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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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63bcff2a30
When Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is enabled, access to userspace from the kernel is controlled by the AC flag. To make the performance of manipulating that flag acceptable, there are two new instructions, STAC and CLAC, to set and clear it. This patch adds those instructions, via alternative(), when the SMAP feature is enabled. It also adds X86_EFLAGS_AC unconditionally to the SYSCALL entry mask; there is simply no reason to make that one conditional. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1348256595-29119-9-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
90 lines
2.1 KiB
C
90 lines
2.1 KiB
C
/*
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* User address space access functions.
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*
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* Copyright 1997 Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
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* Copyright 1997 Linus Torvalds
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* Copyright 2002 Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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/*
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* Zero Userspace
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*/
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unsigned long __clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
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{
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long __d0;
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might_fault();
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/* no memory constraint because it doesn't change any memory gcc knows
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about */
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stac();
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asm volatile(
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" testq %[size8],%[size8]\n"
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" jz 4f\n"
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"0: movq %[zero],(%[dst])\n"
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" addq %[eight],%[dst]\n"
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" decl %%ecx ; jnz 0b\n"
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"4: movq %[size1],%%rcx\n"
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" testl %%ecx,%%ecx\n"
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" jz 2f\n"
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"1: movb %b[zero],(%[dst])\n"
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" incq %[dst]\n"
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" decl %%ecx ; jnz 1b\n"
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"2:\n"
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".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
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"3: lea 0(%[size1],%[size8],8),%[size8]\n"
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" jmp 2b\n"
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".previous\n"
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_ASM_EXTABLE(0b,3b)
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_ASM_EXTABLE(1b,2b)
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: [size8] "=&c"(size), [dst] "=&D" (__d0)
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: [size1] "r"(size & 7), "[size8]" (size / 8), "[dst]"(addr),
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[zero] "r" (0UL), [eight] "r" (8UL));
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clac();
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return size;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(__clear_user);
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unsigned long clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
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{
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if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
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return __clear_user(to, n);
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return n;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(clear_user);
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unsigned long copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned len)
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{
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if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, len) && access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, len)) {
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return copy_user_generic((__force void *)to, (__force void *)from, len);
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}
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return len;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_in_user);
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/*
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* Try to copy last bytes and clear the rest if needed.
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* Since protection fault in copy_from/to_user is not a normal situation,
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* it is not necessary to optimize tail handling.
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*/
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unsigned long
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copy_user_handle_tail(char *to, char *from, unsigned len, unsigned zerorest)
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{
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char c;
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unsigned zero_len;
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for (; len; --len) {
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if (__get_user_nocheck(c, from++, sizeof(char)))
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break;
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if (__put_user_nocheck(c, to++, sizeof(char)))
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break;
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}
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for (c = 0, zero_len = len; zerorest && zero_len; --zero_len)
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if (__put_user_nocheck(c, to++, sizeof(char)))
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break;
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clac();
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return len;
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}
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