mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-21 17:58:24 +07:00
8b485ce698
Under fuzzer stress, it is possible that a child gets a non NULL fastopen_req pointer from its parent at accept() time, when/if parent morphs from listener to active session. We need to make sure this can not happen, by clearing the field after socket cloning. BUG: Double free or freeing an invalid pointer Unexpected shadow byte: 0xFB CPU: 3 PID: 20933 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted 4.11.0+ #306 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline] dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52 kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:164 kasan_report_double_free+0x5c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:185 kasan_slab_free+0x9d/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:580 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1357 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1379 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:2961 [inline] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:3882 tcp_free_fastopen_req net/ipv4/tcp.c:1077 [inline] tcp_disconnect+0xc15/0x13e0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2328 inet_child_forget+0xb8/0x600 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:898 inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add+0x1e7/0x250 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:928 tcp_get_cookie_sock+0x21a/0x510 net/ipv4/syncookies.c:217 cookie_v4_check+0x1a19/0x28b0 net/ipv4/syncookies.c:384 tcp_v4_cookie_check net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1384 [inline] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x731/0x940 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1421 tcp_v4_rcv+0x2dc0/0x31c0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1715 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4cc/0xc20 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:216 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x1ce/0x700 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:257 dst_input include/net/dst.h:492 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0xb1d/0x20b0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip_rcv+0xd8c/0x19c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:487 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ad1/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4210 __netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:4248 process_backlog+0xe5/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:4868 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5270 [inline] net_rx_action+0xe70/0x18e0 net/core/dev.c:5335 __do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb99 kernel/softirq.c:284 do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:899 </IRQ> do_softirq.part.17+0x1e8/0x230 kernel/softirq.c:328 do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:176 [inline] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x1cf/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:181 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:31 [inline] rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:931 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x9ab/0x15e0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:230 ip_finish_output+0xa35/0xdf0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:316 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip_output+0x1f6/0x7b0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:404 dst_output include/net/dst.h:486 [inline] ip_local_out+0x95/0x160 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_queue_xmit+0x9a8/0x1a10 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:503 tcp_transmit_skb+0x1ade/0x3470 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1057 tcp_write_xmit+0x79e/0x55b0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2265 __tcp_push_pending_frames+0xfa/0x3a0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2450 tcp_push+0x4ee/0x780 net/ipv4/tcp.c:683 tcp_sendmsg+0x128d/0x39b0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1342 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1696 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1664 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x446059 RSP: 002b:00007faa6761fb58 EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000017 RCX: 0000000000446059 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020ba3fcd RDI: 0000000000000017 RBP: 00000000006e40a0 R08: 0000000020ba4ff0 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000020000000 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000708150 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007faa676209c0 R15: 00007faa67620700 Object at ffff88003b5bbcb8, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64 Allocated: PID = 20909 save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:513 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:525 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:616 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x82/0x270 mm/slub.c:2745 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:490 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:663 [inline] tcp_sendmsg_fastopen net/ipv4/tcp.c:1094 [inline] tcp_sendmsg+0x221a/0x39b0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1139 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1696 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1664 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe Freed: PID = 20909 save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:513 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:525 [inline] kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:589 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1357 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1379 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:2961 [inline] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:3882 tcp_free_fastopen_req net/ipv4/tcp.c:1077 [inline] tcp_disconnect+0xc15/0x13e0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2328 __inet_stream_connect+0x20c/0xf90 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:593 tcp_sendmsg_fastopen net/ipv4/tcp.c:1111 [inline] tcp_sendmsg+0x23a8/0x39b0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1139 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1696 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1664 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe Fixes:e994b2f0fb
("tcp: do not lock listener to process SYN packets") Fixes:7db92362d2
("tcp: fix potential double free issue for fastopen_req") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
826 lines
26 KiB
C
826 lines
26 KiB
C
/*
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* INET An implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite for the LINUX
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* operating system. INET is implemented using the BSD Socket
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* interface as the means of communication with the user level.
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*
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* Implementation of the Transmission Control Protocol(TCP).
