mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-11-26 01:30:54 +07:00
5de0b4d0cd
Avoid using SHA-1 when calculating the user-visible filename when the encryption key is available, and avoid decrypting lots of filenames when searching for a directory entry in a directory block. Change-Id: If4655f144784978ba0305b597bfa1c8d7bb69e63 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
712 lines
18 KiB
C
712 lines
18 KiB
C
/*
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* linux/fs/ext4/crypto_fname.c
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
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*
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* This contains functions for filename crypto management in ext4
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*
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* Written by Uday Savagaonkar, 2014.
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*
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* This has not yet undergone a rigorous security audit.
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*
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*/
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#include <crypto/hash.h>
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#include <crypto/sha.h>
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#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
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#include <keys/user-type.h>
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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#include <linux/gfp.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/key.h>
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#include <linux/key.h>
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#include <linux/list.h>
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#include <linux/mempool.h>
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
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#include <linux/spinlock_types.h>
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#include "ext4.h"
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#include "ext4_crypto.h"
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#include "xattr.h"
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/**
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* ext4_dir_crypt_complete() -
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*/
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static void ext4_dir_crypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int res)
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{
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struct ext4_completion_result *ecr = req->data;
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if (res == -EINPROGRESS)
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return;
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ecr->res = res;
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complete(&ecr->completion);
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}
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bool ext4_valid_filenames_enc_mode(uint32_t mode)
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{
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return (mode == EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS);
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}
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/**
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* ext4_fname_encrypt() -
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*
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* This function encrypts the input filename, and returns the length of the
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* ciphertext. Errors are returned as negative numbers. We trust the caller to
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* allocate sufficient memory to oname string.
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*/
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static int ext4_fname_encrypt(struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ctx,
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const struct qstr *iname,
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struct ext4_str *oname)
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{
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u32 ciphertext_len;
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struct ablkcipher_request *req = NULL;
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DECLARE_EXT4_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr);
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struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm = ctx->ctfm;
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int res = 0;
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char iv[EXT4_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE];
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struct scatterlist sg[1];
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char *workbuf;
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if (iname->len <= 0 || iname->len > ctx->lim)
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return -EIO;
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ciphertext_len = (iname->len < EXT4_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE) ?
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EXT4_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE : iname->len;
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ciphertext_len = (ciphertext_len > ctx->lim)
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? ctx->lim : ciphertext_len;
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/* Allocate request */
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req = ablkcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
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if (!req) {
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printk_ratelimited(
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KERN_ERR "%s: crypto_request_alloc() failed\n", __func__);
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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ablkcipher_request_set_callback(req,
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CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
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ext4_dir_crypt_complete, &ecr);
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/* Map the workpage */
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workbuf = kmap(ctx->workpage);
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/* Copy the input */
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memcpy(workbuf, iname->name, iname->len);
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if (iname->len < ciphertext_len)
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memset(workbuf + iname->len, 0, ciphertext_len - iname->len);
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/* Initialize IV */
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memset(iv, 0, EXT4_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
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/* Create encryption request */
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sg_init_table(sg, 1);
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sg_set_page(sg, ctx->workpage, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
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ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, iname->len, iv);
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res = crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(req);
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if (res == -EINPROGRESS || res == -EBUSY) {
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BUG_ON(req->base.data != &ecr);
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wait_for_completion(&ecr.completion);
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res = ecr.res;
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}
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if (res >= 0) {
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/* Copy the result to output */
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memcpy(oname->name, workbuf, ciphertext_len);
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res = ciphertext_len;
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}
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kunmap(ctx->workpage);
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ablkcipher_request_free(req);
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if (res < 0) {
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printk_ratelimited(
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KERN_ERR "%s: Error (error code %d)\n", __func__, res);
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}
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oname->len = ciphertext_len;
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return res;
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}
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/*
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* ext4_fname_decrypt()
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* This function decrypts the input filename, and returns
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* the length of the plaintext.
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* Errors are returned as negative numbers.
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* We trust the caller to allocate sufficient memory to oname string.
