mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-21 03:21:56 +07:00
6aee4badd8
Pull openat2 support from Al Viro:
"This is the openat2() series from Aleksa Sarai.
I'm afraid that the rest of namei stuff will have to wait - it got
zero review the last time I'd posted #work.namei, and there had been a
leak in the posted series I'd caught only last weekend. I was going to
repost it on Monday, but the window opened and the odds of getting any
review during that... Oh, well.
Anyway, openat2 part should be ready; that _did_ get sane amount of
review and public testing, so here it comes"
From Aleksa's description of the series:
"For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown
flags are present[1].
This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road
to being added to openat(2).
Furthermore, the need for some sort of control over VFS's path
resolution (to avoid malicious paths resulting in inadvertent
breakouts) has been a very long-standing desire of many userspace
applications.
This patchset is a revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[3] patchset
(which was a variant of David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[4] which
was a spin-off of the Capsicum project[5]) with a few additions and
changes made based on the previous discussion within [6] as well as
others I felt were useful.
In line with the conclusions of the original discussion of
AT_NO_JUMPS, the flag has been split up into separate flags. However,
instead of being an openat(2) flag it is provided through a new
syscall openat2(2) which provides several other improvements to the
openat(2) interface (see the patch description for more details). The
following new LOOKUP_* flags are added:
LOOKUP_NO_XDEV:
Blocks all mountpoint crossings (upwards, downwards, or through
absolute links). Absolute pathnames alone in openat(2) do not
trigger this. Magic-link traversal which implies a vfsmount jump is
also blocked (though magic-link jumps on the same vfsmount are
permitted).
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS:
Blocks resolution through /proc/$pid/fd-style links. This is done
by blocking the usage of nd_jump_link() during resolution in a
filesystem. The term "magic-links" is used to match with the only
reference to these links in Documentation/, but I'm happy to change
the name.
It should be noted that this is different to the scope of
~LOOKUP_FOLLOW in that it applies to all path components. However,
you can do openat2(NO_FOLLOW|NO_MAGICLINKS) on a magic-link and it
will *not* fail (assuming that no parent component was a
magic-link), and you will have an fd for the magic-link.
In order to correctly detect magic-links, the introduction of a new
LOOKUP_MAGICLINK_JUMPED state flag was required.
LOOKUP_BENEATH:
Disallows escapes to outside the starting dirfd's
tree, using techniques such as ".." or absolute links. Absolute
paths in openat(2) are also disallowed.
Conceptually this flag is to ensure you "stay below" a certain
point in the filesystem tree -- but this requires some additional
to protect against various races that would allow escape using
"..".
Currently LOOKUP_BENEATH implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, because it
can trivially beam you around the filesystem (breaking the
protection). In future, there might be similar safety checks done
as in LOOKUP_IN_ROOT, but that requires more discussion.
In addition, two new flags are added that expand on the above ideas:
LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS:
Does what it says on the tin. No symlink resolution is allowed at
all, including magic-links. Just as with LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS this
can still be used with NOFOLLOW to open an fd for the symlink as
long as no parent path had a symlink component.
LOOKUP_IN_ROOT:
This is an extension of LOOKUP_BENEATH that, rather than blocking
attempts to move past the root, forces all such movements to be
scoped to the starting point. This provides chroot(2)-like
protection but without the cost of a chroot(2) for each filesystem
operation, as well as being safe against race attacks that
chroot(2) is not.
If a race is detected (as with LOOKUP_BENEATH) then an error is
generated, and similar to LOOKUP_BENEATH it is not permitted to
cross magic-links with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT.
The primary need for this is from container runtimes, which
currently need to do symlink scoping in userspace[7] when opening
paths in a potentially malicious container.
There is a long list of CVEs that could have bene mitigated by
having RESOLVE_THIS_ROOT (such as CVE-2017-1002101,
CVE-2017-1002102, CVE-2018-15664, and CVE-2019-5736, just to name a
few).
In order to make all of the above more usable, I'm working on
libpathrs[8] which is a C-friendly library for safe path resolution.
It features a userspace-emulated backend if the kernel doesn't support
openat2(2). Hopefully we can get userspace to switch to using it, and
thus get openat2(2) support for free once it's ready.
