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linux_dsm_epyc7002/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
David Howells 6c2dc5ae4a X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier 
Extract the signature digest for an X.509 certificate earlier, at the end
of x509_cert_parse() rather than leaving it to the callers thereof since it
has to be called anyway.

Further, immediately after that, check the signature on self-signed
certificates, also rather in the callers of x509_cert_parse().

We note in the x509_certificate struct the following bits of information:

 (1) Whether the signature is self-signed (even if we can't check the
     signature due to missing crypto).

 (2) Whether the key held in the certificate needs unsupported crypto to be
     used.  We may get a PKCS#7 message with X.509 certs that we can't make
     use of - we just ignore them and give ENOPKG at the end it we couldn't
     verify anything if at least one of these unusable certs are in the
     chain of trust.

 (3) Whether the signature held in the certificate needs unsupported crypto
     to be checked.  We can still use the key held in this certificate,
     even if we can't check the signature on it - if it is held in the
     system trusted keyring, for instance.  We just can't add it to a ring
     of trusted keys or follow it further up the chain of trust.

Making these checks earlier allows x509_check_signature() to be removed and
replaced with direct calls to public_key_verify_signature().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06 16:13:34 +01:00

638 lines
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/* X.509 certificate parser
*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "x509_parser.h"
#include "x509-asn1.h"
#include "x509_akid-asn1.h"
struct x509_parse_context {
struct x509_certificate *cert; /* Certificate being constructed */
unsigned long data; /* Start of data */
const void *cert_start; /* Start of cert content */
const void *key; /* Key data */
size_t key_size; /* Size of key data */
enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
enum OID algo_oid; /* Algorithm OID */
unsigned char nr_mpi; /* Number of MPIs stored */
u8 o_size; /* Size of organizationName (O) */
u8 cn_size; /* Size of commonName (CN) */
u8 email_size; /* Size of emailAddress */
u16 o_offset; /* Offset of organizationName (O) */
u16 cn_offset; /* Offset of commonName (CN) */
u16 email_offset; /* Offset of emailAddress */
unsigned raw_akid_size;
const void *raw_akid; /* Raw authorityKeyId in ASN.1 */
const void *akid_raw_issuer; /* Raw directoryName in authorityKeyId */
unsigned akid_raw_issuer_size;
};
/*
* Free an X.509 certificate
*/
void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
if (cert) {
public_key_free(cert->pub);
public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);
kfree(cert->issuer);
kfree(cert->subject);
kfree(cert->id);
kfree(cert->skid);
kfree(cert);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_free_certificate);
/*
* Parse an X.509 certificate
*/
struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct x509_certificate *cert;
struct x509_parse_context *ctx;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
long ret;
ret = -ENOMEM;
cert = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_certificate), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cert)
goto error_no_cert;
cert->pub = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cert->pub)
goto error_no_ctx;
cert->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cert->sig)
goto error_no_ctx;
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
goto error_no_ctx;
ctx->cert = cert;
ctx->data = (unsigned long)data;
/* Attempt to decode the certificate */
ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_decoder, ctx, data, datalen);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_decode;
/* Decode the AuthorityKeyIdentifier */
if (ctx->raw_akid) {
pr_devel("AKID: %u %*phN\n",
ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid);
ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_akid_decoder, ctx,
ctx->raw_akid, ctx->raw_akid_size);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_warn("Couldn't decode AuthKeyIdentifier\n");
goto error_decode;
}
}
cert->pub->key = kmemdup(ctx->key, ctx->key_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cert->pub->key)
goto error_decode;
cert->pub->keylen = ctx->key_size;
/* Grab the signature bits */
ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_decode;
/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
cert->raw_serial_size,
cert->raw_issuer,
cert->raw_issuer_size);
if (IS_ERR(kid)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(kid);
goto error_decode;
}
cert->id = kid;
/* Detect self-signed certificates */
ret = x509_check_for_self_signed(cert);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_decode;
kfree(ctx);
return cert;
error_decode:
kfree(cert->pub->key);
kfree(ctx);
error_no_ctx:
x509_free_certificate(cert);
error_no_cert:
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_cert_parse);
/*
* Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
