Eric Paris ab5a91a836 Security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low vm space ... On a kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY but without an LSM which implements security_file_mmap it is impossible for an application to mmap addresses lower than mmap_min_addr. Based on a suggestion from a developer in the openwall community this patch adds a check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO. It is assumed that any process with this capability can harm the system a lot more easily than writing some stuff on the zero page and then trying to get the kernel to trip over itself. It also means that programs like X on i686 which use vm86 emulation can work even with mmap_min_addr set. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>		2007-12-06 00:24:30 +11:00
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keys	KEYS: Make request_key() and co fundamentally asynchronous	2007-10-17 08:42:57 -07:00
selinux	SELinux: detect dead booleans	2007-12-06 00:24:09 +11:00
capability.c	Implement file posix capabilities	2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
commoncap.c	file capabilities: don't prevent signaling setuid root programs	2007-11-29 09:24:53 -08:00
dummy.c	Security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low vm space	2007-12-06 00:24:30 +11:00
inode.c	security/ cleanups	2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
Kconfig	Implement file posix capabilities	2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
Makefile	[PATCH] LSM: remove BSD secure level security module	2006-09-29 09:18:10 -07:00
root_plug.c	security: Convert LSM into a static interface	2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00
security.c	security/ cleanups	2007-10-17 08:43:07 -07:00