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*/
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static int ext4_fname_decrypt(struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ctx,
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const struct ext4_str *iname,
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struct ext4_str *oname)
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{
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struct ext4_str tmp_in[2], tmp_out[1];
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struct ablkcipher_request *req = NULL;
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DECLARE_EXT4_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr);
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struct scatterlist sg[1];
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struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm = ctx->ctfm;
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int res = 0;
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char iv[EXT4_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE];
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char *workbuf;
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if (iname->len <= 0 || iname->len > ctx->lim)
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return -EIO;
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tmp_in[0].name = iname->name;
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tmp_in[0].len = iname->len;
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tmp_out[0].name = oname->name;
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/* Allocate request */
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req = ablkcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
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if (!req) {
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printk_ratelimited(
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KERN_ERR "%s: crypto_request_alloc() failed\n", __func__);
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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ablkcipher_request_set_callback(req,
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CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
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ext4_dir_crypt_complete, &ecr);
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/* Map the workpage */
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workbuf = kmap(ctx->workpage);
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/* Copy the input */
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memcpy(workbuf, iname->name, iname->len);
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/* Initialize IV */
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memset(iv, 0, EXT4_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
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/* Create encryption request */
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sg_init_table(sg, 1);
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sg_set_page(sg, ctx->workpage, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
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ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, iname->len, iv);
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res = crypto_ablkcipher_decrypt(req);
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if (res == -EINPROGRESS || res == -EBUSY) {
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BUG_ON(req->base.data != &ecr);
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wait_for_completion(&ecr.completion);
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res = ecr.res;
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}
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if (res >= 0) {
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/* Copy the result to output */
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memcpy(oname->name, workbuf, iname->len);
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res = iname->len;
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}
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kunmap(ctx->workpage);
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ablkcipher_request_free(req);
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if (res < 0) {
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printk_ratelimited(
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KERN_ERR "%s: Error in ext4_fname_encrypt (error code %d)\n",
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__func__, res);
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return res;
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}
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oname->len = strnlen(oname->name, iname->len);
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return oname->len;
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}
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static const char *lookup_table =
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"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+,";
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/**
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* ext4_fname_encode_digest() -
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*
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* Encodes the input digest using characters from the set [a-zA-Z0-9_+].
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* The encoded string is roughly 4/3 times the size of the input string.
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*/
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static int digest_encode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
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{
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int i = 0, bits = 0, ac = 0;
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char *cp = dst;
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while (i < len) {
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ac += (((unsigned char) src[i]) << bits);
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bits += 8;
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do {
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*cp++ = lookup_table[ac & 0x3f];
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ac >>= 6;
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bits -= 6;
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} while (bits >= 6);
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i++;
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}
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if (bits)
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*cp++ = lookup_table[ac & 0x3f];
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return cp - dst;
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}
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static int digest_decode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
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{
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int i = 0, bits = 0, ac = 0;
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const char *p;
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char *cp = dst;
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while (i < len) {
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p = strchr(lookup_table, src[i]);
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if (p == NULL || src[i] == 0)
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return -2;
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ac += (p - lookup_table) << bits;
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bits += 6;
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if (bits >= 8) {
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*cp++ = ac & 0xff;
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ac >>= 8;
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bits -= 8;
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}
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i++;
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}
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if (ac)
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return -1;
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return cp - dst;
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}
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/**
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* ext4_free_fname_crypto_ctx() -
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*
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* Frees up a crypto context.
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*/
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void ext4_free_fname_crypto_ctx(struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ctx)
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{
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if (ctx == NULL || IS_ERR(ctx))
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return;
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if (ctx->ctfm && !IS_ERR(ctx->ctfm))
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crypto_free_ablkcipher(ctx->ctfm);
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if (ctx->htfm && !IS_ERR(ctx->htfm))
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crypto_free_hash(ctx->htfm);
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if (ctx->workpage && !IS_ERR(ctx->workpage))
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__free_page(ctx->workpage);
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kfree(ctx);
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}
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/**
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* ext4_put_fname_crypto_ctx() -
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*
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* Return: The crypto context onto free list. If the free list is above a
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* threshold, completely frees up the context, and returns the memory.
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*
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* TODO: Currently we directly free the crypto context. Eventually we should
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* add code it to return to free list. Such an approach will increase
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* efficiency of directory lookup.
