mirror of
https://github.com/AuxXxilium/linux_dsm_epyc7002.git
synced 2024-12-28 11:18:45 +07:00
c512c69187
In commit9f79b78ef7
("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()") I made filldir() use unsafe_put_user(), which improves code generation on x86 enormously. But because we didn't have a "unsafe_copy_to_user()", the dirent name copy was also done by hand with unsafe_put_user() in a loop, and it turns out that a lot of other architectures didn't like that, because unlike x86, they have various alignment issues. Most non-x86 architectures trap and fix it up, and some (like xtensa) will just fail unaligned put_user() accesses unconditionally. Which makes that "copy using put_user() in a loop" not work for them at all. I could make that code do explicit alignment etc, but the architectures that don't like unaligned accesses also don't really use the fancy "user_access_begin/end()" model, so they might just use the regular old __copy_to_user() interface. So this commit takes that looping implementation, turns it into the x86 version of "unsafe_copy_to_user()", and makes other architectures implement the unsafe copy version as __copy_to_user() (the same way they do for the other unsafe_xyz() accessor functions). Note that it only does this for the copying _to_ user space, and we still don't have a unsafe version of copy_from_user(). That's partly because we have no current users of it, but also partly because the copy_from_user() case is slightly different and cannot efficiently be implemented in terms of a unsafe_get_user() loop (because gcc can't do asm goto with outputs). It would be trivial to do this using "rep movsb", which would work really nicely on newer x86 cores, but really badly on some older ones. Al Viro is looking at cleaning up all our user copy routines to make this all a non-issue, but for now we have this simple-but-stupid version for x86 that works fine for the dirent name copy case because those names are short strings and we simply don't need anything fancier. Fixes:9f79b78ef7
("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
375 lines
12 KiB
C
375 lines
12 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
|
|
#ifndef __LINUX_UACCESS_H__
|
|
#define __LINUX_UACCESS_H__
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/sched.h>
|
|
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
|
|
#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
|
|
|
|
#define uaccess_kernel() segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)
|
|
|
|
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Architectures should provide two primitives (raw_copy_{to,from}_user())
|
|
* and get rid of their private instances of copy_{to,from}_user() and
|
|
* __copy_{to,from}_user{,_inatomic}().
|
|
*
|
|
* raw_copy_{to,from}_user(to, from, size) should copy up to size bytes and
|
|
* return the amount left to copy. They should assume that access_ok() has
|
|
* already been checked (and succeeded); they should *not* zero-pad anything.
|
|
* No KASAN or object size checks either - those belong here.
|
|
*
|
|
* Both of these functions should attempt to copy size bytes starting at from
|
|
* into the area starting at to. They must not fetch or store anything
|
|
* outside of those areas. Return value must be between 0 (everything
|
|
* copied successfully) and size (nothing copied).
|
|
*
|
|
* If raw_copy_{to,from}_user(to, from, size) returns N, size - N bytes starting
|
|
* at to must become equal to the bytes fetched from the corresponding area
|
|
* starting at from. All data past to + size - N must be left unmodified.
|
|
*
|
|
* If copying succeeds, the return value must be 0. If some data cannot be
|
|
* fetched, it is permitted to copy less than had been fetched; the only
|
|
* hard requirement is that not storing anything at all (i.e. returning size)
|
|
* should happen only when nothing could be copied. In other words, you don't
|
|
* have to squeeze as much as possible - it is allowed, but not necessary.
|
|
*
|
|
* For raw_copy_from_user() to always points to kernel memory and no faults
|
|
* on store should happen. Interpretation of from is affected by set_fs().
|
|
* For raw_copy_to_user() it's the other way round.
|
|
*
|
|
* Both can be inlined - it's up to architectures whether it wants to bother
|
|
* with that. They should not be used directly; they are used to implement
|
|
* the 6 functions (copy_{to,from}_user(), __copy_{to,from}_user_inatomic())
|
|
* that are used instead. Out of those, __... ones are inlined. Plain
|
|
* copy_{to,from}_user() might or might not be inlined. If you want them
|
|
* inlined, have asm/uaccess.h define INLINE_COPY_{TO,FROM}_USER.
|
|
*
|
|
* NOTE: only copy_from_user() zero-pads the destination in case of short copy.
|
|
* Neither __copy_from_user() nor __copy_from_user_inatomic() zero anything
|
|
* at all; their callers absolutely must check the return value.
|
|
*
|
|
* Biarch ones should also provide raw_copy_in_user() - similar to the above,
|
|
* but both source and destination are __user pointers (affected by set_fs()
|
|
* as usual) and both source and destination can trigger faults.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
|
|
__copy_from_user_inatomic(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
|
|
{
|
|
kasan_check_write(to, n);
|
|
check_object_size(to, n, false);
|
|
return raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
|
|
__copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
|
|
{
|
|
might_fault();
|
|
kasan_check_write(to, n);
|
|
check_object_size(to, n, false);
|
|
return raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* __copy_to_user_inatomic: - Copy a block of data into user space, with less checking.
