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1b53cf9815
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d5 ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
104 lines
2.5 KiB
C
104 lines
2.5 KiB
C
/*
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* fscrypt_private.h
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
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*
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* This contains encryption key functions.
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*
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* Written by Michael Halcrow, Ildar Muslukhov, and Uday Savagaonkar, 2015.
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*/
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#ifndef _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H
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#define _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H
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#include <linux/fscrypt_supp.h>
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#define FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE 32
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/* Encryption parameters */
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#define FS_XTS_TWEAK_SIZE 16
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#define FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE 16
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#define FS_AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE 32
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#define FS_AES_256_CBC_KEY_SIZE 32
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#define FS_AES_256_CTS_KEY_SIZE 32
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#define FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE 64
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#define FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE 64
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#define FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX "fscrypt:"
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#define FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE 8
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#define FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE 16
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/**
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* Encryption context for inode
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*
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* Protector format:
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* 1 byte: Protector format (1 = this version)
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* 1 byte: File contents encryption mode
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* 1 byte: File names encryption mode
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* 1 byte: Flags
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* 8 bytes: Master Key descriptor
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* 16 bytes: Encryption Key derivation nonce
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*/
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struct fscrypt_context {
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u8 format;
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u8 contents_encryption_mode;
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u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
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u8 flags;
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u8 master_key_descriptor[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
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u8 nonce[FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE];
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} __packed;
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#define FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1 1
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/* This is passed in from userspace into the kernel keyring */
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struct fscrypt_key {
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u32 mode;
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u8 raw[FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
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u32 size;
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} __packed;
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/*
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* A pointer to this structure is stored in the file system's in-core
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* representation of an inode.
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*/
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struct fscrypt_info {
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u8 ci_data_mode;
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u8 ci_filename_mode;
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u8 ci_flags;
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struct crypto_skcipher *ci_ctfm;
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u8 ci_master_key[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
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};
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typedef enum {
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FS_DECRYPT = 0,
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FS_ENCRYPT,
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} fscrypt_direction_t;
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#define FS_CTX_REQUIRES_FREE_ENCRYPT_FL 0x00000001
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#define FS_CTX_HAS_BOUNCE_BUFFER_FL 0x00000002
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struct fscrypt_completion_result {
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struct completion completion;
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int res;
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};
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#define DECLARE_FS_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr) \
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struct fscrypt_completion_result ecr = { \
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COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK((ecr).completion), 0 }
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/* crypto.c */
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extern int fscrypt_initialize(unsigned int cop_flags);
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extern struct workqueue_struct *fscrypt_read_workqueue;
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extern int fscrypt_do_page_crypto(const struct inode *inode,
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fscrypt_direction_t rw, u64 lblk_num,
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struct page *src_page,
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struct page *dest_page,
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unsigned int len, unsigned int offs,
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gfp_t gfp_flags);
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extern struct page *fscrypt_alloc_bounce_page(struct fscrypt_ctx *ctx,
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gfp_t gfp_flags);
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#endif /* _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H */
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