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*/
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void ext4_put_fname_crypto_ctx(struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx **ctx)
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{
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if (*ctx == NULL || IS_ERR(*ctx))
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return;
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ext4_free_fname_crypto_ctx(*ctx);
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*ctx = NULL;
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}
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/**
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* ext4_search_fname_crypto_ctx() -
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*/
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static struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ext4_search_fname_crypto_ctx(
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const struct ext4_encryption_key *key)
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{
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return NULL;
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}
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/**
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* ext4_alloc_fname_crypto_ctx() -
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*/
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struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ext4_alloc_fname_crypto_ctx(
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const struct ext4_encryption_key *key)
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{
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struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ctx;
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ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx), GFP_NOFS);
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if (ctx == NULL)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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if (key->mode == EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID) {
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/* This will automatically set key mode to invalid
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* As enum for ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID is zero */
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memset(&ctx->key, 0, sizeof(ctx->key));
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} else {
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memcpy(&ctx->key, key, sizeof(struct ext4_encryption_key));
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}
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ctx->has_valid_key = (EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID == key->mode)
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? 0 : 1;
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ctx->ctfm_key_is_ready = 0;
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ctx->ctfm = NULL;
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ctx->htfm = NULL;
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ctx->workpage = NULL;
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return ctx;
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}
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/**
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* ext4_get_fname_crypto_ctx() -
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*
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* Allocates a free crypto context and initializes it to hold
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* the crypto material for the inode.
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*
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* Return: NULL if not encrypted. Error value on error. Valid pointer otherwise.
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*/
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struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ext4_get_fname_crypto_ctx(
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struct inode *inode, u32 max_ciphertext_len)
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{
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struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ctx;
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struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
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int res;
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/* Check if the crypto policy is set on the inode */
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res = ext4_encrypted_inode(inode);
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if (res == 0)
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return NULL;
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if (!ext4_has_encryption_key(inode))
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ext4_generate_encryption_key(inode);
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/* Get a crypto context based on the key.
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* A new context is allocated if no context matches the requested key.
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*/
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ctx = ext4_search_fname_crypto_ctx(&(ei->i_encryption_key));
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if (ctx == NULL)
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ctx = ext4_alloc_fname_crypto_ctx(&(ei->i_encryption_key));
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if (IS_ERR(ctx))
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return ctx;
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if (ctx->has_valid_key) {
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if (ctx->key.mode != EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS) {
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printk_once(KERN_WARNING
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"ext4: unsupported key mode %d\n",
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ctx->key.mode);
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
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}
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/* As a first cut, we will allocate new tfm in every call.
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* later, we will keep the tfm around, in case the key gets
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* re-used */
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if (ctx->ctfm == NULL) {
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ctx->ctfm = crypto_alloc_ablkcipher("cts(cbc(aes))",
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0, 0);
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}
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if (IS_ERR(ctx->ctfm)) {
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res = PTR_ERR(ctx->ctfm);
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printk(
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KERN_DEBUG "%s: error (%d) allocating crypto tfm\n",
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__func__, res);
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ctx->ctfm = NULL;
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ext4_put_fname_crypto_ctx(&ctx);
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return ERR_PTR(res);
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}
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if (ctx->ctfm == NULL) {
