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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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59607db367
The expected course of development for user namespaces targeted capabilities is laid out at https://wiki.ubuntu.com/UserNamespace. Goals: - Make it safe for an unprivileged user to unshare namespaces. They will be privileged with respect to the new namespace, but this should only include resources which the unprivileged user already owns. - Provide separate limits and accounting for userids in different namespaces. Status: Currently (as of 2.6.38) you can clone with the CLONE_NEWUSER flag to get a new user namespace if you have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_SETUID, and CAP_SETGID capabilities. What this gets you is a whole new set of userids, meaning that user 500 will have a different 'struct user' in your namespace than in other namespaces. So any accounting information stored in struct user will be unique to your namespace. However, throughout the kernel there are checks which - simply check for a capability. Since root in a child namespace has all capabilities, this means that a child namespace is not constrained. - simply compare uid1 == uid2. Since these are the integer uids, uid 500 in namespace 1 will be said to be equal to uid 500 in namespace 2. As a result, the lxc implementation at lxc.sf.net does not use user namespaces. This is actually helpful because it leaves us free to develop user namespaces in such a way that, for some time, user namespaces may be unuseful. Bugs aside, this patchset is supposed to not at all affect systems which are not actively using user namespaces, and only restrict what tasks in child user namespace can do. They begin to limit privilege to a user namespace, so that root in a container cannot kill or ptrace tasks in the parent user namespace, and can only get world access rights to files. Since all files currently belong to the initila user namespace, that means that child user namespaces can only get world access rights to *all* files. While this temporarily makes user namespaces bad for system containers, it starts to get useful for some sandboxing. I've run the 'runltplite.sh' with and without this patchset and found no difference. This patch: copy_process() handles CLONE_NEWUSER before the rest of the namespaces. So in the case of clone(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWUTS) the new uts namespace will have the new user namespace as its owner. That is what we want, since we want root in that new userns to be able to have privilege over it. Changelog: Feb 15: don't set uts_ns->user_ns if we didn't create a new uts_ns. Feb 23: Move extern init_user_ns declaration from init/version.c to utsname.h. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
201 lines
4.8 KiB
C
201 lines
4.8 KiB
C
/*
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* The "user cache".
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*
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* (C) Copyright 1991-2000 Linus Torvalds
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*
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* We have a per-user structure to keep track of how many
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* processes, files etc the user has claimed, in order to be
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* able to have per-user limits for system resources.
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*/
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/bitops.h>
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#include <linux/key.h>
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#include <linux/interrupt.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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/*
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* userns count is 1 for root user, 1 for init_uts_ns,
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* and 1 for... ?
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*/
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struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
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.kref = {
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.refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(3),
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},
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.creator = &root_user,
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};
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
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/*
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* UID task count cache, to get fast user lookup in "alloc_uid"
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* when changing user ID's (ie setuid() and friends).
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*/
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#define UIDHASH_MASK (UIDHASH_SZ - 1)
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#define __uidhashfn(uid) (((uid >> UIDHASH_BITS) + uid) & UIDHASH_MASK)
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#define uidhashentry(ns, uid) ((ns)->uidhash_table + __uidhashfn((uid)))
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static struct kmem_cache *uid_cachep;
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/*
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* The uidhash_lock is mostly taken from process context, but it is
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* occasionally also taken from softirq/tasklet context, when
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* task-structs get RCU-freed. Hence all locking must be softirq-safe.
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* But free_uid() is also called with local interrupts disabled, and running
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* local_bh_enable() with local interrupts disabled is an error - we'll run
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* softirq callbacks, and they can unconditionally enable interrupts, and
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* the caller of free_uid() didn't expect that..
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*/
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static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(uidhash_lock);
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/* root_user.__count is 2, 1 for init task cred, 1 for init_user_ns->user_ns */
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struct user_struct root_user = {
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.__count = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
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.processes = ATOMIC_INIT(1),
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.files = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
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.sigpending = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
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.locked_shm = 0,
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.user_ns = &init_user_ns,
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};
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/*
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* These routines must be called with the uidhash spinlock held!
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*/
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static void uid_hash_insert(struct user_struct *up, struct hlist_head *hashent)
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{
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hlist_add_head(&up->uidhash_node, hashent);
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}
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static void uid_hash_remove(struct user_struct *up)
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{
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hlist_del_init(&up->uidhash_node);
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put_user_ns(up->user_ns);
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}
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static struct user_struct *uid_hash_find(uid_t uid, struct hlist_head *hashent)
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{
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struct user_struct *user;
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struct hlist_node *h;
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hlist_for_each_entry(user, h, hashent, uidhash_node) {
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if (user->uid == uid) {
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atomic_inc(&user->__count);
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return user;
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}
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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/* IRQs are disabled and uidhash_lock is held upon function entry.
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* IRQ state (as stored in flags) is restored and uidhash_lock released
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* upon function exit.
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*/
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static void free_user(struct user_struct *up, unsigned long flags)
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__releases(&uidhash_lock)
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{
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uid_hash_remove(up);
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uidhash_lock, flags);
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key_put(up->uid_keyring);
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key_put(up->session_keyring);
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kmem_cache_free(uid_cachep, up);
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}
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/*
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* Locate the user_struct for the passed UID. If found, take a ref on it. The
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* caller must undo that ref with free_uid().
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*
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* If the user_struct could not be found, return NULL.
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*/
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struct user_struct *find_user(uid_t uid)
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{
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struct user_struct *ret;
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unsigned long flags;
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struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
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spin_lock_irqsave(&uidhash_lock, flags);
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ret = uid_hash_find(uid, uidhashentry(ns, uid));
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spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uidhash_lock, flags);
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return ret;
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}
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void free_uid(struct user_struct *up)
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{
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unsigned long flags;
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if (!up)
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return;
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local_irq_save(flags);
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if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&up->__count, &uidhash_lock))
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free_user(up, flags);
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else
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local_irq_restore(flags);
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}
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struct user_struct *alloc_uid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t uid)
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{
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struct hlist_head *hashent = uidhashentry(ns, uid);
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struct user_struct *up, *new;
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spin_lock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
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up = uid_hash_find(uid, hashent);
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spin_unlock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
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if (!up) {
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new = kmem_cache_zalloc(uid_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!new)
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goto out_unlock;
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new->uid = uid;
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atomic_set(&new->__count, 1);
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new->user_ns = get_user_ns(ns);
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/*
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* Before adding this, check whether we raced
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* on adding the same user already..
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*/
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spin_lock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
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up = uid_hash_find(uid, hashent);
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if (up) {
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put_user_ns(ns);
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key_put(new->uid_keyring);
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key_put(new->session_keyring);
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kmem_cache_free(uid_cachep, new);
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} else {
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uid_hash_insert(new, hashent);
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up = new;
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}
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spin_unlock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
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}
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return up;
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out_unlock:
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return NULL;
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}
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static int __init uid_cache_init(void)
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{
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int n;
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uid_cachep = kmem_cache_create("uid_cache", sizeof(struct user_struct),
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0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
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for(n = 0; n < UIDHASH_SZ; ++n)
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INIT_HLIST_HEAD(init_user_ns.uidhash_table + n);
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/* Insert the root user immediately (init already runs as root) */
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spin_lock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
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uid_hash_insert(&root_user, uidhashentry(&init_user_ns, 0));
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spin_unlock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
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return 0;
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}
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module_init(uid_cache_init);
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