Eric Dumazet 9915672d41 af_unix: limit unix_tot_inflight ... Vegard Nossum found a unix socket OOM was possible, posting an exploit program. My analysis is we can eat all LOWMEM memory before unix_gc() being called from unix_release_sock(). Moreover, the thread blocked in unix_gc() can consume huge amount of time to perform cleanup because of huge working set. One way to handle this is to have a sensible limit on unix_tot_inflight, tested from wait_for_unix_gc() and to force a call to unix_gc() if this limit is hit. This solves the OOM and also reduce overall latencies, and should not slowdown normal workloads. Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>		2010-11-24 09:15:27 -08:00
..
af_unix.c	fs: allow for more than 2^31 files	2010-10-26 16:52:15 -07:00
garbage.c	af_unix: limit unix_tot_inflight	2010-11-24 09:15:27 -08:00
Kconfig	[NET]: move config options out to individual protocols	2005-07-11 21:13:56 -07:00
Makefile	Linux-2.6.12-rc2	2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
sysctl_net_unix.c	include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h	2010-03-30 22:02:32 +09:00