linux_dsm_epyc7002/include/net/scm.h
Eric Dumazet e0e3cea46d af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug.  The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).

This bug was introduced in commit 16e5726269
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)

This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.

Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.

With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek

This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-08-21 14:53:01 -07:00

131 lines
3.2 KiB
C

#ifndef __LINUX_NET_SCM_H
#define __LINUX_NET_SCM_H
#include <linux/limits.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
/* Well, we should have at least one descriptor open
* to accept passed FDs 8)
*/
#define SCM_MAX_FD 253
struct scm_fp_list {
short count;
short max;
struct file *fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
};
struct scm_cookie {
struct pid *pid; /* Skb credentials */
const struct cred *cred;
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
struct ucred creds; /* Skb credentials */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
#endif
};
extern void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
extern void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
extern int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
extern void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm);
extern struct scm_fp_list * scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
}
#else
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
static __inline__ void scm_set_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm,
struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred)
{
scm->pid = get_pid(pid);
scm->cred = cred ? get_cred(cred) : NULL;
cred_to_ucred(pid, cred, &scm->creds);
}
static __inline__ void scm_destroy_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
put_pid(scm->pid);
scm->pid = NULL;
if (scm->cred)
put_cred(scm->cred);
scm->cred = NULL;
}
static __inline__ void scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
scm_destroy_cred(scm);
if (scm && scm->fp)
__scm_destroy(scm);
}
static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct scm_cookie *scm, bool forcecreds)
{
memset(scm, 0, sizeof(*scm));
if (forcecreds)
scm_set_cred(scm, task_tgid(current), current_cred());
unix_get_peersec_dgram(sock, scm);
if (msg->msg_controllen <= 0)
return 0;
return __scm_send(sock, msg, scm);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
}
}
}
#else
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
static __inline__ void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
{
if (!msg->msg_control) {
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) || scm->fp)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
scm_destroy(scm);
return;
}
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags))
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_CREDENTIALS, sizeof(scm->creds), &scm->creds);
scm_destroy_cred(scm);
scm_passec(sock, msg, scm);
if (!scm->fp)
return;
scm_detach_fds(msg, scm);
}
#endif /* __LINUX_NET_SCM_H */