* to interpret it.
*/
int x509_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {
char buffer[50];
sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
pr_debug("Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n",
(unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Save the position of the TBS data so that we can check the signature over it
* later.
*/
int x509_note_tbs_certificate(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
pr_debug("x509_note_tbs_certificate(,%zu,%02x,%ld,%zu)!\n",
hdrlen, tag, (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, vlen);
ctx->cert->tbs = value - hdrlen;
ctx->cert->tbs_size = vlen + hdrlen;
return 0;
}
/*
* Record the public key algorithm
*/
int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
pr_debug("PubKey Algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
switch (ctx->last_oid) {
case OID_md2WithRSAEncryption:
case OID_md3WithRSAEncryption:
default:
return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */
case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "md4";
ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";
ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";
ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";
ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";
ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";
ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
}
ctx->algo_oid = ctx->last_oid;
return 0;
}
/*
* Note the whereabouts and type of the signature.
*/
int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
pr_debug("Signature type: %u size %zu\n", ctx->last_oid, vlen);
if (ctx->last_oid != ctx->algo_oid) {
pr_warn("Got cert with pkey (%u) and sig (%u) algorithm OIDs\n",
ctx->algo_oid, ctx->last_oid);
return -EINVAL;
}
ctx->cert->raw_sig = value;
ctx->cert->raw_sig_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
/*
* Note the certificate serial number
*/
int x509_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
ctx->cert->raw_serial = value;
ctx->cert->raw_serial_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
/*
* Note some of the name segments from which we'll fabricate a name.
*/
int x509_extract_name_segment(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
switch (ctx->last_oid) {
case OID_commonName:
ctx->cn_size = vlen;
ctx->cn_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;
break;
case OID_organizationName:
ctx->o_size = vlen;
ctx->o_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;
break;
case OID_email_address:
ctx->email_size = vlen;
ctx->email_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;
break;
default:
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Fabricate and save the issuer and subject names
*/
static int x509_fabricate_name(struct x509_parse_context *ctx, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
char **_name, size_t vlen)
{
const void *name, *data = (const void *)ctx->data;
size_t namesize;
char *buffer;
if (*_name)
return -EINVAL;
/* Empty name string if no material */
if (!ctx->cn_size && !ctx->o_size && !ctx->email_size) {
buffer = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
buffer[0] = 0;
goto done;
}
if (ctx->cn_size && ctx->o_size) {
/* Consider combining O and CN, but use only the CN if it is
* prefixed by the O, or a significant portion thereof.
*/
namesize = ctx->cn_size;
name = data + ctx->cn_offset;
if (ctx->cn_size >= ctx->o_size &&
memcmp(data + ctx->cn_offset, data + ctx->o_offset,
ctx->o_size) == 0)
goto single_component;
if (ctx->cn_size >= 7 &&
ctx->o_size >= 7 &&
memcmp(data + ctx->cn_offset, data + ctx->o_offset, 7) == 0)
goto single_component;
buffer = kmalloc(ctx->o_size + 2 + ctx->cn_size + 1,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(buffer,
data + ctx->o_offset, ctx->o_size);
buffer[ctx->o_size + 0] = ':';
buffer[ctx->o_size + 1] = ' ';
memcpy(buffer + ctx->o_size + 2,
data + ctx->cn_offset, ctx->cn_size);
buffer[ctx->o_size + 2 + ctx->cn_size] = 0;
goto done;
} else if (ctx->cn_size) {
namesize = ctx->cn_size;
name = data + ctx->cn_offset;
} else if (ctx->o_size) {
namesize = ctx->o_size;
name = data + ctx->o_offset;
} else {
namesize = ctx->email_size;
name = data + ctx->email_offset;
}
single_component:
buffer = kmalloc(namesize + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(buffer, name, namesize);
buffer[namesize] = 0;
done:
*_name = buffer;
ctx->cn_size = 0;
ctx->o_size = 0;
ctx->email_size = 0;
return 0;
}
int x509_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
ctx->cert->raw_issuer = value;
ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->issuer, vlen);
}
int x509_note_subject(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
ctx->cert->raw_subject = value;
ctx->cert->raw_subject_size = vlen;
return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->subject, vlen);
}
/*
* Extract the data for the public key algorithm
*/
int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
if (ctx->last_oid != OID_rsaEncryption)
return -ENOPKG;
ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "rsa";
/* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */
