mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-23 10:13:58 +07:00
410feb75de
- Spectre v4 mitigation (Speculative Store Bypass Disable) support for arm64 using SMC firmware call to set a hardware chicken bit - ACPI PPTT (Processor Properties Topology Table) parsing support and enable the feature for arm64 - Report signal frame size to user via auxv (AT_MINSIGSTKSZ). The primary motivation is Scalable Vector Extensions which requires more space on the signal frame than the currently defined MINSIGSTKSZ - ARM perf patches: allow building arm-cci as module, demote dev_warn() to dev_dbg() in arm-ccn event_init(), miscellaneous cleanups - cmpwait() WFE optimisation to avoid some spurious wakeups - L1_CACHE_BYTES reverted back to 64 (for performance reasons that have to do with some network allocations) while keeping ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN to 128. cache_line_size() returns the actual hardware Cache Writeback Granule - Turn LSE atomics on by default in Kconfig - Kernel fault reporting tidying - Some #include and miscellaneous cleanups -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEE5RElWfyWxS+3PLO2a9axLQDIXvEFAlsaoqsACgkQa9axLQDI XvH+8RAAqRCrEtkNPS7zxHyMK/D2cxSy9EVtlJ1sxhmsONEe5t5MDTWX9byobQ5A PAKMSQBQgUvecqHLOtD7SJWef1il30zgWmc/yPcgNv3OsA1Au7j2g3ht/Drw+N5I Vy0aOUEtw+Jzs7y/CJyl6lufSkkOzszOujt2Nybiz6omztOrwkW9isKnURzQBNj5 gquZI35h604YJ9F0TqS6ZqU7tNcuB9q02FxvVBpLmb83jP4jSEjYACUJwVVxvEAB UXjdD4N130rRXDS5OMRWo5+4SAj+kPYhdVYEvaDx7xTOIRHhXK05GlJbsUAc5E6l xy810fH5Dm0diYpVvYWTA5J+BU1jNOvCys5zKWl7gs2P8YB59PdqY4M2YBPNGb5H PaVgq73TZAsww6ZInbZlK+wZOIxZZIOf//Z+QKn6EPtu3RmzIFWwyttTj01w1E3i LhjcUoGnvxJFcMoCr59ihDwfP9nkCVrNc4REOGaWDk6L/t/bOfaZfDz+OCGbwQdL akCFKZI6q5O/no+YfhtdtNFpCQb/Bo1J88KuotICRXq8z4vO41zIG53bi97W8QeG rCBiX0NxUxYJ3ybus7kZHTmMGieMyEHP28n12QffwvJj4vJBsUXQBrV8hclx0djZ HMt7iPi/0BW6nVV7ngIgN3cdCpaDCEGRsfO4Ch0rFZrC9UbYQnE= =uums -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas: "Apart from the core arm64 and perf changes, the Spectre v4 mitigation touches the arm KVM code and the ACPI PPTT support touches drivers/ (acpi and cacheinfo). I should have the maintainers' acks in place. Summary: - Spectre v4 mitigation (Speculative Store Bypass Disable) support for arm64 using SMC firmware call to set a hardware chicken bit - ACPI PPTT (Processor Properties Topology Table) parsing support and enable the feature for arm64 - Report signal frame size to user via auxv (AT_MINSIGSTKSZ). The primary motivation is Scalable Vector Extensions which requires more space on the signal frame than the currently defined MINSIGSTKSZ - ARM perf patches: allow building arm-cci as module, demote dev_warn() to dev_dbg() in arm-ccn event_init(), miscellaneous cleanups - cmpwait() WFE optimisation to avoid some spurious wakeups - L1_CACHE_BYTES reverted back to 64 (for performance reasons that have to do with some network allocations) while keeping ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN to 128. cache_line_size() returns the actual hardware Cache Writeback Granule - Turn LSE atomics on by default in Kconfig - Kernel fault reporting tidying - Some #include and miscellaneous cleanups" * tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (53 commits) arm64: Fix syscall restarting around signal suppressed by tracer arm64: topology: Avoid checking numa mask for scheduler MC selection ACPI / PPTT: fix build when CONFIG_ACPI_PPTT is not enabled arm64: cpu_errata: include required headers arm64: KVM: Move VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG macros to the top of the file arm64: signal: Report signal frame size to userspace via auxv arm64/sve: Thin out initialisation sanity-checks for sve_max_vl arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 discovery through ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID arm64: KVM: Handle guest's ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 requests arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 support for guests arm64: KVM: Add HYP per-cpu accessors arm64: ssbd: Add prctl interface for per-thread mitigation arm64: ssbd: Introduce thread flag to control userspace mitigation arm64: ssbd: Restore mitigation status on CPU resume arm64: ssbd: Skip apply_ssbd if not using dynamic mitigation arm64: ssbd: Add global mitigation state accessor arm64: Add 'ssbd' command-line option arm64: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 probing arm64: Add per-cpu infrastructure to call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 arm64: Call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 on transitions between EL0 and EL1 ...