|
|
* @to: Destination address, in user space.
|
|
* @from: Source address, in kernel space.
|
|
* @n: Number of bytes to copy.
|
|
*
|
|
* Context: User context only.
|
|
*
|
|
* Copy data from kernel space to user space. Caller must check
|
|
* the specified block with access_ok() before calling this function.
|
|
* The caller should also make sure he pins the user space address
|
|
* so that we don't result in page fault and sleep.
|
|
*/
|
|
static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
|
|
__copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
|
|
{
|
|
kasan_check_read(from, n);
|
|
check_object_size(from, n, true);
|
|
return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
|
|
__copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
|
|
{
|
|
might_fault();
|
|
kasan_check_read(from, n);
|
|
check_object_size(from, n, true);
|
|
return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER
|
|
static inline __must_check unsigned long
|
|
_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long res = n;
|
|
might_fault();
|
|
if (likely(access_ok(from, n))) {
|
|
kasan_check_write(to, n);
|
|
res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
|
|
}
|
|
if (unlikely(res))
|
|
memset(to + (n - res), 0, res);
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
extern __must_check unsigned long
|
|
_copy_from_user(void *, const void __user *, unsigned long);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INLINE_COPY_TO_USER
|
|
static inline __must_check unsigned long
|
|
_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
|
|
{
|
|
might_fault();
|
|
if (access_ok(to, n)) {
|
|
kasan_check_read(from, n);
|
|
n = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
|
|
}
|
|
return n;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
extern __must_check unsigned long
|
|
_copy_to_user(void __user *, const void *, unsigned long);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
|
|
copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
|
|
{
|
|
if (likely(check_copy_size(to, n, false)))
|
|
n = _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
|
|
return n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
|
|
copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
|
|
{
|
|
if (likely(check_copy_size(from, n, true)))
|
|
n = _copy_to_user(to, from, n);
|
|
return n;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
|
|
copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
|
|
{
|
|
might_fault();
|
|
if (access_ok(to, n) && access_ok(from, n))
|
|
n = raw_copy_in_user(to, from, n);
|
|
return n;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static __always_inline void pagefault_disabled_inc(void)
|
|
{
|
|
current->pagefault_disabled++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static __always_inline void pagefault_disabled_dec(void)
|
|
{
|
|
current->pagefault_disabled--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* These routines enable/disable the pagefault handler. If disabled, it will
|
|
* not take any locks and go straight to the fixup table.
|
|
*
|
|
* User access methods will not sleep when called from a pagefault_disabled()
|
|
* environment.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline void pagefault_disable(void)
|
|
{
|
|
pagefault_disabled_inc();
|
|
/*
|
|
* make sure to have issued the store before a pagefault
|
|
* can hit.
|
|
*/
|
|
barrier();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void pagefault_enable(void)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* make sure to issue those last loads/stores before enabling
|
|
* the pagefault handler again.
|
|
*/
|
|
barrier();
|
|
pagefault_disabled_dec();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Is the pagefault handler disabled? If so, user access methods will not sleep.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return current->pagefault_disabled != 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The pagefault handler is in general disabled by pagefault_disable() or
|
|
* when in irq context (via in_atomic()).
|
|
*
|
|
* This function should only be used by the fault handlers. Other users should
|
|
* stick to pagefault_disabled().
|
|
* Please NEVER use preempt_disable() to disable the fault handler. With
|
|
* !CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT, this is like a NOP. So the handler won't be disabled.
|
|
* in_atomic() will report different values based on !CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define faulthandler_disabled() (pagefault_disabled() || in_atomic())
|
|
|
|
#ifndef ARCH_HAS_NOCACHE_UACCESS
|
|
|
|
static inline __must_check unsigned long
|
|
__copy_from_user_inatomic_nocache(void *to, const void __user *from,
|
|
unsigned long n)
|
|
{
|
|
return __copy_from_user_inatomic(to, from, n);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* ARCH_HAS_NOCACHE_UACCESS */
|
|
|
|
extern __must_check int check_zeroed_user(const void __user *from, size_t size);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* copy_struct_from_user: copy a struct from userspace
|
|
* @dst: Destination address, in kernel space. This buffer must be @ksize
|
|
* bytes long.
|
|
* @ksize: Size of @dst struct.
|
|
* @src: Source address, in userspace.
|
|
* @usize: (Alleged) size of @src struct.
|
|
*
|
|
* Copies a struct from userspace to kernel space, in a way that guarantees
|
|
* backwards-compatibility for struct syscall arguments (as long as future
|
|
* struct extensions are made such that all new fields are *appended* to the
|
|
* old struct, and zeroed-out new fields have the same meaning as the old
|
|
* struct).
|
|
*
|
|
* @ksize is just sizeof(*dst), and @usize should've been passed by userspace.
