linux_dsm_epyc7002/Documentation/intel_txt.txt

Intel(R) TXT Overview:
=====================

Intel's technology for safer computing, Intel(R) Trusted Execution
Technology (Intel(R) TXT), defines platform-level enhancements that
provide the building blocks for creating trusted platforms.

Intel TXT was formerly known by the code name LaGrande Technology (LT).

Intel TXT in Brief:
o  Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM)
o  Data protection in case of improper shutdown
o  Measurement and verification of launched environment

Intel TXT is part of the vPro(TM) brand and is also available some
non-vPro systems.  It is currently available on desktop systems
based on the Q35, X38, Q45, and Q43 Express chipsets (e.g. Dell
Optiplex 755, HP dc7800, etc.) and mobile systems based on the GM45,
PM45, and GS45 Express chipsets.

For more information, see http://www.intel.com/technology/security/.
This site also has a link to the Intel TXT MLE Developers Manual,
which has been updated for the new released platforms.

Intel TXT has been presented at various events over the past few
years, some of which are:
      LinuxTAG 2008:
          http://www.linuxtag.org/2008/en/conf/events/vp-donnerstag.html
      TRUST2008:
          http://www.trust-conference.eu/downloads/Keynote-Speakers/
          3_David-Grawrock_The-Front-Door-of-Trusted-Computing.pdf
      IDF, Shanghai:
          http://www.prcidf.com.cn/index_en.html
      IDFs 2006, 2007 (I'm not sure if/where they are online)

Trusted Boot Project Overview:
=============================

Trusted Boot (tboot) is an open source, pre-kernel/VMM module that
uses Intel TXT to perform a measured and verified launch of an OS
kernel/VMM.

It is hosted on SourceForge at http://sourceforge.net/projects/tboot.
The mercurial source repo is available at http://www.bughost.org/
repos.hg/tboot.hg.

Tboot currently supports launching Xen (open source VMM/hypervisor
w/ TXT support since v3.2), and now Linux kernels.


Value Proposition for Linux or "Why should you care?"
=====================================================

While there are many products and technologies that attempt to
measure or protect the integrity of a running kernel, they all
assume the kernel is "good" to begin with.  The Integrity
Measurement Architecture (IMA) and Linux Integrity Module interface
are examples of such solutions.

To get trust in the initial kernel without using Intel TXT, a
static root of trust must be used.  This bases trust in BIOS
starting at system reset and requires measurement of all code
executed between system reset through the completion of the kernel
boot as well as data objects used by that code.  In the case of a
Linux kernel, this means all of BIOS, any option ROMs, the
bootloader and the boot config.  In practice, this is a lot of
code/data, much of which is subject to change from boot to boot
(e.g. changing NICs may change option ROMs).  Without reference
hashes, these measurement changes are difficult to assess or
confirm as benign.  This process also does not provide DMA
protection, memory configuration/alias checks and locks, crash
protection, or policy support.

By using the hardware-based root of trust that Intel TXT provides,
many of these issues can be mitigated.  Specifically: many
pre-launch components can be removed from the trust chain, DMA
protection is provided to all launched components, a large number
of platform configuration checks are performed and values locked,
protection is provided for any data in the event of an improper
shutdown, and there is support for policy-based execution/verification.
This provides a more stable measurement and a higher assurance of
system configuration and initial state than would be otherwise
possible.  Since the tboot project is open source, source code for
almost all parts of the trust chain is available (excepting SMM and
Intel-provided firmware).