886 lines
25 KiB
C
886 lines
25 KiB
C
/*
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* Based on arch/arm/mm/fault.c
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1995 Linus Torvalds
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* Copyright (C) 1995-2004 Russell King
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* Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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#include <linux/extable.h>
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#include <linux/signal.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/hardirq.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kprobes.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/page-flags.h>
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#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
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#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
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#include <linux/highmem.h>
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#include <linux/perf_event.h>
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#include <linux/preempt.h>
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#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
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#include <asm/bug.h>
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#include <asm/cmpxchg.h>
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#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
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#include <asm/exception.h>
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#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
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#include <asm/esr.h>
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#include <asm/sysreg.h>
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#include <asm/system_misc.h>
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#include <asm/pgtable.h>
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#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
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#include <asm/traps.h>
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#include <acpi/ghes.h>
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struct fault_info {
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int (*fn)(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
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struct pt_regs *regs);
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int sig;
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int code;
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const char *name;
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};
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static const struct fault_info fault_info[];
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static inline const struct fault_info *esr_to_fault_info(unsigned int esr)
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{
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return fault_info + (esr & 63);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
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static inline int notify_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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/* kprobe_running() needs smp_processor_id() */
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if (!user_mode(regs)) {
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preempt_disable();
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if (kprobe_running() && kprobe_fault_handler(regs, esr))
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ret = 1;
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preempt_enable();
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}
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return ret;
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}
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#else
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static inline int notify_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int esr)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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#endif
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static void data_abort_decode(unsigned int esr)
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{
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pr_alert("Data abort info:\n");
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if (esr & ESR_ELx_ISV) {
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pr_alert(" Access size = %u byte(s)\n",
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1U << ((esr & ESR_ELx_SAS) >> ESR_ELx_SAS_SHIFT));
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pr_alert(" SSE = %lu, SRT = %lu\n",
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(esr & ESR_ELx_SSE) >> ESR_ELx_SSE_SHIFT,
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(esr & ESR_ELx_SRT_MASK) >> ESR_ELx_SRT_SHIFT);
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pr_alert(" SF = %lu, AR = %lu\n",
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(esr & ESR_ELx_SF) >> ESR_ELx_SF_SHIFT,
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(esr & ESR_ELx_AR) >> ESR_ELx_AR_SHIFT);
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} else {
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pr_alert(" ISV = 0, ISS = 0x%08lx\n", esr & ESR_ELx_ISS_MASK);
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}
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pr_alert(" CM = %lu, WnR = %lu\n",
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(esr & ESR_ELx_CM) >> ESR_ELx_CM_SHIFT,
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(esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) >> ESR_ELx_WNR_SHIFT);
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}
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static void mem_abort_decode(unsigned int esr)
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{
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pr_alert("Mem abort info:\n");
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pr_alert(" ESR = 0x%08x\n", esr);
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pr_alert(" Exception class = %s, IL = %u bits\n",
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esr_get_class_string(esr),
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(esr & ESR_ELx_IL) ? 32 : 16);
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pr_alert(" SET = %lu, FnV = %lu\n",
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(esr & ESR_ELx_SET_MASK) >> ESR_ELx_SET_SHIFT,
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(esr & ESR_ELx_FnV) >> ESR_ELx_FnV_SHIFT);
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pr_alert(" EA = %lu, S1PTW = %lu\n",
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(esr & ESR_ELx_EA) >> ESR_ELx_EA_SHIFT,
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(esr & ESR_ELx_S1PTW) >> ESR_ELx_S1PTW_SHIFT);
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if (esr_is_data_abort(esr))
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data_abort_decode(esr);
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}
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/*
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* Dump out the page tables associated with 'addr' in the currently active mm.
