linux_dsm_epyc7002/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
Linus Torvalds da9803dfd3 This feature enhances the current guest memory encryption support
called SEV by also encrypting the guest register state, making the
 registers inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
 switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
 exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.
 
 With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
 hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
 mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
 Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
 Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared between
 the guest and the hypervisor.
 
 Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest so
 in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init code
 needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself, brings
 a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early boot code
 like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand building of the
 identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do not use the EFI
 page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled one.
 
 The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
 mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly
 separate from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
 SEV-ES-specific files:
 
  arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
  arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
 
 Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and behind
 static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES setups.
 
 Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others.
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Merge tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov:
 "SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV
  by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers
  inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
  switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
  exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.

  With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
  hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
  mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
  Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
  Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared
  between the guest and the hypervisor.

  Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest
  so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init
  code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself,
  brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early
  boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand
  building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do
  not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled
  one.

  The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
  mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate
  from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
  SEV-ES-specific files:

    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
    arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c

  Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and
  behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES
  setups.

  Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others"

* tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits)
  x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer
  x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES
  x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
  x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
  x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online
  x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
  x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
  x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
  x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point
  x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
  x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
  x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events
  x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events
  ...
2020-10-14 10:21:34 -07:00

354 lines
9.5 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Interrupt descriptor table related code
*/
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/proto.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/hw_irq.h>
#define DPL0 0x0
#define DPL3 0x3
#define DEFAULT_STACK 0
#define G(_vector, _addr, _ist, _type, _dpl, _segment) \
{ \
.vector = _vector, \
.bits.ist = _ist, \
.bits.type = _type, \
.bits.dpl = _dpl, \
.bits.p = 1, \
.addr = _addr, \
.segment = _segment, \
}
/* Interrupt gate */
#define INTG(_vector, _addr) \
G(_vector, _addr, DEFAULT_STACK, GATE_INTERRUPT, DPL0, __KERNEL_CS)
