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https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
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2c78ee898d
Implement permissions as stated in uapi/linux/capability.h In order to do that the verifier allow_ptr_leaks flag is split into four flags and they are set as: env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(); env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(); env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(); env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable(); The first three currently equivalent to perfmon_capable(), since leaking kernel pointers and reading kernel memory via side channel attacks is roughly equivalent to reading kernel memory with cap_perfmon. 'bpf_capable' enables bounded loops, precision tracking, bpf to bpf calls and other verifier features. 'allow_ptr_leaks' enable ptr leaks, ptr conversions, subtraction of pointers. 'bypass_spec_v1' disables speculative analysis in the verifier, run time mitigations in bpf array, and enables indirect variable access in bpf programs. 'bypass_spec_v4' disables emission of sanitation code by the verifier. That means that the networking BPF program loaded with CAP_BPF + CAP_NET_ADMIN will have speculative checks done by the verifier and other spectre mitigation applied. Such networking BPF program will not be able to leak kernel pointers and will not be able to access arbitrary kernel memory. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513230355.7858-3-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
121 lines
3.0 KiB
C
121 lines
3.0 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/* Copyright (c) 2017 Facebook
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*/
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/bpf.h>
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#include "map_in_map.h"
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struct bpf_map *bpf_map_meta_alloc(int inner_map_ufd)
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{
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struct bpf_map *inner_map, *inner_map_meta;
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u32 inner_map_meta_size;
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struct fd f;
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f = fdget(inner_map_ufd);
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inner_map = __bpf_map_get(f);
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if (IS_ERR(inner_map))
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return inner_map;
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/* prog_array->aux->{type,jited} is a runtime binding.
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* Doing static check alone in the verifier is not enough.
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*/
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if (inner_map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY ||
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inner_map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE ||
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inner_map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE ||
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inner_map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) {
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fdput(f);
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
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}
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/* Does not support >1 level map-in-map */
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if (inner_map->inner_map_meta) {
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fdput(f);
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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}
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if (map_value_has_spin_lock(inner_map)) {
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fdput(f);
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
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}
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inner_map_meta_size = sizeof(*inner_map_meta);
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/* In some cases verifier needs to access beyond just base map. */
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if (inner_map->ops == &array_map_ops)
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inner_map_meta_size = sizeof(struct bpf_array);
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inner_map_meta = kzalloc(inner_map_meta_size, GFP_USER);
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if (!inner_map_meta) {
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fdput(f);
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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}
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inner_map_meta->map_type = inner_map->map_type;
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inner_map_meta->key_size = inner_map->key_size;
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inner_map_meta->value_size = inner_map->value_size;
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inner_map_meta->map_flags = inner_map->map_flags;
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inner_map_meta->max_entries = inner_map->max_entries;
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inner_map_meta->spin_lock_off = inner_map->spin_lock_off;
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/* Misc members not needed in bpf_map_meta_equal() check. */
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inner_map_meta->ops = inner_map->ops;
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if (inner_map->ops == &array_map_ops) {
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inner_map_meta->bypass_spec_v1 = inner_map->bypass_spec_v1;
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container_of(inner_map_meta, struct bpf_array, map)->index_mask =
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container_of(inner_map, struct bpf_array, map)->index_mask;
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}
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fdput(f);
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return inner_map_meta;
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}
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void bpf_map_meta_free(struct bpf_map *map_meta)
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{
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kfree(map_meta);
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}
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bool bpf_map_meta_equal(const struct bpf_map *meta0,
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const struct bpf_map *meta1)
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{
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/* No need to compare ops because it is covered by map_type */
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return meta0->map_type == meta1->map_type &&
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meta0->key_size == meta1->key_size &&
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meta0->value_size == meta1->value_size &&
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meta0->map_flags == meta1->map_flags &&
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meta0->max_entries == meta1->max_entries;
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}
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void *bpf_map_fd_get_ptr(struct bpf_map *map,
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struct file *map_file /* not used */,
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int ufd)
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{
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struct bpf_map *inner_map;
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struct fd f;
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f = fdget(ufd);
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inner_map = __bpf_map_get(f);
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if (IS_ERR(inner_map))
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return inner_map;
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if (bpf_map_meta_equal(map->inner_map_meta, inner_map))
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bpf_map_inc(inner_map);
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else
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inner_map = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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fdput(f);
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return inner_map;
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}
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void bpf_map_fd_put_ptr(void *ptr)
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{
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/* ptr->ops->map_free() has to go through one
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* rcu grace period by itself.
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*/
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bpf_map_put(ptr);
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}
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u32 bpf_map_fd_sys_lookup_elem(void *ptr)
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{
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return ((struct bpf_map *)ptr)->id;
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}
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