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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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3c0ad98c2e
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The main changes are extending the TPM 2.0 PCR banks with bank
specific file hashes, calculating the "boot_aggregate" based on other
TPM PCR banks, using the default IMA hash algorithm, instead of SHA1,
as the basis for the cache hash table key, and preventing the mprotect
syscall to circumvent an IMA mmap appraise policy rule.
- In preparation for extending TPM 2.0 PCR banks with bank specific
digests, commit 0b6cf6b97b
("tpm: pass an array of
tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()") modified
tpm_pcr_extend(). The original SHA1 file digests were
padded/truncated, before being extended into the other TPM PCR
banks. This pull request calculates and extends the TPM PCR banks
with bank specific file hashes completing the above change.
- The "boot_aggregate", the first IMA measurement list record, is the
"trusted boot" link between the pre-boot environment and the
running OS. With TPM 2.0, the "boot_aggregate" record is not
limited to being based on the SHA1 TPM PCR bank, but can be
calculated based on any enabled bank, assuming the hash algorithm
is also enabled in the kernel.
Other changes include the following and five other bug fixes/code
clean up:
- supporting both a SHA1 and a larger "boot_aggregate" digest in a
custom template format containing both the the SHA1 ('d') and
larger digests ('d-ng') fields.
- Initial hash table key fix, but additional changes would be good"
* tag 'integrity-v5.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Directly free *entry in ima_alloc_init_template() if digests is NULL
ima: Call ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in ima_eventdigest_init()
ima: Directly assign the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules
ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy
evm: Fix possible memory leak in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()
ima: Set again build_ima_appraise variable
ima: Remove redundant policy rule set in add_rules()
ima: Fix ima digest hash table key calculation
ima: Use ima_hash_algo for collision detection in the measurement list
ima: Calculate and extend PCR with digests in ima_template_entry
ima: Allocate and initialize tfm for each PCR bank
ima: Switch to dynamically allocated buffer for template digests
ima: Store template digest directly in ima_template_entry
ima: Evaluate error in init_ima()
ima: Switch to ima_hash_algo for boot aggregate
504 lines
12 KiB
C
504 lines
12 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
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*
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* Authors:
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* Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
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* Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>
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* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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*
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* File: ima_fs.c
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* implemenents security file system for reporting
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* current measurement list and IMA statistics
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*/
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#include <linux/fcntl.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/seq_file.h>
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#include <linux/rculist.h>
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#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
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#include <linux/parser.h>
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#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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#include "ima.h"
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static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_write_mutex);
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bool ima_canonical_fmt;
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static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str)
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{
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#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
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ima_canonical_fmt = true;
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#endif
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return 1;
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}
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__setup("ima_canonical_fmt", default_canonical_fmt_setup);
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static int valid_policy = 1;
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static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count,
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loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_t *val)
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{
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char tmpbuf[32]; /* greater than largest 'long' string value */
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ssize_t len;
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len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val));
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return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len);
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}
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static ssize_t ima_show_htable_violations(struct file *filp,
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char __user *buf,
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size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.violations);
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}
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static const struct file_operations ima_htable_violations_ops = {
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.read = ima_show_htable_violations,
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.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
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};
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static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp,
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char __user *buf,
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size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.len);
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}
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static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = {
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.read = ima_show_measurements_count,
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.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
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};
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/* returns pointer to hlist_node */
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static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
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{
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loff_t l = *pos;
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struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
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/* we need a lock since pos could point beyond last element */
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rcu_read_lock();
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list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_measurements, later) {
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if (!l--) {
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return qe;
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}
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}
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return NULL;
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}
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static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
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{
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struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
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/* lock protects when reading beyond last element
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* against concurrent list-extension
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*/
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rcu_read_lock();
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qe = list_entry_rcu(qe->later.next, struct ima_queue_entry, later);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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(*pos)++;
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return (&qe->later == &ima_measurements) ? NULL : qe;
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}
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static void ima_measurements_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
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{
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}
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void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen)
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{
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while (datalen--)
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seq_putc(m, *(char *)data++);
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}
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/* print format:
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* 32bit-le=pcr#
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* char[20]=template digest
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* 32bit-le=template name size
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* char[n]=template name
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* [eventdata length]
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* eventdata[n]=template specific data
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*/
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int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
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{
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/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
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struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
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struct ima_template_entry *e;
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char *template_name;
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u32 pcr, namelen, template_data_len; /* temporary fields */
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bool is_ima_template = false;
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int i;
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/* get entry */
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e = qe->entry;
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if (e == NULL)
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return -1;
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template_name = (e->template_desc->name[0] != '\0') ?