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*/
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void show_pte(unsigned long addr)
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{
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struct mm_struct *mm;
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pgd_t *pgdp;
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pgd_t pgd;
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if (addr < TASK_SIZE) {
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/* TTBR0 */
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mm = current->active_mm;
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if (mm == &init_mm) {
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pr_alert("[%016lx] user address but active_mm is swapper\n",
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addr);
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return;
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}
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} else if (addr >= VA_START) {
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/* TTBR1 */
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mm = &init_mm;
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} else {
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pr_alert("[%016lx] address between user and kernel address ranges\n",
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addr);
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return;
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}
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pr_alert("%s pgtable: %luk pages, %u-bit VAs, pgdp = %p\n",
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mm == &init_mm ? "swapper" : "user", PAGE_SIZE / SZ_1K,
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VA_BITS, mm->pgd);
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pgdp = pgd_offset(mm, addr);
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pgd = READ_ONCE(*pgdp);
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pr_alert("[%016lx] pgd=%016llx", addr, pgd_val(pgd));
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do {
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pud_t *pudp, pud;
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pmd_t *pmdp, pmd;
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pte_t *ptep, pte;
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if (pgd_none(pgd) || pgd_bad(pgd))
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break;
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pudp = pud_offset(pgdp, addr);
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pud = READ_ONCE(*pudp);
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pr_cont(", pud=%016llx", pud_val(pud));
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if (pud_none(pud) || pud_bad(pud))
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break;
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pmdp = pmd_offset(pudp, addr);
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pmd = READ_ONCE(*pmdp);
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pr_cont(", pmd=%016llx", pmd_val(pmd));
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if (pmd_none(pmd) || pmd_bad(pmd))
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break;
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ptep = pte_offset_map(pmdp, addr);
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pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
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pr_cont(", pte=%016llx", pte_val(pte));
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pte_unmap(ptep);
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} while(0);
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pr_cont("\n");
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}
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/*
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* This function sets the access flags (dirty, accessed), as well as write
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* permission, and only to a more permissive setting.
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*
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* It needs to cope with hardware update of the accessed/dirty state by other
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* agents in the system and can safely skip the __sync_icache_dcache() call as,
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* like set_pte_at(), the PTE is never changed from no-exec to exec here.
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*
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* Returns whether or not the PTE actually changed.
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*/
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int ptep_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
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unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep,
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pte_t entry, int dirty)
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{
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pteval_t old_pteval, pteval;
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pte_t pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
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if (pte_same(pte, entry))
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return 0;
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/* only preserve the access flags and write permission */
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pte_val(entry) &= PTE_RDONLY | PTE_AF | PTE_WRITE | PTE_DIRTY;
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/*
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* Setting the flags must be done atomically to avoid racing with the
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* hardware update of the access/dirty state. The PTE_RDONLY bit must
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* be set to the most permissive (lowest value) of *ptep and entry
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* (calculated as: a & b == ~(~a | ~b)).
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*/
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pte_val(entry) ^= PTE_RDONLY;
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pteval = pte_val(pte);
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do {
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old_pteval = pteval;
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pteval ^= PTE_RDONLY;
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pteval |= pte_val(entry);
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pteval ^= PTE_RDONLY;
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pteval = cmpxchg_relaxed(&pte_val(*ptep), old_pteval, pteval);
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} while (pteval != old_pteval);
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flush_tlb_fix_spurious_fault(vma, address);
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return 1;
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}
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static bool is_el1_instruction_abort(unsigned int esr)
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{
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return ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_CUR;
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}
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static inline bool is_el1_permission_fault(unsigned int esr,
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struct pt_regs *regs,
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unsigned long addr)
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{
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unsigned int ec = ESR_ELx_EC(esr);
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unsigned int fsc_type = esr & ESR_ELx_FSC_TYPE;
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if (ec != ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_CUR && ec != ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_CUR)
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return false;
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if (fsc_type == ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM)
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return true;
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if (addr < TASK_SIZE && system_uses_ttbr0_pan())
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return fsc_type == ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT &&
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(regs->pstate & PSR_PAN_BIT);
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return false;
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}
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static void die_kernel_fault(const char *msg, unsigned long addr,
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unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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bust_spinlocks(1);
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pr_alert("Unable to handle kernel %s at virtual address %016lx\n", msg,
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addr);
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mem_abort_decode(esr);
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show_pte(addr);
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die("Oops", regs, esr);
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bust_spinlocks(0);
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do_exit(SIGKILL);
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}
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static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
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struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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const char *msg;
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/*
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* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault?
