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7f5d465f4d
I think we need to soften the language a bit. It might scare folks off, especially the: We prefer to fully disclose the bug as soon as possible. which is not really the case. Linus says: It's not full disclosure, it's not coordinated disclosure, and it's not "no disclosure". It's more like just "timely open fixes". I changed a bit of the wording in here, but mostly to remove the word "disclosure" since it seems to mean very specific things to people that we do not mean here. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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.. _securitybugs:
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Security bugs
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=============
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Linux kernel developers take security very seriously. As such, we'd
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like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and
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disclosed as quickly as possible. Please report security bugs to the
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Linux kernel security team.
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Contact
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-------
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The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at
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<security@kernel.org>. This is a private list of security officers
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who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix.
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If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as
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that can speed up the process considerably. It is possible that the
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security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to
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understand and fix the security vulnerability.
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As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it
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will be to diagnose and fix. Please review the procedure outlined in
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admin-guide/reporting-bugs.rst if you are unclear about what
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information is helpful. Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
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be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
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made public.
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Disclosure
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----------
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The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the bug
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submitter to understand and fix the bug. We prefer to publish the fix as
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soon as possible, but try to avoid public discussion of the bug itself
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and leave that to others.
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Publishing the fix may be delayed when the bug or the fix is not yet
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fully understood, the solution is not well-tested or for vendor
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coordination. However, we expect these delays to be short, measurable in
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days, not weeks or months. A release date is negotiated by the security
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team working with the bug submitter as well as vendors. However, the
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kernel security team holds the final say when setting a timeframe. The
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timeframe varies from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known bug)
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to a few weeks. As a basic default policy, we expect report date to
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release date to be on the order of 7 days.
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Coordination
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------------
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Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege
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escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private
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<linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors
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are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the
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upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and
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will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update
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publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate,
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the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can
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include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
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the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
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<http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>
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CVE assignment
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--------------
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The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them
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for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and
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may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
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assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private
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linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known
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before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit
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message, though.
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Non-disclosure agreements
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-------------------------
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The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable
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to enter any non-disclosure agreements.
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