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[ Upstream commit 7fedb63a8307dda0ec3b8969a3b233a1dd7ea8e0 ] This work tightens the offset mask we use for unprivileged pointer arithmetic in order to mitigate a corner case reported by Piotr and Benedict where in the speculative domain it is possible to advance, for example, the map value pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-bounds in order to leak kernel memory via side-channel to user space. Before this change, the computed ptr_limit for retrieve_ptr_limit() helper represents largest valid distance when moving pointer to the right or left which is then fed as aux->alu_limit to generate masking instructions against the offset register. After the change, the derived aux->alu_limit represents the largest potential value of the offset register which we mask against which is just a narrower subset of the former limit. For minimal complexity, we call sanitize_ptr_alu() from 2 observation points in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), that is, before and after the simulated alu operation. In the first step, we retieve the alu_state and alu_limit before the operation as well as we branch-off a verifier path and push it to the verification stack as we did before which checks the dst_reg under truncation, in other words, when the speculative domain would attempt to move the pointer out-of-bounds. In the second step, we retrieve the new alu_limit and calculate the absolute distance between both. Moreover, we commit the alu_state and final alu_limit via update_alu_sanitation_state() to the env's instruction aux data, and bail out from there if there is a mismatch due to coming from different verification paths with different states. Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Reported-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Tested-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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.. | ||
preload | ||
arraymap.c | ||
bpf_inode_storage.c | ||
bpf_iter.c | ||
bpf_local_storage.c | ||
bpf_lru_list.c | ||
bpf_lru_list.h | ||
bpf_lsm.c | ||
bpf_struct_ops_types.h | ||
bpf_struct_ops.c | ||
btf.c | ||
cgroup.c | ||
core.c | ||
cpumap.c | ||
devmap.c | ||
disasm.c | ||
disasm.h | ||
dispatcher.c | ||
hashtab.c | ||
helpers.c | ||
inode.c | ||
local_storage.c | ||
lpm_trie.c | ||
Makefile | ||
map_in_map.c | ||
map_in_map.h | ||
map_iter.c | ||
net_namespace.c | ||
offload.c | ||
percpu_freelist.c | ||
percpu_freelist.h | ||
prog_iter.c | ||
queue_stack_maps.c | ||
reuseport_array.c | ||
ringbuf.c | ||
stackmap.c | ||
syscall.c | ||
sysfs_btf.c | ||
task_iter.c | ||
tnum.c | ||
trampoline.c | ||
verifier.c |