How Does it Work?
=================

o  Tboot is an executable that is launched by the bootloader as
   the "kernel" (the binary the bootloader executes).
o  It performs all of the work necessary to determine if the
   platform supports Intel TXT and, if so, executes the GETSEC[SENTER]
   processor instruction that initiates the dynamic root of trust.
   -  If tboot determines that the system does not support Intel TXT
      or is not configured correctly (e.g. the SINIT AC Module was
      incorrect), it will directly launch the kernel with no changes
      to any state.
   -  Tboot will output various information about its progress to the
      terminal, serial port, and/or an in-memory log; the output
      locations can be configured with a command line switch.
o  The GETSEC[SENTER] instruction will return control to tboot and
   tboot then verifies certain aspects of the environment (e.g. TPM NV
   lock, e820 table does not have invalid entries, etc.).
o  It will wake the APs from the special sleep state the GETSEC[SENTER]
   instruction had put them in and place them into a wait-for-SIPI
   state.
   -  Because the processors will not respond to an INIT or SIPI when
      in the TXT environment, it is necessary to create a small VT-x
      guest for the APs.  When they run in this guest, they will
      simply wait for the INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence, which will cause
      VMEXITs, and then disable VT and jump to the SIPI vector.  This
      approach seemed like a better choice than having to insert
      special code into the kernel's MP wakeup sequence.
o  Tboot then applies an (optional) user-defined launch policy to
   verify the kernel and initrd.
   -  This policy is rooted in TPM NV and is described in the tboot
      project.  The tboot project also contains code for tools to
      create and provision the policy.
   -  Policies are completely under user control and if not present
      then any kernel will be launched.
   -  Policy action is flexible and can include halting on failures
      or simply logging them and continuing.
o  Tboot adjusts the e820 table provided by the bootloader to reserve
   its own location in memory as well as to reserve certain other
   TXT-related regions.
o  As part of its launch, tboot DMA protects all of RAM (using the
   VT-d PMRs).  Thus, the kernel must be booted with 'intel_iommu=on'
   in order to remove this blanket protection and use VT-d's
   page-level protection.
o  Tboot will populate a shared page with some data about itself and
   pass this to the Linux kernel as it transfers control.
   -  The location of the shared page is passed via the boot_params
      struct as a physical address.
o  The kernel will look for the tboot shared page address and, if it
   exists, map it.
o  As one of the checks/protections provided by TXT, it makes a copy
   of the VT-d DMARs in a DMA-protected region of memory and verifies
   them for correctness.  The VT-d code will detect if the kernel was
   launched with tboot and use this copy instead of the one in the
   ACPI table.
o  At this point, tboot and TXT are out of the picture until a
   shutdown (S<n>)
o  In order to put a system into any of the sleep states after a TXT
   launch, TXT must first be exited.  This is to prevent attacks that
   attempt to crash the system to gain control on reboot and steal
   data left in memory.
   -  The kernel will perform all of its sleep preparation and
      populate the shared page with the ACPI data needed to put the
      platform in the desired sleep state.
   -  Then the kernel jumps into tboot via the vector specified in the
      shared page.
   -  Tboot will clean up the environment and disable TXT, then use the
      kernel-provided ACPI information to actually place the platform
      into the desired sleep state.
   -  In the case of S3, tboot will also register itself as the resume
      vector.  This is necessary because it must re-establish the
      measured environment upon resume.  Once the TXT environment
      has been restored, it will restore the TPM PCRs and then
      transfer control back to the kernel's S3 resume vector.
      In order to preserve system integrity across S3, the kernel
      provides tboot with a set of memory ranges (RAM and RESERVED_KERN
      in the e820 table, but not any memory that BIOS might alter over
      the S3 transition) that tboot will calculate a MAC (message
      authentication code) over and then seal with the TPM. On resume
      and once the measured environment has been re-established, tboot
      will re-calculate the MAC and verify it against the sealed value.
      Tboot's policy determines what happens if the verification fails.
      Note that the c/s 194 of tboot which has the new MAC code supports
      this.

That's pretty much it for TXT support.


Configuring the System:
======================

This code works with 32bit, 32bit PAE, and 64bit (x86_64) kernels.

In BIOS, the user must enable:  TPM, TXT, VT-x, VT-d.  Not all BIOSes
allow these to be individually enabled/disabled and the screens in
which to find them are BIOS-specific.

grub.conf needs to be modified as follows:
        title Linux 2.6.29-tip w/ tboot
          root (hd0,0)
                kernel /tboot.gz logging=serial,vga,memory
                module /vmlinuz-2.6.29-tip intel_iommu=on ro
                       root=LABEL=/ rhgb console=ttyS0,115200 3
                module /initrd-2.6.29-tip.img
                module /Q35_SINIT_17.BIN

The kernel option for enabling Intel TXT support is found under the
Security top-level menu and is called "Enable Intel(R) Trusted
Execution Technology (TXT)".  It is marked as EXPERIMENTAL and
depends on the generic x86 support (to allow maximum flexibility in
kernel build options), since the tboot code will detect whether the
platform actually supports Intel TXT and thus whether any of the
kernel code is executed.

The Q35_SINIT_17.BIN file is what Intel TXT refers to as an
Authenticated Code Module.  It is specific to the chipset in the
system and can also be found on the Trusted Boot site.  It is an
(unencrypted) module signed by Intel that is used as part of the
DRTM process to verify and configure the system.  It is signed
because it operates at a higher privilege level in the system than
any other macrocode and its correct operation is critical to the
establishment of the DRTM.  The process for determining the correct
SINIT ACM for a system is documented in the SINIT-guide.txt file
that is on the tboot SourceForge site under the SINIT ACM downloads.