mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-11-30 14:06:51 +07:00
0f30cbea00
Adding a specially crafted X.509 certificate whose subjectPublicKey
ASN.1 value is zero-length caused x509_extract_key_data() to set the
public key size to SIZE_MAX, as it subtracted the nonexistent BIT STRING
metadata byte. Then, x509_cert_parse() called kmemdup() with that bogus
size, triggering the WARN_ON_ONCE() in kmalloc_slab().
This appears to be harmless, but it still must be fixed since WARNs are
never supposed to be user-triggerable.
Fix it by updating x509_cert_parse() to validate that the value has a
BIT STRING metadata byte, and that the byte is 0 which indicates that
the number of bits in the bitstring is a multiple of 8.
It would be nice to handle the metadata byte in asn1_ber_decoder()
instead. But that would be tricky because in the general case a BIT
STRING could be implicitly tagged, and/or could legitimately have a
length that is not a whole number of bytes.
Here was the WARN (cleaned up slightly):
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 202 at mm/slab_common.c:971 kmalloc_slab+0x5d/0x70 mm/slab_common.c:971
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 202 Comm: keyctl Tainted: G B 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
task: ffff880033014180 task.stack: ffff8800305c8000
Call Trace:
__do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3706 [inline]
__kmalloc_track_caller+0x22/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3726
kmemdup+0x17/0x40 mm/util.c:118
kmemdup include/linux/string.h:414 [inline]
x509_cert_parse+0x2cb/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:106
x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Fixes: 42d5ec27f8
("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
640 lines
16 KiB
C
640 lines
16 KiB
C
/* X.509 certificate parser
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
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#include <crypto/public_key.h>
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#include "x509_parser.h"
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#include "x509-asn1.h"
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#include "x509_akid-asn1.h"
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struct x509_parse_context {
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struct x509_certificate *cert; /* Certificate being constructed */
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unsigned long data; /* Start of data */
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const void *cert_start; /* Start of cert content */
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const void *key; /* Key data */
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size_t key_size; /* Size of key data */
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enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
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enum OID algo_oid; /* Algorithm OID */
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unsigned char nr_mpi; /* Number of MPIs stored */
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u8 o_size; /* Size of organizationName (O) */
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u8 cn_size; /* Size of commonName (CN) */
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u8 email_size; /* Size of emailAddress */
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u16 o_offset; /* Offset of organizationName (O) */
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u16 cn_offset; /* Offset of commonName (CN) */
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u16 email_offset; /* Offset of emailAddress */
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unsigned raw_akid_size;
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const void *raw_akid; /* Raw authorityKeyId in ASN.1 */
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const void *akid_raw_issuer; /* Raw directoryName in authorityKeyId */
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unsigned akid_raw_issuer_size;
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};
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/*
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* Free an X.509 certificate
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*/
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void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
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{
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if (cert) {
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public_key_free(cert->pub);
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public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);
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kfree(cert->issuer);
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kfree(cert->subject);
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kfree(cert->id);
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kfree(cert->skid);
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kfree(cert);
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}
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_free_certificate);
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/*
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* Parse an X.509 certificate
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*/
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struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
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{
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struct x509_certificate *cert;
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx;
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struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
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long ret;
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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cert = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_certificate), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!cert)
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goto error_no_cert;
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cert->pub = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!cert->pub)
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goto error_no_ctx;
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cert->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!cert->sig)
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goto error_no_ctx;
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ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!ctx)
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goto error_no_ctx;
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ctx->cert = cert;
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ctx->data = (unsigned long)data;
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/* Attempt to decode the certificate */
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ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_decoder, ctx, data, datalen);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error_decode;
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/* Decode the AuthorityKeyIdentifier */
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if (ctx->raw_akid) {
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pr_devel("AKID: %u %*phN\n",
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ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid);
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ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_akid_decoder, ctx,
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ctx->raw_akid, ctx->raw_akid_size);
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if (ret < 0) {
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pr_warn("Couldn't decode AuthKeyIdentifier\n");
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goto error_decode;
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}
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}
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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cert->pub->key = kmemdup(ctx->key, ctx->key_size, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!cert->pub->key)
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goto error_decode;
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cert->pub->keylen = ctx->key_size;
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/* Grab the signature bits */
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ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error_decode;
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/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
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kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
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cert->raw_serial_size,
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cert->raw_issuer,
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cert->raw_issuer_size);
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if (IS_ERR(kid)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(kid);
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goto error_decode;
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}
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cert->id = kid;
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/* Detect self-signed certificates */
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ret = x509_check_for_self_signed(cert);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error_decode;
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kfree(ctx);
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return cert;
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error_decode:
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kfree(ctx);
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error_no_ctx:
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x509_free_certificate(cert);
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error_no_cert:
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return ERR_PTR(ret);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_cert_parse);
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/*
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* Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
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* to interpret it.
