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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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e63650840e
Now that eagerfpu= is gone, remove it from the docs and some comments. Also sync the changes to tools/. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cf430dd4481d41280e93ac6cf0def1007a67fc8e.1476740397.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
227 lines
6.5 KiB
C
227 lines
6.5 KiB
C
/*
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* Intel Memory Protection Keys management
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* Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
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* under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
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* version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
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* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
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* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
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* more details.
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*/
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#include <linux/debugfs.h> /* debugfs_create_u32() */
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#include <linux/mm_types.h> /* mm_struct, vma, etc... */
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#include <linux/pkeys.h> /* PKEY_* */
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#include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h>
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#include <asm/cpufeature.h> /* boot_cpu_has, ... */
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#include <asm/mmu_context.h> /* vma_pkey() */
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#include <asm/fpu/internal.h> /* fpregs_active() */
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int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
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{
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bool need_to_set_mm_pkey = false;
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int execute_only_pkey = mm->context.execute_only_pkey;
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int ret;
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/* Do we need to assign a pkey for mm's execute-only maps? */
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if (execute_only_pkey == -1) {
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/* Go allocate one to use, which might fail */
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execute_only_pkey = mm_pkey_alloc(mm);
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if (execute_only_pkey < 0)
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return -1;
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need_to_set_mm_pkey = true;
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}
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/*
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* We do not want to go through the relatively costly
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* dance to set PKRU if we do not need to. Check it
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* first and assume that if the execute-only pkey is
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* write-disabled that we do not have to set it
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* ourselves. We need preempt off so that nobody
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* can make fpregs inactive.
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*/
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preempt_disable();
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if (!need_to_set_mm_pkey &&
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fpregs_active() &&
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!__pkru_allows_read(read_pkru(), execute_only_pkey)) {
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preempt_enable();
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return execute_only_pkey;
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}
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preempt_enable();
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/*
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* Set up PKRU so that it denies access for everything
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* other than execution.
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*/
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ret = arch_set_user_pkey_access(current, execute_only_pkey,
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PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
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/*
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* If the PKRU-set operation failed somehow, just return
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* 0 and effectively disable execute-only support.
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*/
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if (ret) {
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mm_set_pkey_free(mm, execute_only_pkey);
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return -1;
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}
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/* We got one, store it and use it from here on out */
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if (need_to_set_mm_pkey)
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mm->context.execute_only_pkey = execute_only_pkey;
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return execute_only_pkey;
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}
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static inline bool vma_is_pkey_exec_only(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
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{
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/* Do this check first since the vm_flags should be hot */
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if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)) != VM_EXEC)
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return false;
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if (vma_pkey(vma) != vma->vm_mm->context.execute_only_pkey)
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return false;
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return true;
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}
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/*
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* This is only called for *plain* mprotect calls.
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*/
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int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot, int pkey)
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{
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/*
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* Is this an mprotect_pkey() call? If so, never
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* override the value that came from the user.
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*/
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if (pkey != -1)
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return pkey;
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/*
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* Look for a protection-key-drive execute-only mapping
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* which is now being given permissions that are not
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* execute-only. Move it back to the default pkey.
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*/
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if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma) &&
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(prot & (PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE))) {
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* The mapping is execute-only. Go try to get the
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* execute-only protection key. If we fail to do that,
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* fall through as if we do not have execute-only
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* support.
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*/
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if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
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pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm);
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if (pkey > 0)
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return pkey;
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}
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/*
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* This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to
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* setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we
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* are working on.
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*/
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return vma_pkey(vma);
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}
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#define PKRU_AD_KEY(pkey) (PKRU_AD_BIT << ((pkey) * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY))
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/*
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* Make the default PKRU value (at execve() time) as restrictive
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* as possible. This ensures that any threads clone()'d early
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* in the process's lifetime will not accidentally get access
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* to data which is pkey-protected later on.
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*/
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u32 init_pkru_value = PKRU_AD_KEY( 1) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 2) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 3) |
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PKRU_AD_KEY( 4) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 5) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 6) |
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PKRU_AD_KEY( 7) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 8) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 9) |
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PKRU_AD_KEY(10) | PKRU_AD_KEY(11) | PKRU_AD_KEY(12) |
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PKRU_AD_KEY(13) | PKRU_AD_KEY(14) | PKRU_AD_KEY(15);
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/*
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* Called from the FPU code when creating a fresh set of FPU
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* registers. This is called from a very specific context where
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* we know the FPU regstiers are safe for use and we can use PKRU
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* directly.
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*/
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void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void)
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{
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u32 init_pkru_value_snapshot = READ_ONCE(init_pkru_value);
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/*
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* Any write to PKRU takes it out of the XSAVE 'init
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* state' which increases context switch cost. Avoid
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* writing 0 when PKRU was already 0.
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*/
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if (!init_pkru_value_snapshot && !read_pkru())
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return;
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/*
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* Override the PKRU state that came from 'init_fpstate'
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* with the baseline from the process.
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*/
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write_pkru(init_pkru_value_snapshot);
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}
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static ssize_t init_pkru_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
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size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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char buf[32];
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unsigned int len;
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len = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", init_pkru_value);
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return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, len);
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}
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static ssize_t init_pkru_write_file(struct file *file,
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const char __user *user_buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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char buf[32];
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ssize_t len;
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u32 new_init_pkru;
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len = min(count, sizeof(buf) - 1);
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if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, len))
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return -EFAULT;
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/* Make the buffer a valid string that we can not overrun */
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buf[len] = '\0';
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if (kstrtouint(buf, 0, &new_init_pkru))
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return -EINVAL;
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/*
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* Don't allow insane settings that will blow the system
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* up immediately if someone attempts to disable access
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* or writes to pkey 0.
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*/
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if (new_init_pkru & (PKRU_AD_BIT|PKRU_WD_BIT))
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return -EINVAL;
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WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru);
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return count;
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}
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static const struct file_operations fops_init_pkru = {
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.read = init_pkru_read_file,
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.write = init_pkru_write_file,
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.llseek = default_llseek,
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};
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static int __init create_init_pkru_value(void)
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{
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debugfs_create_file("init_pkru", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR,
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arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, &fops_init_pkru);
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return 0;
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}
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late_initcall(create_init_pkru_value);
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static __init int setup_init_pkru(char *opt)
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{
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u32 new_init_pkru;
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if (kstrtouint(opt, 0, &new_init_pkru))
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return 1;
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WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru);
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return 1;
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}
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__setup("init_pkru=", setup_init_pkru);
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