mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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7794b1d418
Highlights: - Infrastructure for secure boot on some bare metal Power9 machines. The firmware support is still in development, so the code here won't actually activate secure boot on any existing systems. - A change to xmon (our crash handler / pseudo-debugger) to restrict it to read-only mode when the kernel is lockdown'ed, otherwise it's trivial to drop into xmon and modify kernel data, such as the lockdown state. - Support for KASLR on 32-bit BookE machines (Freescale / NXP). - Fixes for our flush_icache_range() and __kernel_sync_dicache() (VDSO) to work with memory ranges >4GB. - Some reworks of the pseries CMM (Cooperative Memory Management) driver to make it behave more like other balloon drivers and enable some cleanups of generic mm code. - A series of fixes to our hardware breakpoint support to properly handle unaligned watchpoint addresses. Plus a bunch of other smaller improvements, fixes and cleanups. Thanks to: Alastair D'Silva, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anthony Steinhauser, Cédric Le Goater, Chris Packham, Chris Smart, Christophe Leroy, Christopher M. Riedl, Christoph Hellwig, Claudio Carvalho, Daniel Axtens, David Hildenbrand, Deb McLemore, Diana Craciun, Eric Richter, Geert Uytterhoeven, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Greg Kurz, Gustavo L. F. Walbon, Hari Bathini, Harish, Jason Yan, Krzysztof Kozlowski, Leonardo Bras, Mathieu Malaterre, Mauro S. M. Rodrigues, Michal Suchanek, Mimi Zohar, Nathan Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Nayna Jain, Nick Desaulniers, Oliver O'Halloran, Qian Cai, Rasmus Villemoes, Ravi Bangoria, Sam Bobroff, Santosh Sivaraj, Scott Wood, Thomas Huth, Tyrel Datwyler, Vaibhav Jain, Valentin Longchamp, YueHaibing. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJHBAABCAAxFiEEJFGtCPCthwEv2Y/bUevqPMjhpYAFAl3hBycTHG1wZUBlbGxl cm1hbi5pZC5hdQAKCRBR6+o8yOGlgApBEACk91MEQDYJ9MF9I6uN+85qb5p4pMsp rGzqnpt+XFidbDAc3eP63pYfIDSo3jtkQ2YL7shAnDOTvkO0md+Vqkl9Aq/G6FIf lDBlwbgkXMSxS/O2Lpvfn4NZAoK6dKmiV55LSgfliM62X3e2Saeg6TR55wBTgJ6/ SlYPDwZfcVHOAiFS3UmfB+hkiIZk+AI5Zr5VAZvT2ZmeH36yAWkq4JgJI1uAk6m1 /7iCnlfUjx/nl/BhnA3kjjmAgGCJ5s/WuVgwFMz47XpMBWGBhLWpMh/NqDTFb8ca kpiVQoVPQe2xyO3pL/kOwBy6sii26ftfHDhLKMy1hJdEhVQzS5LerPIMeh1qsU8Q hV/Cj+jfsrS/vBDOehj3jwx93t+861PmTOqgLnpYQ6Ltrt+2B/74+fufGMHE1kI3 Ffo7xvNw4sw6bSziDxDFqUx2P1dFN5D5EJsJsYM98ekkVAAkzNqCDRvfD2QI8Pif VXWPYXqtNJTrVPJA0D7Yfo9FDNwhANd0f1zi7r/U5mVXBFUyKOlGqTQSkXgMrVeK 3I7wHPOVGgdA5UUkfcd3pcuqsY081U9E//o5PUfj8ybO5JCwly8NoatbG+xHmKia a72uJT8MjCo9mGCHKDrwi9l/kqms6ZSv8RP+yMhGuB52YoiGc6PpVyab5jXIUd1N yTtBlC0YGW1JYw== =JHzg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'powerpc-5.5-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman: "Highlights: - Infrastructure for secure boot on some bare metal Power9 machines. The firmware support is still in development, so the code here won't actually activate secure boot on any existing systems. - A change to xmon (our crash handler / pseudo-debugger) to restrict it to read-only mode when the kernel is lockdown'ed, otherwise it's trivial to drop into xmon and modify kernel data, such as the lockdown state. - Support for KASLR on 32-bit BookE machines (Freescale / NXP). - Fixes for our flush_icache_range() and __kernel_sync_dicache() (VDSO) to work with memory ranges >4GB. - Some reworks of the pseries CMM (Cooperative Memory Management) driver to make it behave more like other balloon drivers and enable some cleanups of generic mm code. - A series of fixes to our hardware breakpoint support to properly handle unaligned watchpoint addresses. Plus a bunch of other smaller improvements, fixes and cleanups. Thanks to: Alastair D'Silva, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anthony Steinhauser, Cédric Le Goater, Chris Packham, Chris Smart, Christophe Leroy, Christopher M. Riedl, Christoph Hellwig, Claudio Carvalho, Daniel Axtens, David Hildenbrand, Deb McLemore, Diana Craciun, Eric Richter, Geert Uytterhoeven, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Greg Kurz, Gustavo L. F. Walbon, Hari Bathini, Harish, Jason Yan, Krzysztof Kozlowski, Leonardo Bras, Mathieu Malaterre, Mauro S. M. Rodrigues, Michal Suchanek, Mimi Zohar, Nathan Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Nayna Jain, Nick Desaulniers, Oliver O'Halloran, Qian Cai, Rasmus Villemoes, Ravi Bangoria, Sam Bobroff, Santosh Sivaraj, Scott Wood, Thomas Huth, Tyrel Datwyler, Vaibhav Jain, Valentin Longchamp, YueHaibing" * tag 'powerpc-5.5-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (144 commits) powerpc/fixmap: fix crash with HIGHMEM x86/efi: remove unused variables powerpc: Define arch_is_kernel_initmem_freed() for lockdep powerpc/prom_init: Use -ffreestanding to avoid a reference to bcmp powerpc: Avoid clang warnings around setjmp and longjmp powerpc: Don't add -mabi= flags when building with Clang powerpc: Fix Kconfig indentation powerpc/fixmap: don't clear fixmap area in paging_init() selftests/powerpc: spectre_v2 test must be built 64-bit powerpc/powernv: Disable native PCIe port management powerpc/kexec: Move kexec files into a dedicated subdir. powerpc/32: Split kexec low level code out of misc_32.S powerpc/sysdev: drop simple gpio powerpc/83xx: map IMMR with a BAT. powerpc/32s: automatically allocate BAT in setbat() powerpc/ioremap: warn on early use of ioremap() powerpc: Add support for GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP powerpc/fixmap: Use __fix_to_virt() instead of fix_to_virt() powerpc/8xx: use the fixmapped IMMR in cpm_reset() powerpc/8xx: add __init to cpm1 init functions ...
195 lines
5.3 KiB
C
195 lines
5.3 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/* Lock down the kernel
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
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static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down;
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static const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
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[LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
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[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
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[LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
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[LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
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[LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
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[LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
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[LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
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[LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
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[LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
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[LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables",
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[LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
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[LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
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[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
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[LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
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[LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
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[LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
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[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
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[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
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[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
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[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
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[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
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[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
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[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
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[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
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};
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static const enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE,
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LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
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LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX};
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/*