ctx->key = value + 1;
ctx->key_size = vlen - 1;
return 0;
}
/* The keyIdentifier in AuthorityKeyIdentifier SEQUENCE is tag(CONT,PRIM,0) */
#define SEQ_TAG_KEYID (ASN1_CONT << 6)
/*
* Process certificate extensions that are used to qualify the certificate.
*/
int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
const unsigned char *v = value;
pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) {
/* Get hold of the key fingerprint */
if (ctx->cert->skid || vlen < 3)
return -EBADMSG;
if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2)
return -EBADMSG;
v += 2;
vlen -= 2;
ctx->cert->raw_skid_size = vlen;
ctx->cert->raw_skid = v;
kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen, "", 0);
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
ctx->cert->skid = kid;
pr_debug("subjkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
/* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
ctx->raw_akid = v;
ctx->raw_akid_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* x509_decode_time - Decode an X.509 time ASN.1 object
* @_t: The time to fill in
* @hdrlen: The length of the object header
* @tag: The object tag
* @value: The object value
* @vlen: The size of the object value
*
* Decode an ASN.1 universal time or generalised time field into a struct the
* kernel can handle and check it for validity. The time is decoded thus:
*
* [RFC5280 §4.1.2.5]
* CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate validity
* dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity dates in
* 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. Conforming
* applications MUST be able to process validity dates that are encoded in
* either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.
*/
int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen)
{
static const unsigned char month_lengths[] = { 31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30,
31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31 };
const unsigned char *p = value;
unsigned year, mon, day, hour, min, sec, mon_len;
#define dec2bin(X) ({ unsigned char x = (X) - '0'; if (x > 9) goto invalid_time; x; })
#define DD2bin(P) ({ unsigned x = dec2bin(P[0]) * 10 + dec2bin(P[1]); P += 2; x; })
if (tag == ASN1_UNITIM) {
/* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
if (vlen != 13)
goto unsupported_time;
year = DD2bin(p);
if (year >= 50)
year += 1900;
else
year += 2000;
} else if (tag == ASN1_GENTIM) {
/* GenTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
if (vlen != 15)
goto unsupported_time;
year = DD2bin(p) * 100 + DD2bin(p);
if (year >= 1950 && year <= 2049)
goto invalid_time;
} else {
goto unsupported_time;
}
mon = DD2bin(p);
day = DD2bin(p);
hour = DD2bin(p);
min = DD2bin(p);
sec = DD2bin(p);
if (*p != 'Z')
goto unsupported_time;
if (year < 1970 ||
mon < 1 || mon > 12)
goto invalid_time;
mon_len = month_lengths[mon - 1];
if (mon == 2) {
if (year % 4 == 0) {
mon_len = 29;
if (year % 100 == 0) {
mon_len = 28;
if (year % 400 == 0)
mon_len = 29;
}
}
}
if (day < 1 || day > mon_len ||
hour > 24 || /* ISO 8601 permits 24:00:00 as midnight tomorrow */
min > 59 ||
sec > 60) /* ISO 8601 permits leap seconds [X.680 46.3] */
goto invalid_time;
*_t = mktime64(year, mon, day, hour, min, sec);
return 0;
unsupported_time:
pr_debug("Got unsupported time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",
tag, (int)vlen, value);
return -EBADMSG;
invalid_time:
pr_debug("Got invalid time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",
tag, (int)vlen, value);
return -EBADMSG;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_decode_time);
int x509_note_not_before(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_from, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
}
int x509_note_not_after(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_to, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
}
/*
* Note a key identifier-based AuthorityKeyIdentifier
*/
int x509_akid_note_kid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
pr_debug("AKID: keyid: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
if (ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1])
return 0;
kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0);
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1] = kid;
return 0;
}
/*
* Note a directoryName in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier
*/
int x509_akid_note_name(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
pr_debug("AKID: name: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
ctx->akid_raw_issuer = value;
ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
/*
* Note a serial number in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier
*/
int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
pr_debug("AKID: serial: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0])
return 0;
kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value,
vlen,
ctx->akid_raw_issuer,
ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size);
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0] = kid;
return 0;
}
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