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*
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* Authors: Ross Biro
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* Fred N. van Kempen, <waltje@uWalt.NL.Mugnet.ORG>
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* Mark Evans, <evansmp@uhura.aston.ac.uk>
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* Corey Minyard <wf-rch!minyard@relay.EU.net>
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* Florian La Roche, <flla@stud.uni-sb.de>
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* Charles Hedrick, <hedrick@klinzhai.rutgers.edu>
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* Linus Torvalds, <torvalds@cs.helsinki.fi>
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* Alan Cox, <gw4pts@gw4pts.ampr.org>
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* Matthew Dillon, <dillon@apollo.west.oic.com>
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* Arnt Gulbrandsen, <agulbra@nvg.unit.no>
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* Jorge Cwik, <jorge@laser.satlink.net>
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*/
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/sysctl.h>
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#include <linux/workqueue.h>
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#include <net/tcp.h>
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#include <net/inet_common.h>
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#include <net/xfrm.h>
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#include <net/busy_poll.h>
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int sysctl_tcp_abort_on_overflow __read_mostly;
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static bool tcp_in_window(u32 seq, u32 end_seq, u32 s_win, u32 e_win)
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{
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if (seq == s_win)
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return true;
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if (after(end_seq, s_win) && before(seq, e_win))
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return true;
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return seq == e_win && seq == end_seq;
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}
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static enum tcp_tw_status
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tcp_timewait_check_oow_rate_limit(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw,
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const struct sk_buff *skb, int mib_idx)
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{
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struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw = tcp_twsk((struct sock *)tw);
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if (!tcp_oow_rate_limited(twsk_net(tw), skb, mib_idx,
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&tcptw->tw_last_oow_ack_time)) {
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/* Send ACK. Note, we do not put the bucket,
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* it will be released by caller.
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*/
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return TCP_TW_ACK;
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}
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/* We are rate-limiting, so just release the tw sock and drop skb. */
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inet_twsk_put(tw);
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return TCP_TW_SUCCESS;
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}
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/*
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* * Main purpose of TIME-WAIT state is to close connection gracefully,
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* when one of ends sits in LAST-ACK or CLOSING retransmitting FIN
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* (and, probably, tail of data) and one or more our ACKs are lost.
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* * What is TIME-WAIT timeout? It is associated with maximal packet
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* lifetime in the internet, which results in wrong conclusion, that
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* it is set to catch "old duplicate segments" wandering out of their path.
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* It is not quite correct. This timeout is calculated so that it exceeds
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* maximal retransmission timeout enough to allow to lose one (or more)
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* segments sent by peer and our ACKs. This time may be calculated from RTO.
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* * When TIME-WAIT socket receives RST, it means that another end
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* finally closed and we are allowed to kill TIME-WAIT too.
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* * Second purpose of TIME-WAIT is catching old duplicate segments.
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* Well, certainly it is pure paranoia, but if we load TIME-WAIT
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* with this semantics, we MUST NOT kill TIME-WAIT state with RSTs.
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* * If we invented some more clever way to catch duplicates
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* (f.e. based on PAWS), we could truncate TIME-WAIT to several RTOs.
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*
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* The algorithm below is based on FORMAL INTERPRETATION of RFCs.
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* When you compare it to RFCs, please, read section SEGMENT ARRIVES
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* from the very beginning.
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*
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* NOTE. With recycling (and later with fin-wait-2) TW bucket
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* is _not_ stateless. It means, that strictly speaking we must
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* spinlock it. I do not want! Well, probability of misbehaviour
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* is ridiculously low and, seems, we could use some mb() tricks
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* to avoid misread sequence numbers, states etc. --ANK
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*
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* We don't need to initialize tmp_out.sack_ok as we don't use the results
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*/
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enum tcp_tw_status
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tcp_timewait_state_process(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw, struct sk_buff *skb,
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const struct tcphdr *th)
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{
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struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
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struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw = tcp_twsk((struct sock *)tw);
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bool paws_reject = false;
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tmp_opt.saw_tstamp = 0;
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if (th->doff > (sizeof(*th) >> 2) && tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp) {
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tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, 0, NULL);
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if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp) {
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if (tmp_opt.rcv_tsecr)
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tmp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tcptw->tw_ts_offset;
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tmp_opt.ts_recent = tcptw->tw_ts_recent;
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tmp_opt.ts_recent_stamp = tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp;
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paws_reject = tcp_paws_reject(&tmp_opt, th->rst);
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}
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}
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if (tw->tw_substate == TCP_FIN_WAIT2) {
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/* Just repeat all the checks of tcp_rcv_state_process() */
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/* Out of window, send ACK */
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if (paws_reject ||
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!tcp_in_window(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq,
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tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt,
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tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt + tcptw->tw_rcv_wnd))
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return tcp_timewait_check_oow_rate_limit(
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tw, skb, LINUX_MIB_TCPACKSKIPPEDFINWAIT2);
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if (th->rst)
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goto kill;
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if (th->syn && !before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt))
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return TCP_TW_RST;
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/* Dup ACK? */
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if (!th->ack ||
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!after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt) ||
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TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq == TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq) {
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inet_twsk_put(tw);
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return TCP_TW_SUCCESS;
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}
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/* New data or FIN. If new data arrive after half-duplex close,
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* reset.
