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96d4f267e4
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
369 lines
9.2 KiB
C
369 lines
9.2 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2012-2014 Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
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*
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* Based on the original implementation which is:
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* Copyright (C) 2001 Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@suse.de> SuSE
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* Copyright 2003 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs.
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*
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* Parts of the original code have been moved to arch/x86/vdso/vma.c
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*
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* This file implements vsyscall emulation. vsyscalls are a legacy ABI:
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* Userspace can request certain kernel services by calling fixed
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* addresses. This concept is problematic:
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*
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* - It interferes with ASLR.
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* - It's awkward to write code that lives in kernel addresses but is
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* callable by userspace at fixed addresses.
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* - The whole concept is impossible for 32-bit compat userspace.
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* - UML cannot easily virtualize a vsyscall.
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*
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* As of mid-2014, I believe that there is no new userspace code that
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* will use a vsyscall if the vDSO is present. I hope that there will
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* soon be no new userspace code that will ever use a vsyscall.
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*
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* The code in this file emulates vsyscalls when notified of a page
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* fault to a vsyscall address.
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*/
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/timer.h>
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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#include <linux/mm_types.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
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#include <asm/vsyscall.h>
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#include <asm/unistd.h>
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#include <asm/fixmap.h>
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#include <asm/traps.h>
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#include <asm/paravirt.h>
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#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
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#include "vsyscall_trace.h"
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static enum { EMULATE, NONE } vsyscall_mode =
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#ifdef CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE
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NONE;
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#else
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EMULATE;
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#endif
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static int __init vsyscall_setup(char *str)
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{
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if (str) {
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if (!strcmp("emulate", str))
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vsyscall_mode = EMULATE;
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else if (!strcmp("none", str))
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vsyscall_mode = NONE;
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else
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return -EINVAL;
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return 0;
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}
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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early_param("vsyscall", vsyscall_setup);
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static void warn_bad_vsyscall(const char *level, struct pt_regs *regs,
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const char *message)
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{
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if (!show_unhandled_signals)
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return;
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printk_ratelimited("%s%s[%d] %s ip:%lx cs:%lx sp:%lx ax:%lx si:%lx di:%lx\n",
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level, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
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message, regs->ip, regs->cs,
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regs->sp, regs->ax, regs->si, regs->di);
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}
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static int addr_to_vsyscall_nr(unsigned long addr)
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{
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int nr;
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if ((addr & ~0xC00UL) != VSYSCALL_ADDR)
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return -EINVAL;
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nr = (addr & 0xC00UL) >> 10;
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if (nr >= 3)
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return -EINVAL;
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return nr;
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}
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static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size)
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{
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/*
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* XXX: if access_ok, get_user, and put_user handled
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* sig_on_uaccess_err, this could go away.
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*/
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if (!access_ok((void __user *)ptr, size)) {
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struct thread_struct *thread = ¤t->thread;
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thread->error_code = X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_WRITE;
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thread->cr2 = ptr;
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thread->trap_nr = X86_TRAP_PF;
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force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, (void __user *)ptr, current);
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return false;
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} else {
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return true;
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}
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}
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bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
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{
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struct task_struct *tsk;
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unsigned long caller;
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int vsyscall_nr, syscall_nr, tmp;
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int prev_sig_on_uaccess_err;
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long ret;
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unsigned long orig_dx;
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/*
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* No point in checking CS -- the only way to get here is a user mode
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* trap to a high address, which means that we're in 64-bit user code.
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*/
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WARN_ON_ONCE(address != regs->ip);
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if (vsyscall_mode == NONE) {
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warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs,
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"vsyscall attempted with vsyscall=none");
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return false;
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}
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vsyscall_nr = addr_to_vsyscall_nr(address);
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trace_emulate_vsyscall(vsyscall_nr);
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if (vsyscall_nr < 0) {
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warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_WARNING, regs,
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"misaligned vsyscall (exploit attempt or buggy program) -- look up the vsyscall kernel parameter if you need a workaround");
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goto sigsegv;
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}
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if (get_user(caller, (unsigned long __user *)regs->sp) != 0) {
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warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_WARNING, regs,
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"vsyscall with bad stack (exploit attempt?)");
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goto sigsegv;
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}
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tsk = current;
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/*
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* Check for access_ok violations and find the syscall nr.
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*
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* NULL is a valid user pointer (in the access_ok sense) on 32-bit and
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* 64-bit, so we don't need to special-case it here. For all the
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* vsyscalls, NULL means "don't write anything" not "write it at
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* address 0".
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*/
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switch (vsyscall_nr) {
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case 0:
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if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(struct timeval)) ||
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!write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(struct timezone))) {
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ret = -EFAULT;
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goto check_fault;
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}
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syscall_nr = __NR_gettimeofday;
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break;
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case 1:
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if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(time_t))) {
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ret = -EFAULT;
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goto check_fault;
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}
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syscall_nr = __NR_time;
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break;
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case 2:
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if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(unsigned)) ||
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!write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(unsigned))) {
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ret = -EFAULT;
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goto check_fault;
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}
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syscall_nr = __NR_getcpu;
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break;
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}
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/*
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* Handle seccomp. regs->ip must be the original value.