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*/
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int x509_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
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if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {
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char buffer[50];
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sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
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pr_debug("Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n",
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(unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Save the position of the TBS data so that we can check the signature over it
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* later.
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*/
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int x509_note_tbs_certificate(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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pr_debug("x509_note_tbs_certificate(,%zu,%02x,%ld,%zu)!\n",
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hdrlen, tag, (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, vlen);
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ctx->cert->tbs = value - hdrlen;
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ctx->cert->tbs_size = vlen + hdrlen;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Record the public key algorithm
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*/
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int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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pr_debug("PubKey Algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
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switch (ctx->last_oid) {
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case OID_md2WithRSAEncryption:
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case OID_md3WithRSAEncryption:
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default:
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return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */
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case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption:
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ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "md4";
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ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
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break;
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case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption:
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ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";
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ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
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break;
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case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
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ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";
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ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
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break;
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case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption:
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ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";
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ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
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break;
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case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption:
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ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";
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ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
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break;
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case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption:
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ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";
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ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
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break;
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}
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ctx->algo_oid = ctx->last_oid;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Note the whereabouts and type of the signature.
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*/
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int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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pr_debug("Signature type: %u size %zu\n", ctx->last_oid, vlen);
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if (ctx->last_oid != ctx->algo_oid) {
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pr_warn("Got cert with pkey (%u) and sig (%u) algorithm OIDs\n",
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ctx->algo_oid, ctx->last_oid);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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ctx->cert->raw_sig = value;
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ctx->cert->raw_sig_size = vlen;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Note the certificate serial number
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*/
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int x509_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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ctx->cert->raw_serial = value;
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ctx->cert->raw_serial_size = vlen;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Note some of the name segments from which we'll fabricate a name.
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*/
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int x509_extract_name_segment(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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switch (ctx->last_oid) {
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case OID_commonName:
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ctx->cn_size = vlen;
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ctx->cn_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;
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break;
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case OID_organizationName:
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ctx->o_size = vlen;
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ctx->o_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;
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break;
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case OID_email_address:
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ctx->email_size = vlen;
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ctx->email_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;
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break;
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default:
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break;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Fabricate and save the issuer and subject names
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*/
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static int x509_fabricate_name(struct x509_parse_context *ctx, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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char **_name, size_t vlen)
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{
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const void *name, *data = (const void *)ctx->data;
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size_t namesize;
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char *buffer;
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if (*_name)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Empty name string if no material */
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if (!ctx->cn_size && !ctx->o_size && !ctx->email_size) {
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buffer = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!buffer)
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return -ENOMEM;
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buffer[0] = 0;
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goto done;
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}
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if (ctx->cn_size && ctx->o_size) {
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/* Consider combining O and CN, but use only the CN if it is
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* prefixed by the O, or a significant portion thereof.
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*/
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namesize = ctx->cn_size;
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name = data + ctx->cn_offset;
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if (ctx->cn_size >= ctx->o_size &&
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memcmp(data + ctx->cn_offset, data + ctx->o_offset,
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ctx->o_size) == 0)
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goto single_component;
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if (ctx->cn_size >= 7 &&
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ctx->o_size >= 7 &&
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memcmp(data + ctx->cn_offset, data + ctx->o_offset, 7) == 0)
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goto single_component;
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buffer = kmalloc(ctx->o_size + 2 + ctx->cn_size + 1,
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!buffer)
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return -ENOMEM;
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memcpy(buffer,
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data + ctx->o_offset, ctx->o_size);
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buffer[ctx->o_size + 0] = ':';
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buffer[ctx->o_size + 1] = ' ';
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memcpy(buffer + ctx->o_size + 2,
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data + ctx->cn_offset, ctx->cn_size);
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buffer[ctx->o_size + 2 + ctx->cn_size] = 0;
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goto done;
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} else if (ctx->cn_size) {
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namesize = ctx->cn_size;
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name = data + ctx->cn_offset;
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} else if (ctx->o_size) {
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namesize = ctx->o_size;
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name = data + ctx->o_offset;
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} else {
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namesize = ctx->email_size;
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name = data + ctx->email_offset;
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}
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single_component:
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buffer = kmalloc(namesize + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!buffer)
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return -ENOMEM;
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memcpy(buffer, name, namesize);
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buffer[namesize] = 0;
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done:
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*_name = buffer;
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ctx->cn_size = 0;
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ctx->o_size = 0;
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ctx->email_size = 0;
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return 0;
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}
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int x509_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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ctx->cert->raw_issuer = value;
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ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
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return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->issuer, vlen);
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}
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int x509_note_subject(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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ctx->cert->raw_subject = value;
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ctx->cert->raw_subject_size = vlen;
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return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->subject, vlen);
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}
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/*
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* Extract the data for the public key algorithm
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*/
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int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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if (ctx->last_oid != OID_rsaEncryption)
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return -ENOPKG;
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ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "rsa";
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/* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */
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if (vlen < 1 || *(const u8 *)value != 0)
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return -EBADMSG;
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ctx->key = value + 1;
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ctx->key_size = vlen - 1;
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return 0;
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}
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/* The keyIdentifier in AuthorityKeyIdentifier SEQUENCE is tag(CONT,PRIM,0) */
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#define SEQ_TAG_KEYID (ASN1_CONT << 6)
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/*
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* Process certificate extensions that are used to qualify the certificate.