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*/
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if (!th->fin ||
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TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq != tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt + 1)
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return TCP_TW_RST;
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/* FIN arrived, enter true time-wait state. */
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tw->tw_substate = TCP_TIME_WAIT;
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tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
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if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp) {
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tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp = get_seconds();
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tcptw->tw_ts_recent = tmp_opt.rcv_tsval;
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}
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inet_twsk_reschedule(tw, TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN);
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return TCP_TW_ACK;
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}
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/*
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* Now real TIME-WAIT state.
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*
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* RFC 1122:
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* "When a connection is [...] on TIME-WAIT state [...]
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* [a TCP] MAY accept a new SYN from the remote TCP to
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* reopen the connection directly, if it:
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*
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* (1) assigns its initial sequence number for the new
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* connection to be larger than the largest sequence
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* number it used on the previous connection incarnation,
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* and
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*
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* (2) returns to TIME-WAIT state if the SYN turns out
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* to be an old duplicate".
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*/
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if (!paws_reject &&
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(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt &&
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(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq || th->rst))) {
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/* In window segment, it may be only reset or bare ack. */
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if (th->rst) {
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/* This is TIME_WAIT assassination, in two flavors.
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* Oh well... nobody has a sufficient solution to this
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* protocol bug yet.
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*/
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if (sysctl_tcp_rfc1337 == 0) {
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kill:
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inet_twsk_deschedule_put(tw);
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return TCP_TW_SUCCESS;
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}
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}
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inet_twsk_reschedule(tw, TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN);
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if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp) {
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tcptw->tw_ts_recent = tmp_opt.rcv_tsval;
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tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp = get_seconds();
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}
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inet_twsk_put(tw);
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return TCP_TW_SUCCESS;
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}
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/* Out of window segment.
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All the segments are ACKed immediately.
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The only exception is new SYN. We accept it, if it is
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not old duplicate and we are not in danger to be killed
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by delayed old duplicates. RFC check is that it has
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newer sequence number works at rates <40Mbit/sec.
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However, if paws works, it is reliable AND even more,
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we even may relax silly seq space cutoff.
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RED-PEN: we violate main RFC requirement, if this SYN will appear
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old duplicate (i.e. we receive RST in reply to SYN-ACK),
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we must return socket to time-wait state. It is not good,
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but not fatal yet.
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*/
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if (th->syn && !th->rst && !th->ack && !paws_reject &&
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(after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt) ||
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(tmp_opt.saw_tstamp &&
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(s32)(tcptw->tw_ts_recent - tmp_opt.rcv_tsval) < 0))) {
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u32 isn = tcptw->tw_snd_nxt + 65535 + 2;
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if (isn == 0)
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isn++;
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TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = isn;
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return TCP_TW_SYN;
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}
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if (paws_reject)
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__NET_INC_STATS(twsk_net(tw), LINUX_MIB_PAWSESTABREJECTED);
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if (!th->rst) {
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/* In this case we must reset the TIMEWAIT timer.
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*
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* If it is ACKless SYN it may be both old duplicate
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* and new good SYN with random sequence number <rcv_nxt.
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* Do not reschedule in the last case.
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*/
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if (paws_reject || th->ack)
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inet_twsk_reschedule(tw, TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN);
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return tcp_timewait_check_oow_rate_limit(
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tw, skb, LINUX_MIB_TCPACKSKIPPEDTIMEWAIT);
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}
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inet_twsk_put(tw);
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return TCP_TW_SUCCESS;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_timewait_state_process);
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/*
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* Move a socket to time-wait or dead fin-wait-2 state.
