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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-05 09:26:44 +07:00
58319057b7
Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based on Christoph's patch. ===== The status quo ===== On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that they hold. Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP), inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify what capabilities can be in pE. Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI. If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it can remove capabilities from X. Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1]. If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP) and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2]. File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them. A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are: pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) pI' = pI pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0) X is unchanged For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently (primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP are empty and fE is false. As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set, LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc. This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged program to change its security state in a way that persists cross execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped programs to be exploited for privilege escalation. ===== The problem ===== Capability inheritance is basically useless. If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated capabilities if you aren't root. On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems. If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with secure exec rules, breaking many things. This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use capabilities for anything useful. ===== The proposed change ===== This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA). pA does what most people expect pI to do. pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore, setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can re-add bits to pA afterwards. The capability evolution rules are changed: pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA) pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA' pI' = pI pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA') X is unchanged If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah! Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace) and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less impossible. Hallelujah! You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch. Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping privileges will still work. It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker *already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though -- setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so, and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more paranoid route. We can revisit this later. An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities (CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than it is with this patch. ===== Footnotes ===== [1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false. The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason. [2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask; it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who has tried to use file capabilities. [3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly discarded. Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2 Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality (from Christoph): /* * Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell * that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities. * * (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> * Released under: GPL v3 or later. * * * Compile using: * * gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng * * This program must have the following capabilities to run properly: * Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE * * A command to equip the binary with the right caps is: * * setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test * * * To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes: * * ./ambient_test /bin/bash * * * Verifying that it works: * * From the bash spawed by ambient_test run * * cat /proc/$$/status * * and have a look at the capabilities. */ #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <cap-ng.h> #include <sys/prctl.h> #include <linux/capability.h> /* * Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed * when the /usr/include files have these defined. */ #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4 static void set_ambient_cap(int cap) { int rc; capng_get_caps_process(); rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap); if (rc) { printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n"); exit(2); } capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS); /* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */ if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) { perror("Cannot set cap"); exit(1); } } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int rc; set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW); set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN); set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE); printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n"); if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1)) perror("Cannot exec"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com> Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com> Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
409 lines
12 KiB
C
409 lines
12 KiB
C
/* Credentials management - see Documentation/security/credentials.txt
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#ifndef _LINUX_CRED_H
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#define _LINUX_CRED_H
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/key.h>
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#include <linux/selinux.h>
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#include <linux/atomic.h>
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#include <linux/uidgid.h>
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struct user_struct;
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struct cred;
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struct inode;
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/*
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* COW Supplementary groups list
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*/
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#define NGROUPS_SMALL 32
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#define NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK ((unsigned int)(PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(kgid_t)))
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struct group_info {
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atomic_t usage;
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int ngroups;
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int nblocks;
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kgid_t small_block[NGROUPS_SMALL];
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kgid_t *blocks[0];
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};
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/**
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* get_group_info - Get a reference to a group info structure
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* @group_info: The group info to reference
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*
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* This gets a reference to a set of supplementary groups.
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*
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* If the caller is accessing a task's credentials, they must hold the RCU read
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* lock when reading.
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*/
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static inline struct group_info *get_group_info(struct group_info *gi)
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{
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atomic_inc(&gi->usage);
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return gi;
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}
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/**
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* put_group_info - Release a reference to a group info structure
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* @group_info: The group info to release
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*/
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#define put_group_info(group_info) \
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do { \
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if (atomic_dec_and_test(&(group_info)->usage)) \
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groups_free(group_info); \
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} while (0)
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extern struct group_info init_groups;
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#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER
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extern struct group_info *groups_alloc(int);
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extern void groups_free(struct group_info *);
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extern int in_group_p(kgid_t);
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extern int in_egroup_p(kgid_t);
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#else
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static inline void groups_free(struct group_info *group_info)
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{
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}
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static inline int in_group_p(kgid_t grp)
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{
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return 1;
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}
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static inline int in_egroup_p(kgid_t grp)
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{
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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extern int set_current_groups(struct group_info *);
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extern void set_groups(struct cred *, struct group_info *);
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extern int groups_search(const struct group_info *, kgid_t);
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extern bool may_setgroups(void);
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/* access the groups "array" with this macro */
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#define GROUP_AT(gi, i) \
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((gi)->blocks[(i) / NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK][(i) % NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK])
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/*
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* The security context of a task
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*
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* The parts of the context break down into two categories:
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*
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* (1) The objective context of a task. These parts are used when some other
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* task is attempting to affect this one.
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*
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* (2) The subjective context. These details are used when the task is acting
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* upon another object, be that a file, a task, a key or whatever.
