mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-21 00:39:33 +07:00
bb02e2cb71
Don't print an error message about VMX being disabled by BIOS if KVM,
the sole user of VMX, is disabled. E.g. if KVM is disabled and the MSR
is unlocked, the kernel will intentionally disable VMX when locking
feature control and then complain that "BIOS" disabled VMX.
Fixes: ef4d3bf198
("x86/cpu: Clear VMX feature flag if VMX is not fully enabled")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200114202545.20296-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
146 lines
4.5 KiB
C
146 lines
4.5 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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#include <linux/tboot.h>
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#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
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#include <asm/msr-index.h>
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#include <asm/processor.h>
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#include <asm/vmx.h>
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#undef pr_fmt
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "x86/cpu: " fmt
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES
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enum vmx_feature_leafs {
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MISC_FEATURES = 0,
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PRIMARY_CTLS,
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SECONDARY_CTLS,
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NR_VMX_FEATURE_WORDS,
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};
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#define VMX_F(x) BIT(VMX_FEATURE_##x & 0x1f)
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static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
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{
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u32 supported, funcs, ept, vpid, ign;
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BUILD_BUG_ON(NVMXINTS != NR_VMX_FEATURE_WORDS);
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/*
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* The high bits contain the allowed-1 settings, i.e. features that can
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* be turned on. The low bits contain the allowed-0 settings, i.e.
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* features that can be turned off. Ignore the allowed-0 settings,
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* if a feature can be turned on then it's supported.
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*
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* Use raw rdmsr() for primary processor controls and pin controls MSRs
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* as they exist on any CPU that supports VMX, i.e. we want the WARN if
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* the RDMSR faults.
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*/
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rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS, ign, supported);
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c->vmx_capability[PRIMARY_CTLS] = supported;
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rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2, &ign, &supported);
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c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] = supported;
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rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS, ign, supported);
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rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC, &ign, &funcs);
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/*
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* Except for EPT+VPID, which enumerates support for both in a single
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* MSR, low for EPT, high for VPID.
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*/
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rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP, &ept, &vpid);
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/* Pin, EPT, VPID and VM-Func are merged into a single word. */
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WARN_ON_ONCE(supported >> 16);
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WARN_ON_ONCE(funcs >> 4);
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c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] = (supported & 0xffff) |
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((vpid & 0x1) << 16) |
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((funcs & 0xf) << 28);
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/* EPT bits are full on scattered and must be manually handled. */
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if (ept & VMX_EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY_BIT)
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c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY);
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if (ept & VMX_EPT_AD_BIT)
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c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(EPT_AD);
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if (ept & VMX_EPT_1GB_PAGE_BIT)
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c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(EPT_1GB);
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/* Synthetic APIC features that are aggregates of multiple features. */
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if ((c->vmx_capability[PRIMARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRTUAL_TPR)) &&
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(c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRT_APIC_ACCESSES)))
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c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(FLEXPRIORITY);
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if ((c->vmx_capability[PRIMARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRTUAL_TPR)) &&
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(c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(APIC_REGISTER_VIRT)) &&
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(c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRT_INTR_DELIVERY)) &&
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(c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(POSTED_INTR)))
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c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(APICV);
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/* Set the synthetic cpufeatures to preserve /proc/cpuinfo's ABI. */
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if (c->vmx_capability[PRIMARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRTUAL_TPR))
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set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW);
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if (c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(FLEXPRIORITY))
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set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_FLEXPRIORITY);
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if (c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(VIRTUAL_NMIS))
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set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
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if (c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(EPT))
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set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_EPT);
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if (c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(EPT_AD))
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set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_EPT_AD);
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if (c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(VPID))
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set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VPID);
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES */
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void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
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{
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bool tboot = tboot_enabled();
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u64 msr;
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if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr)) {
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clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
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return;
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}
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if (msr & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED)
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goto update_caps;
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/*
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* Ignore whatever value BIOS left in the MSR to avoid enabling random
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* features or faulting on the WRMSR.
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*/
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msr = FEAT_CTL_LOCKED;
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/*
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* Enable VMX if and only if the kernel may do VMXON at some point,
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* i.e. KVM is enabled, to avoid unnecessarily adding an attack vector
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* for the kernel, e.g. using VMX to hide malicious code.
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*/
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if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)) {
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msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
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if (tboot)
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msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
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}
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wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, msr);
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update_caps:
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set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL);
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if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
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return;
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if ( (tboot && !(msr & FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX)) ||
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(!tboot && !(msr & FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX))) {
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL))
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pr_err_once("VMX (%s TXT) disabled by BIOS\n",
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tboot ? "inside" : "outside");
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clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
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} else {
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES
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init_vmx_capabilities(c);
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#endif
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}
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}
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