mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-27 00:25:21 +07:00
2c88c742d0
GCC 9 reworks the way the references to the stack canary are emitted, to prevent the value from being spilled to the stack before the final comparison in the epilogue, defeating the purpose, given that the spill slot is under control of the attacker that we are protecting ourselves from. Since our canary value address is obtained without accessing memory (as opposed to pre-v7 code that will obtain it from a literal pool), it is unlikely (although not guaranteed) that the compiler will spill the canary value in the same way, so let's just disable this improvement when building with GCC9+. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
123 lines
2.8 KiB
C
123 lines
2.8 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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#include "gcc-common.h"
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__visible int plugin_is_GPL_compatible;
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static unsigned int sp_mask, canary_offset;
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static unsigned int arm_pertask_ssp_rtl_execute(void)
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{
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rtx_insn *insn;
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for (insn = get_insns(); insn; insn = NEXT_INSN(insn)) {
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const char *sym;
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rtx body;
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rtx mask, masked_sp;
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/*
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* Find a SET insn involving a SYMBOL_REF to __stack_chk_guard
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*/
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if (!INSN_P(insn))
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continue;
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body = PATTERN(insn);
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if (GET_CODE(body) != SET ||
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GET_CODE(SET_SRC(body)) != SYMBOL_REF)
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continue;
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sym = XSTR(SET_SRC(body), 0);
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if (strcmp(sym, "__stack_chk_guard"))
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continue;
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/*
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* Replace the source of the SET insn with an expression that
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* produces the address of the copy of the stack canary value
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* stored in struct thread_info
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*/
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mask = GEN_INT(sext_hwi(sp_mask, GET_MODE_PRECISION(Pmode)));
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masked_sp = gen_reg_rtx(Pmode);
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emit_insn_before(gen_rtx_SET(masked_sp,
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gen_rtx_AND(Pmode,
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stack_pointer_rtx,
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mask)),
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insn);
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SET_SRC(body) = gen_rtx_PLUS(Pmode, masked_sp,
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GEN_INT(canary_offset));
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}
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return 0;
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}
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#define PASS_NAME arm_pertask_ssp_rtl
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#define NO_GATE
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#include "gcc-generate-rtl-pass.h"
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#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION >= 9000
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static bool no(void)
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{
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return false;
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}
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static void arm_pertask_ssp_start_unit(void *gcc_data, void *user_data)
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{
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targetm.have_stack_protect_combined_set = no;
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targetm.have_stack_protect_combined_test = no;
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}
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#endif
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__visible int plugin_init(struct plugin_name_args *plugin_info,
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struct plugin_gcc_version *version)
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{
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const char * const plugin_name = plugin_info->base_name;
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const int argc = plugin_info->argc;
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const struct plugin_argument *argv = plugin_info->argv;
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int tso = 0;
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int i;
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if (!plugin_default_version_check(version, &gcc_version)) {
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error(G_("incompatible gcc/plugin versions"));
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return 1;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < argc; ++i) {
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if (!strcmp(argv[i].key, "disable"))
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return 0;
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/* all remaining options require a value */
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if (!argv[i].value) {
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error(G_("no value supplied for option '-fplugin-arg-%s-%s'"),
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plugin_name, argv[i].key);
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return 1;
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}
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if (!strcmp(argv[i].key, "tso")) {
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tso = atoi(argv[i].value);
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continue;
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}
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if (!strcmp(argv[i].key, "offset")) {
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canary_offset = atoi(argv[i].value);
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continue;
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}
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error(G_("unknown option '-fplugin-arg-%s-%s'"),
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plugin_name, argv[i].key);
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return 1;
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}
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/* create the mask that produces the base of the stack */
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sp_mask = ~((1U << (12 + tso)) - 1);
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PASS_INFO(arm_pertask_ssp_rtl, "expand", 1, PASS_POS_INSERT_AFTER);
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register_callback(plugin_info->base_name, PLUGIN_PASS_MANAGER_SETUP,
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NULL, &arm_pertask_ssp_rtl_pass_info);
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#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION >= 9000
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register_callback(plugin_info->base_name, PLUGIN_START_UNIT,
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arm_pertask_ssp_start_unit, NULL);
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#endif
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return 0;
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}
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