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printk(
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KERN_DEBUG "%s: could not allocate crypto tfm\n",
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__func__);
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ext4_put_fname_crypto_ctx(&ctx);
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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}
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if (ctx->workpage == NULL)
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ctx->workpage = alloc_page(GFP_NOFS);
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if (IS_ERR(ctx->workpage)) {
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res = PTR_ERR(ctx->workpage);
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printk(
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KERN_DEBUG "%s: error (%d) allocating work page\n",
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__func__, res);
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ctx->workpage = NULL;
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ext4_put_fname_crypto_ctx(&ctx);
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return ERR_PTR(res);
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}
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if (ctx->workpage == NULL) {
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printk(
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KERN_DEBUG "%s: could not allocate work page\n",
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__func__);
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ext4_put_fname_crypto_ctx(&ctx);
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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}
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ctx->lim = max_ciphertext_len;
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crypto_ablkcipher_clear_flags(ctx->ctfm, ~0);
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crypto_tfm_set_flags(crypto_ablkcipher_tfm(ctx->ctfm),
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CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
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/* If we are lucky, we will get a context that is already
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* set up with the right key. Else, we will have to
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* set the key */
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if (!ctx->ctfm_key_is_ready) {
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/* Since our crypto objectives for filename encryption
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* are pretty weak,
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* we directly use the inode master key */
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res = crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(ctx->ctfm,
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ctx->key.raw, ctx->key.size);
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if (res) {
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ext4_put_fname_crypto_ctx(&ctx);
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return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
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}
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ctx->ctfm_key_is_ready = 1;
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} else {
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/* In the current implementation, key should never be
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* marked "ready" for a context that has just been
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* allocated. So we should never reach here */
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BUG();
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}
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}
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if (ctx->htfm == NULL)
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ctx->htfm = crypto_alloc_hash("sha256", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
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if (IS_ERR(ctx->htfm)) {
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res = PTR_ERR(ctx->htfm);
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printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: error (%d) allocating hash tfm\n",
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__func__, res);
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ctx->htfm = NULL;
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ext4_put_fname_crypto_ctx(&ctx);
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return ERR_PTR(res);
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}
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if (ctx->htfm == NULL) {
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printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: could not allocate hash tfm\n",
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__func__);
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ext4_put_fname_crypto_ctx(&ctx);
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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}
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return ctx;
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}
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/**
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* ext4_fname_crypto_round_up() -
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*
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* Return: The next multiple of block size
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*/
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u32 ext4_fname_crypto_round_up(u32 size, u32 blksize)
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{
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return ((size+blksize-1)/blksize)*blksize;
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}
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/**
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* ext4_fname_crypto_namelen_on_disk() -
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*/
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int ext4_fname_crypto_namelen_on_disk(struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ctx,
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u32 namelen)
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{
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u32 ciphertext_len;
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if (ctx == NULL)
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return -EIO;
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if (!(ctx->has_valid_key))
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return -EACCES;
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ciphertext_len = (namelen < EXT4_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE) ?
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EXT4_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE : namelen;
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ciphertext_len = (ciphertext_len > ctx->lim)
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? ctx->lim : ciphertext_len;
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return (int) ciphertext_len;
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}
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/**
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* ext4_fname_crypto_alloc_obuff() -