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*/
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void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo)
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{
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const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
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const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
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struct inet_timewait_sock *tw;
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struct inet_timewait_death_row *tcp_death_row = &sock_net(sk)->ipv4.tcp_death_row;
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tw = inet_twsk_alloc(sk, tcp_death_row, state);
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if (tw) {
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struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw = tcp_twsk((struct sock *)tw);
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const int rto = (icsk->icsk_rto << 2) - (icsk->icsk_rto >> 1);
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struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
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tw->tw_transparent = inet->transparent;
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tw->tw_rcv_wscale = tp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale;
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tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt = tp->rcv_nxt;
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tcptw->tw_snd_nxt = tp->snd_nxt;
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tcptw->tw_rcv_wnd = tcp_receive_window(tp);
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tcptw->tw_ts_recent = tp->rx_opt.ts_recent;
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tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp = tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp;
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tcptw->tw_ts_offset = tp->tsoffset;
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tcptw->tw_last_oow_ack_time = 0;
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#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
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if (tw->tw_family == PF_INET6) {
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struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
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tw->tw_v6_daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
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tw->tw_v6_rcv_saddr = sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
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tw->tw_tclass = np->tclass;
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tw->tw_flowlabel = be32_to_cpu(np->flow_label & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK);
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tw->tw_ipv6only = sk->sk_ipv6only;
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
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/*
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* The timewait bucket does not have the key DB from the
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* sock structure. We just make a quick copy of the
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* md5 key being used (if indeed we are using one)
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* so the timewait ack generating code has the key.
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*/
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do {
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struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;
|
|
tcptw->tw_md5_key = NULL;
|
|
key = tp->af_specific->md5_lookup(sk, sk);
|
|
if (key) {
|
|
tcptw->tw_md5_key = kmemdup(key, sizeof(*key), GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
if (tcptw->tw_md5_key && !tcp_alloc_md5sig_pool())
|
|
BUG();
|
|
}
|
|
} while (0);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Get the TIME_WAIT timeout firing. */
|
|
if (timeo < rto)
|
|
timeo = rto;
|
|
|
|
tw->tw_timeout = TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN;
|
|
if (state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
|
|
timeo = TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN;
|
|
|
|
inet_twsk_schedule(tw, timeo);
|
|
/* Linkage updates. */
|
|
__inet_twsk_hashdance(tw, sk, &tcp_hashinfo);
|
|
inet_twsk_put(tw);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Sorry, if we're out of memory, just CLOSE this
|
|
* socket up. We've got bigger problems than
|
|
* non-graceful socket closings.
|
|
*/
|
|
NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPTIMEWAITOVERFLOW);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tcp_update_metrics(sk);
|
|