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* We are almost certainly not prepared to handle instruction faults.
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*/
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if (!is_el1_instruction_abort(esr) && fixup_exception(regs))
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return;
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if (is_el1_permission_fault(esr, regs, addr)) {
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if (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR)
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msg = "write to read-only memory";
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else
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msg = "read from unreadable memory";
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} else if (addr < PAGE_SIZE) {
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msg = "NULL pointer dereference";
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} else {
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msg = "paging request";
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}
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die_kernel_fault(msg, addr, esr, regs);
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}
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static void __do_user_fault(struct siginfo *info, unsigned int esr)
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{
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current->thread.fault_address = (unsigned long)info->si_addr;
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/*
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* If the faulting address is in the kernel, we must sanitize the ESR.
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* From userspace's point of view, kernel-only mappings don't exist
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* at all, so we report them as level 0 translation faults.
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* (This is not quite the way that "no mapping there at all" behaves:
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* an alignment fault not caused by the memory type would take
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* precedence over translation fault for a real access to empty
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* space. Unfortunately we can't easily distinguish "alignment fault
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* not caused by memory type" from "alignment fault caused by memory
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* type", so we ignore this wrinkle and just return the translation
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* fault.)
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*/
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if (current->thread.fault_address >= TASK_SIZE) {
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switch (ESR_ELx_EC(esr)) {
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case ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW:
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/*
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* These bits provide only information about the
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* faulting instruction, which userspace knows already.
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* We explicitly clear bits which are architecturally
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* RES0 in case they are given meanings in future.
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* We always report the ESR as if the fault was taken
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* to EL1 and so ISV and the bits in ISS[23:14] are
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* clear. (In fact it always will be a fault to EL1.)
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*/
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esr &= ESR_ELx_EC_MASK | ESR_ELx_IL |
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ESR_ELx_CM | ESR_ELx_WNR;
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esr |= ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT;
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break;
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case ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW:
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/*
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* Claim a level 0 translation fault.
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* All other bits are architecturally RES0 for faults
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* reported with that DFSC value, so we clear them.
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*/
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esr &= ESR_ELx_EC_MASK | ESR_ELx_IL;
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esr |= ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT;
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break;
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default:
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/*
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* This should never happen (entry.S only brings us
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* into this code for insn and data aborts from a lower
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* exception level). Fail safe by not providing an ESR
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* context record at all.
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*/
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WARN(1, "ESR 0x%x is not DABT or IABT from EL0\n", esr);
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esr = 0;
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break;
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}
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}
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current->thread.fault_code = esr;
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arm64_force_sig_info(info, esr_to_fault_info(esr)->name, current);
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}
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static void do_bad_area(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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/*
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* If we are in kernel mode at this point, we have no context to
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* handle this fault with.
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*/
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if (user_mode(regs)) {
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const struct fault_info *inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
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struct siginfo si;
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clear_siginfo(&si);
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si.si_signo = inf->sig;
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si.si_code = inf->code;
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si.si_addr = (void __user *)addr;
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__do_user_fault(&si, esr);
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} else {
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__do_kernel_fault(addr, esr, regs);
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}
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}
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#define VM_FAULT_BADMAP 0x010000
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#define VM_FAULT_BADACCESS 0x020000
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static int __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
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unsigned int mm_flags, unsigned long vm_flags,
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struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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struct vm_area_struct *vma;
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int fault;
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vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
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fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
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if (unlikely(!vma))
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goto out;
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if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > addr))
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goto check_stack;
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/*
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* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so we can handle
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* it.
