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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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359efcc2c9
The driver exposes EFI runtime services to user-space through an IOCTL interface, calling the EFI services function pointers directly without using the efivar API. Disallow access to the /dev/efi_test character device when the kernel is locked down to prevent arbitrary user-space to call EFI runtime services. Also require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to open the chardev to prevent unprivileged users to call the EFI runtime services, instead of just relying on the chardev file mode bits for this. The main user of this driver is the fwts [0] tool that already checks if the effective user ID is 0 and fails otherwise. So this change shouldn't cause any regression to this tool. [0]: https://wiki.ubuntu.com/FirmwareTestSuite/Reference/uefivarinfo Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-7-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
193 lines
5.2 KiB
C
193 lines
5.2 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/* Lock down the kernel
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
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static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down;
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static const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
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[LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
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[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
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[LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
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[LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
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[LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
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[LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
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[LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
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[LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
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[LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
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[LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables",
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[LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
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[LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
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[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
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[LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
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[LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
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[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
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[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
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[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
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[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
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[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
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[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
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[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
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};
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static const enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE,
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LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
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LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX};
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/*
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* Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
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*/
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static int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
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{
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if (kernel_locked_down >= level)
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return -EPERM;
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kernel_locked_down = level;
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pr_notice("Kernel is locked down from %s; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
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where);
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return 0;
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}
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static int __init lockdown_param(char *level)
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{
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if (!level)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (strcmp(level, "integrity") == 0)
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lock_kernel_down("command line", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
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else if (strcmp(level, "confidentiality") == 0)
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lock_kernel_down("command line", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
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else
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return -EINVAL;
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return 0;
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}
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early_param("lockdown", lockdown_param);
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/**
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* lockdown_is_locked_down - Find out if the kernel is locked down
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* @what: Tag to use in notice generated if lockdown is in effect
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*/
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static int lockdown_is_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
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{
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if (WARN(what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
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"Invalid lockdown reason"))
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return -EPERM;
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if (kernel_locked_down >= what) {
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if (lockdown_reasons[what])
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pr_notice("Lockdown: %s: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
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current->comm, lockdown_reasons[what]);
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return -EPERM;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
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LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
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};
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static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
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{
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#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
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lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
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#elif defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY)
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lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
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#endif
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security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
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"lockdown");
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return 0;
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}
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static ssize_t lockdown_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
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loff_t *ppos)
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{
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char temp[80];
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int i, offset = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_levels); i++) {
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enum lockdown_reason level = lockdown_levels[i];
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if (lockdown_reasons[level]) {
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const char *label = lockdown_reasons[level];
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if (kernel_locked_down == level)
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offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "[%s] ", label);
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else
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offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "%s ", label);
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}
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}
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/* Convert the last space to a newline if needed. */
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if (offset > 0)
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temp[offset-1] = '\n';
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return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
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}
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static ssize_t lockdown_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
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size_t n, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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char *state;
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int i, len, err = -EINVAL;
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state = memdup_user_nul(buf, n);
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if (IS_ERR(state))
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return PTR_ERR(state);
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len = strlen(state);
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if (len && state[len-1] == '\n') {
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state[len-1] = '\0';
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len--;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_levels); i++) {
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enum lockdown_reason level = lockdown_levels[i];
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const char *label = lockdown_reasons[level];
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if (label && !strcmp(state, label))
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err = lock_kernel_down("securityfs", level);
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}
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kfree(state);
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return err ? err : n;
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}
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static const struct file_operations lockdown_ops = {
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.read = lockdown_read,
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.write = lockdown_write,
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};
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static int __init lockdown_secfs_init(void)
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{
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struct dentry *dentry;
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dentry = securityfs_create_file("lockdown", 0600, NULL, NULL,
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&lockdown_ops);
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return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(dentry);
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}
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core_initcall(lockdown_secfs_init);
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
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DEFINE_EARLY_LSM(lockdown) = {
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#else
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DEFINE_LSM(lockdown) = {
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#endif
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.name = "lockdown",
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.init = lockdown_lsm_init,
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};
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