tcp_done(sk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void tcp_twsk_destructor(struct sock *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
|
|
struct tcp_timewait_sock *twsk = tcp_twsk(sk);
|
|
|
|
if (twsk->tw_md5_key)
|
|
kfree_rcu(twsk->tw_md5_key, rcu);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_twsk_destructor);
|
|
|
|
/* Warning : This function is called without sk_listener being locked.
|
|
* Be sure to read socket fields once, as their value could change under us.
|
|
*/
|
|
void tcp_openreq_init_rwin(struct request_sock *req,
|
|
const struct sock *sk_listener,
|
|
const struct dst_entry *dst)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
|
|
const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk_listener);
|
|
int full_space = tcp_full_space(sk_listener);
|
|
u32 window_clamp;
|
|
__u8 rcv_wscale;
|
|
int mss;
|
|
|
|
mss = tcp_mss_clamp(tp, dst_metric_advmss(dst));
|
|
window_clamp = READ_ONCE(tp->window_clamp);
|
|
/* Set this up on the first call only */
|
|
req->rsk_window_clamp = window_clamp ? : dst_metric(dst, RTAX_WINDOW);
|
|
|
|
/* limit the window selection if the user enforce a smaller rx buffer */
|
|
if (sk_listener->sk_userlocks & SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK &&
|
|
(req->rsk_window_clamp > full_space || req->rsk_window_clamp == 0))
|
|
req->rsk_window_clamp = full_space;
|
|
|
|
/* tcp_full_space because it is guaranteed to be the first packet */
|
|
tcp_select_initial_window(full_space,
|
|
mss - (ireq->tstamp_ok ? TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED : 0),
|
|
&req->rsk_rcv_wnd,
|
|
&req->rsk_window_clamp,
|
|
ireq->wscale_ok,
|
|
&rcv_wscale,
|
|
dst_metric(dst, RTAX_INITRWND));
|
|
ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_openreq_init_rwin);
|
|
|
|
static void tcp_ecn_openreq_child(struct tcp_sock *tp,
|
|
const struct request_sock *req)
|
|
{
|
|
tp->ecn_flags = inet_rsk(req)->ecn_ok ? TCP_ECN_OK : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void tcp_ca_openreq_child(struct sock *sk, const struct dst_entry *dst)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
|
|
u32 ca_key = dst_metric(dst, RTAX_CC_ALGO);
|
|
bool ca_got_dst = false;
|
|
|
|
if (ca_key != TCP_CA_UNSPEC) {
|
|
const struct tcp_congestion_ops *ca;
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
ca = tcp_ca_find_key(ca_key);
|
|
if (likely(ca && try_module_get(ca->owner))) {
|
|
icsk->icsk_ca_dst_locked = tcp_ca_dst_locked(dst);
|
|
icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca;
|
|
ca_got_dst = true;
|
|
}
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If no valid choice made yet, assign current system default ca. */
|
|
if (!ca_got_dst &&
|
|
(!icsk->icsk_ca_setsockopt ||
|
|
!try_module_get(icsk->icsk_ca_ops->owner)))
|
|
tcp_assign_congestion_control(sk);
|
|
|
|
tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_ca_openreq_child);
|
|
|
|
/* This is not only more efficient than what we used to do, it eliminates
|
|
* a lot of code duplication between IPv4/IPv6 SYN recv processing. -DaveM
|
|
*
|
|
* Actually, we could lots of memory writes here. tp of listening
|
|
* socket contains all necessary default parameters.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct sock *tcp_create_openreq_child(const struct sock *sk,
|
|
struct request_sock *req,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sock *newsk = inet_csk_clone_lock(sk, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
|
|
if (newsk) {
|
|
const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
|
|
struct tcp_request_sock *treq = tcp_rsk(req);
|
|
struct inet_connection_sock *newicsk = inet_csk(newsk);
|
|
struct tcp_sock *newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
|
|
|
|
/* Now setup tcp_sock */
|
|
newtp->pred_flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
newtp->rcv_wup = newtp->copied_seq =
|
|
newtp->rcv_nxt = treq->rcv_isn + 1;
|
|
newtp->segs_in = 1;
|
|
|
|
newtp->snd_sml = newtp->snd_una =
|
|
newtp->snd_nxt = newtp->snd_up = treq->snt_isn + 1;
|
|
|
|
tcp_prequeue_init(newtp);
|
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&newtp->tsq_node);
|
|
|
|
tcp_init_wl(newtp, treq->rcv_isn);
|
|
|
|
newtp->srtt_us = 0;
|
|
newtp->mdev_us = jiffies_to_usecs(TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
|
|
minmax_reset(&newtp->rtt_min, tcp_time_stamp, ~0U);
|
|
newicsk->icsk_rto = TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT;
|
|
newicsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime = tcp_time_stamp;
|
|
|
|
newtp->packets_out = 0;
|
|
newtp->retrans_out = 0;
|
|
newtp->sacked_out = 0;
|
|
newtp->fackets_out = 0;
|
|
newtp->snd_ssthresh = TCP_INFINITE_SSTHRESH;
|
|
newtp->tlp_high_seq = 0;
|
|
newtp->lsndtime = treq->snt_synack.stamp_jiffies;
|
|
newsk->sk_txhash = treq->txhash;
|
|
newtp->last_oow_ack_time = 0;
|
|
newtp->total_retrans = req->num_retrans;
|
|
|
|