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*/
|
|
good_area:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check that the permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which
|
|
* occurred.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
|
|
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return handle_mm_fault(vma, addr & PAGE_MASK, mm_flags);
|
|
|
|
check_stack:
|
|
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(vma, addr))
|
|
goto good_area;
|
|
out:
|
|
return fault;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool is_el0_instruction_abort(unsigned int esr)
|
|
{
|
|
return ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
{
|
|
struct task_struct *tsk;
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm;
|
|
struct siginfo si;
|
|
int fault, major = 0;
|
|
unsigned long vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_WRITE;
|
|
unsigned int mm_flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE;
|
|
|
|
if (notify_page_fault(regs, esr))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
tsk = current;
|
|
mm = tsk->mm;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we're in an interrupt or have no user context, we must not take
|
|
* the fault.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (faulthandler_disabled() || !mm)
|
|
goto no_context;
|
|
|
|
if (user_mode(regs))
|
|
mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
|
|
|
|
if (is_el0_instruction_abort(esr)) {
|
|
vm_flags = VM_EXEC;
|
|
} else if ((esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) && !(esr & ESR_ELx_CM)) {
|
|
vm_flags = VM_WRITE;
|
|
mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (addr < TASK_SIZE && is_el1_permission_fault(esr, regs, addr)) {
|
|
/* regs->orig_addr_limit may be 0 if we entered from EL0 */
|
|
if (regs->orig_addr_limit == KERNEL_DS)
|
|
die_kernel_fault("access to user memory with fs=KERNEL_DS",
|
|
addr, esr, regs);
|
|
|
|
if (is_el1_instruction_abort(esr))
|
|
die_kernel_fault("execution of user memory",
|
|
addr, esr, regs);
|
|
|
|
if (!search_exception_tables(regs->pc))
|
|
die_kernel_fault("access to user memory outside uaccess routines",
|
|
addr, esr, regs);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, addr);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* As per x86, we may deadlock here. However, since the kernel only
|
|
* validly references user space from well defined areas of the code,
|
|
* we can bug out early if this is from code which shouldn't.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
|
|
if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->pc))
|
|
goto no_context;
|
|
retry:
|
|
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The above down_read_trylock() might have succeeded in which
|
|
* case, we'll have missed the might_sleep() from down_read().
|
|
*/
|
|
might_sleep();
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
|
|
if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->pc))
|
|
goto no_context;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fault = __do_page_fault(mm, addr, mm_flags, vm_flags, tsk);
|
|
major |= fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
|
|
|
|
if (fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we need to retry but a fatal signal is pending,
|
|
* handle the signal first. We do not need to release
|
|
* the mmap_sem because it would already be released
|
|
* in __lock_page_or_retry in mm/filemap.c.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
|
|
if (!user_mode(regs))
|
|
goto no_context;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clear FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY to avoid any risk of
|
|
* starvation.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mm_flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY) {
|
|
mm_flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
|
|
mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_TRIED;
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Handle the "normal" (no error) case first.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (likely(!(fault & (VM_FAULT_ERROR | VM_FAULT_BADMAP |
|
|
VM_FAULT_BADACCESS)))) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Major/minor page fault accounting is only done
|
|
* once. If we go through a retry, it is extremely
|
|
* likely that the page will be found in page cache at
|
|
* that point.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (major) {
|
|
tsk->maj_flt++;
|
|
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, regs,
|
|
addr);
|
|
} else {
|
|
tsk->min_flt++;
|
|
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, regs,
|
|
addr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are in kernel mode at this point, we have no context to
|
|
* handle this fault with.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!user_mode(regs))
|
|
goto no_context;
|
|
|
|
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We ran out of memory, call the OOM killer, and return to
|
|
* userspace (which will retry the fault, or kill us if we got
|
|
* oom-killed).
|
|
*/
|
|
pagefault_out_of_memory();
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
clear_siginfo(&si);
|
|
si.si_addr = (void __user *)addr;
|
|
|
|
if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We had some memory, but were unable to successfully fix up
|
|
* this page fault.