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* Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
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*/
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static int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
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{
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if (kernel_locked_down >= level)
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return -EPERM;
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kernel_locked_down = level;
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pr_notice("Kernel is locked down from %s; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
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where);
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return 0;
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}
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static int __init lockdown_param(char *level)
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{
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if (!level)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (strcmp(level, "integrity") == 0)
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lock_kernel_down("command line", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
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else if (strcmp(level, "confidentiality") == 0)
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lock_kernel_down("command line", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
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else
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return -EINVAL;
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return 0;
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}
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early_param("lockdown", lockdown_param);
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/**
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* lockdown_is_locked_down - Find out if the kernel is locked down
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* @what: Tag to use in notice generated if lockdown is in effect
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*/
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static int lockdown_is_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
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{
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if (WARN(what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
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"Invalid lockdown reason"))
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return -EPERM;
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if (kernel_locked_down >= what) {
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if (lockdown_reasons[what])
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pr_notice("Lockdown: %s: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
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current->comm, lockdown_reasons[what]);
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return -EPERM;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
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LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
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};
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static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
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{
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#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
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lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
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#elif defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY)
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lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
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#endif
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security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
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"lockdown");
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return 0;
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}
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static ssize_t lockdown_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
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loff_t *ppos)
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{
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char temp[80];
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int i, offset = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_levels); i++) {
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enum lockdown_reason level = lockdown_levels[i];
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if (lockdown_reasons[level]) {
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const char *label = lockdown_reasons[level];
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if (kernel_locked_down == level)
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offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "[%s] ", label);
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else
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offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "%s ", label);
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}
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}
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/* Convert the last space to a newline if needed. */
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if (offset > 0)
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temp[offset-1] = '\n';
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return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
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}
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static ssize_t lockdown_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
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size_t n, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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char *state;
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int i, len, err = -EINVAL;
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state = memdup_user_nul(buf, n);
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if (IS_ERR(state))
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return PTR_ERR(state);
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len = strlen(state);
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if (len && state[len-1] == '\n') {
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state[len-1] = '\0';
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len--;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_levels); i++) {
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enum lockdown_reason level = lockdown_levels[i];
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const char *label = lockdown_reasons[level];
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if (label && !strcmp(state, label))
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err = lock_kernel_down("securityfs", level);
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}
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kfree(state);
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return err ? err : n;
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}
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static const struct file_operations lockdown_ops = {
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.read = lockdown_read,
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.write = lockdown_write,
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};
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static int __init lockdown_secfs_init(void)
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{
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struct dentry *dentry;
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dentry = securityfs_create_file("lockdown", 0600, NULL, NULL,
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&lockdown_ops);
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return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(dentry);
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}
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core_initcall(lockdown_secfs_init);
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
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DEFINE_EARLY_LSM(lockdown) = {
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#else
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DEFINE_LSM(lockdown) = {
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#endif
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.name = "lockdown",
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.init = lockdown_lsm_init,
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};
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