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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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2d6bb6adb7
- Introduces the stackleak gcc plugin ported from grsecurity by Alexander
Popov, with x86 and arm64 support.
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Comment: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
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Merge tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull stackleak gcc plugin from Kees Cook:
"Please pull this new GCC plugin, stackleak, for v4.20-rc1. This plugin
was ported from grsecurity by Alexander Popov. It provides efficient
stack content poisoning at syscall exit. This creates a defense
against at least two classes of flaws:
- Uninitialized stack usage. (We continue to work on improving the
compiler to do this in other ways: e.g. unconditional zero init was
proposed to GCC and Clang, and more plugin work has started too).
- Stack content exposure. By greatly reducing the lifetime of valid
stack contents, exposures via either direct read bugs or unknown
cache side-channels become much more difficult to exploit. This
complements the existing buddy and heap poisoning options, but
provides the coverage for stacks.
The x86 hooks are included in this series (which have been reviewed by
Ingo, Dave Hansen, and Thomas Gleixner). The arm64 hooks have already
been merged through the arm64 tree (written by Laura Abbott and
reviewed by Mark Rutland and Will Deacon).
With VLAs having been removed this release, there is no need for
alloca() protection, so it has been removed from the plugin"
* tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
arm64: Drop unneeded stackleak_check_alloca()
stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing
doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature
fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system
lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack
x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
91 lines
2.7 KiB
C
91 lines
2.7 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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#ifndef __LKDTM_H
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#define __LKDTM_H
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "lkdtm: " fmt
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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/* lkdtm_bugs.c */
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void __init lkdtm_bugs_init(int *recur_param);
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void lkdtm_PANIC(void);
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void lkdtm_BUG(void);
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void lkdtm_WARNING(void);
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void lkdtm_EXCEPTION(void);
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void lkdtm_LOOP(void);
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void lkdtm_OVERFLOW(void);
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void lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK(void);
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void lkdtm_CORRUPT_STACK_STRONG(void);
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void lkdtm_UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE(void);
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void lkdtm_SOFTLOCKUP(void);
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void lkdtm_HARDLOCKUP(void);
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void lkdtm_SPINLOCKUP(void);
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void lkdtm_HUNG_TASK(void);
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void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD(void);
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void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void);
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void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void);
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void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING(void);
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void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING(void);
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/* lkdtm_heap.c */
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void lkdtm_OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION(void);
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void lkdtm_WRITE_AFTER_FREE(void);
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void lkdtm_READ_AFTER_FREE(void);
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void lkdtm_WRITE_BUDDY_AFTER_FREE(void);
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void lkdtm_READ_BUDDY_AFTER_FREE(void);
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/* lkdtm_perms.c */
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void __init lkdtm_perms_init(void);
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void lkdtm_WRITE_RO(void);
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void lkdtm_WRITE_RO_AFTER_INIT(void);
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void lkdtm_WRITE_KERN(void);
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void lkdtm_EXEC_DATA(void);
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void lkdtm_EXEC_STACK(void);
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void lkdtm_EXEC_KMALLOC(void);
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void lkdtm_EXEC_VMALLOC(void);
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void lkdtm_EXEC_RODATA(void);
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void lkdtm_EXEC_USERSPACE(void);
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void lkdtm_ACCESS_USERSPACE(void);
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/* lkdtm_refcount.c */
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_INC_OVERFLOW(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_ADD_OVERFLOW(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_INC_NOT_ZERO_OVERFLOW(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_ADD_NOT_ZERO_OVERFLOW(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_DEC_ZERO(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_DEC_NEGATIVE(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_DEC_AND_TEST_NEGATIVE(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_SUB_AND_TEST_NEGATIVE(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_INC_ZERO(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_ADD_ZERO(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_INC_SATURATED(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_DEC_SATURATED(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_ADD_SATURATED(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_INC_NOT_ZERO_SATURATED(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_ADD_NOT_ZERO_SATURATED(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_DEC_AND_TEST_SATURATED(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_SUB_AND_TEST_SATURATED(void);
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void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_TIMING(void);
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void lkdtm_ATOMIC_TIMING(void);
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/* lkdtm_rodata.c */
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void lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing(void);
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/* lkdtm_usercopy.c */
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void __init lkdtm_usercopy_init(void);
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void __exit lkdtm_usercopy_exit(void);
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void lkdtm_USERCOPY_HEAP_SIZE_TO(void);
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void lkdtm_USERCOPY_HEAP_SIZE_FROM(void);
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void lkdtm_USERCOPY_HEAP_WHITELIST_TO(void);
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void lkdtm_USERCOPY_HEAP_WHITELIST_FROM(void);
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void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_TO(void);
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void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM(void);
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void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND(void);
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void lkdtm_USERCOPY_KERNEL(void);
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void lkdtm_USERCOPY_KERNEL_DS(void);
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/* lkdtm_stackleak.c */
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void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING(void);
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#endif
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