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* See seccomp_send_sigsys and Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst.
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*
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* We could optimize the seccomp disabled case, but performance
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* here doesn't matter.
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*/
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regs->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
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regs->ax = -ENOSYS;
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tmp = secure_computing(NULL);
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if ((!tmp && regs->orig_ax != syscall_nr) || regs->ip != address) {
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warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_DEBUG, regs,
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"seccomp tried to change syscall nr or ip");
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do_exit(SIGSYS);
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}
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regs->orig_ax = -1;
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if (tmp)
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goto do_ret; /* skip requested */
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/*
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* With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV. We want to
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* preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder.
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*/
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prev_sig_on_uaccess_err = current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err;
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current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = 1;
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ret = -EFAULT;
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switch (vsyscall_nr) {
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case 0:
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/* this decodes regs->di and regs->si on its own */
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ret = __x64_sys_gettimeofday(regs);
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break;
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case 1:
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/* this decodes regs->di on its own */
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ret = __x64_sys_time(regs);
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break;
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case 2:
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/* while we could clobber regs->dx, we didn't in the past... */
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orig_dx = regs->dx;
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regs->dx = 0;
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/* this decodes regs->di, regs->si and regs->dx on its own */
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ret = __x64_sys_getcpu(regs);
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regs->dx = orig_dx;
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break;
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}
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current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = prev_sig_on_uaccess_err;
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check_fault:
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if (ret == -EFAULT) {
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/* Bad news -- userspace fed a bad pointer to a vsyscall. */
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warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs,
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"vsyscall fault (exploit attempt?)");
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/*
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* If we failed to generate a signal for any reason,
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* generate one here. (This should be impossible.)
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*/
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGBUS) &&
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!sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGSEGV)))
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goto sigsegv;
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return true; /* Don't emulate the ret. */
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}
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regs->ax = ret;
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do_ret:
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/* Emulate a ret instruction. */
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regs->ip = caller;
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regs->sp += 8;
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return true;
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sigsegv:
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force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
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return true;
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}
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/*
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* A pseudo VMA to allow ptrace access for the vsyscall page. This only
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* covers the 64bit vsyscall page now. 32bit has a real VMA now and does
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* not need special handling anymore:
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*/
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static const char *gate_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
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{
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return "[vsyscall]";
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}
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static const struct vm_operations_struct gate_vma_ops = {
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.name = gate_vma_name,
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};
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static struct vm_area_struct gate_vma = {
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.vm_start = VSYSCALL_ADDR,
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.vm_end = VSYSCALL_ADDR + PAGE_SIZE,
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.vm_page_prot = PAGE_READONLY_EXEC,
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.vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC,
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.vm_ops = &gate_vma_ops,
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};
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struct vm_area_struct *get_gate_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
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if (!mm || mm->context.ia32_compat)
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return NULL;
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#endif
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if (vsyscall_mode == NONE)
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return NULL;
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return &gate_vma;
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}
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int in_gate_area(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
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{
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struct vm_area_struct *vma = get_gate_vma(mm);
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if (!vma)
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return 0;
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return (addr >= vma->vm_start) && (addr < vma->vm_end);
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}
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/*
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* Use this when you have no reliable mm, typically from interrupt
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* context. It is less reliable than using a task's mm and may give
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* false positives.
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*/
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int in_gate_area_no_mm(unsigned long addr)
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{
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return vsyscall_mode != NONE && (addr & PAGE_MASK) == VSYSCALL_ADDR;
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}
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/*
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* The VSYSCALL page is the only user-accessible page in the kernel address
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* range. Normally, the kernel page tables can have _PAGE_USER clear, but
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* the tables covering VSYSCALL_ADDR need _PAGE_USER set if vsyscalls
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* are enabled.
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*
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* Some day we may create a "minimal" vsyscall mode in which we emulate
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* vsyscalls but leave the page not present. If so, we skip calling
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* this.
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*/
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void __init set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(pgd_t *root)
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{
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pgd_t *pgd;
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p4d_t *p4d;
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pud_t *pud;
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pmd_t *pmd;
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pgd = pgd_offset_pgd(root, VSYSCALL_ADDR);
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set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(pgd_val(*pgd) | _PAGE_USER));
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p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, VSYSCALL_ADDR);
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#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS >= 5
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set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(p4d_val(*p4d) | _PAGE_USER));
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#endif
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pud = pud_offset(p4d, VSYSCALL_ADDR);
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set_pud(pud, __pud(pud_val(*pud) | _PAGE_USER));
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pmd = pmd_offset(pud, VSYSCALL_ADDR);
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set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) | _PAGE_USER));
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}
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void __init map_vsyscall(void)
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{
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extern char __vsyscall_page;
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unsigned long physaddr_vsyscall = __pa_symbol(&__vsyscall_page);
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if (vsyscall_mode != NONE) {
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__set_fixmap(VSYSCALL_PAGE, physaddr_vsyscall,
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PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR);
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set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(swapper_pg_dir);
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}
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BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)__fix_to_virt(VSYSCALL_PAGE) !=
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(unsigned long)VSYSCALL_ADDR);
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}
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