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2da473e59e
commit 159e1de201b6fca10bfec50405a3b53a561096a8 upstream. It's possible to create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file concurrently with adding the encryption key. Specifically, sys_open(O_CREAT) (or sys_mkdir(), sys_mknod(), or sys_symlink()) can lookup the target filename while the directory's encryption key hasn't been added yet, resulting in a negative no-key dentry. The VFS then calls ->create() (or ->mkdir(), ->mknod(), or ->symlink()) because the dentry is negative. Normally, ->create() would return -ENOKEY due to the directory's key being unavailable. However, if the key was added between the dentry lookup and ->create(), then the filesystem will go ahead and try to create the file. If the target filename happens to already exist as a normal name (not a no-key name), a duplicate filename may be added to the directory. In order to fix this, we need to fix the filesystems to prevent ->create(), ->mkdir(), ->mknod(), and ->symlink() on no-key names. (->rename() and ->link() need it too, but those are already handled correctly by fscrypt_prepare_rename() and fscrypt_prepare_link().) In preparation for this, add a helper function fscrypt_is_nokey_name() that filesystems can use to do this check. Use this helper function for the existing checks that fs/crypto/ does for rename and link. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-2-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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| .. | ||
| bio.c | ||
| crypto.c | ||
| fname.c | ||
| fscrypt_private.h | ||
| hkdf.c | ||
| hooks.c | ||
| inline_crypt.c | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| keyring.c | ||
| keysetup_v1.c | ||
| keysetup.c | ||
| Makefile | ||
| policy.c | ||