Future work would include implementing things like
RESOLVE_NO_AUTOMOUNT and possibly a RESOLVE_NO_REMOTE (to allow
programs to be sure they don't hit DoSes though stale NFS handles)"
* 'work.openat2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
Documentation: path-lookup: include new LOOKUP flags
selftests: add openat2(2) selftests
open: introduce openat2(2) syscall
namei: LOOKUP_{IN_ROOT,BENEATH}: permit limited ".." resolution
namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like scoped resolution
namei: LOOKUP_BENEATH: O_BENEATH-like scoped resolution
namei: LOOKUP_NO_XDEV: block mountpoint crossing
namei: LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: block magic-link resolution
namei: LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: block symlink resolution
namei: allow set_root() to produce errors
namei: allow nd_jump_link() to produce errors
nsfs: clean-up ns_get_path() signature to return int
namei: only return -ECHILD from follow_dotdot_rcu()
105 lines
3.8 KiB
C
105 lines
3.8 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
|
|
#ifndef _LINUX_NAMEI_H
|
|
#define _LINUX_NAMEI_H
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/fs.h>
|
|
#include <linux/kernel.h>
|
|
#include <linux/path.h>
|
|
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
|
|
#include <linux/errno.h>
|
|
|
|
enum { MAX_NESTED_LINKS = 8 };
|
|
|
|
#define MAXSYMLINKS 40
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Type of the last component on LOOKUP_PARENT
|
|
*/
|
|
enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
|
|
|
|
/* pathwalk mode */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_FOLLOW 0x0001 /* follow links at the end */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_DIRECTORY 0x0002 /* require a directory */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT 0x0004 /* force terminal automount */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_EMPTY 0x4000 /* accept empty path [user_... only] */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_DOWN 0x8000 /* follow mounts in the starting point */
|
|
|
|
#define LOOKUP_REVAL 0x0020 /* tell ->d_revalidate() to trust no cache */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_RCU 0x0040 /* RCU pathwalk mode; semi-internal */
|
|
|
|
/* These tell filesystem methods that we are dealing with the final component... */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_OPEN 0x0100 /* ... in open */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_CREATE 0x0200 /* ... in object creation */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_EXCL 0x0400 /* ... in exclusive creation */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_RENAME_TARGET 0x0800 /* ... in destination of rename() */
|
|
|
|
/* internal use only */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_PARENT 0x0010
|
|
#define LOOKUP_JUMPED 0x1000
|
|
#define LOOKUP_ROOT 0x2000
|
|
#define LOOKUP_ROOT_GRABBED 0x0008
|
|
|
|
/* Scoping flags for lookup. */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS 0x010000 /* No symlink crossing. */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS 0x020000 /* No nd_jump_link() crossing. */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_NO_XDEV 0x040000 /* No mountpoint crossing. */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_BENEATH 0x080000 /* No escaping from starting point. */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_IN_ROOT 0x100000 /* Treat dirfd as fs root. */
|
|
/* LOOKUP_* flags which do scope-related checks based on the dirfd. */
|
|
#define LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_IN_ROOT)
|
|
|
|
extern int path_pts(struct path *path);
|
|
|
|
extern int user_path_at_empty(int, const char __user *, unsigned, struct path *, int *empty);
|
|
|
|
static inline int user_path_at(int dfd, const char __user *name, unsigned flags,
|
|
struct path *path)
|
|
{
|
|
return user_path_at_empty(dfd, name, flags, path, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extern int kern_path(const char *, unsigned, struct path *);
|
|
|
|
extern struct dentry *kern_path_create(int, const char *, struct path *, unsigned int);
|
|
extern struct dentry *user_path_create(int, const char __user *, struct path *, unsigned int);
|
|
extern void done_path_create(struct path *, struct dentry *);
|
|
extern struct dentry *kern_path_locked(const char *, struct path *);
|
|
extern int kern_path_mountpoint(int, const char *, struct path *, unsigned int);
|
|
|
|
extern struct dentry *try_lookup_one_len(const char *, struct dentry *, int);
|
|
extern struct dentry *lookup_one_len(const char *, struct dentry *, int);
|
|
extern struct dentry *lookup_one_len_unlocked(const char *, struct dentry *, int);
|
|
extern struct dentry *lookup_positive_unlocked(const char *, struct dentry *, int);
|
|
|
|
extern int follow_down_one(struct path *);
|
|
extern int follow_down(struct path *);
|
|
extern int follow_up(struct path *);
|
|
|
|
extern struct dentry *lock_rename(struct dentry *, struct dentry *);
|
|
extern void unlock_rename(struct dentry *, struct dentry *);
|
|
|
|
extern int __must_check nd_jump_link(struct path *path);
|
|
|
|
static inline void nd_terminate_link(void *name, size_t len, size_t maxlen)
|
|
{
|
|
((char *) name)[min(len, maxlen)] = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* retry_estale - determine whether the caller should retry an operation
|
|
* @error: the error that would currently be returned
|
|
* @flags: flags being used for next lookup attempt
|
|
*
|
|
* Check to see if the error code was -ESTALE, and then determine whether
|
|
* to retry the call based on whether "flags" already has LOOKUP_REVAL set.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns true if the caller should try the operation again.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline bool
|
|
retry_estale(const long error, const unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return error == -ESTALE && !(flags & LOOKUP_REVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* _LINUX_NAMEI_H */
|