/* System interrupt gate */
#define SYSG(_vector, _addr) \
G(_vector, _addr, DEFAULT_STACK, GATE_INTERRUPT, DPL3, __KERNEL_CS)
/*
* Interrupt gate with interrupt stack. The _ist index is the index in
* the tss.ist[] array, but for the descriptor it needs to start at 1.
*/
#define ISTG(_vector, _addr, _ist) \
G(_vector, _addr, _ist + 1, GATE_INTERRUPT, DPL0, __KERNEL_CS)
/* Task gate */
#define TSKG(_vector, _gdt) \
G(_vector, NULL, DEFAULT_STACK, GATE_TASK, DPL0, _gdt << 3)
#define IDT_TABLE_SIZE (IDT_ENTRIES * sizeof(gate_desc))
static bool idt_setup_done __initdata;
/*
* Early traps running on the DEFAULT_STACK because the other interrupt
* stacks work only after cpu_init().
*/
static const __initconst struct idt_data early_idts[] = {
INTG(X86_TRAP_DB, asm_exc_debug),
SYSG(X86_TRAP_BP, asm_exc_int3),
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Not possible on 64-bit. See idt_setup_early_pf() for details.
*/
INTG(X86_TRAP_PF, asm_exc_page_fault),
#endif
};
/*
* The default IDT entries which are set up in trap_init() before
* cpu_init() is invoked. Interrupt stacks cannot be used at that point and
* the traps which use them are reinitialized with IST after cpu_init() has
* set up TSS.
*/
static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
INTG(X86_TRAP_DE, asm_exc_divide_error),
INTG(X86_TRAP_NMI, asm_exc_nmi),
INTG(X86_TRAP_BR, asm_exc_bounds),
INTG(X86_TRAP_UD, asm_exc_invalid_op),
INTG(X86_TRAP_NM, asm_exc_device_not_available),
INTG(X86_TRAP_OLD_MF, asm_exc_coproc_segment_overrun),
INTG(X86_TRAP_TS, asm_exc_invalid_tss),
INTG(X86_TRAP_NP, asm_exc_segment_not_present),
INTG(X86_TRAP_SS, asm_exc_stack_segment),
INTG(X86_TRAP_GP, asm_exc_general_protection),
INTG(X86_TRAP_SPURIOUS, asm_exc_spurious_interrupt_bug),
INTG(X86_TRAP_MF, asm_exc_coprocessor_error),
INTG(X86_TRAP_AC, asm_exc_alignment_check),
INTG(X86_TRAP_XF, asm_exc_simd_coprocessor_error),
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
TSKG(X86_TRAP_DF, GDT_ENTRY_DOUBLEFAULT_TSS),
#else
INTG(X86_TRAP_DF, asm_exc_double_fault),
#endif
INTG(X86_TRAP_DB, asm_exc_debug),
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
INTG(X86_TRAP_MC, asm_exc_machine_check),
#endif
SYSG(X86_TRAP_OF, asm_exc_overflow),
#if defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)
SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR, entry_INT80_compat),
#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR, entry_INT80_32),
#endif
};
/*
* The APIC and SMP idt entries
*/
static const __initconst struct idt_data apic_idts[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
INTG(RESCHEDULE_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_reschedule_ipi),
INTG(CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_call_function),
INTG(CALL_FUNCTION_SINGLE_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_call_function_single),
INTG(IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_irq_move_cleanup),
INTG(REBOOT_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_reboot),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_THERMAL_VECTOR
INTG(THERMAL_APIC_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_thermal),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE_THRESHOLD
INTG(THRESHOLD_APIC_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_threshold),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE_AMD
INTG(DEFERRED_ERROR_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_deferred_error),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
INTG(LOCAL_TIMER_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt),
INTG(X86_PLATFORM_IPI_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_x86_platform_ipi),
# ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM
INTG(POSTED_INTR_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_kvm_posted_intr_ipi),
INTG(POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_kvm_posted_intr_wakeup_ipi),
INTG(POSTED_INTR_NESTED_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_kvm_posted_intr_nested_ipi),
# endif
# ifdef CONFIG_IRQ_WORK
INTG(IRQ_WORK_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_irq_work),
# endif
INTG(SPURIOUS_APIC_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_spurious_apic_interrupt),
INTG(ERROR_APIC_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_error_interrupt),
#endif
};
/* Must be page-aligned because the real IDT is used in the cpu entry area */
static gate_desc idt_table[IDT_ENTRIES] __page_aligned_bss;
static struct desc_ptr idt_descr __ro_after_init = {
.size = IDT_TABLE_SIZE - 1,
.address = (unsigned long) idt_table,
};
void load_current_idt(void)
{
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
load_idt(&idt_descr);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG
bool idt_is_f00f_address(unsigned long address)
{
return ((address - idt_descr.address) >> 3) == 6;
}
#endif
static __init void
idt_setup_from_table(gate_desc *idt, const struct idt_data *t, int size, bool sys)