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*
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* Note that some members of this structure belong to both categories - the
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* LSM security pointer for instance.
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*
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* A task has two security pointers. task->real_cred points to the objective
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* context that defines that task's actual details. The objective part of this
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* context is used whenever that task is acted upon.
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*
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* task->cred points to the subjective context that defines the details of how
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* that task is going to act upon another object. This may be overridden
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* temporarily to point to another security context, but normally points to the
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* same context as task->real_cred.
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*/
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struct cred {
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atomic_t usage;
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#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
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atomic_t subscribers; /* number of processes subscribed */
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void *put_addr;
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unsigned magic;
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#define CRED_MAGIC 0x43736564
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#define CRED_MAGIC_DEAD 0x44656144
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#endif
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kuid_t uid; /* real UID of the task */
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kgid_t gid; /* real GID of the task */
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kuid_t suid; /* saved UID of the task */
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kgid_t sgid; /* saved GID of the task */
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kuid_t euid; /* effective UID of the task */
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kgid_t egid; /* effective GID of the task */
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kuid_t fsuid; /* UID for VFS ops */
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kgid_t fsgid; /* GID for VFS ops */
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unsigned securebits; /* SUID-less security management */
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kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable; /* caps our children can inherit */
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kernel_cap_t cap_permitted; /* caps we're permitted */
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kernel_cap_t cap_effective; /* caps we can actually use */
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kernel_cap_t cap_bset; /* capability bounding set */
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kernel_cap_t cap_ambient; /* Ambient capability set */
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#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
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unsigned char jit_keyring; /* default keyring to attach requested
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* keys to */
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struct key __rcu *session_keyring; /* keyring inherited over fork */
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struct key *process_keyring; /* keyring private to this process */
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struct key *thread_keyring; /* keyring private to this thread */
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struct key *request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
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void *security; /* subjective LSM security */
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#endif
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struct user_struct *user; /* real user ID subscription */
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struct user_namespace *user_ns; /* user_ns the caps and keyrings are relative to. */
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struct group_info *group_info; /* supplementary groups for euid/fsgid */
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struct rcu_head rcu; /* RCU deletion hook */
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};
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extern void __put_cred(struct cred *);
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extern void exit_creds(struct task_struct *);
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extern int copy_creds(struct task_struct *, unsigned long);
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extern const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *);
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extern struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void);
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extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void);
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extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void);
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extern int commit_creds(struct cred *);
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extern void abort_creds(struct cred *);
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extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
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extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
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extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
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extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
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extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
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extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
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extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
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extern void __init cred_init(void);
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/*
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* check for validity of credentials
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*/
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#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
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extern void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *, const char *, unsigned);
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extern void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *,
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const char *, unsigned);
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extern bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred);
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static inline void __validate_creds(const struct cred *cred,
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const char *file, unsigned line)
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{
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if (unlikely(creds_are_invalid(cred)))
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__invalid_creds(cred, file, line);
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}
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#define validate_creds(cred) \
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do { \
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__validate_creds((cred), __FILE__, __LINE__); \
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} while(0)
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#define validate_process_creds() \
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do { \
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__validate_process_creds(current, __FILE__, __LINE__); \
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} while(0)
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extern void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *);
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#else
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static inline void validate_creds(const struct cred *cred)
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{
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}
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static inline void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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}
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static inline void validate_process_creds(void)
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{
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}
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#endif
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static inline bool cap_ambient_invariant_ok(const struct cred *cred)
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{
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return cap_issubset(cred->cap_ambient,
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cap_intersect(cred->cap_permitted,
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cred->cap_inheritable));
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}
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/**
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* get_new_cred - Get a reference on a new set of credentials
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* @cred: The new credentials to reference
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*
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* Get a reference on the specified set of new credentials. The caller must
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* release the reference.
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*/
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static inline struct cred *get_new_cred(struct cred *cred)
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{
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atomic_inc(&cred->usage);
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return cred;
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}
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/**
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* get_cred - Get a reference on a set of credentials
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* @cred: The credentials to reference
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*
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* Get a reference on the specified set of credentials. The caller must
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* release the reference.
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*
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* This is used to deal with a committed set of credentials. Although the
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* pointer is const, this will temporarily discard the const and increment the
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* usage count. The purpose of this is to attempt to catch at compile time the
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* accidental alteration of a set of credentials that should be considered
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* immutable.
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*/
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static inline const struct cred *get_cred(const struct cred *cred)
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{
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struct cred *nonconst_cred = (struct cred *) cred;
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validate_creds(cred);
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return get_new_cred(nonconst_cred);
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}
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/**
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* put_cred - Release a reference to a set of credentials
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* @cred: The credentials to release
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*
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* Release a reference to a set of credentials, deleting them when the last ref
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* is released.