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e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt;
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/*
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* 1st: PCRIndex
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* PCR used defaults to the same (config option) in
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* little-endian format, unless set in policy
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*/
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pcr = !ima_canonical_fmt ? e->pcr : cpu_to_le32(e->pcr);
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ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(e->pcr));
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/* 2nd: template digest */
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ima_putc(m, e->digests[ima_sha1_idx].digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
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/* 3rd: template name size */
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namelen = !ima_canonical_fmt ? strlen(template_name) :
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cpu_to_le32(strlen(template_name));
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ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen));
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/* 4th: template name */
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ima_putc(m, template_name, strlen(template_name));
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/* 5th: template length (except for 'ima' template) */
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if (strcmp(template_name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0)
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is_ima_template = true;
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if (!is_ima_template) {
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template_data_len = !ima_canonical_fmt ? e->template_data_len :
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cpu_to_le32(e->template_data_len);
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ima_putc(m, &template_data_len, sizeof(e->template_data_len));
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}
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/* 6th: template specific data */
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for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
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enum ima_show_type show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY;
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const struct ima_template_field *field =
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e->template_desc->fields[i];
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if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "d") == 0)
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show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN;
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if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "n") == 0)
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show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT;
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field->field_show(m, show, &e->template_data[i]);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static const struct seq_operations ima_measurments_seqops = {
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.start = ima_measurements_start,
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.next = ima_measurements_next,
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.stop = ima_measurements_stop,
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.show = ima_measurements_show
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};
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static int ima_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
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{
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return seq_open(file, &ima_measurments_seqops);
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}
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static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = {
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.open = ima_measurements_open,
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.read = seq_read,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.release = seq_release,
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};
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void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size)
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{
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u32 i;
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for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
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seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i));
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}
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/* print in ascii */
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static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
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{
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/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
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struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
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struct ima_template_entry *e;
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char *template_name;
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int i;
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/* get entry */
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e = qe->entry;
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if (e == NULL)
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return -1;
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template_name = (e->template_desc->name[0] != '\0') ?
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e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt;
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/* 1st: PCR used (config option) */
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seq_printf(m, "%2d ", e->pcr);
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/* 2nd: SHA1 template hash */
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ima_print_digest(m, e->digests[ima_sha1_idx].digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
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/* 3th: template name */
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seq_printf(m, " %s", template_name);
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/* 4th: template specific data */
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for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
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seq_puts(m, " ");
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if (e->template_data[i].len == 0)
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continue;
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e->template_desc->fields[i]->field_show(m, IMA_SHOW_ASCII,
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&e->template_data[i]);
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}
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seq_puts(m, "\n");
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return 0;
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}
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static const struct seq_operations ima_ascii_measurements_seqops = {
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.start = ima_measurements_start,
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.next = ima_measurements_next,
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.stop = ima_measurements_stop,
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.show = ima_ascii_measurements_show
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};
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static int ima_ascii_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
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{
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return seq_open(file, &ima_ascii_measurements_seqops);
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}
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static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
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.open = ima_ascii_measurements_open,
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.read = seq_read,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.release = seq_release,
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};
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static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
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{
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void *data;
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char *datap;
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loff_t size;
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int rc, pathlen = strlen(path);
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char *p;
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/* remove \n */
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datap = path;
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strsep(&datap, "\n");
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rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0, READING_POLICY);
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if (rc < 0) {
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pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
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return rc;
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}
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datap = data;
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while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) {
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pr_debug("rule: %s\n", p);
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rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p);
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if (rc < 0)
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break;
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size -= rc;
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}
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vfree(data);
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if (rc < 0)
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return rc;
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else if (size)