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*/
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int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
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const unsigned char *v = value;
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pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
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if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) {
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/* Get hold of the key fingerprint */
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if (ctx->cert->skid || vlen < 3)
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return -EBADMSG;
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if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2)
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return -EBADMSG;
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v += 2;
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vlen -= 2;
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ctx->cert->raw_skid_size = vlen;
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ctx->cert->raw_skid = v;
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kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen, "", 0);
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if (IS_ERR(kid))
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return PTR_ERR(kid);
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ctx->cert->skid = kid;
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pr_debug("subjkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
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return 0;
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}
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if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
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/* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
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ctx->raw_akid = v;
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ctx->raw_akid_size = vlen;
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return 0;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* x509_decode_time - Decode an X.509 time ASN.1 object
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* @_t: The time to fill in
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* @hdrlen: The length of the object header
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* @tag: The object tag
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* @value: The object value
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* @vlen: The size of the object value
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*
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* Decode an ASN.1 universal time or generalised time field into a struct the
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* kernel can handle and check it for validity. The time is decoded thus:
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*
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* [RFC5280 §4.1.2.5]
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* CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate validity
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* dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity dates in
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* 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. Conforming
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* applications MUST be able to process validity dates that are encoded in
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* either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.
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*/
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int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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static const unsigned char month_lengths[] = { 31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30,
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31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31 };
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const unsigned char *p = value;
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unsigned year, mon, day, hour, min, sec, mon_len;
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#define dec2bin(X) ({ unsigned char x = (X) - '0'; if (x > 9) goto invalid_time; x; })
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#define DD2bin(P) ({ unsigned x = dec2bin(P[0]) * 10 + dec2bin(P[1]); P += 2; x; })
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if (tag == ASN1_UNITIM) {
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/* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
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if (vlen != 13)
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goto unsupported_time;
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year = DD2bin(p);
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if (year >= 50)
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year += 1900;
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else
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year += 2000;
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} else if (tag == ASN1_GENTIM) {
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/* GenTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
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if (vlen != 15)
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goto unsupported_time;
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year = DD2bin(p) * 100 + DD2bin(p);
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if (year >= 1950 && year <= 2049)
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goto invalid_time;
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} else {
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goto unsupported_time;
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}
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mon = DD2bin(p);
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day = DD2bin(p);
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hour = DD2bin(p);
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min = DD2bin(p);
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sec = DD2bin(p);
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if (*p != 'Z')
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goto unsupported_time;
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if (year < 1970 ||
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mon < 1 || mon > 12)
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goto invalid_time;
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mon_len = month_lengths[mon - 1];
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if (mon == 2) {
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if (year % 4 == 0) {
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mon_len = 29;
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if (year % 100 == 0) {
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mon_len = 28;
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if (year % 400 == 0)
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mon_len = 29;
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}
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}
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}
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if (day < 1 || day > mon_len ||
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hour > 24 || /* ISO 8601 permits 24:00:00 as midnight tomorrow */
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min > 59 ||
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sec > 60) /* ISO 8601 permits leap seconds [X.680 46.3] */
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goto invalid_time;
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*_t = mktime64(year, mon, day, hour, min, sec);
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return 0;
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unsupported_time:
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pr_debug("Got unsupported time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",
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tag, (int)vlen, value);
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return -EBADMSG;
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invalid_time:
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pr_debug("Got invalid time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",
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tag, (int)vlen, value);
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return -EBADMSG;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_decode_time);
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int x509_note_not_before(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_from, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
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}
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int x509_note_not_after(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_to, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
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}
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/*
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* Note a key identifier-based AuthorityKeyIdentifier
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*/
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int x509_akid_note_kid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
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pr_debug("AKID: keyid: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
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if (ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1])
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return 0;
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kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0);
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if (IS_ERR(kid))
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return PTR_ERR(kid);
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pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
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ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1] = kid;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Note a directoryName in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier
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*/
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int x509_akid_note_name(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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pr_debug("AKID: name: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
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ctx->akid_raw_issuer = value;
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ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size = vlen;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Note a serial number in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier
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*/
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int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const void *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
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struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
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pr_debug("AKID: serial: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
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if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0])
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return 0;
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kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value,
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vlen,
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ctx->akid_raw_issuer,
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ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size);
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if (IS_ERR(kid))
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return PTR_ERR(kid);
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pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
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ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0] = kid;
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return 0;
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}
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