|
|
*/
|
|
si.si_signo = SIGBUS;
|
|
si.si_code = BUS_ADRERR;
|
|
} else if (fault & VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE) {
|
|
unsigned int hindex = VM_FAULT_GET_HINDEX(fault);
|
|
|
|
si.si_signo = SIGBUS;
|
|
si.si_code = BUS_MCEERR_AR;
|
|
si.si_addr_lsb = hstate_index_to_shift(hindex);
|
|
} else if (fault & VM_FAULT_HWPOISON) {
|
|
si.si_signo = SIGBUS;
|
|
si.si_code = BUS_MCEERR_AR;
|
|
si.si_addr_lsb = PAGE_SHIFT;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Something tried to access memory that isn't in our memory
|
|
* map.
|
|
*/
|
|
si.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
|
|
si.si_code = fault == VM_FAULT_BADACCESS ?
|
|
SEGV_ACCERR : SEGV_MAPERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
__do_user_fault(&si, esr);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
no_context:
|
|
__do_kernel_fault(addr, esr, regs);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __kprobes do_translation_fault(unsigned long addr,
|
|
unsigned int esr,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
{
|
|
if (addr < TASK_SIZE)
|
|
return do_page_fault(addr, esr, regs);
|
|
|
|
do_bad_area(addr, esr, regs);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int do_alignment_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
{
|
|
do_bad_area(addr, esr, regs);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int do_bad(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
{
|
|
return 1; /* "fault" */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int do_sea(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
{
|
|
struct siginfo info;
|
|
const struct fault_info *inf;
|
|
|
|
inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Synchronous aborts may interrupt code which had interrupts masked.
|
|
* Before calling out into the wider kernel tell the interested
|
|
* subsystems.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_SEA)) {
|
|
if (interrupts_enabled(regs))
|
|
nmi_enter();
|
|
|
|
ghes_notify_sea();
|
|
|
|
if (interrupts_enabled(regs))
|
|
nmi_exit();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
clear_siginfo(&info);
|
|
info.si_signo = inf->sig;
|
|
info.si_errno = 0;
|
|
info.si_code = inf->code;
|
|
if (esr & ESR_ELx_FnV)
|
|
info.si_addr = NULL;
|
|
else
|
|
info.si_addr = (void __user *)addr;
|
|
arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, &info, esr);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const struct fault_info fault_info[] = {
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "ttbr address size fault" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 1 address size fault" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 2 address size fault" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 3 address size fault" },
|
|
{ do_translation_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, "level 0 translation fault" },
|
|
{ do_translation_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, "level 1 translation fault" },
|
|
{ do_translation_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, "level 2 translation fault" },
|
|
{ do_translation_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, "level 3 translation fault" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 8" },
|
|
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 1 access flag fault" },
|
|
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 2 access flag fault" },
|
|
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 3 access flag fault" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 12" },
|
|
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 1 permission fault" },
|
|
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 2 permission fault" },
|
|
{ do_page_fault, SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "level 3 permission fault" },
|
|
{ do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_OBJERR, "synchronous external abort" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 17" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 18" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 19" },
|
|
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 0 (translation table walk)" },
|
|
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 1 (translation table walk)" },
|
|
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 2 (translation table walk)" },
|
|
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 3 (translation table walk)" },
|
|
{ do_sea, SIGBUS, BUS_OBJERR, "synchronous parity or ECC error" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 25" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 26" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 27" },
|
|
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 0 synchronous parity error (translation table walk)" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
|
|
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 1 synchronous parity error (translation table walk)" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
|
|
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 2 synchronous parity error (translation table walk)" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
|
|
{ do_sea, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "level 3 synchronous parity error (translation table walk)" }, // Reserved when RAS is implemented
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 32" },
|
|
{ do_alignment_fault, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, "alignment fault" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 34" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 35" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 36" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 37" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 38" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 39" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 40" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 41" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 42" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 43" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 44" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 45" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 46" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 47" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "TLB conflict abort" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "Unsupported atomic hardware update fault" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 50" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 51" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "implementation fault (lockdown abort)" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGBUS, BUS_OBJERR, "implementation fault (unsupported exclusive)" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 54" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 55" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 56" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 57" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 58" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 59" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 60" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "section domain fault" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "page domain fault" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 63" },