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*
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* This takes a const pointer to a set of credentials because the credentials
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* on task_struct are attached by const pointers to prevent accidental
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* alteration of otherwise immutable credential sets.
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*/
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static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)
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{
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struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
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validate_creds(cred);
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if (atomic_dec_and_test(&(cred)->usage))
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__put_cred(cred);
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}
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/**
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* current_cred - Access the current task's subjective credentials
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*
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* Access the subjective credentials of the current task. RCU-safe,
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* since nobody else can modify it.
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*/
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#define current_cred() \
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rcu_dereference_protected(current->cred, 1)
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/**
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* current_real_cred - Access the current task's objective credentials
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*
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* Access the objective credentials of the current task. RCU-safe,
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* since nobody else can modify it.
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*/
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#define current_real_cred() \
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rcu_dereference_protected(current->real_cred, 1)
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/**
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* __task_cred - Access a task's objective credentials
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* @task: The task to query
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*
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* Access the objective credentials of a task. The caller must hold the RCU
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* readlock.
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*
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* The result of this function should not be passed directly to get_cred();
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* rather get_task_cred() should be used instead.
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*/
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#define __task_cred(task) \
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rcu_dereference((task)->real_cred)
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/**
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* get_current_cred - Get the current task's subjective credentials
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*
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* Get the subjective credentials of the current task, pinning them so that
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* they can't go away. Accessing the current task's credentials directly is
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* not permitted.
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*/
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#define get_current_cred() \
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(get_cred(current_cred()))
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/**
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* get_current_user - Get the current task's user_struct
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*
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* Get the user record of the current task, pinning it so that it can't go
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* away.
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*/
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#define get_current_user() \
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({ \
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struct user_struct *__u; \
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const struct cred *__cred; \
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__cred = current_cred(); \
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__u = get_uid(__cred->user); \
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__u; \
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})
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/**
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* get_current_groups - Get the current task's supplementary group list
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*
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* Get the supplementary group list of the current task, pinning it so that it
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* can't go away.
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*/
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#define get_current_groups() \
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({ \
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struct group_info *__groups; \
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const struct cred *__cred; \
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__cred = current_cred(); \
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__groups = get_group_info(__cred->group_info); \
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__groups; \
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})
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|
|
|
#define task_cred_xxx(task, xxx) \
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|
({ \
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|
__typeof__(((struct cred *)NULL)->xxx) ___val; \
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|
rcu_read_lock(); \
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|
___val = __task_cred((task))->xxx; \
|
|
rcu_read_unlock(); \
|
|
___val; \
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
#define task_uid(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), uid))
|
|
#define task_euid(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), euid))
|
|
|
|
#define current_cred_xxx(xxx) \
|
|
({ \
|
|
current_cred()->xxx; \
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
#define current_uid() (current_cred_xxx(uid))
|
|
#define current_gid() (current_cred_xxx(gid))
|
|
#define current_euid() (current_cred_xxx(euid))
|
|
#define current_egid() (current_cred_xxx(egid))
|
|
#define current_suid() (current_cred_xxx(suid))
|
|
#define current_sgid() (current_cred_xxx(sgid))
|
|
#define current_fsuid() (current_cred_xxx(fsuid))
|
|
#define current_fsgid() (current_cred_xxx(fsgid))
|
|
#define current_cap() (current_cred_xxx(cap_effective))
|
|
#define current_user() (current_cred_xxx(user))
|
|
#define current_security() (current_cred_xxx(security))
|
|
|
|
extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
|
|
#define current_user_ns() (current_cred_xxx(user_ns))
|
|
#else
|
|
#define current_user_ns() (&init_user_ns)
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define current_uid_gid(_uid, _gid) \
|
|
do { \
|
|
const struct cred *__cred; \
|
|
__cred = current_cred(); \
|
|
*(_uid) = __cred->uid; \
|
|
*(_gid) = __cred->gid; \
|
|
} while(0)
|
|
|
|
#define current_euid_egid(_euid, _egid) \
|
|
do { \
|
|
const struct cred *__cred; \
|
|
__cred = current_cred(); \
|
|
*(_euid) = __cred->euid; \
|
|
*(_egid) = __cred->egid; \
|
|
} while(0)
|
|
|
|
#define current_fsuid_fsgid(_fsuid, _fsgid) \
|
|
do { \
|
|
const struct cred *__cred; \
|
|
__cred = current_cred(); \
|
|
*(_fsuid) = __cred->fsuid; \
|
|
*(_fsgid) = __cred->fsgid; \
|
|
} while(0)
|
|
|
|
#endif /* _LINUX_CRED_H */
|