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8bf37d8c06
The migitation control is simpler to implement in architecture code as it avoids the extra function call to check the mode. Aside of that having an explicit seccomp enabled mode in the architecture mitigations would require even more workarounds. Move it into architecture code and provide a weak function in the seccomp code. Remove the 'which' argument as this allows the architecture to decide which mitigations are relevant for seccomp. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
69 lines
2.1 KiB
C
69 lines
2.1 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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// Copyright(c) 2018 Linus Torvalds. All rights reserved.
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// Copyright(c) 2018 Alexei Starovoitov. All rights reserved.
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// Copyright(c) 2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
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#ifndef _LINUX_NOSPEC_H
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#define _LINUX_NOSPEC_H
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#include <asm/barrier.h>
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struct task_struct;
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/**
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* array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise
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* @index: array element index
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* @size: number of elements in array
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*
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* When @index is out of bounds (@index >= @size), the sign bit will be
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* set. Extend the sign bit to all bits and invert, giving a result of
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* zero for an out of bounds index, or ~0 if within bounds [0, @size).
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*/
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#ifndef array_index_mask_nospec
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static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
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unsigned long size)
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{
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/*
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* Always calculate and emit the mask even if the compiler
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* thinks the mask is not needed. The compiler does not take
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* into account the value of @index under speculation.
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*/
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OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(index);
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return ~(long)(index | (size - 1UL - index)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1);
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}
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#endif
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/*
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* array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check
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*
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* For a code sequence like:
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*
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* if (index < size) {
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* index = array_index_nospec(index, size);
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* val = array[index];
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* }
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*
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* ...if the CPU speculates past the bounds check then
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* array_index_nospec() will clamp the index within the range of [0,
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* size).
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*/
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#define array_index_nospec(index, size) \
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({ \
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typeof(index) _i = (index); \
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typeof(size) _s = (size); \
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unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(_i, _s); \
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\
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BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long)); \
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BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long)); \
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\
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(typeof(_i)) (_i & _mask); \
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})
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/* Speculation control prctl */
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int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which);
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int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
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unsigned long ctrl);
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/* Speculation control for seccomp enforced mitigation */
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void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task);
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#endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */
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