8 *asn1_template, size_t asn1_size)
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{
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unsigned PS_end, T_offset, i;
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kenter(",,%zu,%zu,%zu", k, hash_size, asn1_size);
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if (k < 2 + 1 + asn1_size + hash_size)
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return -EBADMSG;
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/* Decode the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 */
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if (EM[1] != 0x01) {
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kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[1] == %02u]", EM[1]);
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return -EBADMSG;
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}
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T_offset = k - (asn1_size + hash_size);
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PS_end = T_offset - 1;
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if (EM[PS_end] != 0x00) {
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kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T-1] == %02u]", EM[PS_end]);
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return -EBADMSG;
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}
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for (i = 2; i < PS_end; i++) {
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if (EM[i] != 0xff) {
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kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[PS%x] == %02u]", i - 2, EM[i]);
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return -EBADMSG;
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}
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}
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if (crypto_memneq(asn1_template, EM + T_offset, asn1_size) != 0) {
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kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T] ASN.1 mismatch]");
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return -EBADMSG;
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}
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if (crypto_memneq(H, EM + T_offset + asn1_size, hash_size) != 0) {
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kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [EM[T] hash mismatch]");
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return -EKEYREJECTED;
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}
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kleave(" = 0");
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Perform the verification step [RFC3447 sec 8.2.2].
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*/
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static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key *key,
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const struct public_key_signature *sig)
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{
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size_t tsize;
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int ret;
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/* Variables as per RFC3447 sec 8.2.2 */
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const u8 *H = sig->digest;
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u8 *EM = NULL;
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MPI m = NULL;
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size_t k;
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kenter("");
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if (!RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data)
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return -ENOTSUPP;
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/* (1) Check the signature size against the public key modulus size */
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k = mpi_get_nbits(key->rsa.n);
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tsize = mpi_get_nbits(sig->rsa.s);
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/* According to RFC 4880 sec 3.2, length of MPI is computed starting
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* from most significant bit. So the RFC 3447 sec 8.2.2 size check
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* must be relaxed to conform with shorter signatures - so we fail here
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* only if signature length is longer than modulus size.
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*/
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pr_devel("step 1: k=%zu size(S)=%zu\n", k, tsize);
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if (k < tsize) {
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ret = -EBADMSG;
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goto error;
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}
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/* Round up and convert to octets */
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k = (k + 7) / 8;
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/* (2b) Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive to the public key */
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ret = RSAVP1(key, sig->rsa.s, &m);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error;
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/* (2c) Convert the message representative (m) to an encoded message
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* (EM) of length k octets.
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*
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* NOTE! The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI, so we pass a
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* pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify()!
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*/
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ret = RSA_I2OSP(m, k, &EM);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error;
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ret = RSA_verify(H, EM - 1, k, sig->digest_size,
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RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data,
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RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].size);
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error:
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kfree(EM);
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mpi_free(m);
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kleave(" = %d", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm = {
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.name = "RSA",
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.n_pub_mpi = 2,
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.n_sec_mpi = 3,
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.n_sig_mpi = 1,
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.verify_signature = RSA_verify_signature,
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};
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(RSA_public_key_algorithm);
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