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return -EINVAL;
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else
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return pathlen;
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}
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static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
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size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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char *data;
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ssize_t result;
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if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE)
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datalen = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
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/* No partial writes. */
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result = -EINVAL;
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if (*ppos != 0)
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goto out;
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data = memdup_user_nul(buf, datalen);
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if (IS_ERR(data)) {
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result = PTR_ERR(data);
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goto out;
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}
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result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex);
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if (result < 0)
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goto out_free;
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if (data[0] == '/') {
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result = ima_read_policy(data);
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} else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) {
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pr_err("signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n");
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integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
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"policy_update", "signed policy required",
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1, 0);
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result = -EACCES;
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} else {
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result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
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}
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mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
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out_free:
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kfree(data);
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out:
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if (result < 0)
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valid_policy = 0;
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return result;
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}
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static struct dentry *ima_dir;
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static struct dentry *ima_symlink;
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static struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements;
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static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements;
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static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count;
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static struct dentry *violations;
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static struct dentry *ima_policy;
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enum ima_fs_flags {
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IMA_FS_BUSY,
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};
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static unsigned long ima_fs_flags;
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
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static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = {
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.start = ima_policy_start,
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.next = ima_policy_next,
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.stop = ima_policy_stop,
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.show = ima_policy_show,
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};
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#endif
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/*
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* ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
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*/
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static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
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{
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if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) {
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#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
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return -EACCES;
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#else
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if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY)
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return -EACCES;
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if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
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return -EPERM;
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return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops);
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#endif
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}
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if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags))
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return -EBUSY;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* ima_release_policy - start using the new measure policy rules.
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*
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* Initially, ima_measure points to the default policy rules, now
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* point to the new policy rules, and remove the securityfs policy file,
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* assuming a valid policy.
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*/
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static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
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{
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const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed";
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if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY)
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return seq_release(inode, file);
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if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) {
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cause = "failed";
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valid_policy = 0;
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}
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pr_info("policy update %s\n", cause);
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integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
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"policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0);
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if (!valid_policy) {
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ima_delete_rules();
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valid_policy = 1;
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clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
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return 0;
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}
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ima_update_policy();
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#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
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securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
|
|
ima_policy = NULL;
|
|
#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY)
|
|
clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
|
|
#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
|
|
inode->i_mode &= ~S_IWUSR;
|
|
#endif
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
|
|
.open = ima_open_policy,
|
|
.write = ima_write_policy,
|
|
.read = seq_read,
|
|
.release = ima_release_policy,
|
|
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int __init ima_fs_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", integrity_dir);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
ima_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("ima", NULL, "integrity/ima",
|
|
NULL);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ima_symlink))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
binary_runtime_measurements =
|
|
securityfs_create_file("binary_runtime_measurements",
|
|
S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
|
|
&ima_measurements_ops);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
ascii_runtime_measurements =
|
|
securityfs_create_file("ascii_runtime_measurements",
|
|
S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
|
|
&ima_ascii_measurements_ops);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
runtime_measurements_count =
|
|
securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count",
|
|
S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
|
|
&ima_measurements_count_ops);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
violations =
|
|
securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
|
|
ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(violations))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS,
|
|
ima_dir, NULL,
|
|
&ima_measure_policy_ops);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ima_policy))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
out:
|
|
securityfs_remove(violations);
|
|
securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
|
|
securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
|
|
securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
|
|
securityfs_remove(ima_symlink);
|
|
securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
|
|
securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|