Eric W. Biederman 90f62cf30a net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages ... It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>		2014-04-24 13:44:54 -04:00
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af_phonet.c
datagram.c	net: add build-time checks for msg->msg_name size	2014-01-18 23:04:16 -08:00
Kconfig
Makefile
pep-gprs.c	net: Fix use after free by removing length arg from sk_data_ready callbacks.	2014-04-11 16:15:36 -04:00
pep.c	net: Fix use after free by removing length arg from sk_data_ready callbacks.	2014-04-11 16:15:36 -04:00
pn_dev.c
pn_netlink.c	net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages	2014-04-24 13:44:54 -04:00
socket.c
sysctl.c