/* So many TCP implementations out there (incorrectly) count the
|
|
* initial SYN frame in their delayed-ACK and congestion control
|
|
* algorithms that we must have the following bandaid to talk
|
|
* efficiently to them. -DaveM
|
|
*/
|
|
newtp->snd_cwnd = TCP_INIT_CWND;
|
|
newtp->snd_cwnd_cnt = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* There's a bubble in the pipe until at least the first ACK. */
|
|
newtp->app_limited = ~0U;
|
|
|
|
tcp_init_xmit_timers(newsk);
|
|
newtp->write_seq = newtp->pushed_seq = treq->snt_isn + 1;
|
|
|
|
newtp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp = 0;
|
|
|
|
newtp->rx_opt.dsack = 0;
|
|
newtp->rx_opt.num_sacks = 0;
|
|
|
|
newtp->urg_data = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (sock_flag(newsk, SOCK_KEEPOPEN))
|
|
inet_csk_reset_keepalive_timer(newsk,
|
|
keepalive_time_when(newtp));
|
|
|
|
newtp->rx_opt.tstamp_ok = ireq->tstamp_ok;
|
|
if ((newtp->rx_opt.sack_ok = ireq->sack_ok) != 0) {
|
|
if (sysctl_tcp_fack)
|
|
tcp_enable_fack(newtp);
|
|
}
|
|
newtp->window_clamp = req->rsk_window_clamp;
|
|
newtp->rcv_ssthresh = req->rsk_rcv_wnd;
|
|
newtp->rcv_wnd = req->rsk_rcv_wnd;
|
|
newtp->rx_opt.wscale_ok = ireq->wscale_ok;
|
|
if (newtp->rx_opt.wscale_ok) {
|
|
newtp->rx_opt.snd_wscale = ireq->snd_wscale;
|
|
newtp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale = ireq->rcv_wscale;
|
|
} else {
|
|
newtp->rx_opt.snd_wscale = newtp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale = 0;
|
|
newtp->window_clamp = min(newtp->window_clamp, 65535U);
|
|
}
|
|
newtp->snd_wnd = (ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->window) <<
|
|
newtp->rx_opt.snd_wscale);
|
|
newtp->max_window = newtp->snd_wnd;
|
|
|
|
if (newtp->rx_opt.tstamp_ok) {
|
|
newtp->rx_opt.ts_recent = req->ts_recent;
|
|
newtp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = get_seconds();
|
|
newtp->tcp_header_len = sizeof(struct tcphdr) + TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED;
|
|
} else {
|
|
newtp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = 0;
|
|
newtp->tcp_header_len = sizeof(struct tcphdr);
|
|
}
|
|
newtp->tsoffset = treq->ts_off;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
|
|
newtp->md5sig_info = NULL; /*XXX*/
|
|
if (newtp->af_specific->md5_lookup(sk, newsk))
|
|
newtp->tcp_header_len += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (skb->len >= TCP_MSS_DEFAULT + newtp->tcp_header_len)
|
|
newicsk->icsk_ack.last_seg_size = skb->len - newtp->tcp_header_len;
|
|
newtp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = req->mss;
|
|
tcp_ecn_openreq_child(newtp, req);
|
|
newtp->fastopen_req = NULL;
|
|
newtp->fastopen_rsk = NULL;
|
|
newtp->syn_data_acked = 0;
|
|
newtp->rack.mstamp.v64 = 0;
|
|
newtp->rack.advanced = 0;
|
|
|
|
__TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_PASSIVEOPENS);
|
|
}
|
|
return newsk;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_create_openreq_child);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Process an incoming packet for SYN_RECV sockets represented as a
|
|
* request_sock. Normally sk is the listener socket but for TFO it
|
|
* points to the child socket.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX (TFO) - The current impl contains a special check for ack
|
|
* validation and inside tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack(). Can we do better?
|
|
*
|
|
* We don't need to initialize tmp_opt.sack_ok as we don't use the results
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
struct request_sock *req,
|
|
bool fastopen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
|
|
struct sock *child;
|
|
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
|
|
__be32 flg = tcp_flag_word(th) & (TCP_FLAG_RST|TCP_FLAG_SYN|TCP_FLAG_ACK);
|
|
bool paws_reject = false;
|
|
bool own_req;
|
|
|
|
tmp_opt.saw_tstamp = 0;
|
|
if (th->doff > (sizeof(struct tcphdr)>>2)) {
|
|
tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp) {
|
|
tmp_opt.ts_recent = req->ts_recent;
|
|
if (tmp_opt.rcv_tsecr)
|
|
tmp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off;
|
|
/* We do not store true stamp, but it is not required,
|
|
* it can be estimated (approximately)
|
|
* from another data.
|
|
*/
|
|
tmp_opt.ts_recent_stamp = get_seconds() - ((TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT/HZ)<<req->num_timeout);
|
|
paws_reject = tcp_paws_reject(&tmp_opt, th->rst);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check for pure retransmitted SYN. */
|
|
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn &&
|
|
flg == TCP_FLAG_SYN &&
|
|
!paws_reject) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC793 draws (Incorrectly! It was fixed in RFC1122)
|
|
* this case on figure 6 and figure 8, but formal
|
|
* protocol description says NOTHING.
|
|
* To be more exact, it says that we should send ACK,
|
|
* because this segment (at least, if it has no data)
|
|
* is out of window.