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int handle_guest_sea(phys_addr_t addr, unsigned int esr)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = -ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_SEA))
|
|
ret = ghes_notify_sea();
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
asmlinkage void __exception do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct fault_info *inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
|
|
struct siginfo info;
|
|
|
|
if (!inf->fn(addr, esr, regs))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
|
|
pr_alert("Unhandled fault at 0x%016lx\n", addr);
|
|
mem_abort_decode(esr);
|
|
show_pte(addr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
clear_siginfo(&info);
|
|
info.si_signo = inf->sig;
|
|
info.si_errno = 0;
|
|
info.si_code = inf->code;
|
|
info.si_addr = (void __user *)addr;
|
|
arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, &info, esr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_irq_bp_hardening(void)
|
|
{
|
|
/* PC has already been checked in entry.S */
|
|
arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_ia_bp_hardening(unsigned long addr,
|
|
unsigned int esr,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* We've taken an instruction abort from userspace and not yet
|
|
* re-enabled IRQs. If the address is a kernel address, apply
|
|
* BP hardening prior to enabling IRQs and pre-emption.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (addr > TASK_SIZE)
|
|
arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
|
|
|
|
local_irq_enable();
|
|
do_mem_abort(addr, esr, regs);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
asmlinkage void __exception do_sp_pc_abort(unsigned long addr,
|
|
unsigned int esr,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
{
|
|
struct siginfo info;
|
|
|
|
if (user_mode(regs)) {
|
|
if (instruction_pointer(regs) > TASK_SIZE)
|
|
arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
|
|
local_irq_enable();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
clear_siginfo(&info);
|
|
info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
|
|
info.si_errno = 0;
|
|
info.si_code = BUS_ADRALN;
|
|
info.si_addr = (void __user *)addr;
|
|
arm64_notify_die("SP/PC alignment exception", regs, &info, esr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int __init early_brk64(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* __refdata because early_brk64 is __init, but the reference to it is
|
|
* clobbered at arch_initcall time.
|
|
* See traps.c and debug-monitors.c:debug_traps_init().
|
|
*/
|
|
static struct fault_info __refdata debug_fault_info[] = {
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT, "hardware breakpoint" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT, "hardware single-step" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT, "hardware watchpoint" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 3" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_BRKPT, "aarch32 BKPT" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "aarch32 vector catch" },
|
|
{ early_brk64, SIGTRAP, TRAP_BRKPT, "aarch64 BRK" },
|
|
{ do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 7" },
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
void __init hook_debug_fault_code(int nr,
|
|
int (*fn)(unsigned long, unsigned int, struct pt_regs *),
|
|
int sig, int code, const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
BUG_ON(nr < 0 || nr >= ARRAY_SIZE(debug_fault_info));
|
|
|
|
debug_fault_info[nr].fn = fn;
|
|
debug_fault_info[nr].sig = sig;
|
|
debug_fault_info[nr].code = code;
|
|
debug_fault_info[nr].name = name;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
asmlinkage int __exception do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr,
|
|
unsigned int esr,
|
|
struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct fault_info *inf = debug_fault_info + DBG_ESR_EVT(esr);
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Tell lockdep we disabled irqs in entry.S. Do nothing if they were
|
|
* already disabled to preserve the last enabled/disabled addresses.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (interrupts_enabled(regs))
|
|
trace_hardirqs_off();
|
|
|
|
if (user_mode(regs) && instruction_pointer(regs) > TASK_SIZE)
|
|
arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
|
|
|
|
if (!inf->fn(addr, esr, regs)) {
|
|
rv = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
struct siginfo info;
|
|
|
|
clear_siginfo(&info);
|
|
info.si_signo = inf->sig;
|
|
info.si_errno = 0;
|
|
info.si_code = inf->code;
|
|
info.si_addr = (void __user *)addr;
|
|
arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, &info, esr);
|
|
rv = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (interrupts_enabled(regs))
|
|
trace_hardirqs_on();
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_debug_exception);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PAN
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void cpu_enable_pan(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
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{
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/*
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* We modify PSTATE. This won't work from irq context as the PSTATE
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* is discarded once we return from the exception.
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*/
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WARN_ON_ONCE(in_interrupt());
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config_sctlr_el1(SCTLR_EL1_SPAN, 0);
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asm(SET_PSTATE_PAN(1));
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PAN */
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