|
|
* The recommended usage is something like the following:
|
|
*
|
|
* SYSCALL_DEFINE2(foobar, const struct foo __user *, uarg, size_t, usize)
|
|
* {
|
|
* int err;
|
|
* struct foo karg = {};
|
|
*
|
|
* if (usize > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
* return -E2BIG;
|
|
* if (usize < FOO_SIZE_VER0)
|
|
* return -EINVAL;
|
|
*
|
|
* err = copy_struct_from_user(&karg, sizeof(karg), uarg, usize);
|
|
* if (err)
|
|
* return err;
|
|
*
|
|
* // ...
|
|
* }
|
|
*
|
|
* There are three cases to consider:
|
|
* * If @usize == @ksize, then it's copied verbatim.
|
|
* * If @usize < @ksize, then the userspace has passed an old struct to a
|
|
* newer kernel. The rest of the trailing bytes in @dst (@ksize - @usize)
|
|
* are to be zero-filled.
|
|
* * If @usize > @ksize, then the userspace has passed a new struct to an
|
|
* older kernel. The trailing bytes unknown to the kernel (@usize - @ksize)
|
|
* are checked to ensure they are zeroed, otherwise -E2BIG is returned.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns (in all cases, some data may have been copied):
|
|
* * -E2BIG: (@usize > @ksize) and there are non-zero trailing bytes in @src.
|
|
* * -EFAULT: access to userspace failed.
|
|
*/
|
|
static __always_inline __must_check int
|
|
copy_struct_from_user(void *dst, size_t ksize, const void __user *src,
|
|
size_t usize)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t size = min(ksize, usize);
|
|
size_t rest = max(ksize, usize) - size;
|
|
|
|
/* Deal with trailing bytes. */
|
|
if (usize < ksize) {
|
|
memset(dst + size, 0, rest);
|
|
} else if (usize > ksize) {
|
|
int ret = check_zeroed_user(src + size, rest);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
return ret ?: -E2BIG;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Copy the interoperable parts of the struct. */
|
|
if (copy_from_user(dst, src, size))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* probe_kernel_read(): safely attempt to read from a location
|
|
* @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data
|
|
* @src: address to read from
|
|
* @size: size of the data chunk
|
|
*
|
|
* Safely read from address @src to the buffer at @dst. If a kernel fault
|
|
* happens, handle that and return -EFAULT.
|
|
*/
|
|
extern long probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
|
|
extern long __probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* probe_user_read(): safely attempt to read from a location in user space
|
|
* @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data
|
|
* @src: address to read from
|
|
* @size: size of the data chunk
|
|
*
|
|
* Safely read from address @src to the buffer at @dst. If a kernel fault
|
|
* happens, handle that and return -EFAULT.
|
|
*/
|
|
extern long probe_user_read(void *dst, const void __user *src, size_t size);
|
|
extern long __probe_user_read(void *dst, const void __user *src, size_t size);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* probe_kernel_write(): safely attempt to write to a location
|
|
* @dst: address to write to
|
|
* @src: pointer to the data that shall be written
|
|
* @size: size of the data chunk
|
|
*
|
|
* Safely write to address @dst from the buffer at @src. If a kernel fault
|
|
* happens, handle that and return -EFAULT.
|
|
*/
|
|
extern long notrace probe_kernel_write(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
|
|
extern long notrace __probe_kernel_write(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
|
|
|
|
extern long strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count);
|
|
extern long strncpy_from_unsafe_user(char *dst, const void __user *unsafe_addr,
|
|
long count);
|
|
extern long strnlen_unsafe_user(const void __user *unsafe_addr, long count);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* probe_kernel_address(): safely attempt to read from a location
|
|
* @addr: address to read from
|
|
* @retval: read into this variable
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 on success, or -EFAULT.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define probe_kernel_address(addr, retval) \
|
|
probe_kernel_read(&retval, addr, sizeof(retval))
|
|
|
|
#ifndef user_access_begin
|
|
#define user_access_begin(ptr,len) access_ok(ptr, len)
|
|
#define user_access_end() do { } while (0)
|
|
#define unsafe_op_wrap(op, err) do { if (unlikely(op)) goto err; } while (0)
|
|
#define unsafe_get_user(x,p,e) unsafe_op_wrap(__get_user(x,p),e)
|
|
#define unsafe_put_user(x,p,e) unsafe_op_wrap(__put_user(x,p),e)
|
|
#define unsafe_copy_to_user(d,s,l,e) unsafe_op_wrap(__copy_to_user(d,s,l),e)
|
|
static inline unsigned long user_access_save(void) { return 0UL; }
|
|
static inline void user_access_restore(unsigned long flags) { }
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
|
|
void usercopy_warn(const char *name, const char *detail, bool to_user,
|
|
unsigned long offset, unsigned long len);
|
|
void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
|
|
bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
|
|
unsigned long len);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#endif /* __LINUX_UACCESS_H__ */
|