|
|
*
|
|
* CONCLUSION: RFC793 (even with RFC1122) DOES NOT
|
|
* describe SYN-RECV state. All the description
|
|
* is wrong, we cannot believe to it and should
|
|
* rely only on common sense and implementation
|
|
* experience.
|
|
*
|
|
* Enforce "SYN-ACK" according to figure 8, figure 6
|
|
* of RFC793, fixed by RFC1122.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that even if there is new data in the SYN packet
|
|
* they will be thrown away too.
|
|
*
|
|
* Reset timer after retransmitting SYNACK, similar to
|
|
* the idea of fast retransmit in recovery.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tcp_oow_rate_limited(sock_net(sk), skb,
|
|
LINUX_MIB_TCPACKSKIPPEDSYNRECV,
|
|
&tcp_rsk(req)->last_oow_ack_time) &&
|
|
|
|
!inet_rtx_syn_ack(sk, req)) {
|
|
unsigned long expires = jiffies;
|
|
|
|
expires += min(TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT << req->num_timeout,
|
|
TCP_RTO_MAX);
|
|
if (!fastopen)
|
|
mod_timer_pending(&req->rsk_timer, expires);
|
|
else
|
|
req->rsk_timer.expires = expires;
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Further reproduces section "SEGMENT ARRIVES"
|
|
for state SYN-RECEIVED of RFC793.
|
|
It is broken, however, it does not work only
|
|
when SYNs are crossed.
|
|
|
|
You would think that SYN crossing is impossible here, since
|
|
we should have a SYN_SENT socket (from connect()) on our end,
|
|
but this is not true if the crossed SYNs were sent to both
|
|
ends by a malicious third party. We must defend against this,
|
|
and to do that we first verify the ACK (as per RFC793, page
|
|
36) and reset if it is invalid. Is this a true full defense?
|
|
To convince ourselves, let us consider a way in which the ACK
|
|
test can still pass in this 'malicious crossed SYNs' case.
|
|
Malicious sender sends identical SYNs (and thus identical sequence
|
|
numbers) to both A and B:
|
|
|
|
A: gets SYN, seq=7
|
|
B: gets SYN, seq=7
|
|
|
|
By our good fortune, both A and B select the same initial
|
|
send sequence number of seven :-)
|
|
|
|
A: sends SYN|ACK, seq=7, ack_seq=8
|
|
B: sends SYN|ACK, seq=7, ack_seq=8
|
|
|
|
So we are now A eating this SYN|ACK, ACK test passes. So
|
|
does sequence test, SYN is truncated, and thus we consider
|
|
it a bare ACK.
|
|
|
|
If icsk->icsk_accept_queue.rskq_defer_accept, we silently drop this
|
|
bare ACK. Otherwise, we create an established connection. Both
|
|
ends (listening sockets) accept the new incoming connection and try
|
|
to talk to each other. 8-)
|
|
|
|
Note: This case is both harmless, and rare. Possibility is about the
|
|
same as us discovering intelligent life on another plant tomorrow.
|
|
|
|
But generally, we should (RFC lies!) to accept ACK
|
|
from SYNACK both here and in tcp_rcv_state_process().
|
|
tcp_rcv_state_process() does not, hence, we do not too.
|
|
|
|
Note that the case is absolutely generic:
|
|
we cannot optimize anything here without
|
|
violating protocol. All the checks must be made
|
|
before attempt to create socket.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* RFC793 page 36: "If the connection is in any non-synchronized state ...
|
|
* and the incoming segment acknowledges something not yet
|
|
* sent (the segment carries an unacceptable ACK) ...
|
|
* a reset is sent."
|
|
*
|
|
* Invalid ACK: reset will be sent by listening socket.