{
gate_desc desc;
for (; size > 0; t++, size--) {
idt_init_desc(&desc, t);
write_idt_entry(idt, t->vector, &desc);
if (sys)
set_bit(t->vector, system_vectors);
}
}
static __init void set_intr_gate(unsigned int n, const void *addr)
{
struct idt_data data;
init_idt_data(&data, n, addr);
idt_setup_from_table(idt_table, &data, 1, false);
}
/**
* idt_setup_early_traps - Initialize the idt table with early traps
*
* On X8664 these traps do not use interrupt stacks as they can't work
* before cpu_init() is invoked and sets up TSS. The IST variants are
* installed after that.
*/
void __init idt_setup_early_traps(void)
{
idt_setup_from_table(idt_table, early_idts, ARRAY_SIZE(early_idts),
true);
load_idt(&idt_descr);
}
/**
* idt_setup_traps - Initialize the idt table with default traps
*/
void __init idt_setup_traps(void)
{
idt_setup_from_table(idt_table, def_idts, ARRAY_SIZE(def_idts), true);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Early traps running on the DEFAULT_STACK because the other interrupt
* stacks work only after cpu_init().
*/
static const __initconst struct idt_data early_pf_idts[] = {
INTG(X86_TRAP_PF, asm_exc_page_fault),
};
/*
* The exceptions which use Interrupt stacks. They are setup after
* cpu_init() when the TSS has been initialized.
*/
static const __initconst struct idt_data ist_idts[] = {
ISTG(X86_TRAP_DB, asm_exc_debug, IST_INDEX_DB),
ISTG(X86_TRAP_NMI, asm_exc_nmi, IST_INDEX_NMI),
ISTG(X86_TRAP_DF, asm_exc_double_fault, IST_INDEX_DF),
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
ISTG(X86_TRAP_MC, asm_exc_machine_check, IST_INDEX_MCE),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
ISTG(X86_TRAP_VC, asm_exc_vmm_communication, IST_INDEX_VC),
#endif
};
/**
* idt_setup_early_pf - Initialize the idt table with early pagefault handler
*
* On X8664 this does not use interrupt stacks as they can't work before
* cpu_init() is invoked and sets up TSS. The IST variant is installed
* after that.
*
* Note, that X86_64 cannot install the real #PF handler in
* idt_setup_early_traps() because the memory intialization needs the #PF
* handler from the early_idt_handler_array to initialize the early page
* tables.
*/
void __init idt_setup_early_pf(void)
{
idt_setup_from_table(idt_table, early_pf_idts,
ARRAY_SIZE(early_pf_idts), true);
}
/**
* idt_setup_ist_traps - Initialize the idt table with traps using IST
*/
void __init idt_setup_ist_traps(void)
{
idt_setup_from_table(idt_table, ist_idts, ARRAY_SIZE(ist_idts), true);
}
#endif
static void __init idt_map_in_cea(void)
{
/*
* Set the IDT descriptor to a fixed read-only location in the cpu
* entry area, so that the "sidt" instruction will not leak the
* location of the kernel, and to defend the IDT against arbitrary
* memory write vulnerabilities.
*/
cea_set_pte(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_RO_IDT_VADDR, __pa_symbol(idt_table),
PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
idt_descr.address = CPU_ENTRY_AREA_RO_IDT;
}
/**
* idt_setup_apic_and_irq_gates - Setup APIC/SMP and normal interrupt gates
*/
void __init idt_setup_apic_and_irq_gates(void)
{
int i = FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR;
void *entry;
idt_setup_from_table(idt_table, apic_idts, ARRAY_SIZE(apic_idts), true);
for_each_clear_bit_from(i, system_vectors, FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR) {
entry = irq_entries_start + 8 * (i - FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR);
set_intr_gate(i, entry);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
for_each_clear_bit_from(i, system_vectors, NR_VECTORS) {
/*
* Don't set the non assigned system vectors in the
* system_vectors bitmap. Otherwise they show up in
* /proc/interrupts.
*/
entry = spurious_entries_start + 8 * (i - FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR);
set_intr_gate(i, entry);
}
#endif
/* Map IDT into CPU entry area and reload it. */
idt_map_in_cea();
load_idt(&idt_descr);
/* Make the IDT table read only */
set_memory_ro((unsigned long)&idt_table, 1);
idt_setup_done = true;
}
/**
* idt_setup_early_handler - Initializes the idt table with early handlers
*/
void __init idt_setup_early_handler(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS; i++)
set_intr_gate(i, early_idt_handler_array[i]);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
for ( ; i < NR_VECTORS; i++)
set_intr_gate(i, early_ignore_irq);
#endif
load_idt(&idt_descr);
}
/**
* idt_invalidate - Invalidate interrupt descriptor table
* @addr: The virtual address of the 'invalid' IDT
*/
void idt_invalidate(void *addr)
{
struct desc_ptr idt = { .address = (unsigned long) addr, .size = 0 };
load_idt(&idt);
}
void __init alloc_intr_gate(unsigned int n, const void *addr)
{
if (WARN_ON(n < FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR))
return;
if (WARN_ON(idt_setup_done))
return;
if (!WARN_ON(test_and_set_bit(n, system_vectors)))
set_intr_gate(n, addr);
}