linux_dsm_epyc7002/include/linux/thread_info.h
Kees Cook e01e80634e fork: unconditionally clear stack on fork
One of the classes of kernel stack content leaks[1] is exposing the
contents of prior heap or stack contents when a new process stack is
allocated.  Normally, those stacks are not zeroed, and the old contents
remain in place.  In the face of stack content exposure flaws, those
contents can leak to userspace.

Fixing this will make the kernel no longer vulnerable to these flaws, as
the stack will be wiped each time a stack is assigned to a new process.
There's not a meaningful change in runtime performance; it almost looks
like it provides a benefit.

Performing back-to-back kernel builds before:
	Run times: 157.86 157.09 158.90 160.94 160.80
	Mean: 159.12
	Std Dev: 1.54

and after:
	Run times: 159.31 157.34 156.71 158.15 160.81
	Mean: 158.46
	Std Dev: 1.46

Instead of making this a build or runtime config, Andy Lutomirski
recommended this just be enabled by default.

[1] A noisy search for many kinds of stack content leaks can be seen here:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=linux+kernel+stack+leak

I did some more with perf and cycle counts on running 100,000 execs of
/bin/true.

before:
Cycles: 218858861551 218853036130 214727610969 227656844122 224980542841
Mean:  221015379122.60
Std Dev: 4662486552.47

after:
Cycles: 213868945060 213119275204 211820169456 224426673259 225489986348
Mean:  217745009865.40
Std Dev: 5935559279.99

It continues to look like it's faster, though the deviation is rather
wide, but I'm not sure what I could do that would be less noisy.  I'm
open to ideas!

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180221021659.GA37073@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-20 17:18:35 -07:00

150 lines
3.8 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/* thread_info.h: common low-level thread information accessors
*
* Copyright (C) 2002 David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
* - Incorporating suggestions made by Linus Torvalds
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_THREAD_INFO_H
#define _LINUX_THREAD_INFO_H
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/restart_block.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
/*
* For CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK kernels we need <asm/current.h> for the
* definition of current, but for !CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK kernels,
* including <asm/current.h> can cause a circular dependency on some platforms.
*/
#include <asm/current.h>
#define current_thread_info() ((struct thread_info *)current)
#endif
#include <linux/bitops.h>
/*
* For per-arch arch_within_stack_frames() implementations, defined in
* asm/thread_info.h.
*/
enum {
BAD_STACK = -1,
NOT_STACK = 0,
GOOD_FRAME,
GOOD_STACK,
};
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#ifndef THREAD_ALIGN
#define THREAD_ALIGN THREAD_SIZE
#endif
#define THREADINFO_GFP (GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO)
/*
* flag set/clear/test wrappers
* - pass TIF_xxxx constants to these functions
*/
static inline void set_ti_thread_flag(struct thread_info *ti, int flag)
{
set_bit(flag, (unsigned long *)&ti->flags);
}
static inline void clear_ti_thread_flag(struct thread_info *ti, int flag)
{
clear_bit(flag, (unsigned long *)&ti->flags);
}
static inline int test_and_set_ti_thread_flag(struct thread_info *ti, int flag)
{
return test_and_set_bit(flag, (unsigned long *)&ti->flags);
}
static inline int test_and_clear_ti_thread_flag(struct thread_info *ti, int flag)
{
return test_and_clear_bit(flag, (unsigned long *)&ti->flags);
}
static inline int test_ti_thread_flag(struct thread_info *ti, int flag)
{
return test_bit(flag, (unsigned long *)&ti->flags);
}
#define set_thread_flag(flag) \
set_ti_thread_flag(current_thread_info(), flag)
#define clear_thread_flag(flag) \
clear_ti_thread_flag(current_thread_info(), flag)
#define test_and_set_thread_flag(flag) \
test_and_set_ti_thread_flag(current_thread_info(), flag)
#define test_and_clear_thread_flag(flag) \
test_and_clear_ti_thread_flag(current_thread_info(), flag)
#define test_thread_flag(flag) \
test_ti_thread_flag(current_thread_info(), flag)
#define tif_need_resched() test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
static inline int arch_within_stack_frames(const void * const stack,
const void * const stackend,
const void *obj, unsigned long len)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
extern void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
bool to_user);
static __always_inline void check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
bool to_user)
{
if (!__builtin_constant_p(n))
__check_object_size(ptr, n, to_user);
}
#else
static inline void check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
bool to_user)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY */
extern void __compiletime_error("copy source size is too small")
__bad_copy_from(void);
extern void __compiletime_error("copy destination size is too small")
__bad_copy_to(void);
static inline void copy_overflow(int size, unsigned long count)
{
WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected (%d < %lu)!\n", size, count);
}
static __always_inline bool
check_copy_size(const void *addr, size_t bytes, bool is_source)
{
int sz = __compiletime_object_size(addr);
if (unlikely(sz >= 0 && sz < bytes)) {
if (!__builtin_constant_p(bytes))
copy_overflow(sz, bytes);
else if (is_source)
__bad_copy_from();
else
__bad_copy_to();
return false;
}
check_object_size(addr, bytes, is_source);
return true;
}
#ifndef arch_setup_new_exec
static inline void arch_setup_new_exec(void) { }
#endif
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _LINUX_THREAD_INFO_H */