|
|
* Note that the ACK validity check for a Fast Open socket is done
|
|
* elsewhere and is checked directly against the child socket rather
|
|
* than req because user data may have been sent out.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((flg & TCP_FLAG_ACK) && !fastopen &&
|
|
(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq !=
|
|
tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn + 1))
|
|
return sk;
|
|
|
|
/* Also, it would be not so bad idea to check rcv_tsecr, which
|
|
* is essentially ACK extension and too early or too late values
|
|
* should cause reset in unsynchronized states.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* RFC793: "first check sequence number". */
|
|
|
|
if (paws_reject || !tcp_in_window(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq,
|
|
tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt, tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt + req->rsk_rcv_wnd)) {
|
|
/* Out of window: send ACK and drop. */
|
|
if (!(flg & TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
|
|
!tcp_oow_rate_limited(sock_net(sk), skb,
|
|
LINUX_MIB_TCPACKSKIPPEDSYNRECV,
|
|
&tcp_rsk(req)->last_oow_ack_time))
|
|
req->rsk_ops->send_ack(sk, skb, req);
|
|
if (paws_reject)
|
|
__NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_PAWSESTABREJECTED);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* In sequence, PAWS is OK. */
|
|
|
|
if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp && !after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt))
|
|
req->ts_recent = tmp_opt.rcv_tsval;
|
|
|
|
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn) {
|
|
/* Truncate SYN, it is out of window starting
|
|
at tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn + 1. */
|
|
flg &= ~TCP_FLAG_SYN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* RFC793: "second check the RST bit" and
|
|
* "fourth, check the SYN bit"
|
|
*/
|
|
if (flg & (TCP_FLAG_RST|TCP_FLAG_SYN)) {
|
|
__TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_ATTEMPTFAILS);
|
|
goto embryonic_reset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ACK sequence verified above, just make sure ACK is
|
|
* set. If ACK not set, just silently drop the packet.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX (TFO) - if we ever allow "data after SYN", the
|
|
* following check needs to be removed.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(flg & TCP_FLAG_ACK))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* For Fast Open no more processing is needed (sk is the
|
|
* child socket).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (fastopen)
|
|
return sk;
|
|
|
|
/* While TCP_DEFER_ACCEPT is active, drop bare ACK. */
|
|
if (req->num_timeout < inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue.rskq_defer_accept &&
|
|
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq == tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn + 1) {
|
|
inet_rsk(req)->acked = 1;
|
|
__NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPDEFERACCEPTDROP);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* OK, ACK is valid, create big socket and
|
|
* feed this segment to it. It will repeat all
|
|
* the tests. THIS SEGMENT MUST MOVE SOCKET TO
|
|
* ESTABLISHED STATE. If it will be dropped after
|
|
* socket is created, wait for troubles.
|
|
*/
|
|
child = inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, NULL,
|
|
req, &own_req);
|
|
if (!child)
|
|
goto listen_overflow;
|
|
|
|
sock_rps_save_rxhash(child, skb);
|
|
tcp_synack_rtt_meas(child, req);
|
|
return inet_csk_complete_hashdance(sk, child, req, own_req);
|
|
|
|
listen_overflow:
|
|
if (!sysctl_tcp_abort_on_overflow) {
|
|
inet_rsk(req)->acked = 1;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
embryonic_reset:
|
|
if (!(flg & TCP_FLAG_RST)) {
|
|
/* Received a bad SYN pkt - for TFO We try not to reset
|
|
* the local connection unless it's really necessary to
|
|
* avoid becoming vulnerable to outside attack aiming at
|
|
* resetting legit local connections.
|
|
*/
|
|
req->rsk_ops->send_reset(sk, skb);
|
|
} else if (fastopen) { /* received a valid RST pkt */
|
|
reqsk_fastopen_remove(sk, req, true);
|
|
tcp_reset(sk);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!fastopen) {
|
|
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(sk, req);
|
|
__NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_EMBRYONICRSTS);
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_check_req);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Queue segment on the new socket if the new socket is active,
|
|
* otherwise we just shortcircuit this and continue with
|
|
* the new socket.
|
|
*
|
|
* For the vast majority of cases child->sk_state will be TCP_SYN_RECV
|
|
* when entering. But other states are possible due to a race condition
|
|
* where after __inet_lookup_established() fails but before the listener
|
|
* locked is obtained, other packets cause the same connection to
|
|
* be created.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int tcp_child_process(struct sock *parent, struct sock *child,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
int state = child->sk_state;
|
|
|
|
/* record NAPI ID of child */
|
|
sk_mark_napi_id(child, skb);
|
|
|
|
tcp_segs_in(tcp_sk(child), skb);
|
|
if (!sock_owned_by_user(child)) {
|
|
ret = tcp_rcv_state_process(child, skb);
|
|
/* Wakeup parent, send SIGIO */
|
|
if (state == TCP_SYN_RECV && child->sk_state != state)
|
|
parent->sk_data_ready(parent);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Alas, it is possible again, because we do lookup
|
|
* in main socket hash table and lock on listening
|
|
* socket does not protect us more.
|
|
*/
|
|
__sk_add_backlog(child, skb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bh_unlock_sock(child);
|
|
sock_put(child);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_child_process);
|