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*
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* Allocates an output buffer that is sufficient for the crypto operation
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* specified by the context and the direction.
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*/
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int ext4_fname_crypto_alloc_buffer(struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ctx,
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u32 ilen, struct ext4_str *crypto_str)
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{
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unsigned int olen;
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if (!ctx)
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return -EIO;
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olen = ext4_fname_crypto_round_up(ilen, EXT4_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
crypto_str->len = olen;
|
|
if (olen < EXT4_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE*2)
|
|
olen = EXT4_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE*2;
|
|
/* Allocated buffer can hold one more character to null-terminate the
|
|
* string */
|
|
crypto_str->name = kmalloc(olen+1, GFP_NOFS);
|
|
if (!(crypto_str->name))
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* ext4_fname_crypto_free_buffer() -
|
|
*
|
|
* Frees the buffer allocated for crypto operation.
|
|
*/
|
|
void ext4_fname_crypto_free_buffer(struct ext4_str *crypto_str)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!crypto_str)
|
|
return;
|
|
kfree(crypto_str->name);
|
|
crypto_str->name = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* ext4_fname_disk_to_usr() - converts a filename from disk space to user space
|
|
*/
|
|
int _ext4_fname_disk_to_usr(struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ctx,
|
|
struct dx_hash_info *hinfo,
|
|
const struct ext4_str *iname,
|
|
struct ext4_str *oname)
|
|
{
|
|
char buf[24];
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL)
|
|
return -EIO;
|
|
if (iname->len < 3) {
|
|
/*Check for . and .. */
|
|
if (iname->name[0] == '.' && iname->name[iname->len-1] == '.') {
|
|
oname->name[0] = '.';
|
|
oname->name[iname->len-1] = '.';
|
|
oname->len = iname->len;
|
|
return oname->len;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->has_valid_key)
|
|
return ext4_fname_decrypt(ctx, iname, oname);
|
|
|
|
if (iname->len <= EXT4_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE) {
|
|
ret = digest_encode(iname->name, iname->len, oname->name);
|
|
oname->len = ret;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
if (hinfo) {
|
|
memcpy(buf, &hinfo->hash, 4);
|
|
memcpy(buf+4, &hinfo->minor_hash, 4);
|
|
} else
|
|
memset(buf, 0, 8);
|
|
memcpy(buf + 8, iname->name + iname->len - 16, 16);
|
|
oname->name[0] = '_';
|
|
ret = digest_encode(buf, 24, oname->name+1);
|
|
oname->len = ret + 1;
|
|
return ret + 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ext4_fname_disk_to_usr(struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ctx,
|
|
struct dx_hash_info *hinfo,
|
|
const struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de,
|
|
struct ext4_str *oname)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ext4_str iname = {.name = (unsigned char *) de->name,
|
|
.len = de->name_len };
|
|
|
|
return _ext4_fname_disk_to_usr(ctx, hinfo, &iname, oname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* ext4_fname_usr_to_disk() - converts a filename from user space to disk space
|
|
*/
|
|
int ext4_fname_usr_to_disk(struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ctx,
|
|
const struct qstr *iname,
|
|
struct ext4_str *oname)
|
|
{
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL)
|
|
return -EIO;
|
|
if (iname->len < 3) {
|
|
/*Check for . and .. */
|
|
if (iname->name[0] == '.' &&
|
|
iname->name[iname->len-1] == '.') {
|
|
oname->name[0] = '.';
|
|
oname->name[iname->len-1] = '.';
|
|
oname->len = iname->len;
|
|
return oname->len;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->has_valid_key) {
|
|
res = ext4_fname_encrypt(ctx, iname, oname);
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Without a proper key, a user is not allowed to modify the filenames
|
|
* in a directory. Consequently, a user space name cannot be mapped to
|
|
* a disk-space name */
|
|
return -EACCES;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate the htree hash from a filename from user space
|
|
*/
|
|
int ext4_fname_usr_to_hash(struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ctx,
|
|
const struct qstr *iname,
|
|
struct dx_hash_info *hinfo)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ext4_str tmp;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
char buf[EXT4_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE+1];
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx ||
|
|
((iname->name[0] == '.') &&
|
|
((iname->len == 1) ||
|
|
((iname->name[1] == '.') && (iname->len == 2))))) {
|
|
ext4fs_dirhash(iname->name, iname->len, hinfo);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->has_valid_key && iname->name[0] == '_') {
|
|
if (iname->len != 33)
|
|
return -ENOENT;
|
|
ret = digest_decode(iname->name+1, iname->len, buf);
|
|
if (ret != 24)
|
|
return -ENOENT;
|
|
memcpy(&hinfo->hash, buf, 4);
|
|
memcpy(&hinfo->minor_hash, buf + 4, 4);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->has_valid_key && iname->name[0] != '_') {
|
|
if (iname->len > 43)
|
|
return -ENOENT;
|
|
ret = digest_decode(iname->name, iname->len, buf);
|
|
ext4fs_dirhash(buf, ret, hinfo);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* First encrypt the plaintext name */
|
|
ret = ext4_fname_crypto_alloc_buffer(ctx, iname->len, &tmp);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = ext4_fname_encrypt(ctx, iname, &tmp);
|
|
if (ret >= 0) {
|
|
ext4fs_dirhash(tmp.name, tmp.len, hinfo);
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ext4_fname_crypto_free_buffer(&tmp);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ext4_fname_match(struct ext4_fname_crypto_ctx *ctx, struct ext4_str *cstr,
|
|
int len, const char * const name,
|
|
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = -ENOENT;
|
|
int bigname = (*name == '_');
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->has_valid_key) {
|
|
if (cstr->name == NULL) {
|
|
struct qstr istr;
|
|
|
|
ret = ext4_fname_crypto_alloc_buffer(ctx, len, cstr);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto errout;
|
|
istr.name = name;
|
|
istr.len = len;
|
|
ret = ext4_fname_encrypt(ctx, &istr, cstr);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto errout;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (cstr->name == NULL) {
|
|
cstr->name = kmalloc(32, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (cstr->name == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
if ((bigname && (len != 33)) ||
|
|
(!bigname && (len > 43)))
|
|
goto errout;
|
|
ret = digest_decode(name+bigname, len-bigname,
|
|
cstr->name);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
ret = -ENOENT;
|
|
goto errout;
|
|
}
|
|
cstr->len = ret;
|
|
}
|
|
if (bigname) {
|
|
if (de->name_len < 16)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ret = memcmp(de->name + de->name_len - 16,
|
|
cstr->name + 8, 16);
|
|
return (ret == 0) ? 1 : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (de->name_len != cstr->len)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ret = memcmp(de->name, cstr->name, cstr->len);
|
|
return (ret == 0) ? 1 : 0;
|
|
errout:
|
|
kfree(cstr->name);
|
|
cstr->name = NULL;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|